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Evaluation of the Kenya Hunger Safety Net Programme Phase 2

Special Study on the Arid Lands Support Programme

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Executive summary

Oxford Policy Management (OPM) conducted this special study of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) funded Arid Lands Support Programme (ASP) in February and March 2016. The study focuses on two of the four outputs of the ASP: the support to government coordination and planning in the counties; and the support to community-level adaptive initiatives. The study reviewed documents, and carried out focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs).

Findings from the study established that there was an appreciation of ASP's actions at the technical level in county governments . However, the lack of a consensus that ASP-like actions were a priority for county government is expressed by a lack of investment using County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) funds on similar actions.

The European Commission, United Nations and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded governance support for CIDP management has helped county governments involve citizens in some decision-making via participatory meetings at sub-county levels, to agree on priority actions. A key observation coming out of the interviews with government officials at county level is that there is a lack of a forum for, or a focus on, discussing poverty alleviation or resilience building in a comprehensive way for the poorest citizens. Furthermore, few county-level policy-makers that might have a role in regard to guiding actions leading to resilience building amongst the poorest have a view on what non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are doing. Dialogue on the extent to which the CIDPs are focusing on helping to build the resilience of the poorest is not being pursued in a way that might lead to a concerted coordinated strategy. Even in the absence of such coordination, with the increasingly participatory nature of CIDP planning there is a role for NGOs to play here to help facilitate good choices at this level.

New infrastructure, such as better roads, livestock market venues and extensions to the electricity grid, are having an impact on community livelihoods. Food prices are coming down and entrepreneur numbers are going up, including people from outside the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP)/ ASP counties. The fruits of the peace agreements between clans are also resulting in improved trade and reduced prices.

There was a consensus across the counties that combining cash transfers with other livelihood programmes was a useful combination to help build resilience. From previous OPM operational monitoring studies it has been established that most of the HSNP income is used to buy food, repay debts and pay school fees. The discussants in this study's FGDs noted that the combination of cash transfers and livelihood support, such as access to irrigation, Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs) and Pastoralist Field Schools (PFSs) gave them the room needed to engage in activities to earn a livelihood, and not just to meet their basic needs. What ASP and other similar programmes, notably Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands – Improving Resilience (REGAL-IR), has afforded them is the opportunity to think about long-term resilience.

On the role NGOs have played in building resilience, we found that the ASP NGOs are heavily dependent on DFID in their work on resilience building, with several lacking sufficient funding to continue this work in the absence of ASP. Although these NGOs have been working hand in hand with relevant government departments in their resilience building activities, it is clear that further support to the ministries is required, especially in regard to capacity building and policy development.

OPM offers eight suggestions for how DFID could take its concerns for combining its support for cash transfers in the northern counties with actions that support poor families to grow out of poverty.

Suggestion 1: County poverty reduction/resilience building strategy. Help county governments put in place a process focused on developing and managing a county poverty reduction strategy. Chaired by the governor, key government departments could meet with international partners and their agents (NGOs) investing in this area (notably DFID and USAID, and also EC, the UN, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and others). A key early task would be to take stock of existing actions and to put in place a budgeted strategy that would include allocations from the county budget. One way to do this would be to work towards proposing an update of the terms of reference for the County Steering Group (CSG) to explicitly include formal attention to poverty reduction aimed at the poorest, as well as ensuring the relevant county departments are fully involved.

Suggestion 2: Evidence-based advocacy for county resilience building strategies. Through a combination of the research and evaluation material produced by development partners working in this area a powerful advocacy case could be brought together aimed at convincing national and county governments to invest more of their resources in resilience building for the poorest households in the arid counties. Once the material is compiled, a communication strategy aimed at fostering dialogue could help to tip county leadership into supporting the development of an explicit strategy. Such a strategy should involve members of the county assemblies as key customers.

Suggestion 3: Lay the ground for evolving the relations between NGOs and county governments. Help county governments to systematically orient county staff and members of the county assembly who have a role in budget decision-making on resilience building for poor people, through a combination of organised field trips, workshops, radio programmes focused on the achievements of the ASP, and other similar programmes, such as REGAL-IR. Negotiate with county governments for NGO staff to engage in the more regular developmental sector committee meetings, rather than formally engaging with them only via the CSG. Where these committees are not functional, invest resources to help make them more functional. This could include setting up a bespoke county committee (see Suggestion 1).

Suggestion 4: Secure DFID resilience building budget allocations in the county budget and leverage allocations in the county budget. Negotiate incentives for county governments to make allocations, such as a 50:50 funding partnership at the activity level (assuming DFID would continue to channel their resources via the NGOs). Agree with county governments that DFID allocations via the NGOs appear in the sector budgeted workplans, as happens with UN agency investments.

Suggestion 5: Increase targeting efficiency for ASP investments at household level by using the Single registry database compiled for targeting cash transfers.

Suggestion 6: As part of the next phase negotiations on a closer engagement between NGOs and government, look into extending a tripartite agreement to include a role for NGOs to provide third-party feedback to county departments regarding the quality of constructions completed under county government tenders.

Suggestion 7: With the operational lessons learned by the ASP contractors on their unit costs and how these vary, and the information feeding into the dialogue from the Landell Mills cost–benefit analysis, the partners could be brought together to develop some tighter parameters to guide expected operational cost overheads in a new phase. Conditions are ripening for a demographic transition: could more be done to encourage this as part of a poverty reduction strategy?

Suggestion 8: Taking this all together it seems clear that a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy should include a government-led acceleration of efforts to encourage a demographic transition. Such strategies would, of course, need in-depth analysis, consensus building and careful planning with county governments.

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List of abbreviations

ASP	Arid Lands Support Programme
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
CEC	County Executive Committee
CMDRR	Community-managed disaster risk reduction
CSG	County Steering Group
DFID	UK Department for International Development (UK AID)
EBTVET	Enterprise-based TVET
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
EDE	Ending Drought Emergencies
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus group discussion
HSNP	Hunger Safety Net Programme
IBTVET	Institutional-based TVET
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KES	Kenyan shilling
KII	Key informant interview
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
MCA	Members of the County Assembly
MUBs	Micronutrient urea blocks
MIS	Management information system
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NSNP	National Safety Net Programme
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PFS	Pastoralist Field School
PISP	Pastoralist Integrated Support Programme
REGAL-AR	Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands – Accelerating Growth

REGAL-IR	Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands – Improving Resilience
TVET	Technical vocational and educational training
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VSLA	Village Savings and Loan Association
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

1 Introduction

DFID has invested £14.3 million over three years from 2013 to 2016 to build more resilient livelihoods for some of the poorest people in northern Kenya via the ASP. The ASP aims to complement the HSNP in regard to building longer-term resilience to drought and other shocks in the four counties of Turkana, Marsabit, Mandera and Wajir. The programme's objectives are to improve government coordination and planning in the region (£1.87 million), support existing community-level adaptive initiatives (£8.04 million), scale-up a livestock insurance scheme (£1.37 million) and create a fund to improve rapid disaster response and reduce risks associated with shocks such as droughts (£3.02 million).

The expected impact of the ASP is as follows:

- 64,000 beneficiaries become less poor relative to non-beneficiaries in the four counties; and
- there is an increase in the value of assets owned by households in the four counties, from 2,400 Kenyan shillings (KES) to KES 2,900, accounting for inflation, relative to non-beneficiaries.

The expected outcomes of the programme include:

- integrated government policies, institutions and practices specific to the needs of poor people in the arid lands;
- enhanced household resilience in the face of drought; and
- enhanced community resilience in the face of, and ability to adapt to, drought.

The output indicators include:

- 475,000 people benefitting from emergency cash transfers in times of drought;
- 126,000 people benefitting from livestock insurance; and
- 64 community-led programmes reaching 64,000 people.

OPM is conducting the independent evaluation of the HSNP Phase 2, for which activities started in 2015. This special study of ASP was commissioned as an activity within the overall HSNP evaluation. Its aim is to inform the further evolution of DFID's support to resilience building in the arid counties under the umbrella of the Vision 2030 Development Strategy for the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands, the Second Medium-Term Sector Plan for Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) (2013), and the National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands (the ASAP Policy). A common feature of these umbrella policy documents is their lack of explicit guidance and encouragement regarding targeting livelihood-building capital and technical support to help the very poorest citizens start small businesses to help themselves grow out of poverty, which is the key strategy of the ASP.

This special study will be complemented by findings from the qualitative impact evaluation workstream of the HSNP evaluation, which looks broadly at the interaction between HSNP and other livelihood support programmes (including the ASP).

The rest of this report is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the methodology of the study. Section 3 presents the findings by county for Turkana, Marsabit, and Wajir and Mandera, respectively. Section 4 offers concluding remarks. Annexes provide a list of persons interviewed, the interview guides used, and a list of livelihood support activities undertaken by NGOs in receipt of ASP funding.

2 Methods

2.1 Research questions

This study focuses on two of the four ASP outputs: the support to government coordination and planning in the counties; and the support to community-level adaptive initiatives. It looks for evidence of synergy between cash transfers (disbursed via HSNP) and the activities supported by ASP as a means of helping to build the resilience of poor households in the four counties. It elicited the views of NGO and county government officials on the future trajectory of these investments.

A combination of ASP-like resilience building, coupled with cash transfers targeted towards vulnerable households, combined with improved human and animal health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and education services, banking service deepening and livestock market improvements should constitute a foundation from which poor households in the four counties can build their assets and climb out of poverty. Elements of this strategy are noted in the 'policy measures' chapter of the National Social Protection Strategy.

With this in mind the following research questions were agreed as the focus of the study:

- To what extent is there a consensus on the path toward resilience and the place of livelihood-enhancing actions in the county development plans?
- What are the merits of combining the cash transfer and other livelihood support programmes?
- What is the role of NGOs in building community resilience?
- Is this combined approach to livelihood support appropriate in the four counties?
- What are the views of county development plan managers, fund allocators and NGO officials on the value for money of ASP activities?

On the basis of the information gathered under these research questions, the study aims to provide an assessment of the extent to which the ASP-funded NGOs were able to influence county government planning and resource allocation.

The study complements other elements of the research agenda of the ASP programme, the cost–benefit analysis contracted to Landell Mills, and the International Livestock Research Institute's (ILRI's) research on the index-linked insurance.

2.2 Research methods

With the terms of reference agreed in December 2015, the evaluation team started work on the study in January 2016, with visits to the counties taking place in February 2016. The team relied on three sources of information:

Document reviews: CIDPs, budgets and expenditures were reviewed, including drafts of second-round CIDPs, where available. Relevant documents offered by the seven NGOs working on ASP were also reviewed, as well as key ASP documentation, including the business case, the logframe and the 2015 annual review. Relevant national policy documents were also consulted.

FGDs and KIIs: County officials, ASP-contracted NGO staff and recipient households were interviewed in all four countries in the course of February 2016. Some development partners were also interviewed in Nairobi. The question guides and interviewee list are presented in the annexes of this report. A bibliography is also presented, at the end of the report.

Figure 1: FGD, Sololo, Marsabit County

In order to obtain an insight into the degree to which ASP beneficiaries are also benefitting from the HSNP we attempted to link databases of beneficiaries provided by the ASP NGOs to the HSNP management information system (MIS), using the reclink command in Stata. Reclink builds on a probabilistic technique that exploits similarities in household characteristics and household members' names across the two datasets. The idea is that since the MIS is a census, it should contain all the households benefitting from the NGO activities, insofar as the households have not dissolved or changed composition beyond recognition in the intervening time period between the construction of the various datasets.

Of the four datasets we obtained from the NGOs, only that received from Save the Children contained sufficient information to enable the matching exercise to be conducted using reclink. Through this method we were able to link 539 out of 658 records to the HSNP MIS. Of these 539, 206 (38%) were HSNP (Group 1) beneficiaries.

2.3 Limitations of the study

The unique research carried out as part of this study includes interviews with county officials, NGO staff and USAID staff who manage programmes similar to DFID's investments in resilience building in northern Kenya, and interviews with citizens who have benefited from investments channelled to them from the ASP. There is no pretence that any quantification of value for money, or quantified evidence of impact, can be generated from these sources. At the planning stages for the study it was thought that an analysis of county government expenditure might be possible, by retrieving this information from county government. It transpired that while county governments are working towards being able to share expenditures, none of them were doing so at the time of the research for this study. Only the first annual county budgets are available for public review. Discussions with county officials on the usefulness of analysing county budgets revealed that expenditures have not tracked plans closely, particularly for the first budgets that were compiled early on in the lifetime of devolved governance. The second official budgets were not yet ready for county governments to make them public, so they were not available to the study team for review.

The terms of reference also suggested that OPM would investigate the extent to which the EDE framework had influenced, or would soon influence, county development actions. It transpired that while EDE had been launched at the national level, this was not the case at the county level and thus very few of the people interviewed had much to say about EDE. Therefore it was premature to ask in-depth questions about how EDE might be influencing county development. However, the terms and concepts relating to building resilience and actions to reduce poverty for the poorest groups were understood. This report therefore does provide information about what interviewees said about these issues.

3 Findings from the county- and local-level interviews and document reviews

3.1 Introduction

This section gives a detailed summary of the findings from KIIs and FGDs undertaken in the four counties. We report separately on Turkana and Marsabit, but group together Wajir and Mandera. The latter are grouped together because: a) only one NGO is contracted by ASP in each of the latter two counties (Turkana has two NGOs and Marsabit three); and b) from the point of view of resilience building strategies aimed at poor people there are many similarities between Wajir and Mandera.

3.2 Analysis of CIDPs and fiscal strategies

While planning this study we intended to look at CIDPs and expenditures in order to examine the extent to which counties are also focusing on the kind of actions typically being implemented by ASP NGOs.

Figure 2: Planned share of development budget, Turkana County 2015/16 fiscal year



Source: Turkana County fiscal strategy paper, February 2015.

As it turned out, it was too ambitious to assume that planned and actual expenditures would be made available to us in sufficient detail to explore this question. Figure 2 gives an example of the level of detail of available planned expenditures data for the case of Turkana. Finer detail than this is not yet publically available. Similar information is available for Wajir (which shows that the latter is spending much more on water (22%, versus 10% for Turkana) and roads (25%, versus 11%). As at April 2016 similar information was not available on the websites for Marsabit and Mandera.

We did not manage to obtain actual expenditure data in any of the counties, although enquiries revealed that approximately 20% of the budgets was not spent in the last complete fiscal year in both Marsabit and Turkana.

Interviews and observation made it clear that little expenditure from the CIDPs is focused directly on the poorest households, or on the kind of micro-enterprise investments that are at the core of the ASP strategy and the strategy for the USAID designed and funded REGAL-IR programme[1].

In sum, it is too early in the life of county-led development planning for these kinds of investments, with county governments focused on getting their systems in place and commissioning big-ticket items. It will probably soon be within county governments' capacity to publically post planned and actual expenditures in more detail than is currently available.

The kind of granular, local-level investments ASP delivers are admired at county level (to the extent that they are known) and are possibly something county governments could scale-up with their own budgets as the expenditures on the initial flurry of big-ticket items start to tail off. Some combination of working with county governments to develop a county poverty alleviation, resilience building, or 'ending drought emergencies' strategy is likely to be a real possibility in the next year or two.

3.3 Turkana

3.3.1 To what extent is there a consensus regarding the path toward resilience and the place of livelihood-enhancing actions in the CIDPs?

In Turkana we found a broad county-level political consensus regarding the pathway to resilience, but with some provisos and divergence of opinion. Notably, some Members of the County Assembly (MCAs) and civil servants said they would prefer the next phase of the CIDP to see more investment in the livestock sector, at the expense of health and education sectors, while some suggested more should be invested in organising and scaling up irrigation. The planned share of the development budget presented in Figure 2 represents the current compromise between different groups.

We found a most positive view expressed by citizens on the performance of government compared to pre-devolution. Taken together, the resilience building[2] outputs delivered so far by the county government in its short period of existence surpass those delivered when budget control was mainly in the hands of central government.

The EC, UN and USAID-funded governance support for CIDP management is clearly a crucial investment in these early days of devolution. It has helped county government involve citizens in some decision-making, via participatory meetings at sub-county levels to discuss budget allocations. In this participatory budgeting process, there are two meetings: one to propose and one to review the draft integrated development plan for the sub-county or ward. Most of the budget made available to the ward level goes to school classroom extensions, water for consumption developments, irrigation, health centre extensions, road repair, electricity extension and Prosopis

[1] REGAL-IR is a programme that is similar in design to the ASP. It is funded by USAID, through Feed the Future funding, and is contracted to Adeso. Information on the programme can be found at www.adesoafrica.org/regal-ir.

[2] In the course of the interviews for this study, some interviewees referred to resilience building and others to poverty reduction. Perhaps as a result of several orientations/workshops over the last few years, and the absence of an official drought response programme since 2011, the use of the phrase 'disaster risk reduction' did not feature in the interviews, except to refer in some cases to community disaster risk reduction plans prepared in a few places with the support of the EC's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO) funding. Even these types of community plans (often funded by ASP or REGAL-IR) are now being called community-based development plans.

control[3]. Importantly, for those interested in seeing more focused resilience building for the poorest, there are no county allocations to small-scale micro finance activities of the kind made by ASP and USAID's REGAL-IR contractors.

Potential economic game changers: Before moving on to describing the main actions focused on poorer households funded via ASP, there are three potential game changers for future resilience that are commonly discussed in relation to poverty alleviation in Turkana, namely: crude oil, water aquifers and the shrinking of Lake Turkana.

- **Oil:** the downturn in global crude prices, now projected to last into the medium-term, means it will be several years before oil exports from Turkana will make a contribution to the county budget; negotiations between county and national government regarding the percentage of profits that will accrue to Turkana have been taking place.
- **Water aquifer:** a large aquifer has recently been discovered under much of Turkana. The water has some salinity, the degree of which varies from place to place. If the salinity is not too great, with new technologies it may become cost effective in some places to use it for irrigation. More research is needed before the potential impact of the aquifer on agriculture is understood.
- **Lake Turkana:** The reduction in fresh water flow into the lake from the Omo River, as a result of the irrigation schemes being built in Ethiopia, will result in increasing salinity in the lake. The consequences of this on the fishing industry are being investigated.

Livestock production: Livestock dominates the Turkana economy and thus involving the poorest families in this sector is a key feature of resilience building. The county strategy to improve the sector includes developing fattening grounds, which requires contracting fodder providers and ensuring animals at the grounds are vaccinated. The motivation is to 'Turkana-ise' what little export of livestock there is from the county, meaning to gain control of the export business by Turkana traders. To date, exports from the county have been sporadic at best (with little export outside of Islamic holidays), and have been in the hands of people from outside the county. Investments are being made using county development funds in abattoirs (as is the case in all four ASP counties), with a view also to adding industrial tanning facilities and putting in place programmes aimed at increasing the quality of skins. The plans for abattoirs are a key 'big project' in all of the four counties, often linked to plans to export meat via airfreight to the Middle East. All four counties are also budgeting for upgrades to their airport to allow for cargo planes for these exports.

There is a sense that much more is yet to be done, but that, finally, after many years, resources are now being made available thanks to the devolution of county financing. Interviewees from the county government made it clear that they feel they are now making-up for years of inadequate investment when resources were only in the hands of the national government.

Peace-building: One cannot review the prospects of increased income from livestock without noting peace-building. A stronger county government led to county officials being more effective in maintaining peace than was managed under the old system. USAID and the EC have made investments in support of the county government in this area. Peace with neighbours in Uganda and Sudan has been sustained for some time – and recently also with the Pokot. One cannot overestimate the success local government has had in the last few years compared to what came in the period after 1979, when the arms scale-up started in the region (after Idi Amin's' retreating

[3] Prosopis Juliflora, a native of bush of Central America, was introduced to much of east Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, with FAO support, as a way of combating soil erosion. In Kenya it is sometimes called Mathenge, reputedly after the surname of the FAO officer in charge of the introduction. Southern Turkana was a focus area for this programme. The bush has turned out to be overly invasive and it displacing native species. While its seeds are nutritious and its wood makes excellent charcoal, generally speaking the bush is considered a pest and NGOs and county governments have put in place programmes to control it. Promising experiments with biological control, involving introducing a borer beetle from central America, are taking place in South Africa.

army left the doors to the Moroto Barracks open in Uganda). Peace between the Turkana and the Pokot is reported by the interviewees to be most fragile in southern Turkana. In part, this is because the Pokot are an entirely separate group, unlike the various Karamojong sub-clans that regard the Turkana as the same ethnic group, and also because of the legacy of old scores between the clans that have not been settled.

There is a strong link between the peace-building efforts at the political level and efforts to help poor people build resilience. The FGD conducted in Lobei area included a story of how a middle-aged man had, with the help of improved livestock services, turned himself from a cattle rustler, praying on the Pokot and the Karamojong (and in turn being prayed on himself), into a cattle trader with his former enemies.

Irrigation potential: A focus on the development of irrigation potential along the Turkwell and Kerio rivers features in current county government expenditure and in future plans. Interviews confirmed that the county government is determined to try and get this sector organised. They are well aware of the many years of failed efforts in the past, which they blame on central planning and not enough consultation with communities. Investing in reviving old schemes and expanding into new territory is not seen as a route to Turkana becoming a crop production powerhouse, but rather as a way of helping poor families who have lost livestock to find an alternative livelihood, which combines agriculture with raring livestock. With planning more in the hands of community issues such as ensuring fodder during the dry season should be more easily agreed upon than in the past. Indeed, with respect to fodder, the county government argues that irrigation should ensure a larger amount of fodder is available than has been the case in the past.

There are four developments under way in regard to irrigation: three financed by county government and one by DFID, via the World Vision contribution to ASP. The World Food Programme (WFP) is also investing in irrigation along the Turkwell River, via their cash-for-assets programme. There is plenty of room for further expansion of irrigation. Estimates from county officials interviewed for this study suggest around another 50% of potential areas can be irrigated: for example, approximately half of a possible 8,000 acres are currently in service along the Kerio River. Lessons have been learned regarding the need to plan investments in irrigation much more closely with the communities than was the case in the past decades. Moreover, upgrading, expanding and maintaining irrigation schemes can potentially be done in a labour intensive way, as is the case with the World Vision and WFP funded actions. With the county government commissioning feasibility studies on further expansions, there is room for the county government to help more poor families earn their living from irrigated agriculture. If this happens, attention (currently absent) will be needed around governance of water use, as it seems that water availability is the limiting factor, rather than the land area that could potentially be irrigated. In addition, more people living along the rivers will need expansion of health, education and agricultural extension services, as well as investment in Prosopis control[4].

Finally, the areas along the rivers traditionally provide dry season grazing for the pastoralists. County and local planners say that local management will enable cohabitation between the livestock and the agricultural economies. Indeed, Trócaire noted that their support via ASP mainly revolved around expanding the fodder production potential of the rivers.

Education: While education is mainly a national government responsibility, the county planners have decided to make significant investments in constructing classrooms, and in education bursaries to supplement national bursaries For example, in the county budget for the current financial year, ‘big wards’ were reported to have been allocated KES 10 million and ‘small wards’

[4] The Kerio River area in Turkana was one of the sites where FAO first introduced Prosopis Juliflora in the early 1980s. Thus, in places, the species has grown to such a level that it provides shade when the underbrush is cleared away.

KES 8 million. There are issues in regard to the management of the education bursaries. These issues are of relevance in regard to the overall desire to coordinate social protection investments by the state in poor households – notably as regards getting a more complete picture of what subsidies any particular household is receiving. The social protection Single Registry is attempting to record which households are benefitting from cash transfers and enrolment in cash or food-for-assets. In the future it may also be able to include information on who is benefitting from the various education scholarships (national, county and civil society). However, it will likely be some time before social protection derived from the county budget is included.

Health: The county budget is also used to expand health centres. However, the limitations of county capacities are exposed when it comes to more complex tasks. According to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), maintaining drug supplies in health centres (a more complex task than contracting a builder) is proving to be a major capacity gap, with sufficient budgets not allocated, and reporting and stocking systems not working well – such that the quality of service delivery is sometimes very poor. FGDs with ASP recipients along the Kerio River, and with World Vision staff and UNICEF revealed that that malaria is an area on which a more concerted effort could be made. However, taking action requires complex coordination and a substantive allocation of capital, in order to gain traction.

Cash transfers: The HSNP and other cash transfer programmes are greatly appreciated by the Turkana county government, notwithstanding the operational challenges and issues around targeting and the harmonisation agenda within the National Safety Net Programme (NSNP). As is the case with Marsabit and Mandera, county resources were allocated in the plan for the 2015/16 financial year for cash transfers. However, in the case of Turkana (as in Mandera) the county assembly could not reach a consensus on how to spend this money and so the resources were reallocated to health facilities infrastructure. Generally, there is a sense amongst senior county civil servants and local politicians that they need more orientation on social protection issues (a five-day course going over the basics so that there is a basic understanding that is sufficient to allow realistic planning of the sector as part of the CIDP), which should lead to a greater county say in how cash transfers are managed.

Migration: Respondents noted that external migration of mainly young men from families with little livestock from Turkana is a key strategy for resilience building[5]. This does not feature as a strategy in the CIDP and no plans are in place to help county residents to find employment outside of the county. Important loci for finding work include Baragoi, Isiolo, Baringo (farm work) and Nakuru (working as a security guard). One could imagine, as part of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy aimed at poorer households, that investments could be made via the CIDP to help young people who want to migrate for work, including linking youth to available skills-building possibilities, and then, via a public–private partnership, to the job market outside of the county, to reduce the risks to youth of going on risky speculative adventures to find work that may not materialise.

[5] For those with livestock or those involved in livestock exports, temporary migration to Karamoja is a common strategy in order to take livestock to dry season grazing and increasingly as a trade route for exporting livestock.

3.3.2 What is the role of NGOs in building community resilience?

Table 1: Profile of ASP-funded activities in Turkana

NGO	Summary of ASP-funded activities	Geographic area
World Vision	Opening up 200 hectares of irrigated land for settlement by poor households. Supporting Government of Kenya provision of livestock extension services and improving community-based natural resources management. Improving farming techniques through farmer associations. Improving financial literacy of pastoralists. Improving access to markets for smallholders and livestock. Importing new breeds, notably Galla goats and camels from Wajir, to improve the local stock. Building capacity of community groups on agro-product commercialisation, notably honey and Aloe Vera production. Creating an enabling policy environment in regard to climate change at county and community levels.	East and south Turkana
Trócaire	Livestock production, breed improvement, fodder production and disease surveillance. Support to government mass vaccinations of livestock and establishment of agrovets. Crop production and post-harvest management. Livelihood and income diversification. Building capacity and mechanisms for production, management and storage of surpluses. Community-managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) and early warning systems. Conflict transformation and social auditing of public funds. Influencing the allocation of devolved public funds to support food security and resilience.	Central Turkana (Loima)

World Vision has had a full-time presence in southern Turkana since 1992. Trócaire has been active for the last 15 years. In 1995 World Vision started to help expand irrigated farming along the Kerio River, and in 2000 they started a child sponsorship scheme. Humanitarian funding was featured in the NGO’s accounts every year between 2000 and 2014. Currently, World Vision’s portfolio is 70% funded by DFID, with their own funding covering the balance. The bulk of ASP investments take place in Lokori sub-county, mainly along the banks of the Kerio River, with families that used to be pastoralists but who have lost animals due to a combination of drought and raids, mainly from the neighbouring Pokots. Trócaire is about 60% funded by DFID, with the other 40% coming from their own funding, including a global grant by Irish Aid. Their area of activity is along the banks of the Turkwell River. While they have not spent resources on expanding areas under cultivation, the remainder of Trócaire’s activities are similar to those of World Vision.

Sub-County development planning, including CMDRR: Trócaire drew on its international reach in resilience to put together the ‘Food Security Master Plan for Turkana County’, which, according to Trócaire staff, has been a key resource document for the CIDP livestock development strategy. Trócaire, with funding from the EC, also plays a role in helping to make sub-county citizen participation in CIDP output planning more participatory. World Vision also works in this area, but without EC financing. Both organisations work with communities to help them develop their disaster risk reduction plans. These plans all feed into the dialogue the NGOs have with respect to how to invest ASP funding in resilience building. This involves introducing grazing cycles and leaving fallow areas, grass regeneration and safeguarding until dry season. Management of water points also features, as does management of trees and introduction of bee-keeping.

Irrigated farming: A major investment by World Vision using ASP resources is to help families make part of their living from irrigated farming. World Vision works with three communities and a total of 9,298 households, having helped them create a new irrigation scheme. Trócaire are less focused on irrigation but have helped communities already in possession of irrigated land to grow fruit trees and fodder.

Interviews with county government officials revealed that they are preparing plans to drastically restructure the management of irrigation along the two rivers. Their plans are on a level that would, if implemented, dwarf the kinds of investments that have gone into the sector over the last 30 years. These latter are more along the lines of what World Vision has been doing with ASP funding. They are closer to the investment levels currently being made by the Ethiopian government just to the north of Lake Turkana, drawing water off the Omo River. The county government is not yet at a stage where their feasibility studies are available for review, but one can surmise with a reasonable degree of certainty that major investments will not start for at least five years. This kind of investment has the potential to have a marked effect on the standards of living of many households that would like to diversify their livelihoods to involve irrigated farming but that have hitherto not been given the chance to do so.

Figure 3: ASP-supported 200 hectare irrigation scheme, Lokori sub-county

Note the encroachment of Prosopis in the line of green bushes below the horizon and behind the farmer.

Currently, grain produced in Turkana in irrigation schemes (mainly sorghum) is consumed by the producers and their extended families, who require additional sources of income on top of production from the irrigation schemes to rise above the poverty threshold. Were production from irrigation schemes to be greatly increased to the extent that they produced a surplus for the market, such production would have to compete with food that enters the local economy via both the food-for-assets programme and the commercially available grain produced in Kitale.

It is possible that a commercial scheme would be more viable if it started producing other products. For example, the South Omo scheme in Ethiopia focuses on sugar production mixed with maize production. And there would also be a demand for fodder (a by-product of sugar and maize production) since the river banks serve as dry season grazing for irrigation schemes.

If the county government make good on their plans to attract major commercial investments, there will be a role for development programmes focused on helping poor households graduate out of poverty, to ensure they benefit from these investments, through such actions as ensuring: a good proportion of jobs go to local households; that pastoralists have access to fodder; and that some of the profits from commercial schemes are reinvested locally to help create further jobs.

Small business creation, including through leveraging microfinance: A key element of both Trócaire and World Vision's work is helping to create small businesses by leveraging micro finance available from national and county governments. There are several sources of this micro finance. On the basis of a business plan, the county Trade Department issues loans of up to KES 400,000 via the Biashara Fund (organised by that department), with an interest rate of 8%. The national UWEZO fund is a zero interest rate fund available nationwide that aims to boost small businesses[6]. World Vision has helped 63 groups to benefit from the fund (with KES 100,000 given to each group) by helping them prepare business plans. Another source of micro finance is the Kenya Women Finance Trust, which has an office in Lodwar. This organisation gives loans with an interest rate of around 15%; usually the loans start at KES 50,000, and one can get a bigger loan once one is credit-worthy. Thus, they are catering to customers who are better off than those the ASP focuses on.

The kinds of businesses both World Vision and Trócaire have helped create include bakeries, small retail shops or kiosks and livestock fattening businesses. They have also provided support for 12 groups that work on Aloe Vera production for local use. These groups have attended trade fairs in Lodwar and Eldoret, but have yet to find a market for their produce. Trócaire is trying to revive meat drying, processing and packaging. When interviewed, the NGOs noted that these are often small-scale enterprises that, given the transport costs involved in taking their produce out of Turkana, usually find it hard to compete with the prices offered for similar products produced closer to the main markets. Baringo is often cited as a county where producers are able to undercut products from Turkana. If in the future international flights leave Lodwar mainly for the transportation of meat to the Middle East, there may be a stronger market for these artisanal products. Or, if the main road leading south out of Turkana is brought up to A-road standards, this might reduce transport costs sufficiently for products to find a market further south in the Rift Valley. The NGOs noted that market research has sometimes been a weak point early on in a cycle of helping to start up new artisanal production lines.

Currently, if a poor household wants to start a small business the only deal on offer is to obtain technical support and a loan from NGOs supported by international development partners, such as those supported by the ASP and REGAL-IR. Given that the county government is also active, albeit with a different range of products, there is room to encourage the county to develop an explicit strategy for micro-business creation that would modify the assistance that is currently available and also help to make the case for more resources from the CIDP for such activities.

[6] The origin of the money was funds set aside for re-runs of national elections.

Figure 4: ASP-funded cattle dip, Loima sub-county

Livestock sector: Both Trócaire and World Vision invest some ASP resources in the livestock sector in Turkana, although this pales in comparison with USAID investments in Marsabit (and Garissa) via Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands (Accelerated Growth) (REGAL-AR). GIZ is also an actor in the sector. Actions that are supported include: county-led mass vaccination campaigns; agrovet businesses, including mobile outreach; training paravets; ensuring veterinary drug supplies are not subject to stock-outs; helping to improve disease surveillance; county livestock disease control, including, in the case of Trócaire, constructing dips and troughs (see Figure 4).

Upgrading the livestock by cross-breeding, including the introduction of Galla goats from Marsabit, which produce more milk and grow larger,[7] and camel cross-breeding with camels from Wajir, are popular ventures. Both NGOs focus some efforts on encouraging families to swap cattle rearing for camel rearing due to climate change and dryer conditions, a strategy that first became popular in Turkana in the 1970s. Finally, dry season fodder production and storage using irrigated land, and experiments with rangeland regeneration through re-seeding and fencing, are also features of both NGOs' work.

Without a decent road through which livestock can be exported out of Turkana, there is a sense that the kind of livestock sector growth that Marsabit is on the verge of attaining is not going to happen in Turkana in the medium-term, unless plans for airfreight direct from Lodwar accelerate once the abattoir is constructed. Indeed, one of the main livestock export routes is to Uganda, which underlines the lack of connections to the rest of Kenya.

[7] The Marsabit Galla goats are originally from Wajir and were brought to Marsabit by USAID REGAL.

3.3.3 What are the merits of combining the cash transfer and other livelihood support programmes?

Across both the World Vision and Trócaire areas, on a rough estimate between 15% and 40% of the households that benefit from ASP funding are also HSNP beneficiaries, depending on the location. Discussants noted that this figure would be higher if HSNP was better targeted.

Interviews with World Vision-supported ASP beneficiaries living close to the Kerio River revealed that most of the 400 or so households that are HSNP beneficiaries save some of their money and invest it mainly in their children's education; some also fatten animals and some have started retail shops—some of these businesses are successful and some collapse. A good portion of their livelihood comes from growing their own crops in irrigation schemes. It is probably the case that many in this community would not be able to make ends meet without the combination of irrigated agriculture and HSNP. While a typical household grows enough for their own consumption, the needs of the extended family mean that a household's own production is not sufficient. Essentially, given the current population, more land needs to be irrigated and this requires investment. ASP capital was used to open up 200 acres – paying for digging irrigation lines and de-stumping. Land availability is not currently a limiting factor, but capital to pay for expansion is. There is great interest in investing in drip irrigation to extend the growing season to times when there is less water available in the river. The NGOs also noted that there is room for the expansion of agriculture support services, especially since those families that are now starting to work in the sector do not benefit from having years of previous experience. Proper use of fertiliser, for example, is an area that needs more pushing.

In the Loima area, where Trócaire operates, the core of their focus is on the livestock sector. Some of the lessons they have learned are as follows:

- Mass vaccinations are considered by citizens to be expensive and there is not a local consensus regarding their value; people are not willing to pay for vaccinations but they are willing to pay for curative drugs. This indicates that a change is needed in the way livestock vaccination is funded. Less disease has reportedly allowed more trade with neighbouring areas, helping to lift some former HSNP beneficiaries out of poverty, through their participation in the increased trade. Those with larger stocks of livestock are the ones that benefit the most. In sum, there is a challenge to increase the level of dialogue over the value for money of livestock vaccination to increase the degree of consensus on how to finance vaccinations.
- Agrovets are working well in some cases and not in others; the business model is still not stable due to the capital that needs to be invested to maintain the business and the disagreements that break out between different partners in agrovet businesses.
- Mobile vet clinics are expensive to run and the county government is not keen to budget for them.
- Disease surveillance is considered a good investment since it is relatively low cost.
- Trócaire's involvement in radio programming on veterinary issues is helping to spark discussions about veterinary care, but it is clear that there is work to do to increase the consensus regarding how to finance improved services.

While World Vision focuses more on facilitating their focus communities' access to other sources of loans, Trócaire operates its own loan system to reach down to households that find it hard to access government loans, due to their poor literacy. The Trócaire loans are charged at 4% interest, versus 10–12% for popular government loans.

The NGOs are keen to upscale their focus on very small businesses along the lines of BOMA's example in Marsabit. They appreciate BOMA's model of: a) clubbing together only three people, giving them a grant of only $150 and following-up with another $50 six months later, and combining this with mentoring support; b) as a second phase, grouping successful groups of three into larger groups to expand the size of businesses and associated outcomes. This is seen as a way to reach down to the poorest households helping them get onto the very lowest business management rung.

> *'Targeting loans on HSNP households would really help. In HSNP Phase 1 recipients of cash that invested some of their money in small businesses like kiosks and rearing livestock are doing well. In Phase 2, those who are in HSNP Group 2 would be a good target for loans since they are more likely to have an entrepreneurial spirit. The perception of HSNP Group 1 is that the money will never stop. They need to be sensitised to make an effort to start to become involved in business. In the end, no one should be discriminated on loans. Everyone should be helped according to their abilities.'* FGD in Lorengippi, Turkana County.

Both World Vision and Trócaire noted that around 20% of the HSNP households, mainly older person households with no children (essentially welfare cases) do not seem to be active in investing HSNP resources in businesses or becoming involved in other income-generation activities, such as those supported by the ASP. Tabulations from the HSNP impact evaluation household survey will be able to triangulate this observation with the survey data. It is interesting to note that this figure is similar to that experienced with the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, where the figure varies by community, from 15% to 25%.

3.3.4 What are the views of CIDP managers, fund allocators and NGO officials on the value for money of ASP activities?

Devolution has brought more activity from government to the sub-county level. The following staff are available in the sub-county where World Vision operates: an irrigation water engineer; agricultural extension officer; a trade officer; an environment officer; a livestock officer; and a veterinary officer. Trócaire interacts with a similar government team. Social services department staff (only in Lodwar) register the savings groups. World Vision has a close and facilitative interaction with county development officers, and often provides them with logistical support due to a funding gap on logistics for county officials, making movement out of county and sub-county capitals a problem for many civil servants[8]. Staffing levels are still low compared to demand for services.

The county government is supplying seeds and irrigation equipment, and loans are being offered to the groups that the ASP has touched. Capacity building for associations of water users and water shed management has increased. Animal mass vaccination is also now offered.

There are remote communities in this area that are not being reached by the CIDP. These are not influencing the CIDP dialogue process.

There is constant change at senior levels within the county government, thus there is a need to brief officials on the work of the ASP. This usually has to happen face to face, to advocate for ASP actions. Day-to-day lobbying is the norm.

[8] It may well help the county government's operational planning if help were offered on the production of a logistical master plan to indicate what budget allocations are needed, to ensure county officials can properly fulfill their job descriptions.

When asked what their views were regarding the work the ASP-funded NGOs are doing, the usual answer, unless the interlocutors were members of the CSG, was that they did not know the details and thus they could not answer questions on value for money.

County officials noted that there is a lack of a forum or focus for discussing poverty alleviation or resilience building, in a comprehensive way, for the poorest citizens. Yes, cash transfers, and cash-for-food or assets, alongside free food hand-outs, as well as school bursaries, are discussed (though not in the same forums), but there is a gap with regard to the next level – the area where the ASP operates. There is no county-level forum to plan and review progress and there is no strategy beyond the CIDP.

> *'There is a proportion of HSNP beneficiaries that are welfare cases, usually older people; maybe 20% are full-time welfare. They cannot grow. Quite a few are using the money to invest in education, opening small shops, buying livestock. Realistically, it is not enough money for these people to grow the wealth of their household alone. The county government is expanding micro credit resources but needs help to make sure the poorer households can access these resources.'* Charles Lokioto, County Executive Secretary, Turkana County

Discussion at the county level has so far focused on larger investments in big-ticket items, like improving livestock marketing, and government subsidised loans that are beyond the reach of the average ASP customer. In part, one gets the impression that this is because the county government does not have the capacity to work in the areas occupied by the NGOs, as it requires good technicians and the transport capacity to interact on a frequent basis with the target group. One also feels that, through negotiation between international partners financing the ASP and other ASP-like programmes, notably REGAL-IR, and the county government, a modification of the existing business model could be possible, which could help to scale-up the ASP model with more involvement of government staff based at the sub-county level.

In the discussion and conclusions section of this report we make some suggestions in regard to helping to strengthen the connection between the work of the ASP NGOs, county officials and the CIDP.

3.3.5 To what extent did the ASP-funded NGOs influence county government planning and resource allocations on poverty reduction of the ASP target group?

Interviews found that the Trócaire team are more directly focused on trying to influence county government planning and resource allocation policy than World Vision. Possibly this is related to the geographic location of their office, in Lodwar town, and their close association with the Diocese of Lodwar, which has a much longer history of trying to influence development in Lodwar than the 15 years of Trócaire presence.

A notable contribution of Trócaire to the dialogue on poverty reduction that predates the ASP and devolution was the Turkana Food Security Master Plan that Trócaire took a lead in developing. Trócaire noted that many of the actions suggested in that plan have influenced resource allocations in the CIDP. Trócaire is also financed by the EC in regard to building county government governance capacity and focusing on human rights, and some of these resources go into enabling the government to implement participative dialogue at local levels in order to agree on how to invest CIDP resources.

World Vision, on the other hand, is, in practice, focused on influencing the implementation of the CIDP mainly with regard to the sub-county within which they operate, through helping communities agree on their community development plans and helping them to lobby for allocations in the course of participative planning sessions facilitated by the county government – again, with support from the EC, REGAL-IR and UN funded governance capacity building activities.

Two meetings take place: one in which the draft sub-county (usually ward-level) plans are proposed, and one in which the plans are reviewed. The county level decides how much will be allocated to the sub-county, and the local level meetings agree on the details – notably the location of the investment. The specific actions agreed upon in the last round of planning included school building, drinking water infrastructure development, irrigation rehabilitation and expansion, health service improvement actions, road repair, electricity extension and the management of Prosopis.

The scope of the actions the CIDP invests in at the sub-county level is limited to CIDP resources being spent on infrastructure. County officials explained that given the lack of capacity of the county to manage more nuanced development activities at the local level, such as the micro-business support ASP provides, the investments focus on issuing tenders for contractors to deliver the kinds of infrastructure noted above.

Thus, while the two NGOs have been engaged in different ways in influencing how CIDP resilience building strategies are conceived and executed, there has not been a specific increase in either the focus on, or the influence of, county government planning for, and resource allocations towards, the kinds of actions ASP invests in. In the medium-term one can assume that the CIDP infrastructure investments will help poor families.

3.4 Marsabit

3.4.1 To what extent is there a consensus regarding the path toward resilience and the place of livelihood-enhancing actions in the CIDPs?

Broadly speaking, there is an understanding of the causes of food insecurity and a rough consensus regarding the strategies to pursue in order to increase resilience, and regarding how this varies from place to place. Consensus breaks down when one comes to the details and where to prioritise investments, as explained in the following paragraphs.

There are several large streams of finance that aim to support resilience building. Apart from DFID (it is clear that the three ASP NGOs greatly depend on DFID funding for the scale of their resilience building) there is, notably, the county development budget, which is the largest potential source of resilience building support for the poorest; the USAID Feed the Future investment via the REGAL-AR and IR vehicles; and the support from the EC and the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) for governance capacity building and disaster risk reduction, respectively.

These groups do not come together at the county level to align themselves on a county resilience building strategy, though a number of them noted that there is a need to form a coordination group at both county and sub-county levels focused on resilience building. However, the nearest the groups have so far come to coordinating on resilience is the CSG. The CSG's background[9] is in coordination around drought relief and use of humanitarian funding, so it is not regarded as having a mandate that strays too much into CIDP territory – even if it is chaired by the Governor.

[9] Note that to date there are no legally mandated requirements that the CSG must fulfill.

Moreover, it has additional problems in that it meets rarely, agendas are usually late, and the purpose of, and follow-up points of, the CSG meetings are not clear.

> *'Families that do well in drought are those that have diversified. Those households that focus only on livestock do badly. Community capacity to understand climate change has increased hugely over the last two to three years and this has helped to drive diversification. Women have led the way on diversification. With more diversification families do better.'* Katelo Ibrae Guyo, Executive Director, Pastoralist Integrated Support Programme

The complex pattern of clan interactions and shifting coalitions between clans, and thus how they share decision-making power in regard to the CIDP, is a key issue when it comes to investments at sub-county level. The extent to which the leadership wants to be inclusive in decision-making is also an important factor. Devolution has brought more local participation and inclusion in budget planning, but this has taken time to get going. Now the county is moving towards a system where each ward has a budgeted development plan, and there is community participation in the generation of this plan. There is thus an opportunity for the county government, as well as various other entities with a development budget for Marsabit, to contribute to development (including ASP-funded NGOs) in a coordinated way, and involving citizens in planning and decision-making.

The second version of the CIDP (still in draft form) is much clearer than the published version. There is work to do in order to reach a broad consensus regarding prioritising investments, as the executive arm and the legislative arm of government do not see eye-to-eye on priorities. Sub-county managers on the whole are not aware of the updated CIDP details. The county bills that are needed to support implementation are mostly bogged down in debate in the county chambers. The result is no particular focus on investing in resilience building, and within that, no focus on the poorest citizens. It is interesting to reflect that, while at the national level debate on draft policies and strategies of import for guiding national development often include many international invitees, the degree of participation of such organisations at the county level is minimal. With a stronger lobbying effort from these stakeholders, the focus on helping poor people to grow out of poverty could be much stronger. Also, done well, this could increase political support at the county level. The discussion and conclusions section of this report makes some suggestions regarding how to improve the county focus on resilience building for the poorest.

Those families who are least resilient are pastoralist drop-outs, as is the case in most of the north of Kenya. Our interviews revealed that, broadly, there is agreement (between county officials, NGO staff and citizens) that the basic ASP programme model—mentored-support for poor families given grants or low-interest loans—is an effective way of helping poor families to save money and assets, and thus to make them prepared to weather droughts. However, a key issue for international partners and the county government is that the county government does not have the capacity to mimic the ASP model and thus to invest its own funds in helping to scale-up the model.

Perhaps the most concrete evidence that the county government is concerned for the poorest is the fact that their dissatisfaction with the targeting of the HSNP has led the county government to set up and implement its own cash transfer programme targeted at 750 poor households that were left out of the HSNP lists. At the time of the interviews one disbursement had been made and a second was imminent.

The County Enterprise Fund could be a significant vehicle for county involvement in micro finance. The policy regarding the Fund is still being debated. The NGOs think that the county government would profit from more direct technical support in helping to implement a micro finance strategy aimed at the poorer citizens across the county. According to the NGOs, helping these poor families to get into livestock rearing, and also helping them to diversify into other businesses, such as retail trade or yoghurt production, skins processing, or migrating to find work after achieving a better education (which is much more common now than in the past), are the key paths to resilience.

The medium-term future impact of climate change is an unknown quantity that will contribute to shaping the future of poverty in Marsabit. If resilience building is well structured, with small-scale support to poor families linked to larger infrastructural investments – notably building up the livestock market (via CIDP and REGAL-AR/REGAL-IR investments combined), then there is a chance that a significant improvement in household resilience could be achieved.

The interviews we conducted suggested that county- and citizen-level opinion is that there are a lot of economic gains that are being unlocked by: improvements in herd management styles; breed improvements; improvements in veterinary care; the construction of better roads; better information flow on prices; the investments in feeder and main markets; the coming abattoir; and, potentially, the development of an international market accessed by the Isiolo international airport.

The key for a focus on the very poor is ensuring that, through micro finance support, together with traditional lending of animals (to relatives who have few), poorer families can get back into the livestock business—and at some scale, now that major investments are being made in the sector. Apart from livestock marketing itself there are also associated small-scale value-adding businesses that can potentially be a focus for poorer people (e.g. more skilled management of skins – which can triple the value of a skin, according to county officials[10] – meat drying and various dairy investments) that ASP has shown it is able to support.

Although the livestock sector is of course dominant in Marsabit, mention must also be made of the agricultural sector: rain-fed agriculture is a significant element of the economy in certain parts of the county. The county government has made a significant investment in tractors, which they use to help poor families, by providing either free or heavily subsidised ploughing services. In this way the county government is helping to channel its resources into increasing the wealth of poor households.

Finally, there is a feeling at county level that population growth is faster than it used to be due to the combined effects of improvements in child health care, leading to lower mortality rates, and a decline in the pastoralist lifestyle, which formerly meant that husbands and wives were separated for long periods. Citizens interviewed for the study generally said that children come from God, meaning that fertility rates are not likely to start coming down in the near future (the Demographic and Health Survey shows that levels are high in all the northern counties) without a concerted effort in the CIDP to start a dialogue on the issue. Given this situation, the demographic issue should be looked at as part of a comprehensive county-led strategy to sustainably reduce poverty, since high fertility rates are likely to wash-out any modest gains made by the poorest families in per capita income.

[10] Some county officials and Concern Worldwide staff are of the view that a more concerted investment should be made in the skin trade, where value addition could be tapped. However, this has not been translated into budget allocations to the offices responsible for building skills at the community level.

3.4.2 What is the role of NGOs in building community resilience?

Table 2: Profile of ASP-funded activities in Marsabit

NGO	Summary of ASP-funded activities	Geographic area
Solidarités International	Training through pastoralist field schools. Creation of pasture conservation areas. Production of urea cattle feed blocks. Revision of disaster risk reduction contingency plans. Improvement of market links. Production of livestock fodder. Training in bee-keeping. Prosopis management. Improvement of fisheries value chain.	North-west Marsabit
Concern Worldwide	Community-managed disaster risk reduction/asset adaptation with climate-resilient livestock species. Community-based livestock disease surveillance. Natural resources management. Improving capacity to participate in, and interact with, markets. Value chain development for hay and vegetables. Increasing uptake of maternal, new born and child health and nutrition services. Strengthening citizen participation and building county capacity to engage with citizens in longer-term development planning	North and north-east Marsabit, including Moyale
BOMA	Establishing community-led, women-focused business groups, trained in financial management and savings associations formed to diversify income and complement livestock ownership.	Marsabit (stronger presence in the south)

Concern mainly operates in the northern and north-eastern parts of the county, and much of its ASP work is contracted to its local partners, Pastoralist Integrated Support Programme (PISP). Solidarités to the west and north-west, and BOMA, starting in the south, has spread out over a wide area with its more focused approach (see below). Both Concern and Solidarités offer a menu of support for various activities aimed at building resilience.

Concern and PISP: Concern and its partner PISP have several programmes, which make up its resilience programming. DFID funds 70–80%, with the balance coming from ECHO (La Nina funding) and the EC governance capacity building programme. Concern also fields a health and nutrition programme funded by USAID, as well as a DFID-funded WASH programme.

Concern underpins its work with participatory planning in the communities it intends to support, which culminates in an action plan that is presented at the ward level, where the county reviews ward development plans. The aim is to raise the voice of communities at the county level. This work feeds into the effort of the county government to ensure public participation in development planning. While this style of development has a long history, in Marsabit County Concern is closely associated with lobbying for the county public participation bill (BOMA has adopted Concern's community interaction process for planning its own support) and REGAL-IR contractors do so too. Concern and PISP help to fund this ward-level consultation with the grant from the EC. The county government, Concern-PISP and other NGOs then co-fund elements of the ward-level community plans. Concern prides itself on having helped reach a consensus on the value of consulting broadly with the community, leading to community-led plans, and the drafting of a citizen participation bill in the county assembly[11].

[11] REGAL-IR also considers community consultation to be a core element of how they facilitate their engagement with communities.

While Concern used to operate exclusively with local NGOs, since devolution they have found it useful to develop memoranda of understanding with departments of the county government because those now have substantive financial resources.

A focus of Concern/PISP's strategy for resilience building is support for village community banking. Typically, this involves groups of 30–40 people who are given a grant of KES 200,000. Concern/PISP work with 24 such groups. Investments by these groups take the form of buying and fattening livestock and setting up retail shops. Profits are often invested in buying more food and in paying education fees. A key driving force and motivation is said to be a new impetus to diversify away from livestock only, as a hedge against dry years, which are more frequent now.

There is a focus on the livestock sector as this makes up 80–90% of the Marsabit economy. Support here is focused on disease surveillance (training community disease reporters) and improving livestock water sources. Here there is an interface with the work of the USAID-funded REGAL-AR, which is making big infrastructure investments in market facilities. PISP noted that Marsabit does not yet have a culture of market days, noting that there is a role in this for NGOs, to try and help build this culture, in order to decrease the risk for people that want to go to the market to sell their products.

Concern/PSIP are also thinking about micro-irrigation as a potential new way of building resilience, especially for vegetable growing (as long as this involves using water sources that are not used for livestock). With the new road, the economics of this might not be as attractive as before – at least close to the road– because prices for vegetables from the highlands have come down. Nevertheless, away from the road, prices are higher. As ever, before a big investment is made the NGOs would do well to help potential investors to do their homework and to prepare a simple business plan.

Re-seeding of degraded pasture areas has not worked well: the winds have blown away the seeds when rain has been delayed. PSIP advises that a longer time frame than the typical NGO funding cycle is required to put in place a strategy for re-seeding rangelands that have been over-grazed, since it may take several years and several re-seeding cycles before rangeland is regenerated.

BOMA: DFID provides 60% of BOMA's budget (via ASP and WASH funding sources), with the remainder coming from a range of US sources. BOMA has been active in resilience building in the county since 2008. BOMA's strategy is two-pronged. The starting point is community conversation over a period of months, which results in community (sub-location) plans—at the time of the interviews there were 42 plans available on the Marsabit county website, of which more than 20 were compiled with support from BOMA.

The core of BOMA's model is picking out groups of three women from poor backgrounds (they have learnt that groups of five are often not successful) selected by the community. Selection is done via a modification of the Grameen Bank participatory wealth-ranking model, and BOMA are confident that the women they work with are in the poorest 10%. BOMA then trains mentors, who have to be at least Form 4 graduates, who in turn work with the women's groups on developing their business plans, which are eventually capitalised with $150. The activities the women become involved in include: buying and selling livestock; butchery and drying meat for sale; and buying and selling petrol.

> *'One lady is a livestock keeper. She goes back and forth to the livestock camps trading mainly goats. Her daughter sells vegetables, sweets, eggs and cooks chips. She started small but has grown. Now she sells diesel and kerosene, which has the best profit. She runs butchery. Now she is getting pestered to give out loans herself. We would like to expand into the milk trade and selling livestock medicine, but we cannot afford refrigeration.*

There is a demand also for tailoring but we cannot afford the equipment.' FGD in Logo Logo, Marsabit County.

Figure 5: BOMA-supported three-woman small business, Marsabit County

The most popular business is small retail outlets. Often, the groups graduate to managing several businesses at once, after having mastered the management of a small retail business. The new road has created opportunities for new shops to open and the BOMA support is capitalising on this change by helping to introduce small retail shops (*dukas*) in remote areas along branches from the main road. Many of the first-stage shops are vegetable stalls. The effect is that more people are now buying vegetables, and also, since BOMA works exclusively with local groups, migrant sellers from the highlands are being displaced by BOMA-supported shops. BOMA has helped to create about 3,000 such shops, and they estimate that the demand in Marsabit County is for perhaps double that number[12].

If they are successful with the first small loan, the groups can graduate to something larger. After six months, BOMA encourages groups of three to join together to form a VSLA, through which they can lend to each other and determine their own interest rates. A recent innovation, still being tested, is to graduate from keeping their savings in a 'three lock box' to using a bespoke bank account facility created by KCB (Kenya Commercial Bank) called 'mChama'; up to 15 people can have a separate account, which can be merged into one account, with only three allowed to make withdrawals. BOMA's total interaction time per group is two years, with the exit strategy being support from BOMA to access the higher value micro finance loans available elsewhere.

BOMA has dropped certain businesses from the portfolio they support, mainly due to experience and the lack of viability with their target group. Honey production is off the menu because it is a seasonal business yet their clients need money on a monthly basis. In regard to gum and resin collection, the value chain here is weak. If the chain strengthens, gum and resin collection might become viable. Growing capers in Laisamis was another business that stopped, because the yield was not good enough to sustain it. Drying camel milk to create powder for sale was also tried without success.

Solidarités International: DFID provides about 70% of Solidarités' funding, with ECHO providing much of the balance. Solidarités has evolved their menu of resilience building actions over the last few years. Five years ago the focus was on hygiene (construction of latrines and building of water facilities) – in part because this was what the funding dictated. Encouraging poultry farming has been dropped, again mainly due to donor insistence. CMDRR is a key element of Solidarité's interactions with the communities they support, and this dialogue that starts with disaster reduction planning is the starting point for the resilience building actions.

[12] See also the first HSNP Phase 2 Qualitative Report, produced as part of the HSNP evaluation series.

Figure 6: Solidarités-supported manufacturing of urea fodder blocks, Marsabit County

Solidarités have supported fodder production for some time and this has grown in importance with the ASP. Linked to fodder production is the production of micronutrient urea blocks (MUBs), a new activity suggested by the FAO (there are 12 groups producing MUBs). This is a bit more capital-intensive, requiring supply lines for the cement, micronutrients and molasses that are required for production. Time is needed to see whether MUBs can be commercially and profitably manufactured. PFSs are now being supported in a way that links them to the other activities, such as those noted above—there are 44 PFSs (22 DFID-funded and 22 EU-funded). Solidarités also helps communities living on Lake Turkana to improve the management of their fishery businesses. Another new item on the menu is support for charcoal production, using Prosopis as the source. Interviews with the NGO personnel suggested that this initiative is being halted, mainly due to running out of dense Prosopis forests (making charcoal out of the many less mature, sparsely spread bushes is not practical). Solidarités is also dropping pasture conservation, except in the dry season pasture areas in the hills, as finding support for this in semi-desert areas has proven to be not economically viable.

In terms of scale-up there is room for MUBs, PFSs, CMDRR and fisheries to grow considerably. All have good potential to build resilience. Solidarités thinks the scale for all could be doubled, and MUBs more so because only Solidarités have been introducing what is an innovation for the county.

BOMA is conducting a randomised control trial of its support for small-scale three-woman run businesses, which includes selecting which women to help, mentoring, business skills training, seed capital of $150, savings group training, a $50 progress grant, and support to businesses in regard to accessing credit from larger, non-BOMA loan schemes available in the county, upon graduation after two years.

3.4.3 What are the merits of combining the cash transfer and other livelihood support programmes?

Estimates of the proportion of HSNP beneficiaries amongst the clients of the ASP NGOs vary from 20% to 40%. This figure can only be made more precise by commissioning a survey of ASP-funded households. BOMA, the NGO that intentionally focuses the most on the very poorest, via their wealth-ranking selection strategy and their low cap on grant size, estimates that 30% are HSNP Group 1 recipients and another 10–20% are in Group 2. They noted that this is an indication of bad HSNP targeting, in as far as they believe that all the families with whom they interact are amongst the very poorest. This means, of course, that many HSNP beneficiaries do not quality for BOMA support because they are too wealthy[13].

[13] The poor targeting of the current HSNP phase is well documented (see www.hsnp.or.ke) and is leading to a new registration and targeting process in the second half of 2016.

Box 1: BOMA's randomised control trial measuring impact on income, savings and assets

1,755 women from 14 locations were randomly assigned to an intervention group (N-585) and the rest to two delayed intervention groups (N= 585 and 582). Baseline surveys were carried out in November 2013 and a follow-up survey was carried out in May 2014.

At one-year follow-up, the following significant benefits were recorded for the intervention group:

- 34% increase in per capita income;
- 131% increase in per capita savings;
- 29% increase in durable asset ownership.

No significant effects of REAP participation were detected in regard to the following measures:

- monthly expenditures on food, medical care, or school fees; and
- food security.

Source: http://bomaproject.org/monitoring_and_evaluation/

All the NGOs noted that the HSNP beneficiary status serves as a guarantee that the family will have some cash on hand at regular intervals. This increases their creditworthiness[14], allowing them to use some of this cash to pay back their micro finance loans faster than would otherwise be the case. This gives them a cushion when some of the businesses inevitably go wrong.

Finally, it was not uncommon to hear remarks from Marsabit County officials about how HSNP dilutes the entrepreneurial spirit, especially among households with able-bodied persons in a context where poor people are being asked to work to build up a few assets. The WFP food-for-assets programme in Marsabit (managed by World Vision in the Moyale sub-county), which works with just over 4,000 households, was reported by some county and local NGO officials as a model for the better-off households currently targeted by HSNP. These interviewees envisage a future in which a smaller number of the poorest households receive regular cash, with expansion during droughts, and a much larger micro finance sector targets the poorer people, financed from the CIDP and other international partners willing to make investments, alongside an expanded cash or food-for-assets public works programme, while the Ministry of Labour and East African Affairs cash transfer programmes serve their target households.

Clearly, to work towards this vision will require more capacity at the county level to coordinate this evolution since it will require detailed interactions between several different programmes. Reaching agreement over phasing, timelines, human resource requirements and budgets would likely take several months and the product would amount to a county poverty reduction strategy. The lessons coming out of the pilot harmonisation of the four cash transfer programmes would be a key input to such planning.

3.4.4 What are the views of CIDP managers, fund allocators and NGO officials on the value for money of ASP activities?

Amongst the officials interviewed, understanding of what ASP-funded NGOs are achieving through their focus on the poorest families varies. County officials that work directly with the NGOs know what they are doing and officials who travel extensively, notably the Governor, have a good idea, since they encounter the work first-hand. However, since analysis of the work of the ASP NGOs is not available in the form of, for example, value for money assessments, or value chain analyses, and since the counties do not have their own explicit strategy for resilience building targeted at the poorest, these favourable opinions and feelings of goodwill are not underpinned by evidence. Generally speaking, however, not many county-level policy-makers who might have a hand in

[14] The HSNP Phase 2 Qualitative Report also notes this trend.

guiding coordinated CIDP actions leading to resilience building amongst the poorest have a view regarding what the NGOs are doing, because they do not encounter their work either in forums in the county capital, or because they do not have occasion to see the work first-hand. Dialogue on the extent to which the CIDP is focusing on helping to build the resilience[15] of the poorest is not currently systematically pursued in such a way as to lead to concerted coordinated effort to focus on the poorest.

For now, plans for greater county involvement in micro finance, via the vehicle of the county enterprise fund (once the bill is passed), imply that the main focus of this fund will be on persons higher up the wealth ladder that already have substantive businesses that could be expanded. These kinds of businesses include medium-scale poultry farming and fodder production businesses to serve the markets USAID is building – with loans of KES 2–10 million, but not small-scale KES 30,000 loans of the type ASP finances. While this is crucial for the economic development of Marsabit, it will only help the poorest families vicariously, in that small-scale livestock fattening will feed into the livestock market infrastructure as much as the direct targeted support to the poorest that the NGOs provide.

The investment in the tarmac road running through the middle of the county will clearly be a big boost for the county's economy. Infrastructure has been significantly improved – including roads and internet connectivity. Food prices are coming down. Entrepreneur numbers are going up significantly, including among people from Meru. Improvements in trade with Ethiopia will happen if security can be maintained. In addition, if devolution resource flows are maintained the extension services will continue to be strengthened.

The ASP NGOs (and others, e.g. USAID-funded resilience building) can be seen to be pioneering a road to resilience building focused on poorer households. The investments in livestock satellite markets and major markets by the county government and REGAL-AR will help the poorer households who are investing in fattening a small number of livestock.

The reality is that, to date, county-level investments in the activities ASP supports have not yet been made. What is missing is a county coordination group that is focused on resilience building for the poorer segments of the Marsabit society. By comparison, there is a coordination group that works on drought relief, and there is one for WASH, and for health and nutrition. Such a group would be able to martial the arguments for different types of resilience building activities and press a case for theose as the CIDP is updated, including with the MCAs. Who should coordinate such a group? Possibly the most natural candidate would be some form of evolution of the CSG, since this is the grouping around which the NGOs have formally interacted with the district and now the county government. This grouping has the virtue of being chaired by the county governor. Expanding the responsibilities of the CSG, if it is to be done well, would require new terms of reference and, as an early output, agreement around a county strategy for poverty reduction focused on the poorest. Obviously, since many of the activities the ASP promotes relate to small businesses and production, the county trade department should be added to the core group that evolves out of the CSG, as well as the livestock department.

Finally, in the absence of coordination on resilience building for the poorest at the county level, the ward level can become a focus for resilience building investments across the county. This is because in the participatory process of developing the CIDP the ward level is increasingly being

[15] In discussions with county officials in Marsabit the terms resilience building, climate change adaptation and disaster risk management, and poverty alleviation, are discussed interchangeably with respect to what these concepts mean for development action.

used as the unit around which investment decisions are being made. The ASP and REGAL-IR NGOs are already playing an active role in helping to facilitate good choices at this level.

3.4.5 To what extent did the ASP-funded NGOs influence county government planning and resource allocations on poverty reduction aimed at the ASP target group?

There is variation in the extent to which the NGOs focus on influencing county government policy and actions on poverty reduction. Concern, who are based in the county capital and have a tradition of focusing on advocacy as part of their international model, have notably focused on advocating for the adoption of the Marsabit County Civic Education and Public Participation policy, and the subsequent bill that must ultimately be approved by the county assembly. When, or if, it is passed, depending on the text, this bill will legally enshrine how community participation interacts with county-level decision-making on the management of the CIDP. Theoretically, this will allow poorer people to have more of a voice in their own development than has been the case in the past.

BOMA has been supportive of Concern's advocacy and have done their part to help persuade county councillors of the merits of community participation. They have also had a hand in helping the county government to post community plans on the county website, with a view to helping external philanthropists to understand where community priorities lie.

Meanwhile, Solidarités reported that they have been involved in helping to push forward county legislation regarding the governance of fisheries in Lake Turkana; their location in North Horr makes them less able to interact on a day-to-day basis with county councillors, civil servants and influential members of civil society in order to lobby for more focused attention on the poor.

One can say that, if it is the case that without ASP funding the NGOs would have terminated their presence in Marsabit County, then the ASP has had an impact in helping to push legislation that supports poor people in the county. If the NGOs would still be there without this funding (and this is certainly the case for BOMA and Concern) then it is likely that their lobbying in this area would have carried on whether the ASP existed or not.

3.5 Wajir and Mandera

3.5.1 To what extent is there a consensus regarding the path toward resilience and the place of livelihood-enhancing actions in the CIDPs?

In Wajir and Mandera there are differing views, between county government officials and non-state actors, as to what path should be taken to enhance livelihoods and build resilience. The county's top priority areas are infrastructure, health and water. The community and NGOs would prefer to see more investment in sectors that have an impact on livelihoods, like agriculture in Wajir and livestock in Mandera.

The trend in both counties has been for the county government to invest first in large infrastructure projects, such as roads, boreholes, and health centres. This was seen as the critical first step, with the next step to then shift the funding focus to the agriculture, livestock and trade sectors. The county governments are seen both by government administrators and a lot of the non-state actors to require a long period of adjustment in order to learn how to cope with devolution. However, county officials are becoming more optimistic about their future work as they become more confident in performing the necessary tasks.

In the last few years development agencies and the governments have shifted their focus from emergency resilience building to intervention strategies yielding long-term benefits to resilience, such as investing in water infrastructure projects[16]. County government officials and NGO employees are concerned about the low rate of scale-up. Specifically, the core of the concern from Oxfam, Save the Children International and officials in the development ministries (water, agriculture, livestock) is that they are not given adequate priority in the county budgets, and therefore there is not enough monetary support for scale-up of successful activities. Activities, such as fodder production, which are seen to build communities resilience, are not felt to be expanding fast enough. The county governments are criticised by the communities for not being supportive enough in scaling up development actions focused on the poorest. In addition, according to county officials and NGO staff, the massive government support for the construction of water sources (over 200 boreholes have been drilled in Wajir in the last two years) has led to critical levels of environmental degradation due to poorly managed construction projects. DFID Kenya actually stopped funding more borehole constructions in Wajir around the turn of the millennium, precisely because of the perception that too many boreholes had already been dug.

County government and NGO activities are coordinated at the CSG level. There are sub-technical working groups that have been formed but these are not very active. The CSG works hand in hand with the department of humanitarian coordination. All stakeholders mentioned the need for better and more focused coordination around resilience building for the poorest.

Regarding the current county budgets and CIDPs, there has been a lot of consultation with stakeholders, including the NGOs and communities. However, discussions with ASP beneficiaries, NGOs, ward administrators and MCAs themselves made it clear that they did not have strong awareness about the actual county budget allocations after the dialogue; indeed, this information cannot be found on the Wajir County website. Furthermore, although consultations were held on what the communities' priorities were, it was felt that the final CIDP did not reflect the needs voiced. This criticism was more pronounced in Mandera, where even within the government administration the investment in big infrastructure projects (notably the international airport) was seen by many of those interviewed as premature. It should be noted that while the CIDPs can be found on the Turkana and Marsabit county websites, they are not available for Wajir and Mandera[17].

Consequently, citizens interviewed in both Wajir and Mandera did not feel like the devolved funds had influenced livelihood or resilience building activities in their neighbourhoods.

> *'There are so many promises from the county government, but we haven't gotten anything from them. There were plans for the government to buy 300 bales of fodder from us but they remain silent. We face many challenges and the biggest one is the lack of a storage facility. The Governor and county agricultural staff came here and promised to build a place for storage; we were told the money would come from the supplementary budget. But now we have waited two years with no results. We have decided to reduce production to avoid losses. We also have no main market for the fodder. We had hopes that the ministry would help but they haven't come through.'* [Jaijai Fodder Cooperative]

MCAs have a different view, believing that the devolved funds are getting to the people. In Wajir, the county revolving fund was allocated KES 50 million in the last financial year, which was used to provide women, youth and persons with disability groups with interest-free loans to help them start businesses; with repayments only set to begin after two years. Over 300 groups are said to have

[16] The EDE framework is not yet widely known by county government officials or citizens. The few who have been trained on EDE view it as a useful framework that has enhanced their knowledge on resilience.
[17] The evaluation team managed to obtain the Mandera CIDP but were not given permission to publically disseminate analysis of it. We were unable to obtain the Wajir CIDP as the Head of Budget was away at the time of our research.

benefited. Other funds from the county government include the ward bursary fund (estimated KES 1.7–2.3 million, given each financial year for every Ward in Wajir; in Mandera the figure is KES 158 million for the county). There is also the trade fund, which provides interest-free loans in the range of KES 100–200 million per year.

The ASP is influencing the county strategies on resilience. The ASP partners have fashioned their work through the relevant county executive committees (CECs), mostly the agriculture, livestock, and water departments. These county administrators say they have learned a lot from the capacity building sessions and training sessions organised by the ASP, and they claim to have made changes in strategy as a result of what they have learned. In Wajir, for example, a number of changes were attributed to ASP-funded NGOs, particularly those that involve policy and legal frameworks, like the Disaster Management Act, which has now become law in that county. In Mandera, the CMDRR has been successful according to the county director of livestock, and it is even being integrated into the school curriculum. The ASP partners are working to influence budget allocation, but this is a slower process and the partners agree that working through the relevant county government organs may take longer, although this is the only way to proceed in the medium-term if county government resources are going to be leveraged for, and capacity built in regard to, reaching out to build the resilience of the poorest families.

FGDs with members of different ASP interventions from across the counties indicated demand for a variety of support to building resilience, such as supporting women's groups with income-generating activities and agricultural production, especially production of fruits like water melons and fodder[18].

3.5.2 What is the role of NGOs in building community resilience?

Table 3: Profile of ASP-funded activities in Wajir and Mandera

NGO	Summary of ASP-funded activities	Geographic area
Save the Children	Development of PFSs to: increase fodder production; improve animal health through private and mobile pharmacies; improve access to market information; rangeland management; water access and cash-for-work schemes. Support community-led initiatives and strengthen county government systems. Support to livelihoods diversification through income-generating activities, VSLAs and technical vocational education technical training (TVET) targeted at youths and dryland farming.	Mandera
Oxfam	Strengthen markets through business skills development through: beef processing; increasing trader voices; improving access to financial services; and promoting market driven input provision. Fodder/asset protection through: fodder harvesting and preservation; livestock health surveillance system; rangeland management; community contingency planning; strengthening county government.	Wajir

The main NGOs working in Wajir and Mandera are Oxfam, Mercy Corps, Save the Children International, Islamic Relief Kenya, AMREF, and World Vision. These NGOs work in the areas of

[18] Loss of mobility due to receipt of livelihood support was not mentioned as a major concern. Many of the people targeted by the ASP are drop-out pastoralists who have lost animals, usually due to drought, and who therefore have no need to be mobile. In some areas the nomadic lifestyle is still in practice, with only a few household members moving with the animals, while the rest of the household are settled in villages in order to access social amenities such as schools and health centres.

food security and livelihoods, WASH, health and nutrition. ASP is funding Oxfam and Save the Children in Wajir and Mandera, respectively.

These organisations have played a major role in building the counties' resilience. However, they face familiar challenges: poor access to some areas due to bad roads, illiteracy, low capacity of staff and lack of technology. It was noted by the MCAs that the NGOs' reach sometimes leaves out certain places, which increases the disparity in economic growth opportunities between areas.

Oxfam in Wajir: The ASP started in 2013 and operates in eight wards. Oxfam is working through other partners in the area of strengthening disaster risk management (e.g. WASDA and ALDEF). Their strategy is to influence the county agenda and national policies through work done with community organisations, civil societies and media. Oxfam's ASP activities are organised aorund three pathways: 1) governance – community sensitisation on the roles and responsibilities of county government; county budget allocation and the county development agenda; 2) market interventions – capacity building of women meat traders, linkage to Sharia-compliant products/banks, business skills development, hygiene promotion and improving standards of meat packaging and marketing of meat; and 3) asset protection – fodder production and preservation.

Oxfam's involvement in the ASP has modified their own approach to resilience building. Their emphasis is now on value chain scaling and activities that have multiplier effects (e.g. finance products and supporting complementary activities). They have curtailed water trucking because the costs outweigh the benefits. It is also their view that this strategy will boost the local economy, assuming small water-carrier businesses with donkey carts will respond to this gap in the market.

Save the Children in Mandera: In Mandera the ASP is implemented by Save the Children International in four wards in Mandera North, West, South and Lafey sub-counties. The ASP programmes include TVET, the establishment of PFSs, and supporting VSLAs. Under TVET, the programme aims to contribute to improved, equitable, sustainable and resilient livelihoods for disadvantaged adolescent youth, women and disabled people, thus reducing their vulnerability through inculcation of employability skills, entrepreneurship and life-skills training. After facing challenges in terms of inadequate equipment and tutors in public institutions for vocational skills training for youth in Mandera, Save the Children explored the use of private enterprises for training of 170 youth. This approach is referred to as enterprise-based TVET (EBTVET) as opposed to institutional-based TVET (IBTVET). Training offered through EBTVET takes a shorter period (six months), is practically oriented and relevant to the arid and semi-arid lands context. Training offered through IBTVET takes two years, is less practical (given inadequate training equipment and tutors) and is guided by a rigid curriculum which is not fully relevant to the arid and semi-arid context. A tracer study conducted by Save the Children six months after the training found that 146 out of 170 trainees (86%) secured employment in either the private or public sectors, while others established their own enterprises. Community adoption of the approach of the training was also noted, through their sponsorship of about 30 youth for similar vocational skills training at local private enterprises. The employment increased the participants' average annual income by about 84% (from KES 4,703 to KES 8,648 per month). The approach was scaled up with funding from elsewhere to reach an additional 120 youth from particularly rural areas.

The coordination of ASP activities with the county governments was particularly apparent with certain departments (i.e. water, agriculture and livestock). The partners have worked with, and coordinate their work through, the county administrators, sub-county officials and ward administrators. In Wajir the emphasis is on improving the county strategy on resilience, especially through capacity building training for county staff. In Mandera the approach is targeted more at the communities.

3.5.3 What are the merits of combining the cash transfer and other livelihood support programmes?

There was a general consensus among respondents that combining cash transfers with other livelihood support programmes was beneficial, and had an impact in regard to building community resilience. The Oxfam ASP project in Jaijai is particularly seen to have improved the locations' local economy.

> *'The milk produced is constant, irrespective of season, because of the constant availability of fodder.'* [Chairman of the Jaijai Fodder Project]

> *'From the success of the fodder production project, we are also getting some income from the neighbouring villages as it has generated a lot of attention leading to an improved sale of fuel, which has improved the local economy.'* [Community member in Jaijai]

Individual successes among beneficiaries supported with cash transfers were mentioned as being limited due to the fact that the money given is too small for anything other than consumption. Most of the cash transfer funds were said to go into the purchase of food, paying school fess and repaying debts. In both Wajir and Mandera stakeholders suggested having the cash transfers given as a lump sum, to allow for investments in income-generating activities.

In Wajir, more so than in Mandera, stakeholders emphasised the need to include livelihood support in cash transfer programmes. The dependency of beneficiaries on cash and other relief programmes is a major concern. Even the ASP beneficiaries indicated the need for programmes to develop their skills and capacities, in order to remove themselves from poverty.

The ASP beneficiaries indicated drought, poor markets and lack of credit-worthy customers as being the main risks of starting up businesses with HSNP funds. A number of HSNP beneficiaries have managed to overcome these challenges by pooling together their resources and are grassing houses or trading livestock. The preference is to have joint ventures, which allows beneficiaries to raise capital easily and share ideas.

The community members had several recommendations for the cash transfer programme. The most common recommendation was the need to increase the value of the cash transfer, as it barely meets their basic needs. Another was to incorporate business skills development and entrepreneurial skills training, to encourage business start-ups. Another recommendation was to increase the coverage of the cash transfer programmes, as many vulnerable households were seen to be left out. It was felt that incorporating these recommendations would yield a better lifestyle and would improve livelihood sustenance for the beneficiaries, thereby improving the likelihood of graduation.

3.5.4 What are the views of CIDP managers, fund allocators and NGO officials on the value for money of ASP activities?

In both Wajir and Mandera county officials said that some 50% to 60% of the county development funds are allocated to livelihoods building activities. Because of the challenges in regard to the disbursement of funds through government channels, the county-budgeted funds are usually not utilised by the end of the financial year. In Mandera, the 2014/15 budget was KES 11.2 billion and over KES 2.2 billion went unspent by the end of the financial year. This was due mainly to delays in disbursement from the national treasury. Information was not available for Wajir. Talking to the different stakeholders made it clear that not many, even at the CEC-director level, are fully aware of the county budget allocations, and even fewer are aware of actual expenditures.

County officials working in the economic growth areas that are a focus of ASP-funded activities would like to see more funding for scaling-up activities that improve livestock production, livestock health and livestock marketing. For example, fodder production was widely mentioned in the FGDs as needing more investment in Wajir. Although the ASP partners are working to influence budget allocation, they have not had much influence in this regard because the county departments they work in depend on budget decisions taken in the assembly, and thus the departments are usually disappointed with the budget decisions taken in the assembly.

What this points to, in common with the other counties, is that efforts differ by department, and there is not yet a consensus that is sufficiently strong to influence budget allocations in the CIDP towards the kinds of investments made by the ASP. The conclusions section of this report makes some suggestions for how DFID could encourage further movement towards the investment of Kenyan taxes in the same activities as are funded by the ASP.

3.5.5 To what extent did the ASP-funded NGOs influence county government planning and resource allocations on poverty reduction of the ASP target group?

Save the Children and Oxfam work with the county governments through the CSG and a number of sectoral sub-committees. Their strategy is to involve relevant departments in their work.

In Mandera Save the Children is influencing the county government plans through its work on community and institutions systems strengthening. Save the Children has facilitated four wards (Ashabito, Warankara, Gither and Shimbir Fatuma) to develop CMDRR plans. This resulted in county government allocation of funds for the expansion and improvement of four maternity health facilities. The CMDRR plan also influenced the Mandera county government in regard to allocating school bursary funds for poor households in these wards. Save the Children influenced Mandera county government and other stakeholders in regard to establishing a disaster risk reduction technical working group, which then developed guidelines on disaster risk reduction programming by county government and all stakeholders.

In Wajir Oxfam is supporting the creation of legislation relating to two policy areas: the Disaster Policy and Implementation Framework for Wajir county government; and the Rangeland Management Bill. These policies will have an impact on the county's preparedness to manage disasters.

In terms of creating policies and developing strategy, the NGOs have to a large extent had an impact on the county governments. The NGOs are working on a daily basis with the county departments, which has enriched the county officers' understanding and enhanced their desire to see the implementation of the policies.

On resource allocation, there remains room for improvement. The process has been slow and this was attributed to the governments' slow reception, especially in the first two years, when they were preoccupied with their own internal growth. The disaster management departments, as well as development sectors, such as agriculture, livestock and water sectors, have so far received relatively low funding in comparison to infrastructure investments, on which county resources have been focused to date. Furthermore, budget rationalisation by the decision-makers in the Governors' offices has made it difficult for departments to push through their own agendas, and in extension has meant that some of the ASP efforts in influencing the county allocations remain, for now, of little influence as the officers they work with, although sympathetic towards the NGOs' suggestions, have control over only small budgets. This situation will remain until the large infrastructure projects that are high in the local agenda move towards completion.

In sum, the NGOs have had some success highlighting the CMDRR plans and advocating for some budget allocations via that channel; this is work that would probably have been going on anyway, with ECHO and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance funding, so it is not directly attributable to the ASP.

4 Conclusions

4.1 Summary findings

This section offers summary answer to the key questions in the terms of reference. Since the four counties each have their nuances, the reader can also review the full text for each of the counties.

4.1.1 To what extent is there a consensus regarding the path toward resilience and the place of livelihood-enhancing actions in the CIDP?

This study took place a little too soon to generate a well-rounded picture of the CIDP priorities merely by looking at the documents themselves. The plans are all still 'first round' versions, hurriedly compiled with consultant support from Nairobi. Planned budgets are not broken down in much detail and expenditures were not made available to the evaluation team. The counties are now coming to the tail end of producing revised CIDPs. They have more buy-in at the county level but are yet to be implemented to the point where opinions can be formed on the extent to which they are going to help the poorest constituents build their resilience. It is worth noting that while the CIDPs are available on the Turkana and Marsabit county websites, this is not the case in Mandera and Wajir (as at March 2016). None of the counties have posted annual reviews or expenditure details.

Generally speaking, there is a consensus on the broad brush-stroke path towards greater resilience for the citizens of the counties as a whole, but a lack of consensus on some of the large infrastructure priorities (e.g. airports and abattoirs). Research and planning is underway on large projects that could have a wide impact on the poorest (e.g. expansion of irrigation if poor families are given first rights to land on such government investments). There is good progress on the large investments needed to improve livestock exports in the USAID-funded REGAL-AR area (mainly Marsabit and outside of the ASP programme area in Garissa). And while, generally, ASP investments are usually appropriate, more can be done to make these strategies more broadly understood by the planners and the legislators, so that more of the county budgets can be allocated towards helping to scale-up this category of investment. That only a small amount of the budgets is allocated from the CIDP to the kinds of actions funded by the ASP can be interpreted as meaning there is no consensus at the county level that this kind of investment is a priority over the short term. For suggested actions in this regard, see the next section of this report.

County governments are greatly concerned about poverty and see the investments they are making as being designed to increase the size of their economies. They are all discussing, have made plans and allocated budgets to, and in one case (see the Marsabit part of this report), have even launched, their own cash transfer programme to supplement the work of the national cash transfer programmes and the HSNP. They have also allocated resources for micro finance (or soon will be doing so), through their County Enterprise Funds, although none of the county schemes are targeted at the very poorest in the manner of the ASP or the REGAL-IR.

Finally, the county governments are all allocating substantive sums to other non-ASP-like actions that they broadly categorise as being resilience building support for the poorest households. Notably, this takes the form of school bursaries (all counties have allocated large budgets) and water service-point expansion (this is universally the top priority for all, from county to village level, with Wajir out-investing the other counties in digging more boreholes), and improvements in health-sector infrastructure.

The key point to highlight is that CIDP resources are not being focused on ASP or REGAL-IR type resilience building for the very poorest of the ‘promotive[19]’ kind.

4.1.2 What is the role of NGOs in building community resilience?

While the reader is encouraged to review the detailed information provided in the report above (since each NGO operates via its own strategy), there are a number of commonalities. All NGOs are involved in raising the awareness of county officials regarding what can be done to focus resilience building actions on the very poorest. They help also in making a connection between poor citizens and county-level development planners to lobby for resilience building focused on the poorest. All of the NGOs are involved in some kind of micro finance activity combined with mentoring, although the business models vary, from grouping, say, a maximum of three people together and giving small grants with frequent access to mentors (BOMA), to grouping people together in groups of 20–30 and giving loans with less frequent access to mentors.

4.1.3 What are the merits of combining the cash transfer and other livelihood support programmes?

The NGOs and ASP support recipients are in agreement that being a recipient of cash transfers makes households much more likely to succeed in ‘promotive’ small-scale business ventures, either individually or in groups. The guaranteed source of cash helps them pay back loans they may have taken out, and if they are part of a group makes the group more credit-worthy. This allows for a faster scaling of the loan tree, enabling households to graduate to larger loans earlier than would otherwise be the case. The NGOs estimate that somewhere between 20% and 40% of their beneficiaries also receive HSNP assistance. This is corroborated by the limited matching exercise we were able to carrying out between a dataset of Save the Children’s beneficiaries and the HSNP MIS, which showed that some 38% of that NGO’s beneficiaries were also recipients of HSNP assistance.

The problem for the CIDPs is that county governments are, to date, not able to scale-up the kind of programming style implemented by the NGOs. The high overhead costs of administrating ASP-like actions targeting resilience building are a well-known brake on convincing governments to focus more of their own attention on helping poor people to grow out of poverty. However, there may well be ways to reduce these costs if an overall county poverty reduction/resilience building strategy is put in place and donors working in the same space (notably ASP and REGAL-IR) come together—and also with county government funding and personnel through some kind of joint programme mechanism.

The long-running situation of almost permanent provision of food relief is perceived to have cramped communities’ motivation to unleash their productive potential; this was an observation brought up several times in interviews in the context of referring, positively, to the efforts of the ASP, REGAL-IR and others to help families grow themselves out of poverty. Whether this is the

[19] A common conceptual framework applied in the social protection field divides all social protection actions into four types. First, actions designed to *protect* citizens from economic and social deprivation through emergency interventions and Group 2 HSNP cash transfers; at county level coordination of these actions is the responsibility of the CSG in times of drought. Second, outside of emergency times there is the *preventive* category of actions designed to avert deprivation or to mitigate the impact of adverse shocks including health investments and unemployment benefits, such as Group 1 HSNP. Third, p*romotive* actions that aim to enhance assets and human capital and income earning capacity are the domain of the ASP and REGAL-IR and can also include larger scale actions aimed at growing the economy within the reach of ASP customer such as the preserve of REGAL-AR. Fourthly, there are *transformative* actions, including legal and judicial reforms, budget analysis and policy evaluations to help better manage social protection; for the case of the four counties this might include the development of comprehensive social protection or poverty alleviation strategies and associated legislation clarifying who is accountable for implementation.

case in reality or not[20], since general food distribution managed by central government seems to have been abandoned in favour of cash transfers (largely HSNP, but also the other NSNP programmes and the counties' own cash transfer programmes), activities such as those funded by the ASP to help poor families grow their own way out of poverty have expanded. What is not clear at the county level is whether the investments of the HSNP, the ASP and REGAL combined add up to less, about the same, or more than has been invested in general food distribution. This points to a desire, at county level, for more 'accounting' analysis, of resilience building support being provided via development programmes managed at the national level, to help county governments gain a more complete picture of trends.

Several county civil servants and NGO officials suggested that it would help to accelerate development if able-bodied poor people could do some work in return for cash, especially where the population is relatively dense, for example along the rivers in Mandera and Turkana. There is plenty of work to do to clear irrigation ditches of Prosopis, and plenty of room to expand existing irrigation channels and clear silt, maintain secondary roads and put in place local schemes to allow poorer households with able-bodied members to access jobs in county contracts such as school building construction. County officials often seemed to hold the opinion that the other national cash transfer programmes should expand to provide cash to the majority of households that should currently be on the HSNP (if it was well targeted), that the expansion capability of HSNP for activation in times of drought should be incorporated, and the capacity of county governments to manage cash-for-assets and ASP/REGAL-IR programming built up over a period of a few years.

Is this combined approach to livelihood support appropriate in the four counties?

The combined approach is certainly appropriate. The proviso is that 'promotive' resilience building support is at a low scale in terms of households reached, compared to the cash transfers. Also, due to the targeting problems HSNP currently has, it seems that a considerable proportion of ASP partner households that might qualify for HSNP are currently not enrolled, so they are not benefitting from the combined HSNP–ASP support. It is possible that HSNP targeting will improve in the near term[21], meaning that any future ASP-like support can potentially have a larger overall impact.

Were a more widespread understanding of ASP-financed strategies to grow at county budget decision-making level, leading to county budget allocations, and if there was stronger coordination with other international actors working in the same field as the ASP (notably REGAL-IR), one could see a relatively fast scale-up in ASP-like activities without increasing levels of capital having to come from the UK taxpayer.

4.1.4 What are the views of CIDP managers, fund allocators and NGO officials on the value for money of ASP activities?

Few CIDP managers know much about what the ASP-funded NGOs do with ASP financing. Governors tend to know quite a lot, because they travel within the county and make it their business to find out what is going on. The officials that work closely with ASP NGOs in the technical departments have knowledge of this area, but in the treasury departments and amongst the county assembly members the level of knowledge is low.

[20] A study examining the effects of food aid on incentives in Ethiopia found the reverse to be true. See Hoddinott, J. (2003) Examining the Incentive Effects of Food Aid on Household Behavior in Rural Ethiopia, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.
[21] HSNP is about to pilot, on behalf of the NSNP, a new targeting approach under the NSNP harmonisation and consolidation agenda.

The technical county staff are almost universally supportive and desire allocations of county funding to be applied to ASP activities. A communication strategy involving a combination of field visits and workshop-based orientations may well help to channel county resources towards ASP actions. Roughly speaking, the counties managed to spend about 80% of their budgets in the last financial year, so, at least theoretically, money is available if a strategy can be agreed between the county leadership, DFID and the ASP NGOs to start scaling up county investments.

4.1.5 To what extent did the ASP-funded NGOs influence county government planning and resource allocations on poverty reduction for the ASP target group?

The experience and success of the NGOs in influencing how CIDP resilience building strategies are conceived and executed has been quite varied. Moreover, it does not appear that either the focus on, or influence of, county government planning and resource allocations has increased specifically as a result of the ASP. Little or no budget is allocated by county governments to the kind of activities funded by the ASP, which reflects a lack of consensus within the counties that funding this kind of activity is a priority in the short term.

If the ASP wants to achieve its aim of influencing county government planning and resource allocation for poverty reduction for its target group, DFID needs to work more closely with both the NGOs and the county governments and other like-minded development partners – notably the USAID-funded REGAL coalition, the UN and the EC, with their focus on local governance capacity building. Such a coalition would stand a good chance of reaching a consensus on how to reduce poverty, and of backing that up with a budgeted action plan.

The maturation and expansion of the national cash transfer programmes (and the social protection policy more generally) in the region provides a foundation on which to build the next layer of actions that will promote people out of poverty in the four counties in a more coordinated way than is currently the case. If one assumes that micro-business creation is a good strategy to provide focused support to poorer households, then there could be a role for the ASP and other partners working towards similar outputs to come together with the county governments to devise an explicit budgeted poverty reduction strategy, underpinned by a situation analysis, a theory of change and a results framework that shows the budgets of all actors working towards poverty reduction goals for the poorest households. A dialogue between all partners with a view to working towards greater unity is at an early stage. The ASP is well positioned to help accelerate this dialogue and explore stronger coordination, including finding a way to help the CIDP to invest more outside of the infrastructure sphere.

In sum, given the close and longstanding relationship some NGOs have with the county governments, and their in-house expertise on poverty reduction, plus the fact that the NSNP is expanding in the four counties, DFID is well placed to challenge both the NGOs and the county governments to work on an explicit, evidence-based county policy and action plan, approved by the county assemblies, focused on the poorest, and building on the base provided by the cash transfer programmes, to work towards targets for lifting families out of poverty. The combination of expertise on the issue within DFID and the NGOs, together with a strengthening capacity within the county governments now able to reach out to local level with community consultation capabilities, could well be moulded into a powerful coalition that is more focused on promoting families out of poverty than is the case today. Mechanisms to achieve this are discussed below.

4.2 Discussion and options for future support for poverty reduction

How can DFID tweak its strategy of twinning a cash transfer programme targeted at poor households (HSNP) with a related set of actions aimed at helping those households grow out of poverty (ASP)?

4.2.1 County resilience building strategy and coordination committee

ASP was conceived before devolution arrived. The fact that county governments are now extant and have large resources to invest changes the possibilities for potential future strategies to help the Government of Kenya lift the poorest people out of poverty. However, county governments are new and are still finding their feet, with systems being built, human resources trained and construction of government buildings still underway.

Interviews confirmed that citizens feel government is closer to them and is more responsive to local needs, even reaching out, with the help of development partners, to sub-county and ward level and giving citizens a voice in county planning and budgeting through agreements on development plans for the local level (albeit with differing degrees of perceived success). Much more is being invested at local level than was the case before devolution, even though half the county budgets go on salaries and a substantive portion of the remainder goes on county capital infrastructure, including roads in the capital, airports in some cases, and buildings for local government. This still means that each of the four counties has somewhere between £10–20 million to invest per year on resilience building actions. If, say, with good advocacy, 5% to 10% of that budget could be spent on the poorest families – the beneficiaries of the ASP and REGAL-IR – this adds up to roughly the current ASP budget by county.

Suggestion 1: Help county government put in place a committee focused on developing and managing a county poverty reduction strategy. Chaired by the governor, key government departments could meet with international partners and their agents (NGOs) investing in this area (notably DFID and USAID, and also the EC, the UN, JICA and others). A key early task would be to take stock of existing actions and put in place a budgeted strategy that would include allocations from the county budget. One way to do this would be to work towards proposing an update of the terms of reference for the CSG to explicitly include formal attention to poverty reduction aimed at the poorest, as well as ensuring the relevant county departments are fully involved.

As the management of the CIDPs improves (the EC, USAID and UN are helping here) one can anticipate that processes for reviewing annual workplans by sector will be strengthened, with annual reports being produced and tweaks to activity plans and stronger mid-term reviews. As this takes place, NGOs working on resilience could lobby to become more engaged in sector planning at the county and sub-county level. There could also be a role to play for NGOs in helping to build CIDP management capacity, including through work-planning support, and possibly support for oversight of contracts awarded (especially brick and mortar work).

4.2.2 An arid county poverty reduction strategy for the poorest

The Second Medium-Term Plan for Drought Risk Management and EDE gives an overview of all the investments suggested as a way of ending drought emergencies in the arid lands. The plan includes mention of the HSNP and a wide array of other investments. However, it is notably vague about the strategy at the core of the ASP, a focus on helping the poorest families grow their way out of poverty through a combination of small grants, micro finance and technical support for setting up and expanding small businesses.

Suggestion 2: Through a combination of the research and evaluation material produced by DFID and the NGOs – for example the outputs of the current HSNP evaluation and the results of BOMA's randomised control trial – a powerful advocacy case could be brought together aimed at convincing national and county governments to invest more of their resources towards resilience building for the poorest households in the arid counties. Once the material is compiled, a communication strategy aimed at fostering dialogue could help to tip county leadership into supporting the development of an explicit strategy. Such a strategy should not forget to involve members of the county assemblies, as key customers.

4.2.3 Closer formal engagement of NGOs with county governments on poverty reduction

If DFID is to continue its strategy of combining support for cash transfers in the arid counties with a focus, involving that of NGOs, on helping to 'promote' the poorest households out of poverty, then it is likely that the best value for money will be found through a closer arrangement with county governments than has been the case with the ASP. All ASP NGOs have excellent relations with their county counterparts, and to varying extents they try and leverage county resources for resilience building focused on the poorest. Some have an explicit focus on this kind of advocacy (e.g. Oxfam), while others leave it to informal dialogue (e.g. World Vision).

DFID may be able to accelerate county government budget allocations if a more explicit agreement could be made between DFID management and county governors on working more closely together to support ASP-like actions.

Suggestion 3: Lay the groundwork for evolving the relations between NGOs and county governments:

- Help county government systematically orient county staff who are involved in budget decision-making on resilience building for poor people, through a combination of organised field trips, workshops, radio programmes focused on the achievements of the ASP and other similar programmes, such as REGAL-IR.
- Negotiate with county governments for NGO staff to engage in the more regular developmental sector committee meetings, rather than formally engaging with them only via the CSG. Where these committees are not functional, invest resources to help make them more functional. This could include setting up a bespoke county committee (see Suggestion 1).

County governments could be encouraged by DFID to discuss their options regarding how to channel their resources. A key reason why county governments have not been able to implement ASP-like investments is the administrative challenge of doing so, yet DFID has demonstrated that, via contracting NGOs, large numbers of poor households can be reached.

One option for the counties would be for them to channel resources via non-state actors, such as the NGOs, perhaps via a tripartite arrangement with DFID and the NGOs. Alternatively the usual county government tendering arrangement could be used, perhaps making use of ASP-NGO expertise to help prepare and review the tender documents.

Discussions with USAID and REGAL-IR management and the UN indicate that they would welcome closer planning of the next phase of resilience building strategy formulation to include these kinds of arrangements.

4.2.4 Including DFID resilience building resources in the county budgets

Suggestion 4: Include DFID resilience building budget allocations in the county budgets and leverage allocations of the county budgets:

- Negotiate incentives for county governments to make allocations, such as a 50:50 funding partnership at the activity level (assuming DFID would continue to channel their resources via the NGOs).
- Agree with county governments that DFID allocations via the NGOs appear in the sector budgeted workplans; this already happens with UN agency investments.

4.2.5 Improving targeting of ASP investments

Suggestion 5: Increase targeting efficiency at household level by using the HSNP MIS and Social Protection Secretariat Single Registry, which has been compiled for targeting cash transfers.

While this database was not ready at the beginning of the ASP (and it has had problems in the last few years), the current round of lesson learning is likely soon to result in a much better database that could be exploited by a coordinated poverty reduction strategy. New mobile database technologies using tablets and cell phones could be implemented to help implement this close connection.

4.2.6 Quality control on social sector infrastructure

County governments are struggling with value for money and quality control generally in regard to social sector construction contracts (e.g. health centre buildings being condemned as unsafe just a few years after construction). There are indications that county political leadership may welcome development partner offers for help in setting up independent monitoring of the quality of their contracts.

Suggestion 6: As part of the next phase negotiations on a closer engagement between NGOs and government, look into extending a tripartite agreement to include a role for NGOs to provide third-party feedback to county departments in regard to the quality of constructions completed under county government tenders.

4.2.7 Preparing guidelines for unit cost planning based on current experience

The overhead cost of delivery is critical for scaling up micro finance and technical support targeted at the very poorest. Even in population-dense areas, this is a design issue. Given the low population density in much of northern Kenya, and thus the cost of travel, careful consideration needs to be brought to bear in the evolution of ASP design. Understanding these costs better would help all partners with their strategy development for poverty reduction programming in northern Kenya.

Suggestion 7: With the operational lessons learned by the ASP contractors on their unit costs and how these vary, and the information feeding into the dialogue from the Landell Mills cost–benefit analysis, the partners could be brought together to develop some tighter parameters to guide expected operational cost overheads in a new phase. Conditions are ripening for a demographic transition; could more be done to encourage this as part of a poverty reduction strategy?

The 2014 Demographic and Health Survey gives county estimates for the first time. It shows that fertility rates are universally high across the counties. Tantalisingly, there are indications of the beginnings of a transition to lower fertility rates (although most adults in the four counties would still say that the numbers of children one gets depends on fate). However, based on the current trends, poverty reduction targets are going to be much harder to reach unless fertility rates decline.

While demographers cannot agree on the details of how a cultural shift takes place, we know enough to be able to see that the major building blocks are coming together. These factors include:

- more power for local government, which is increasingly able to reach out via community-based planning, giving people a greater sense of collective empowerment;
- investments that will drive economic growth, pending for many years, are now taking off (e.g. the focus on livestock marketing, improving social services, electricity supply and secondary roads);
- with exceptions, there is less likelihood of conflict, thanks in part to more local political activism, an issue noted at the most recent annual gathering of the pastoralist parliamentary group in March 2016;
- faster social assistance in response to drought as a result of the HSNP emergency scale-up capability;
- expanding access to banking; and
- Better communications, making these most remote of counties more connected to the rest of the country and the world.

Pulling against these positive factors is the unemployment rates amongst youth. With such high growth rates and a faltering economy, unemployment rates among youth are estimated to be around 85%. Especially in Turkana, in the recent past many of these youths would have been involved in cattle raiding in some form or another, which would serve as a kind of social pressure release.

Climate change is another negative factor, making it increasingly likely that northern Kenya will experience wetter years, followed by drought years.

Suggestion 8: Taking this all together it seems clear that a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy should include a government-led acceleration of efforts to encourage a demographic transition. Such strategies would of course need in-depth analysis, consensus building and careful planning with county government.

4.3 Large investments as the other engine for poverty reduction

The importance of large investments is illuminated by the case of Marsabit. From civil society to senior county planners there is a buzz around the major investments from REGAL-IR combined with county government on livestock marketing and the investments from several partners in building the main road. Interviews conducted for this study showed how these investments are encouraging many of the poorest households to invest more in livestock breeding, with capital derived from the ASP.

Especially in Turkana, but also in the other counties, there are a number of other ‘grand’ potential investments that have not taken off. These require greater coordination between funding partners than has been shown recently, but, were they to come to fruition, they have the potential to improve resilience. These include the expansion of irrigation and the widespread introduction of drip irrigation (desired for scale-up in all counties). Rough estimates indicate that perhaps 50% of irrigation potential is or has been exploited in Turkana (existing schemes have a history of falling into disrepair and being brought back again). While the county government is keen to expand investments in this area, it is clear that they are going to need a lot of help to make this happen.

A missing ingredient has been local political leadership that is strong enough to bring the potential players together to invest in these larger drivers of economic growth. With devolution, such strong leadership is now emerging at the county level. The major international partners could help in the search for the capital needed to bring more of these grand schemes to fruition by coming together in a coalition with local leadership to search for the capital.

Sustained growth out of poverty for the very poorest is probably only going to come from a combination of economic growth fuelled by large projects, combined with the NSNP cash transfers plus ASP/REGAL-IR type actions. The latter alone are necessary but not sufficient to fuel sustained poverty reduction.

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Annex A Persons interviewed

County	Name	Position and organisation	Method
Turkana	Charles Lokioto	County Executive Secretary, Ministry of Public Service, Decentralised Administration and Disaster Management, Turkana County Government	KII
	Joseph Lolepo	Ward Chairman, Lorengipi Ward, Loima sub-county	KII
	Michael Ewoi	MCA, Turkana	KII
	Evelyn Nadio	Programme Officer, NDMA Lodwar	KII
		The World Vision team	FGD
		The Trócaire team	FGD
		World Vision ASP recipients, Lokori sub-county	FGD
		Trócaire ASP recipients, Lobei sub-county	FGD
Marsabit	Sora Adano	Resilience officer, NDMA	KII
	Dub Jirmo	Food-for-assets coordinator, NDMA	KII
	James Jarso Iya	Ward administrator, Saganti Ward, Saku Sub-County	KII
		The Director of the Trade Department	KII
		MCAs	FGD
		The BOMA team	FGD
		Logo Logo township investment group	FGD
		The Concern Worldwide team	FGD
		The PSIP	FGD
	Winnie Imbusya	Manager of Concern's Food, Income and Markets programme	KII
		Concern Marsabit staff	FGD
		PISP ASP recipients	FGD
	Elias Ngari Mugai	Assistant Development Officer	KII
	Samson M. Kamau	Chief Hides and Skins Inspector	KII
		Dadachaelele investment group, Moyale sub-county	FGD
		Sololo Makutano investment group, Moyale sub-county	FGD
		Sololo Town investment group	FGD
		The Solidarité team	FGD
		Negele PFS	FGD
		Kalacha investment group	FGD
Mandera		OXFAM team managing the ASP programme	FGD
	Issack A. Hassan	MCA, Takaba	FGD
	Hon. Adan A. Nurro	MCA, Takaba South	KII
	Hassan Noor Adan	County Chief Officer – Devolved unit	KII

County	Name	Position and organisation	Method
	Mohamed Abdinasir	HSNP Programme Manager	KII
	Issak A. Hapicha	County Drought Resilience Officer	KII
	Mohammed A Issack	County Drought Response Officer	KII
	Abdullahi Mo Adan	Deputy Director Agriculture	KII
	Abdi M Ali	County Director – Livestock	KII
	Yakub Mohamed Abdi	Director TVET	KII
	Hon. Mohamed Abdi	MCA	KII
	Hon. Adan M Abdi	MCA	KII
	Hussein Mohamed Alio	CDC NDMA	KII
		Sub-county Administrators	FGD
		Save the Children PFS members	FGD
Wajir		Oxfam staff managing the programme	FGD
		Ward administrators	FGD
		Director water services; disaster management and humanitarian coordination; chief officer livestock and fisheries; regional pastoral livelihood resilience project coordinator (World Bank); CEC –ICT and trade development; chief officer decentralised units	FGD
		MLEAA – County Coordinator – OPCT	KII
		HSNP Programme Officer	KII
		ASP Programme Coordinator, Oxfam	KII
	Ahmed Farah	CDC NDMA	KII
		Jaijai Multipurpose Coop Society	FGD
Nairobi	Mary Merttens	Office of Food for Peace, USAID Kenya	KII
	Jennifer Maurer	Resilience Team Leader, Office of Economic Growth, USAID Kenya	KII
	Matthew Lovick	Chief of Party, REGAL-IR	KII
	Sid Chatterjiee	UNFPA representative, Kenya	KII

Annex B Interview guides

B.1 KIIs with NGOs

- What is the role of the ASP in your organisation in building community resilience to shocks?
- What is the role of the ASP in your programming?
- What kind of livelihoods building activities are you undertaking?
- How has your menu of activities changed over the last five years?
- What proportions of your livelihoods programming funds are from the ASP?
- Who are your other funding partners for livelihoods generation?
- When you became an ASP partner was there a need to adapt your livelihoods building programme model to fit your activities into the ASP programme model, as defined by the ASP logframe?
- How do NGOs coordinate with county officials on resilience building activities?
- What changes have you seen in the emphasis given to livelihoods building in the CIDPs devolution?
- Do you perceive any difference to the implementation of development activities in the county as a result of the EDE initiative?
- To what extent is there a consensus regarding the path toward resilience and the place of livelihoods-enhancing actions in the CIDPs?
- What do the county development strategies say about the pathway toward resilience, and what are the views of county councillors, civil servants and NGO ASP implementers on the country strategy? What else should be in the county plans?
- To what extent are activities funded by the ASP likely to be central to a path toward universal resilience in each of the four counties?
- Is this combined approach to livelihoods support appropriate in the four counties?
- What are the sources of risks and vulnerability?
- How do community members reduce, mitigate and cope with different stresses and shocks?
- What are the views of CIDP managers, fund allocators and NGO officials on the value for money of ASP activities?
- What proportion of county-level budgets is allocated to ASP-funded activities in the 2013/14 financial year?
- What can be gleaned from the country records regarding expenditure trends on these activities?
- What are the views of country-level officials regarding trends in such allocations over the next five years?
- What are the views of NGO implementers on the trends in county allocations toward the actions of ASP funds? What else could be done, if appropriate, to convince county governments to allocate more resources to ASP-like activities?

B.2 KIIs with county officials

- What proportion of county development funds are allocated to livelihoods building activities aimed at the poorer households in the county?
- Is this money spent by the end of the financial year?

- Are extra funds allocated in the course of the year to these kinds of livelihoods generation activities?
- Alternatively, are funds allocated away from this line item in the course of the year?
- How has the allocation to livelihoods generation changed since the first devolved budget?
- What influence has the EDE strategy had on livelihoods support activities in the county development budget?
- Who are the international development partners supporting livelihoods generation activities for the poorer citizens of the county?
- How is their support for livelihoods building coordinated with spending by the county government?
- How does the county government instigate oversight of the work of the NGOs on livelihoods support?

B.3 FGDs with household recipients of ASP funding, some of whom are also recipients of HSNP transfers

- Do households that receive cash transfers from the HSNP involve themselves in livelihoods building activities?
- What proportion do you think are able to save some of their money for investing in businesses?
- What kind of livelihoods-enhancing activities do HSNP households involve themselves in?
- How has this changed over the last few years?
- What are the enabling and constraining factors in regard to undertaking the range of livelihoods activities identified?
- To what extent, if at all, do the businesses stimulated by livelihoods-enhancing funding result in a loss of household mobility?
- Is a loss of mobility a concern?
- What do the poorest households need to do to be able to take themselves out of poverty over the long term?