



# **Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems Research**

Literature Review (2<sup>nd</sup> edition)

March 2017

## About the project

The Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems study is a two-year research programme (2015 to 2017) led by Oxford Policy Management (OPM), in consortium with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and INASP. Its aim is to strengthen the evidence base as to when and how social protection systems can better respond to shocks in low-income countries and fragile and conflict-affected states, thus minimising negative shock impacts and reducing the need for separate humanitarian responses.

The research is funded by UK Aid from the UK government as part of the UK Department for International Development's (DFID's) Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Programme (HIEP). HIEP is an initiative to improve the quality, quantity and use of evidence in humanitarian programming.

## About this report

This document reviews recent literature on the theory and practice of shock-responsive social protection initiatives and their effectiveness, to accompany the inception report of the study. It is the second edition, having been updated at the end of the project's implementation phase in 2017, to take into account publications and experiences of other research organisations and donor agencies since the first edition was released in March 2016.

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## Executive summary

DFID has commissioned research into shock-responsive social protection systems, to further understand the nature of the interaction between social protection, humanitarian and disaster risk management systems and ways in which long-term social protection systems can be scaled up to provide support in humanitarian emergencies. This literature review is a deliverable under the project and consolidates current thinking and emerging evidence on this topic.

**Section 1 summarises the objectives and methods used.** The authors have reviewed over 400 papers, including peer-reviewed journal papers and open-access documents issued by donor agencies and research organisations. The study is global; however, region- and country-specific literature centres on the three focal regions, namely the Sahel, eastern / southern Africa and Asia.

**Section 2 identifies the types of covariate shock** that are the focus of the research. Shocks are the occurrence of one event or multiple events that result in a loss of welfare by individuals or by a wider community. Covariate shocks can be classified as slow- or rapid-onset shocks, one-off or cyclical shocks, natural, political and economic crises. The section summarises the state of evidence on the impact of covariate shocks on households. After the occurrence of a shock, households may resort to negative risk-coping behaviours, including the depletion of assets such as the sale of livestock, reduction of food consumption, forced migration, or withdrawal of children from school.

**Section 3 summarises key elements of the three overlapping disciplines of importance to shock-responsive social protection: social protection, disaster risk management and humanitarian assistance.** It sets out OPM's typology of social protection to be used in this research, comprising social assistance (social transfers; subsidies; waivers; and public works); social insurance; active labour market policies and social care services. The literature identifies a major overlap between social protection and humanitarian assistance in the use of cash transfers and material assistance, including food. The review also finds several important differences between social transfer programmes and humanitarian transfers, concerning objectives, underlying principles, the value and duration of assistance and use of conditions. These differences are important to bear in mind when considering the scaling-up of social transfers in a crisis.

**Section 4 details the conceptualisation of shock-responsive social protection in the literature.** It explains factors provoking interest in this concept among policymakers—specifically the changing nature (severity, frequency and protracted nature) of emergencies; changes in the conceptualisation of linking relief to development; and recognition of limitations in the current system for delivery of humanitarian assistance. There are increasing calls for humanitarian needs to be built into and addressed as part of longer term development programming, through longer term predictable funding sources and with greater engagement of governments.

The review summarises the evidence as to why social protection—and particularly social transfers—as a vehicle for moving forward with this vision is conceptually appealing. At its core, social protection is a risk management tool for households and individuals. Social transfer programmes are growing in coverage and form the foundation of emerging social protection systems in crisis-affected countries. They have similar administrative requirements to humanitarian programmes that transfer cash and food. Providing assistance during crises through these systems also allows national governments to take responsibility for meeting needs within their territory and a medium-term exit strategy for humanitarian aid.

This section also identifies the defining features of shock-responsive social protection. Aspects considered important determinants of effectiveness in the literature include: flexibility, timeliness,

adaptability and adequacy of resources; links to an established early warning system; central registries for targeting, verification and disbursement; coordination through a single central agency; secure financing to enable governments to invest and build systems; and innovative partnership arrangements including public, private and non-state actors. It notes that social transfers are likely to be a major social protection instrument of relevance for addressing needs following a covariate shock. The literature also suggests that in the context of low-income (and some middle-income) countries and fragile states, the high degree of informality in the labour market and limited development of formal policies and systems are likely to limit the use of social insurance and active labour market policies for shock-response.

This section sets out a typology of ways that social protection systems might respond to a shock:

1. **Vertical expansion:** increasing the benefit value or duration for existing beneficiaries.
2. **Horizontal expansion:** adding new beneficiaries to an existing programme.
3. **Piggybacking:** using a social protection programmes administrative framework to deliver assistance, but running the shock-response programme separately.
4. **Shadow alignment:** running a parallel humanitarian system that aligns as best as possible with a current or possible future social protection programme.
5. **Refocusing:** in case of budget cuts, adjusting the social protection programme to refocus assistance on groups within the caseload that are most vulnerable to the shock. One might consider this to be an 'austerity strategy'.

**Section 5 summarises recent trends in the funding of humanitarian response;** the most common recipients of humanitarian funds; and the types of shocks most likely to be funded. Funds are not assigned to sectors in a way that makes it evident how much of either this international assistance, or the unquantifiable domestic response to emergencies, can be classified as 'social protection'. At times of great demand and finite resources there are difficult decisions to be made regarding funding priorities. The bulk of international government funding in emergency settings tends to be devoted to responding to protracted crises in a small number of countries over many years, especially in conflict-affected areas. Where rapid-onset emergencies call for additional assistance, it tends to be easier to obtain funding for natural hazards such as earthquakes than for economic crises. This is particularly true for funding from private sources.

The section summarises trends in funding for social protection and discusses the implications of these trends for shock-responsive social protection. In lower income countries social assistance programmes may be incorporated into the government's budget but they continue to depend on donor financing as their main source of funding. Any scaling-up of social protection is therefore likely to require external donor financing in the short to medium term. This section also explores the use—or the potential—of instruments such as contingency funds, savings and borrowing, contingent credit, and disaster insurance / catastrophe bonds for the rapid financing of social protection scale-up.

**Section 6 explains why consideration of the political economy of social protection is so important** when designing or implementing shock-responsive social protection. The importance of political economy influences on social policies and systems generally, and some social protection in particular, has long been recognised—yet international donors have until recently failed to engage with political economy factors that underpin poverty. Political economy issues relevant to shock-responsive social protection include consideration of how recipients of emergency assistance are identified, the value of assistance to be received, the institutional location of the emergency response, and the triggers by which funds are released. The section also explores the particular issues to which it will be important to pay attention on programmes seeking to scale up in contexts of fragility and conflict. This includes exacerbated poverty and vulnerability to shocks;

damage to infrastructure; a lack of social cohesion; and a need for developing citizens' trust in the state and in managing possible conflict between certain groups.

**Section 7 details examples of where countries have implemented shock-responsive social protection initiatives following a covariate shock** and summarises the lessons learned in terms of what worked and the challenges in policy design and implementation. Evidence comes from countries affected by the food, fuel and financial crisis of 2008-9, and countries facing rapid and slow onset weather-related shocks. This includes analysis of the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in northern Kenya, among many others. The displacement crisis affecting countries bordering Syria and other conflict-affected countries in the Middle East region has also led to the piloting of shock-responsive social protection.

There is clear evidence of the potential beneficial impact of social assistance, especially social transfers in the form of cash or in-kind transfers. The adoption of options such as subsidies or school feeding may offer a pragmatic response to future shock-response, and be the most feasible and cost-efficient option where institutional weakness and limited existing systems constrain intervention options. There are only a couple of examples in the literature around the scaling up of social insurance or social care services in emergencies. Meeting the needs of informal sector workers affected by crises remains a challenge, as they are excluded from social insurance and also from most social assistance in low-income, where cash transfers are highly rationed and may exclude those with available labour.

The studies also highlight challenges encountered by social protection provision in the event of a shock. The need for timely and rapid response presents a major challenge. So is the provision of adequate levels of support.

**Section 8 discusses the lessons emerging from these studies about the operational processes required for effective shock-responsive social protection.** The feasibility of shock-responsive social protection depends on timely and accurate data; a functioning management information system; strong targeting and delivery systems; institutional capacity to manage the shock-response; and coordination mechanisms between social protection, humanitarian and DRM actors and institutions. A key element of success is having systems in place upon which to add the crisis response initiative. This can make scaling up to geographically unserved areas a challenge, if there is a lack of infrastructure such as for targeting and delivery systems. Meanwhile, reaching a new caseload in existing programme areas can overburden the administrative capacity of staff to support additional households. A major concern in the literature is how to scale down such programmes post-crisis once provision is extended, which highlights the need for exit processes.

**Finally, section 9 proposes a set of future research questions** to build evidence in the field of shock-responsive social protection, based on an analysis on the gaps identified in the literature review and by other researchers. In particular we perceive that it would be valuable to further explore the potential of social protection mechanisms other than social (cash or in-kind) transfers, including social care services, social insurance and active labour market policies.

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## Abbreviations

ADRF	Africa Disaster Risk Financing Initiative
ARC	African Risk Capacity
BISP	Benazir Income Support Programme
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership
Cat-DDOs	Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Options
CCRIF	Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
CCT	conditional cash transfer
CDCP	Citizen Damage Compensation Programme (Pakistan)
CERC	Contingent Emergency Response Components
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CMAM	Community Management of Acute Malnutrition
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development, UK Government
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRFI	Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance programme (Pacific)
DRM	disaster risk management
DRR	disaster risk reduction
ERC	ECHO's Enhanced Response Capacity
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FbF	Forecast-based Financing
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
GHA	Global Humanitarian Assistance report
HIEP	Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Programme
HSNP	Hunger Safety Net Programme (Kenya)
IDA	International Development Association
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRF	Internal Risk Facility
IRM	Immediate Response Mechanism
LEAP	Livelihood Early Assessment Protection (Ethiopia)
LIAS	Livelihood Impact Assessment Sheets (Ethiopia)
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NGO	non-governmental organisation

NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority (Pakistan)
NDRRMF	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (Philippines)
NISSA	National Information System for Social Assistance (Lesotho)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PCRAFI	Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative
PMT	proxy means test
PSNP	Productive Safety Nets Programme (Ethiopia)
RFM	Risk Financing Mechanism
RSR	Rapid Social Response
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SHARE	Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience
SINAPRED	<i>Sistema Nacional para la Prevención Mitigación y Atención de Desastres</i>
SRAF	Situation and Response Analysis Framework
UN	United Nations
UNISDR	United Nations Integrated Strategy for Disaster Reduction
WFP	World Food Programme
4Ps	Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (Philippines)
'Triple F Crisis'	Term referring to the higher fuel and food prices and the financial crisis in 2008/9

# 1 Introduction

This literature review is intended to be of use to all stakeholders contributing to policy-making, programme implementation or research on the nature of the interaction between social protection, humanitarian and disaster risk management (DRM) systems, and on the ways in which long-term social protection systems have been used in response to humanitarian emergencies, be they slow- or rapid-onset shocks, one-off or cyclical, natural, political or economic crises. A first version of this literature review was published during the inception phase of DFID's research programme on Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems in 2015. Since many organisations have been researching and working in this field, it was agreed with DFID that work on an updated second version would be undertaken in 2017, to update the review with newer research in order to maintain its relevance. This document is the second edition of the literature review. Overall, the team gathered and reviewed approximately 500 documents. Some are peer-reviewed journal papers and many are open-access documents issued by donor agencies and research organisations.

The literature review provides the background to the development of the concept of our team's approach to analysing how long-term social protection systems can respond to shocks. Our theoretical approach is detailed in the working paper which accompanies this review; it covers discussions as to how the research team interprets and approaches the concept of shocks, the typology of social protection systems, and mechanisms for responding through such systems in an emergency (Oxford Policy Management, 2015b).

## 1.1 Themes of the review

Sections 2–4 of the literature review present, in brief, the setting as to how these issues have been conceptualised in recent literature. These cover the nature of shocks (section 2), the sectoral context of social protection, humanitarian assistance and DRM (section 3), and conceptualisations of shock-responsiveness (section 4).

Sections 5–6 focus on contextual determinants of effectiveness—financing, political economy, and fragility and conflict. Section 7 examines country-specific experiences of designing and implementing shock-responsive social protection programmes and Section 8 covers operational issues. Most of the examples are drawn from low- and middle-income countries. The inclusion of middle-income countries allows the consideration of experiences from states whose social protection systems have a wide range of maturity. Section 9 rounds off the review with a summary of research gaps highlighted in the literature and from our own analysis.

Given the huge array of research initiatives on the topic at present, we felt it useful to add a descriptive summary to point to some of the key global and regional research activities which may generate large amounts of relevant data and documentation on an ongoing basis. This is provided in Annex A.

## 1.2 Document collection and analysis

We have collected documentation of three types: first, papers of thematic relevance with a global or non-country specific focus; second, documents by global multilateral agencies and non-government organisations (NGOs) outlining their research activities and interventions in relevant sectors; and third, papers that analyse the topic in relation to a specific region or country.

The thematic literature has covered sectoral analyses of social protection, humanitarian assistance and DRM; resilience; conflict and fragility; financing; and the differing ways of measuring

programme effectiveness. Literature by global agencies comprises approaches to social protection and humanitarian assistance as outlined by United Nations (UN) agencies including UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP); DFID (including other research initiatives under the Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Programme (HIEP) and the High-Level Panel on Cash Transfers); the European Union, in both its development and humanitarian arms; the World Bank; and several other international NGOs and research agencies.

The region- and country-specific literature is centred on the three regions that are the focus for this study, namely the Sahel, eastern / southern Africa and Asia, whilst also including evidence from other countries and regions globally. In the Sahel, this includes much documentation on regionwide initiatives. In east Africa there is substantial evidence from Ethiopia and Kenya, two main countries where long term social protection systems have been scaled up in response to humanitarian emergencies. In Asia there is evidence coming from the experiences of scaling up social protection during the typhoon Haiyan response in the Philippines, as well as from similar pilots in Nepal and Fiji. In Latin America and the Caribbean, much evidence comes from a complementary study on shock-responsive social protection in this region by OPM and WFP.

## 2 The nature of shocks

### Key points:

- Shocks can be covariate (affecting many people at once, e.g. an earthquake) or idiosyncratic (affecting individuals, often through life events such as loss of jobs or illness). While all social protection measures respond to shocks, our focus here is on covariate shocks.
- Shocks can be rapid- or slow-onset; natural, social, economic, legal or political. Geographical location may also be a relevant distinction. Some shocks are complex, having multiple dimensions.
- Covariate shocks can increase households' demand for assistance, while risking reducing the level of resources available to respond. Households may use negative coping strategies or suffer adverse impacts on numerous aspects of their well-being, from food insecurity to loss of community cohesion.

### 2.1 Types of shock

Defining a 'shock' is fundamental in exploring the possibility for social protection systems to be 'shock-responsive'. All social protection interventions are in some sense shock-responsive, in that they deal either *ex-ante* or *ex-post* with chronic or sudden events that negatively affect households' livelihoods. So what types of shock are relevant to this review, and how are these classified?

Shocks are the occurrence of one or multiple events that result in a loss of welfare by individuals or by a wider community (Hoddinott, 2009). Risk, the probability that these events will occur, is elaborated in DRM literature as 'the probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions'. Here, hazards are, 'potentially damaging physical events, phenomenon or human activities that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation' and vulnerable conditions are necessarily those that increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards (Baas *et al.*, 2008, UNISDR, 2009).

A common distinction in the categorisation of shocks is between those that affect a large proportion of the population simultaneously (covariate shocks) and those that affect individuals, often through life cycle events such as a loss of jobs, illness, death, etc. (idiosyncratic shocks) (e.g. Holzmann and Jorgensen, 2000). This distinction is central to the present research: while all social protection measures are 'shock-responsive', our focus here is on covariate rather than idiosyncratic shocks.

Two useful further typologies of shocks are adopted in this research. These cover, first, their speed and duration: they can be rapid-onset, e.g. a flood or earthquake; slower onset, such as a drought, or prolonged, e.g. civil war. Second is the setting, which may be natural, social, economic, legal or political (Hoddinott, 2009; McCord, 2013a). McCord (2013a) highlights geographical location (urban vs. rural) as a further classification of relevance to the analysis of shock-responsive systems and policies. Often populations can be afflicted by several interlinked shocks at once. For example, in Somalia, the 2011 famine was a result of multiple factors including drought and food prices, but exacerbated by the conflict that limited the migratory patterns of those affected and also the humanitarian agencies' inability to operate in the country (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2011).

### 2.2 Evidence on the impact of covariate shocks

Covariate shocks can have implications for policymakers in terms of both the size and nature of the demand for assistance by households, and the availability of resources such as tax revenues to respond. One objective of a 'shock-responsive' system is, in part, to find the balance between the two, both mitigating the impact of a shock on households, including through the implementation of

disaster-risk reduction policies or systems for early warning and preparedness for shocks, and ensuring that resources are made available in a timely manner if *ex-post* assistance is required.

In relation to the demand for assistance by households, the literature highlights *ex-ante* and *ex-post* coping mechanisms of households in anticipation of, or in reaction to, shocks (Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Deaton, 1992; Dercon, 2002). A growing body of evidence pertaining to rural and, increasingly, urban settings in many countries suggests that households are unable to fully insure themselves against covariate shocks (GFDRR, 2016; Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997; Fafchamps *et al.*, 1998; Porter, 2012). After the occurrence of a shock, households may resort to negative risk-coping behaviours including the depletion of assets such as the sale of livestock, reduction of food consumption, forced migration, or withdrawal of children from school (Dercon, 2005; OPM, 2014).

These behaviours are quite consistent across geographical areas and over time. They are often associated with households that have fewer years of education and lower consumption. In Bangladesh, for example, Azam and Imai (2012) find covariate shocks to have a relatively higher impact on the vulnerability of poorer, less educated and often rural households. Similarly, in Pacific island countries, poorer households commonly have livelihood strategies that depend on natural resources and are highly sensitive to disasters; they are also more likely to live in areas at risk of a disaster, and to have less access to savings, credit and insurance (Costella and Ivaschenko, 2015). In Zimbabwe, a review of the consequences of a moderate drought found that some households drew down on their assets (households with more assets were more likely to draw down on them) and children from poorer households never recovered from their reduced growth rate compared with those in better off households (Hoddinott, 2006). In rural Ethiopia, households were on average unable to protect themselves against extreme rainfall failure, although they were better able to cope with idiosyncratic shocks (Porter, 2012). In the same country, Yilma *et al* (2014) find that households use savings and reduction in food consumption as coping mechanisms against natural and economic covariate shocks. The same challenges are noted in urban areas. The World Bank highlights the exposure of the urban poor in sub-Saharan Africa to hazards due to rapid urbanisation, poorly planned settlements in high-risk areas, unsustainable land use, and stress on infrastructure, which reduces the coping capacity of these communities (GFDRR, 2016). The World Bank's Shock Waves research into the impact of climate change on development also finds that, for all countries where data exist, poor urban households are more exposed to floods than the average urban population (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016).

After the so-called triple F crisis around 2008-09 (higher fuel and food prices and the financial crisis) many studies looked at its impact on households and the wider economy. Undertaking qualitative research in 17 countries, Heltberg *et al* (2012) found widespread reports of food insecurity, debt, asset loss, stress, and worsening crime and community cohesion, with women often being affected the most. In Nigeria, Samuels *et al.* (2011) found the causal pathway of the crisis and its impact on the economy and households to be complex, but overall found it to have impacted on children's well-being, by increasing their vulnerability and worsening the rates of malnutrition, school withdrawal and child labour. A systematic review of the impact of the crisis on child health found most studies to show harmful effects on children's health, with the most vulnerable groups being disproportionately affected (Rajmil *et al.*, 2014). At an aggregate level the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified reductions in exports as a major likely impact of a crisis on this scale, together with lower levels of remittances and investments (IMF, 2009). These in turn were projected to result in significant reductions in government revenues.

### 3 The sectoral context: social protection, humanitarian assistance and disaster risk management systems

#### Key points:

- Social protection is commonly recognised to comprise social assistance (in the form of social transfers, public works programmes, fee waivers and subsidies), social insurance, social care services and certain active labour market policies. The main overlap between social protection and humanitarian assistance is between social transfers and material assistance in cash and in kind (food).
- The growth of cash transfers as a modality in emergencies has implications for the way in which humanitarian assistance is conceived and delivered, with potential to consolidate transfers that are meeting humanitarian needs in different sectors and streamline infrastructure. However, some objectives of cash-based humanitarian assistance may continue to be best met through standalone transfers.
- Whilst there are overlaps in the design of cash transfers provided as humanitarian assistance and those provided as social assistance, there are also some important differences to bear in mind concerning programme objectives, underlying principles, the value and duration of assistance and use of conditions.
- There is a wealth of humanitarian assistance that does not involve resource transfers or other social protection interventions and would not be affected by, or linked to, shock-responsive social protection.

#### 3.1 Social protection

##### 3.1.1 The ever-changing definition of social protection: latest positions

Having defined a shock, we turn to the question of what counts as a social protection system. Here the literature—both academic and grey literature, especially publications produced by international agencies—varies in its definitions, as do individual countries in accordance with the evidence and their political and ideological perspectives (Devereux and White, 2010). In the case of international agencies, the definition can depend on their organisational mandates. The debate has moved over the decades. Among the most widely adopted definitions of social protection in the last 15 years is that of Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004, p.9) which, expanding on the work of Holzmann and Jørgensen, extends the term beyond its previous confines of formal public social security to cover:

*the set of all initiatives, both formal and informal, that provide: social assistance to extremely poor individuals and households; social services to groups who need special care or would otherwise be denied access to basic services; social insurance to protect people against the risks and consequences of livelihood shocks; and social equity to protect people against social risks such as discrimination or abuse.*

That paper also establishes the now firmly embedded notion of social protection as comprising 'protective', 'preventive', 'promotive' and 'transformative' measures. According to that notion, protective measures are those that provide relief in the sense of safety nets for individuals and households suffering from deprivation, who are otherwise unable to earn a livelihood; preventive measures avert deprivation; promotive measures have a function of consumption-smoothing, but with additional objectives of improving a household's own earning potential; and transformative measures address social equity (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004).

Recent recommendations and policy developments refer to the concept of 'social protection floors', as enshrined by the International Labour Organisation's (ILO's) Recommendation 202 of 2012.

National social protection floors are defined as ‘nationally defined sets of basic social security guarantees which secure protection aimed at preventing or alleviating poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion’ (ILO Recommendation 202). The ILO Recommendation reaffirms social protection as a human right, and firmly anchors the concept of social protection floors to principles of universality, entitlement, adequacy, non-discrimination and social inclusion (ILO, 2012; ILO, 2014). This concept of social protection is picked up by the African Union in its recommendations on building an African agenda on social protection systems (African Union, 2014).

More recently, the establishment of social protection floors and systems has been recognised as a cornerstone for achieving the global development goals. Social protection floors and systems are included in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a policy instrument available to governments in the pursuit of the newly agreed goals, alongside other social sectors previously included in the Millennium Development Goals, such as education and health. For example, target 1.3 of the first SDG states:

*1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable. (United Nations, 2015, p. 15).*

In July 2015, world leaders in Addis Ababa committed to delivering social protection and essential public services for all, through a new social compact to ‘end poverty in all its forms everywhere’. In sum, both the Financing For Development Action Agenda and the SDGs contain strong language on the need to provide social protection systems and measures for all (Bastagli, 2015).

For this research, we understand social protection as the set of public actions that address both the absolute deprivation and vulnerabilities of the poorest, and the need of the currently non-poor for security in the face of shocks and lifecycle events. The ‘public’ character of this response may be governmental or non-governmental, or both (Norton *et al.*, 2001). We also recognise that social protection encompasses a wide range of policy instruments, with varying objectives and supported by different financing mechanisms: we consider policies that may be labelled as ‘social assistance’, ‘social care’, ‘social insurance’ and ‘labour market policies’ (Figure 1). Broadly, policies vary depending on whether they pursue: (a) a social assistance function, supporting vulnerable groups and generally financed through taxation, or through external aid in many low-income countries; or (b) social insurance, addressing risks over people’s lifetimes, generally funded through employer / employee contributions and based on principles such as risk-pooling. These distinctions may be fuzzy, with general taxation used, for instance, to finance social insurance deficits. However, they provide a useful framework within which to categorise policies and programmes<sup>1</sup>.

Our research takes into account the full range of social protection policy instruments, including cash and in-kind transfers, public works programmes, food and fuel subsidies, social care services, training schemes and employment subsidies. Contributory social insurance is not covered where these respond to idiosyncratic shocks, given the focus on response to covariate shocks.


### 3.1.2 Types of social assistance

Social assistance interventions transfer resources to, or otherwise provide economic support to, individuals and households, particularly those considered to be poor or vulnerable (Holmes and Lwanga-Ntale, 2012). Social assistance has been used as a crisis-response mechanism in low-income countries. Response can take various forms including adjustment in the context of spending cuts, scaling up existing programmes or introducing new safety nets. There are

<sup>1</sup> Such a broad framework for social protection is widely understood, forming the foundation to many national policies and strategies and widely adopted in the literature on social protection systems (for example, White, 2016).

numerous examples in low- and middle-income countries of long term social assistance programmes that have fulfilled protective, preventive and promotive objectives in the context of a crisis.

**Figure 1** Our typology of social protection



Source: Authors

- Much of the focus of social assistance responses in emergency settings to date has been on **social transfers**, initially in-kind, but now quite commonly also cash and voucher transfers (see section 7 below). The term ‘cash transfers’ refers here to transfers of monetary value from governments or organisations involved in supporting poor or vulnerable individuals or households, either with or without conditions attached<sup>2</sup>. It does not include person-to-person transfers such as migrant remittances (informal social protection). The use of social transfers has considerable political and cultural implications. Social transfers are about redistributing public resources; and defining a social transfer policy is thus “self-evidently about a vision of society” (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2007: 2), as it implies clarifying which inequalities a society aims to reduce (or which privileges elite groups aim to maintain) through such transfers. In the Sahel, anthropological studies in Niger and Mauritania question the appropriateness of the targeted cash transfer approach (Cartiaux, 2013; Olivier de Sardan, 2013). A recent study in Mauritania also reveals the level of mistrust between national stakeholders and foreign aid actors (Broudic and Selmane, 2015). The overlap between cash transfers provided in emergency and chronic poverty contexts is presented in section 3.4 below.
- **Public works programmes** provide cash or food in return for short term employment on public infrastructure projects. These are used quite extensively under long term social assistance to support the livelihoods and promote the skills of poor households with labour capacity, and to respond to crises, especially under the auspices of the WFP.
- **Fee waivers** and **subsidies**, such as food or fuel subsidies, are an indirect means of increasing the value of household income since they reduce the cost of services and items purchased by the household (Slater *et al.*, 2014). Even if a household's demand for the goods or services is not affected by an emergency, the fact of freeing up the income it would have spent on the items may allow it to increase its expenditure on other essentials such as food. Food security can also be improved by means of subsidies on agricultural inputs (Slater *et al.*, 2014). However, fee waivers and—especially—subsidies are not uncontroversial, as they risk being regressive, delivering greater benefit to less poor households who consume more.

<sup>2</sup> Conditional cash transfers are those where continued receipt of assistance is conditional on the beneficiary fulfilling certain behaviours.

### 3.1.3 Social care responses

'Social care' may be variously called, or subsumed under 'social services', 'social welfare' or 'social work' (EveryChild, 2012). It refers to non-cash interventions such as family support services to prevent family breakdown, child protection services to respond to abuse and neglect, alternative care for children, and social work support to people with disabilities. The importance of psychosocial support in such circumstances is recognised in some quarters (NATO, 2008; Shi, 2014; Xijin and Zhang, 2014). In its six-step model of care, NATO (2008, p.11) notes the need for:

*prevention services that are intended to develop the collective psychosocial resilience of communities and which are planned and delivered in advance of untoward events; basic humanitarian and welfare services that should be made available to everyone and which are centred on families; [and] screening, assessment and intervention services for people who do not recover from immediate and short-term distress.*

However, in many countries the provision of this type of service is low even in a non-crisis context (EveryChild, 2012). Perhaps also for this reason, the literature pays little attention to the possibility of planning for the use or scale-up of regular long term social care services in the event of a disaster.

### 3.1.4 Social insurance

Social insurance comprises insurance programmes that are managed or supervised by government, and funded by contributions paid by (or on behalf of) participants or taxation. In essence, it addresses uncertain risk of loss for the unit (e.g. individual or household) by combining a larger number of similarly exposed units (e.g. individuals or households) into a common fund that makes good the loss caused to any one member (van Ginneken, 1999, cited in Norton *et al.*, 2001). Programmes generally serve a defined population to protect against economic risk caused by a shock, and participation is either compulsory, or the programme is subsidised such that most eligible individuals are able to participate (ILO Convention 102, in Kidd, 2012). Examples of social insurance policies include old-age pensions, unemployment and maternity benefits, and health insurance. Social insurance may be classified as a 'preventive' social protection measure, in that it is designed to reduce the risk of households falling into difficulty in the first place. While much social insurance covers idiosyncratic risk, such policies may nevertheless still provide support to participants affected by certain covariate shocks (see section 7 for examples).

A key challenge to the effectiveness of social insurance in many low- and some middle-income countries is its low coverage and/or undercoverage of low-income groups and of particular sectors of the population, such as the informal sector. Efforts to extend social insurance coverage to currently undercovered or excluded groups include simplifying and streamlining administrative procedures, and removing or adjusting restrictions to membership. However, penetration remains very low in developing countries (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). Insurance innovations and development of index-based insurance products are emerging that are specifically aiming to provide protection against covariate shocks at household or community level. These for the most part remain private insurance schemes rather than social insurance, but may offer some potential for shock-responsive social protection. Section 7 discusses this in fuller detail.

### 3.1.5 Active labour market policies

Active labour market policies are labour market measures to protect existing jobs, and stimulate employment. Besides public works programmes, these measures may include work-sharing

schemes, a reduction in working hours, and training. These are often introduced at times of economic crisis when there is a risk of firms laying off staff (Bastagli, 2014). They have the benefit of ensuring that staff get at least some income, even if not their full salary, though they are relevant mainly for formal sector workers with contracts.

### 3.2 Humanitarian assistance

Humanitarian assistance is defined in the guide to Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship, agreed in 2003 by a group of international donors, NGOs and multilateral agencies, as the resources used to fund, “actions designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies”. Humanitarian assistance is separate from other forms of foreign and development assistance because it is provided in adherence with key humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (GHA, 2014).

Humanitarian assistance is spent on activities and services undertaken for the benefit of affected people to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods, as set out in Box 1, and is coordinated in thematic clusters in line with sectoral objectives<sup>3</sup>. Reviews indicate that the distribution of spending between these categories has remained relatively constant over the past five years.

#### Box 1 OECD DAC categories of humanitarian assistance

- **Material relief assistance and services:** Shelter, water, sanitation and health services, supply of medicines and other non-food relief items; assistance to refugees and internally displaced people in developing countries other than for food or protection
- **Emergency food aid:** Food aid or special supplementary feeding programmes
- **Relief coordination:** Protection and support services: coordination measures, including logistics and communications systems; measures to promote and protect the safety, well-being, dignity and integrity of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities
- **Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation:** Short term reconstruction work after an emergency or conflict limited to restoring pre-existing infrastructure; social and economic rehabilitation in the aftermath of emergencies to facilitate transition, and enable populations to return to their previous livelihood or develop a new livelihood in the wake of an emergency situation
- **Disaster prevention and preparedness:** Disaster risk reduction activities; early warning systems; emergency contingency stocks and contingency planning including preparations for forced displacement

Source: GHA (2014)

The mix depends on the particular needs of a crisis. Only a few of these activities relate to social protection. For example, the supply of emergency shelters, water and sanitation, the provision of health and education, and the reconstruction of roads and telecommunication systems are not social protection activities. They would not be expected to be linked to, or affected by, shock-responsive social protection, except insofar as a household that received unconditional cash support might choose to spend part of it on obtaining services in some of those areas.

### 3.3 DRM systems

Disaster risk management (DRM) is often viewed as having five focal areas: prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (e.g. Baas *et al.* 2008). Establishing a shock-responsive social protection system clearly relates to preparedness, response and recovery from a disaster,

<sup>3</sup> Information on the humanitarian clusters is accessible at <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/clusters>.

and therefore potentially overlaps with a number of different DRM activities and mechanisms<sup>4</sup>. Table 1, below, details these mechanisms, with observations on their potential relevance (Oxford Policy Management, 2015a).

**Table 1 Typology of disaster risk management (DRM) mechanisms**

Aspect of DRM	Examples of DRM mechanisms	Potential relevance to social protection
Preparedness and response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Early warning systems and established criteria for different levels of alert</li> </ul>	The main aim of an early warning system is to trigger action before an emergency to reduce the likelihood of losses. If it works effectively then, ideally, disaster will be averted e.g. through timely evacuation. For some types of disasters, therefore, early warning systems may not be the best trigger for social assistance.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk assessments and hazard risk mapping</li> <li>• Vulnerability assessments and mapping</li> <li>• Mechanisms for monitoring and updating risk information</li> </ul>	Processes and systems for conducting and updating risk assessments and vulnerability assessments could be useful entry points for the design of social protection systems, at national, regional and local levels. This is particularly true if systems are in place to ensure that assessments are kept up to date.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contingency plans</li> <li>• Sector preparedness plans</li> </ul>	Contingency planning and sectoral disaster planning could incorporate planned social protection emergency interventions.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public information and awareness-raising</li> <li>• Emergency communication systems</li> </ul>	These could be useful communication channels for social protection programmes.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Practical supplies, e.g. clean water, warehouses, medical support, shelter</li> </ul>	Distribution of cash transfers can potentially be—and, in some cases, is—linked with the distribution of relief supplies.
	Recovery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Post-disaster needs assessments</li> <li>• Damage and loss assessments (sectoral and cross-sectoral)</li> <li>• Standardised reporting</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconstruction programmes</li> <li>• Resettlement programmes and rehabilitation plans</li> <li>• Adaptive livelihoods programmes</li> </ul>		Reconstruction programmes have been linked with public works programmes in some countries. It may be possible to link resettlement programmes and initiatives to encourage the adaptation of livelihoods to social protection programmes, although political economy analysis would be necessary to fully understand incentives and obstacles to change.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local coordination mechanisms for recovery, linking to the national level</li> </ul>		Local coordination mechanisms for the recovery phase could potentially be useful mechanisms to assist in the distribution of social assistance.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DRM committees at regional, local and community levels</li> </ul>		DRM committees may be able to play an important role in planning, targeting and implementing social protection initiatives.
General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainstreaming efforts e.g. linking in with development plans, cross-sectoral working arrangements etc.</li> </ul>	DRM mainstreaming efforts may enable social protection and DRM staff to work together. This could involve a conceptual linking of the two areas, as well as identifying practical opportunities for collaboration.

<sup>4</sup> We are using the definitions of the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR, 2009).

Aspect of DRM	Examples of DRM mechanisms	Potential relevance to social protection
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DRM legal frameworks</li> </ul>	Laws on DRM and social protection may inter-relate.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutional framework: DRM policies, national platforms for disaster risk reduction (DRR), codes, mandates, agencies etc.</li> </ul>	The DRM institutional framework within a country may be able to formally pay attention to social protection, e.g. in technical working groups or in the development of national policy. Coordination between social protection and DRM professionals may depend largely on coordination between the relevant ministries, though there may be opportunities to combine them.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DRR / DRM financing mechanisms, disaster funds, resource mobilisation systems, insurance mechanisms</li> </ul>	DRM financing mechanisms, insurance and funds could potentially be linked to social protection interventions.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DRR plans at all levels, and mechanisms to ensure effective implementation</li> </ul>	DRR plans at national, regional, local and community level could incorporate social protection.

Source: Oxford Policy Management (2015a)

We have observed during our inception phase research that the discussion on implementing social protection in emergencies is not as well covered in DRM circles and literature as it is in the social protection field.

### 3.4 Overlap between social protection and humanitarian assistance

We observed in section 3.2 above that many aspects of humanitarian assistance, such as rebuilding roads after a disaster, are unrelated to social protection. Where, then, are the main areas of overlap? Classically, the 'assumed, often unspoken paradigm' has been that humanitarian assistance should respond to immediate, temporary life-threatening needs, while non-emergency support is provided on a more long term basis to respond to chronic poverty and vulnerability (Levine and Sharp, 2015). In practice this is often not the case, as humanitarian interventions may continue for years, while long term development activities often contribute to saving lives (Cherrier, 2014a). One area in which the boundaries are increasingly blurred is in the transfer of resources to households in difficulty: the 'social transfers' of long term social protection, and the 'material relief' and 'emergency food aid' of the humanitarian response. As humanitarian actors move towards providing more assistance in cash rather than in-kind, and allowing households flexibility in how they spend it, these humanitarian interventions look more similar to the cash transfers provided by long term social assistance. We document here briefly the growth in cash transfers in humanitarian aid, its benefits and challenges—including the rationale for the emergence of so-called 'multipurpose cash transfers' in humanitarian programming—and the distinctions that are still perceived between humanitarian cash transfers and long term social transfers.

#### 3.4.1 Growth of cash and vouchers in humanitarian aid

The largest proportion of humanitarian assistance from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors is spent on material relief and assistance, followed by food aid. In 2013, material relief made up over two-thirds of official humanitarian assistance, at \$8.5 billion, while \$2.2 billion was spent on emergency food aid (GHA, 2015)<sup>5</sup>. In both cases this involves transferring resources directly to affected households

<sup>5</sup> See also section 5.1 below.

and individuals. Whereas these have traditionally been provided directly to crisis affected populations in-kind, as commodities or services, the last 10 years have seen a marked increase in the use of cash transfers, driven in part by the emergence of new technology which has improved their secure and efficient delivery (GHA, 2015; Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2014).

No precise data are available on the proportion of humanitarian assistance that is provided as cash transfers, because it is often integrated into larger programmes and funding is not distinctly labelled. Funding reported to the OCHA Financial Tracking Service for what are termed full and partial cash-based interventions represents over 1.5% of international humanitarian assistance over the last five years, but this is considered to be a significant underestimate (GHA, 2015). The scale of cash assistance in emergencies is illustrated by Hedlund (2014, cited in Smith and Mohiddin, 2015):

*An estimated 1 billion USD in various cash-based interventions, including vouchers, were distributed in response to Typhoon Haiyan. An equal amount has been distributed in the form of emergency cash safety nets, one-off emergency cash grants and food vouchers in response to the Syrian crisis. In these crises, cash grants and vouchers have been used to meet a wide range of humanitarian needs, including food, non-food items, shelter, wash, and protection.*

Cash transfers were first used in humanitarian assistance to promote food security. Other sectors now use them, with objectives additionally including replenishing non-food items, securing rental accommodation or shelter, asset restocking and livelihoods recovery, nutrition and reintegration (Gairdner *et al.*, 2011; Harvey and Bailey, 2011; Smith and Mohiddin, 2015). An evaluation of the cash and voucher programmes funded by ECHO, one of the largest donors of cash assistance, in 2011–14 shows the year-by-year expansion of its portfolio in sectors beyond food security (Maunder *et al.*, 2015).

### **3.4.2 The rationale for cash transfers in humanitarian programming**

The evidence for the effectiveness of cash transfers in emergencies is well documented (Cabot Venton *et al.*, 2015; Harvey, 2007; Harvey and Bailey, 2011). Where markets are functioning, cash transfers allow people choice and flexibility in how to best meet their needs, including as these needs change from the early stages of a crisis through to recovery. As the nature of crises shifts from temporary to more complex, protracted and chronic emergencies, cash transfers may become more appropriate, since they can allow people to invest in rebuilding their livelihoods and repay debt, and so boost their resilience to future shocks. There is evidence that they have multiplier effects on the local economy to stimulate economic recovery (Gairdner *et al.*, 2011; GHA 2014, 2015; Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2014; Marzo and Mori, 2012).

From an operational perspective, cash transfers offer an opportunity to overcome some challenges of the current approach to humanitarian assistance. They have the potential to improve the speed and efficiency of response relative to in-kind aid, and may promote a move away from compartmentalised cluster-based response approaches. They may also facilitate the development of a consolidated multi-sector response, with agencies working through a single, or multiple, cash-based response modality / modalities and common delivery platform in emergencies (Steets *et al.*, 2016; Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2014).

These more consolidated approaches to resource transfers in humanitarian assistance have emerged in the past two years in the response to the Syrian refugee crisis, through cash transfers that have been labelled as 'multipurpose' (to the bafflement of many development practitioners, for whom that is an intrinsic feature of cash). These are defined by ECHO to be designed to meet a

variety of household needs through a single transfer, with the value based on the expenditure gap across a variety of needs (Council for the European Union, 2015; La Rosa, 2015). The main distinction from unconditional cash transfers in emergencies—which are also recognised to be used by beneficiaries for multiple purposes—lies in the design, since they are conceived from the outset to meet multiple needs, and the logic of the intervention and value of the transfer are developed from this understanding (Mauder *et al.*, 2015).

Multipurpose cash transfers may be effective where populations have diverse needs that can be met by the market, and where a standard allowance can be calculated easily. A key determinant of their effectiveness is that the transfer is of sufficient size to meet critical expenditure gaps, and prevent beneficiaries resorting to harmful coping strategies (Mauder *et al.*, 2015). Operationally, whilst the same contextual factors drive the cost-efficiency and effectiveness of multipurpose cash transfers as other cash modalities, they appear to have some distinct characteristics with potential to generate cost savings including from the size of the transfer relative to the transaction costs; coordinated assessment and registration processes; a common delivery infrastructure; and a reduction in the number of implementing agencies (Mauder *et al.*, 2015).

Cash programming in emergencies will not be feasible or appropriate everywhere. It is dependent on the availability of commodities in the market and conditions of market access. As for multipurpose cash transfers, not all needs following a shock can be effectively addressed through a single consolidated transfer; certain needs may be more appropriately addressed through single sector cash and in-kind transfers such as shelter construction; livelihoods recovery; and actions to safeguard the nutrition and public health of critically vulnerable groups.

In the last two years, moves to implement the various humanitarian reforms required to increase the utilisation of cash as a multi-sectoral response modality are highlighting new technical, operational and strategic challenges. To overcome these requires investment in the assessment and analytical capabilities of humanitarian agencies, but also changes to the ways in which humanitarian aid is implemented, coordinated and financed—such as a decrease in the number of humanitarian actors and a more geographic division of labour (Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2014; Steets *et al.*, 2016).

### 3.4.3 Distinguishing humanitarian cash transfers from long term social assistance

Although there are many similarities between social transfers and humanitarian transfers, and potential synergies and linkages that can be exploited, there is still value in distinguishing between the two. The literature identifies the following distinctions:

- **Objectives.** For Freeland and Cherrier (2012), the distinction rests principally on the objective underscoring the intervention, with social transfer schemes designed to promote and sustain national social development, and humanitarian transfer interventions meant principally to save lives in the short term. La Rosa (2015) highlights differences in their objectives in light of the terms offered by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004). Humanitarian programming tends to focus on protective and preventive objectives, typically seeking to protect the basic consumption needs of households and prevent households from adopting negative strategies in response to shocks; it does not aim to promote poverty reduction or transform institutions that otherwise result in unequal access to social and economic resources and opportunities. Social transfer schemes also have these protective and preventive objectives—primarily to tackle long-term, chronic deficiencies for households and individuals, though some are also designed to address (low to moderate) transient, acute food insecurity—but others may additionally aim for the promotive and transformational objectives described in section 3.1.1.

- **Principles.** Humanitarian transfers can complement existing social transfer schemes, but are framed by humanitarian principles, rather than by national development agendas (Kukrety, 2016).
- **Entry and exit.** Humanitarian transfers are delivered when households have reached, or risk reaching, a state of inadequate basic needs provision; extreme coping strategies; or excessive poor health and nutrition, measured against established emergency thresholds (such as defined by the Sphere handbook or context-specific baselines). They should be ended when households are no longer in this state. The difficulty of determining when this is no longer required, though, is that the high standards of Sphere, 'can often not be met without assistance after a crisis, just as they were not met before it'. It is therefore hard to specify when an exit strategy should be implemented (Levine and Sharp, 2015, p. 50).
- **Transfer value.** The value of humanitarian transfers is generally calculated on households' total needs to fulfil the programme's objective (e.g. total amount of calories; rent payments), taking into account what households can provide for themselves (Harvey and Bailey, 2011). Multipurpose cash transfer values are an estimation of the cost of meeting a 'minimum expenditure basket' across sectors (Council for the European Union, 2015). They may even cover 100% of the income required to meet these needs. This contrasts to social assistance programmes since it is expected that the beneficiary will also have income from other sources. On cash-for-work programmes the transfer value is often aligned with or is slightly lower than the minimum wage.
- **Variability.** Humanitarian transfers need to be flexible and responsive (and therefore not necessarily regular and predictable over the longer term, like social transfers). Humanitarian cash transfers can be given in one payment or in regular instalments. The choice is based on the objectives, since experience shows that household's expenditure decisions change depending on the size and frequency of transfer. Programmes aiming to contribute to meeting a household's regular basic needs will generally transfer money relatively frequently, commonly every month or every other month. This is in line with the design of most social assistance programmes. In contrast, on shelter projects and programmes aiming to support livelihoods recovery or rehabilitation, cash transfers are often intended to enable beneficiaries to make larger, one-off purchases. Here grants are often provided in single or several larger instalments (often with conditions on how the money is used) (Harvey and Bailey, 2011).
- **Conditionality.** As in social assistance programmes, humanitarian cash assistance can be provided with or without conditions. Usually on programmes giving relatively large transfers of assistance intended to cover costs of livelihoods asset recovery or shelter construction, cash is given in several instalments with further tranches conditional on the first having been spent appropriately (IFRC / ICRC, 2007).

## 4 Conceptualising shock-responsive social protection

### Key points:

- There is widespread recognition of the increased frequency and severity of shocks and that the current approach to dealing with humanitarian crises must be adapted, with greater alignment of developmental and humanitarian work towards a common goal. Shock-responsive social protection offers a vehicle to integrate these two fields.
- Much of the interest in shock-responsive social protection stems from the commonalities seen in the design and implementation of one particular social protection instrument—social transfer programmes—and material (cash and food) assistance programmes in humanitarian response, and from the fact that social transfer programmes are forming the foundation of emerging social protection systems in low-income countries. Nevertheless it is important to seek to learn from any best practices or lessons from the use of other social protection instruments to meet humanitarian needs.
- Efforts to make social protection systems shock-responsive typically fall into five categories: vertical expansion; horizontal expansion; piggybacking; shadow alignment; and refocusing.
- The literature identifies a critically important feature of such a system being the ability to scale and flex to accommodate new needs. This has significant implications for social protection operational systems—both targeting and delivery systems—as well as for the capacity of the administering institutions and the availability and release of funds. Other issues include the application of humanitarian principles. Whilst the concept is appealing, these issues must be carefully thought through if social protection programmes are to be an efficient and effective vehicle for delivering emergency assistance. There is a need to better understand the constraints of making social protection systems shock-responsive and the conditions under which it is an appropriate and cost effective option for delivering humanitarian relief.

### 4.1 The rationale for shock-responsive social protection

A number of recent publications have highlighted the interest by humanitarian and development actors about the potential of using social protection programmes to deliver humanitarian response (Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2014; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; Maunder *et al.*, 2015; McCord, 2013a; Poole, 2015; Slater *et al.*, 2015; Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013; del Ninno *et al.*, 2016; UNICEF, 2014; Kukrety, 2016). The rationale has emerged on account of the following considerations.

#### 4.1.1 Effect of covariate shocks

Climate change will increase the frequency and severity of natural hazards and weather-related shocks, the financial costs of dealing with these disasters and the negative impact on the livelihoods of the poorest and most vulnerable, and also the transitory poor, with long term implications for human development (Bastagli, 2014; Browne, 2014; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; La Rosa, 2015; GHA, 2014, 2015; Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013; del Ninno *et al.*, 2016; Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). Interest has been driven by experiences in cyclical, slow-onset crises such as drought but is considered also applicable to countries affected by recurrent weather-related shocks (Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013; del Ninno *et al.*, 2016). Countries at high risk of crisis due to political fragility or environmental vulnerability are also acknowledged to be some of the poorest, with entrenched chronic poverty and limited domestic capacity to respond rendering them reliant on recurrent humanitarian aid. For example, nine of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance between 2003 and 2012 (Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Iraq, Chad, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Myanmar and Haiti), are in the bottom 20 countries ranked in the University of Notre Dame's Global Adaptation Index according to both vulnerability to, and ability to cope with, climate change (GHA, 2014).

### 4.1.2 Limitations of the current approach to addressing crises, and implications

Yearly reactive emergency programming is now seen as inappropriate to address predictable seasonal shocks such as droughts, which could be met with a predictable programme response (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014; del Ninno *et al.*, 2016). The Inter-Agency Standing Committee evaluations of the Horn of Africa drought crisis of 2011 concluded that breaking the cycle of chronic vulnerability to droughts and other crises depended on improved linking of humanitarian and development aims (Paul *et al.*, 2012; Sida *et al.*, 2012; Slim, 2012). The 2011 Horn of Africa famine prompted renewed commitments on early action to respond to warning signs as part of a broader effort to build resilience (GHA, 2015). Commentators point out the value for money of early response, which is proven to be less costly in terms of both direct financial costs and the impact on national longer term development and growth (GHA, 2014; Hobson and Campbell, 2012; Pelham *et al.*, 2011; Poole, 2015). DFID's study on the economics of early response and resilience in five countries—Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger and Bangladesh—indicated the potential for very large cost savings in all countries as a result of moving to early response and resilience building (Cabot Venton, 2013; Poole, 2014). Finding new ways of responding is also becoming more of an imperative when taking into account the increasing frequency and scale of such recurrent crises, along with the humanitarian funding gap (Doyle, 2017).

To respond early and foster greater resilience to crises requires the anticipation of, mitigation of, and response to natural hazards in development interventions (Pelham *et al.*, 2011). Much of the literature concludes that it requires the alignment of humanitarian funding, domestic resources and development assistance funding towards a common goal (GHA, 2015; Maxwell *et al.*, 2008; Pelham *et al.*, 2011; Poole, 2015; Scott, 2015). DFID's study on the economics of early response recommends a move to multi-year humanitarian funding, financing mechanisms to respond early and building longer term interventions (Cabot Venton, 2013).

This has resulted in much discussion and action to take a more holistic approach to address crises, including programming around the concept of 'resilience' and bringing together development, DRR and humanitarian actors to support people in crises (Bastagli, 2014; Mosel and Levine, 2014; La Rosa, 2015; del Ninno *et al.*, 2016)). The 2012 EU Communication on Resilience and the 2013 EU Action Plan on Resilience reiterated the need for further joint analysis and interventions to prevent and mitigate disasters more systematically (La Rosa, 2015). The humanitarian community is also considered to be approaching consensus on the need for nationally led response (Poole, 2015).

### 4.1.3 Operationalising this through social protection

The literature highlights that social protection as a vehicle to integrate development and humanitarian response is conceptually appealing for several reasons:

- **Social protection as a risk reduction tool, overlapping with humanitarian response:** We have seen in sections 2 and 3 that social protection is intrinsically important for populations to manage the risk of shocks, including both current and future climate shocks. *Ex-post* use of social protection has much in common with humanitarian response; their overlap has been discussed above (see also del Ninno *et al.*, 2016; Burton, 2014; Holmes and Bastagli 2014; Pelham *et al.*, 2011; Slater *et al.*, 2011). There have been calls over the last ten years for stronger integration of social protection, climate change adaptation and DRR. The Stern Review (2006) called for the integration of climate change considerations into development practice and singled out social protection as a key component of climate change adaptation. Since then the World Bank, WFP, Food and Agriculture Organization, DFID and international NGOs have all released policies, strategies or discussion papers encouraging integration of the concepts (Vincent and Cull, 2012; La Rosa, 2015; FAO, 2016; Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016; Hillier *et*

*al.*, 2016). The World Bank's new strategic framework for 'disaster resilient development' in sub-Saharan Africa shows increasing interest within the Bank to support DRM as a core element of poverty reduction efforts (GFDRR, 2016).

- **Common modalities and systems enabling effectiveness:** The modalities of cash (and food) transfers are common both to material assistance for households affected by disaster, and social protection to chronically poor households, certainly in low-income countries. They provide a common tool for transitioning smoothly between assistance in normal times and during a crisis (Gairdner *et al.*, 2011; GHA, 2015; Kukrety, 2016; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; La Rosa, 2015; Maunder *et al.*, 2015). This means that the social protection programmes' architecture for administering long term transfers could be used during emergencies with potential for a quicker, more predictable, more efficient and therefore more effective response (Slater and Bhuvanendra 2013; del Ninno *et al.*, 2016; Maunder *et al.*, 2015).
- **Prior experience:** McCord (2013a) explains that the World Bank's interest in social protection delivering humanitarian response was driven by lessons from previous financial crises (the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–99 and the Latin American crisis of 1998–99), which showed that those countries that had developed permanent safety net programmes, or institutions were better able to scale up social protection in response to these crises.
- **Coverage of social protection programmes:** In recent years many low-income countries, including those affected by regular disasters, have invested in national social protection and safety net programmes. Policy makers increasingly view safety nets (particularly social transfers in the form of cash) as a core instrument for reducing poverty and managing risk (ILO, 2014; La Rosa, 2015; Maunder *et al.*, 2015; Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013; Kukrety, 2016; Doyle, 2017; World Bank, 2015b). A review of the ten countries which were ECHO's major focus for emergency cash and voucher transfers in the last three years found approximately two-thirds have a long-term safety net of some kind (Maunder *et al.*, 2015). Providing assistance during crises through these systems allows national governments to take responsibility for meeting the needs of their citizens, providing a medium term exit strategy for humanitarian aid (Maunder *et al.*, 2015).

## 4.2 Defining shock-responsive social protection

'Shock-responsive social protection' is a relatively recently coined term. Whilst the literature has no common definition of shock-responsive social protection, research and policy dialogue on the potential linkages between social protection, DRR, climate change adaptation and humanitarian action has developed a number of related definitions that are applicable here.

McCord (2013b) states that, in the context of the financial crisis, discussion within the donor community has centred on the provision of '**shock-ready**' social protection. Shock-readiness is defined as,

*the extent to which existing or planned social protection provision can meet the anticipated needs of vulnerable populations resulting from the impact of an endogenous or exogenous shock which adversely affects livelihoods and labour markets (McCord, 2013b).*

McCord conceptualises this shock-readiness in terms of:

1. Whether the design and implementation modalities of existing programmes can accommodate rapid alterations of eligibility criteria.
2. How easily and quickly new instruments can be introduced.
3. The plans in place to protect fiscal allocations for existing social protection provision.
4. The plans in place to scale up social protection provision.

This could equally be applied to natural disasters.

The World Bank's terminology, '**climate responsive social protection**', is a comparable concept (Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012). It outlines four design features for social protection that address the negative impacts of climate change: (i) scalable and flexible programmes; (ii) climate-smart targeting, including the ability to distinguish between the chronic poor and those that are likely to suffer transitory poverty as a result of climate shocks; (iii) investments that build resilience and adaptive capacity; and (iv) promotion of institutional capacity for climate risk management. Components (i) and (ii) are shared with shock-responsive social protection as outlined below. Whilst pointing out that all social protection systems are inherently shock-responsive, the World Bank has adopted the 'shock-responsive social protection' terminology, to mean social protection systems that enhance the ability of programmes to meet the challenges imposed by covariate shocks (Doyle 2016).

In 2016 CaLP published practical guidance for humanitarian practitioners on linking with and working with cash-based safety nets in humanitarian contexts, to facilitate an effective response in times of crisis. This guidance uses the term 'shock-responsive social protection' extensively; whilst it does not define this term, the guidance focuses on different ways in which national social assistance programmes or systems can be used to deliver humanitarian assistance (Kukrety, 2016).

In their bilateral review, DFID (2016) highlight that their continual investments in the coverage and quality of social protection systems will increasingly focus on building social protection systems that can flexibly respond to natural disasters, to support the most vulnerable at times of cyclical drought and floods.


### 4.3 Ways in which social protection can respond during emergencies

Commentators are in broad agreement that in low-income country contexts social assistance—especially social transfers—can be expected to have by far the greater utility than other types of social protection (Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013; Slater *et al.*, 2015; McCord, 2013a). Within this, unconditional cash transfers have been proposed by some as the most appropriate form in a crisis, as they are easy to expand and contract, relatively simple to administer, and may be politically acceptable (IEG, 2011; McCord, 2013a). Active labour market policies have limited applicability in low-income countries, because only a small minority of the population are in formal employment (McCord, 2013a). Consideration of the extension of social care services, such as social work support, is almost entirely absent from the literature and merits further research. Whilst contributory social insurance is acknowledged to be a powerful shock-response tool, coverage and benefit levels in low-income countries are so low as to limit the support such programmes can provide currently. In Kenya for example, in 2010, contributory schemes covered an estimated 1% of the total population and those mostly employed in the formal sector (Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013).

A key feature of shock-responsive social protection programmes is their 'scalability', meaning that existing social protection programmes can be somehow leveraged to rapidly extend assistance to those who need it during crises, and scale back afterwards (Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; Pelham *et al.*, 2011; Hillier *et al.*, 2016). There is a consensus on a number of ways in which social protection programmes (particularly social transfer programmes) can be leveraged to support delivery of humanitarian response (Bastagli 2014; Cherrier, 2014b; La Rosa, 2015). The inception report for the present study summarises these in a five-part typology listed below, and illustrated in Figure 2 (Oxford Policy Management, 2015a), which has subsequently been adopted by others (for example, Kukrety, 2016; World Bank, 2016; Doyle, 2017):

1. **Vertical expansion:** increasing the benefit value or duration of an existing programme for existing beneficiaries.
2. **Horizontal expansion:** adding new beneficiaries to an existing programme.
3. **Piggybacking:** using a social protection programme's administrative framework to deliver assistance, but running the shock-response programme separately.
4. **Shadow alignment:** running a parallel humanitarian system that aligns as best as possible with a current or possible future social protection programme.
5. **Refocusing:** in case of budget cuts, adjusting the existing social protection programme to refocus assistance on groups within the caseload that are most vulnerable to the shock. One might consider this to be an 'austerity strategy'.

**Figure 2** Typology for shock-responsive social protection



Source: Oxford Policy Management (2015a)

Three aspects determine the effectiveness of social protection to respond to covariate shocks: timeliness, adaptability, and adequacy of resources (Holmes and Bastagli, 2014; La Rosa, 2015). Successful policy features include integration of climate and disaster risk considerations into the planning and design of social protection programmes; links to an established early warning system; central registries for targeting / verification and disbursement; coordination through a single central agency; pooling and smoothing of donor funds for safety nets to enable governments to prepare for crises in advance and build systems; and innovative partnership arrangements including public, private and non-state actors (World Bank, 2016; Browne, 2014; GHA, 2015; Kukrety, 2016; Maunder *et al.*, (2015); Hillier and Dempsey, 2012; La Rosa, 2015; McCord, 2013b).

Shock-responsive social protection, focusing on the *ex-post* response and recovery following shock, complements actions in the related field of adaptive social protection and the building of risk management capacity (prevention and mitigation) *ex ante* (Browne, 2014; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016; Davies *et al.*, 2009; Jaswal *et al.*, 2015; and Vincent and Cull, 2012; World Bank 2016). For example, research undertaken into shock-responsive social protection in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda highlights that social protection systems have potential to build 'anticipatory capacity', helping people prepare and plan for climate extremes and disasters so as to reduce the impact of climate related shocks, and also have a role in building households' adaptive capacities, so as to support longer term resilience (Jaswal *et al.*, 2015).

#### 4.4 Is shock-responsive social protection always appropriate?

Whilst highlighting the clear conceptual appeal for responding to covariate shocks through social protection systems, these literature sources point to a number of possible risk factors which could limit the feasibility or appropriateness of such links in practical terms.

#### 4.4.1 Adhering to humanitarian principles

The central role of national governments in social protection programmes means political motivations can influence design features such as targeting, whilst such programmes may adhere to conditions that are considered by humanitarians to be inappropriate in an emergency. A number of researchers conclude that humanitarians must consider whether engaging with a national social protection system risks compromising humanitarian principles of impartiality and independence (Maunder *et al.*, 2015; Mosel and Levine, 2014; Slater *et al.*, 2015; Kukrety, 2016; Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013).

#### 4.4.2 The implication of the nature and scale of the crisis

Covariate shocks vary in their frequency, predictability, speed of onset, scale and duration. Some, such as slow-onset food crises, are cyclical and can be anticipated; others, such as flash floods, less so. Some crises require interventions that are more in line with existing social protection systems than others (Bastagli, 2014). Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) highlight that the effectiveness of shock-responsive social protection will have limits, and that for shocks of particular frequency, development of alternative and adapted livelihoods may be needed. The consequences of certain shocks (disasters, conflict) may also limit the capacity of the system to deliver. Maunder *et al.* (2015) and Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) point out that in humanitarian responses, market analysis is a key factor driving modality selection, because the crisis can destabilise markets and lead to inflation of commodities.

#### 4.4.3 Targeting and coverage

It cannot be assumed that those benefiting from a social protection programme will also be those who need assistance following a covariate shock, either because of the geographical coverage of the programme in relation to the disaster-affected areas, or because those targeted for social protection are not most affected by the crisis (Bastagli, 2014; Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2014; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; La Rosa, 2015; McCord, 2013a, 2013b; Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013; Slater *et al.*, 2015) (see Figure 3). The literature considering the merits of shock-responsive social protection highlights that coverage of the poor (especially those of working age) and/or those that are vulnerable to disasters generally remains low (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). There is therefore a risk that focusing on supporting existing social protection cohorts—the 'vertical expansion' in the OPM (2015a) framework described above—risks missing shock-affected households.

**Figure 3** Difference between households affected by shock and those receiving social protection



Source: McCord (2013a).

#### 4.4.4 Operational systems

Scaling up a social protection programme quickly and effectively in an emergency requires that targeting, registration and, where applicable, payment systems can identify, enrol and make

transfers or provide other relevant services quickly to crisis-affected populations. These administration systems are noted in the literature as a likely constraint to effective implementation of shock-responsive social protection (Bastagli, 2014; Bastagli and Holmes, 2014; Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2014; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; La Rosa, 2015; McCord, 2013a; Slater *et al.*, 2015).

As Slater and Bhuvanendra (2013) point out, capacity of systems in low-income countries to deliver social protection, and therefore to implement effective shock-response, is likely to be limited. Ulrich and Slater (2016) and Slater, Bailey and Harvey (2015) highlight the risk to both the development of effective social protection, and to delivery of effective emergency response, of moving too quickly to implement shock-response through social protection systems that are still emerging and developing.

Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) draw attention to the importance of mobility and migration in adapting and building resilience to crises. They highlight that effective shock-response will involve making changes to the design of social protection systems that do not lock beneficiaries into a particular area, but enable the portability of benefits.

The timing of procurement and funding procedures affects implementation. Shock-responsive social protection systems need to be designed with specific plans as to how to supply resources in an emergency (Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; Pelham *et al.*, 2011). The literature frequently highlights the potential of linking social protection to early warning systems and development of triggers, such as those based on weather indices; and to the need for contingency and risk financing (Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; Slater *et al.*, 2015).

McCord (2013a) observes that a major concern in the literature is how to scale down such programmes post-crisis once provision is extended, which highlights the need for exit processes.

#### **4.4.5 Multi-actor coordination**

To be successful, addressing coordination issues among many actors is essential (Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; La Rosa, 2015; Maunder *et al.*, 2015; McCord, 2013a; Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013; Slater *et al.*, 2015). Shock-responsive social protection brings together social protection, humanitarian response and DRR thematic areas in governments, donors and NGOs that have traditionally operated as separate technical disciplines, drawn on distinct lines of funding, focused on different sets of risks and target groups and (within government) have reported to different and uncoordinated line ministries.

## 5 Financing shock-responsive social protection

### Key points:

- Momentum is building for humanitarian financing practices to be reformed, to reduce inefficient transaction chains, improve the coherence of different public and private funding sources, remove barriers to access for governments and to mobilise funding in the early stages of crises through developing objective and politically acceptable pre-agreed ‘triggers’ for early release (Cabot Venton *et al.*, 2015; GHA, 2014; Poole, 2015).
- It is recognised that it is critical for development funding to better anticipate and respond to crises—particularly cyclical and predictable crises, to reduce the need for humanitarian appeals in countries experiencing recurrent or protracted crises and chronic poverty (GHA, 2014). This would also free up humanitarian finance to address funding gaps.
- In many lower-income countries, social assistance programmes may be incorporated into the government’s budget but they continue to depend on donor financing as their main source of funding. Any leveraging of social protection systems to meet humanitarian needs in these contexts is therefore likely to require external donor financing in the short- to medium-term.
- There is a need for governments in shock-prone and low-income countries to identify resources that allow for counter-cyclical shock-response, ahead of a crisis. There are a number of risk financing mechanisms at the disposal of governments to support this including drawing on contingency reserves, and accessing contingent credit based on triggers.
- In the case of large shocks, new insurance-based financing options which allow for risk pooling and risk transfer, such as the African Risk Capacity, offer some promise for financing responses to extreme events. They are a complement to rather than a replacement of other contingency funds.

Responses to shocks can be financed either by domestic governments or with international assistance; they may use funds set aside for humanitarian assistance or for regular development programming. Not all shocks lead to appeals for international humanitarian assistance if national governments have sufficient domestic resources and capacity to deal with the challenge. Gaps in data mean that it is not possible to calculate the value of domestic humanitarian response, but particular national assessments show they can be significant (GHA, 2014). However, many countries that are repeatedly affected by crisis have low domestic capacity to respond (measured by low per capita government expenditure with little prospect for growth), meaning international responses are important (GHA 2014, 2015). For example, 35% of total humanitarian assistance in 2012 went to countries where government spending is less than \$500ppp per citizen per year. This includes Ethiopia, the DRC, Niger and Mali. For many such countries it is the combination of long term and/or recurrent crises, chronic poverty and limited domestic capacity, rather than the *type* of shock, which leads to a reliance on international support.

This section summarises recent trends in the funding of humanitarian response, including through officially reported channels, as well as other funding channels that are emerging, the most common recipients of humanitarian funds and the types of shocks that are most likely to be funded. It also summarises recent trends in funding for social protection, before discussing the possible implications of these trends for shock-responsive social protection.

### 5.1 Trends in international funding for humanitarian responses

Humanitarian funding is defined simply as the financial resources aimed at humanitarian assistance (defined in turn in section 3.2 above). Donors who have signed up to the good humanitarian donorship principles should allocate funding on the basis of needs to recipients committed to delivering principled humanitarian action, with funding flexibility widely accepted to enable impartial and responsive humanitarian action (Poole, 2015). Yet funding of the international response system is reliant on international financing and politics, and it has become well recognised in recent years that the system has not been working (GHA, 2014, 2015; Humanitarian

Emergency Response Review, 2011; Hobson and Campbell, 2012; Poole, 2015; Doyle, 2017). Studies, most recently the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) reports, have outlined several trends and challenges in the international response system that are of relevance to this research, since they have implications for the ease with which crisis responses can be implemented. The GHA report details: the level of humanitarian financing required and raised, major sources of funding, mechanisms for channelling funds, and areas of spend.

International responses begin with the launch of an appeal by the UN and/or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), usually at the request of affected national governments on the basis of a situation report that confirms humanitarian needs. Response to humanitarian appeals are leveraged through mechanisms including all governments reporting to the OECD DAC, plus the European Union (EU) institutions; the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF); the Red Cross movement; and aid from other non-DAC governments and private donors, including NGO fundraising coalitions such as the Disasters Emergency Committee (GHA, 2014). Funding moves from donors to recipient nations, through chains of transaction of varying lengths and complexity. Most commonly, donors contribute the bulk of their funding to UN agencies who subcontract to international and national NGOs (Cabot Venton *et al.*, 2015; GHA, 2014).

### 5.1.1 The scale of humanitarian funding

The increase in the frequency, severity and the protracted nature of crises and levels of forced displacement, twinned with the increasing cost of international assistance, is resulting in a widening gap between the level of humanitarian need and international resources. As an example, in 2003 the international response system assisted 30–40 million people, whereas in 2013 this had risen to 50–70 million (Poole, 2015). This means that whilst 2013 and 2014 were both unprecedented for the volume of aid leveraged in international humanitarian response, funding is uneven, and needs remained unmet in both years (GHA, 2014, 2015; OECD, 2014; Doyle, 2017). An estimated \$24.5 billion was provided as international humanitarian assistance in 2014, an increase of 19% from the \$20.5 billion spent in 2013 and considerably higher than the average of \$18.9 billion for the period 2009–13. About half—\$12 billion—went to UN-coordinated appeals, while the rest was channelled through the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, Médecins sans Frontières, and other humanitarian agencies, or directly to affected country governments. Despite the increase in overall funding, the UN-coordinated appeals only managed to obtain 61% of their total funding requirements, with large variations in the funding of different appeals.

### 5.1.2 Where the funds are coming from

Of the \$24.5 billion of international humanitarian assistance in 2014, three-quarters—\$18.7 billion—came from governments, while the remaining quarter—\$5.8 billion—came from private sources (GHA, 2015). The United States provided far more assistance than any other government, at some \$6 billion, or 32% of global government funding; this is followed by the UK, Germany and Sweden, who each provided around \$1–2 billion. These countries have given the largest total for 2004–14. European and North American governments provided most of the government-funded assistance in 2014 (83% of the total), though donors in the Gulf—Saudi Arabia in particular—are becoming increasingly significant. The private sources that provided the remaining contribution include individuals, trusts, foundations and corporations (GHA, 2015). As with the government funding, their contributions in 2014 also represented a significant increase on previous years.

Achieving a coordinated response and equitable coverage of humanitarian financing among an increasingly diverse set of international donors is a challenge. Traditional international donors often

do not coordinate with networks such as diasporas, and faith and business organisations, which limits the prospects for donors to consider where their contributions fit best (Poole, 2015).

### 5.1.3 Who receives international response funds

National governments and other national actors face barriers to accessing response funds directly from the DAC donors (the 29 countries that together provide about 90% of all government assistance). Their funds are largely channelled through UN agencies. Multilateral organisations received nearly two-thirds of international humanitarian assistance in 2009–13, almost all passing through the UN (GHA 2014, 2015). Other first-level recipients were NGOs (19%) and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (9%), with only 8% going to the public sector. Chains of pass-through funding and subcontracting arrangements between donors and eventual implementing organisations add layers of cost (Cabot Venton *et al.*, 2015; Poole, 2015).

A small proportion of funding channelled through UN agencies is assigned to UN-managed 'humanitarian pooled funds'. In 2014 these accounted for \$1.1 billion, or 4% of international humanitarian assistance. These multilateral funds pool donations from many different countries. They are intended to enable a more speedy response to sudden-onset disasters, and additionally may fill in gaps brought about by donor preferences (Kellett and Peters, 2014). The three main humanitarian pooled funds are the CERF, a global fund: and Emergency Response Funds and Common Humanitarian Funds which have been set up in a few countries.

- **CERF:** established in 2006 to enable more timely humanitarian assistance, only for UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration. CERF is mostly a grant-awarding facility, providing funds for either rapid response or underfunded emergencies; it also has a small loan facility (Kellett and Peters, 2014). An evaluation found CERF to be responsive and rapid in getting funds to the UN agencies, and to have improved the predictability of funding for new emergencies, though the process for allocating funds was less clear (Channel Research, 2010; GHA, 2015).
- **Emergency Response Funds:** Sometimes known as Humanitarian Response Funds, these have operated in 20 countries since they were set up in 1997 to provide NGOs and UN agencies with rapid, flexible funding to address critical gaps in emergencies (Kellett and Peters, 2014). They are relatively small (\$100,000-700,000) and largely provided to NGOs. They have not been fast enough, and are administratively underfunded at country level (Universalia, 2013).
- **Common Humanitarian Funds:** Country-based pooled funds intended to provide early and predictable funding largely to NGOs and UN agencies (though the time between submission and approval of grants is estimated at six to seven months) (Channel Research, 2011). They operate in only five countries, all of which have long-running humanitarian operations: DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and the Central African Republic (Kellett and Peters, 2014).

In 2013, DFID Somalia established the 'Internal Risk Facility' (IRF), a bilateral financing mechanism designed to provide early and predictable funding to support preparedness and response functions when needed on the Humanitarian Programme 2013-17. A review found that the IRF has been successful as a bi-lateral financing mechanism for rapid response, with the process from proposal to fund disbursement being far more efficient and less time consuming than other comparable financing mechanisms. This is supposed to be linked with an early-action trigger mechanism based on 15 indicators to support early responses to drought crises, however this is not yet fully operational and there remain question marks over the quality of the data sources to be used. Whilst the review finds that the IRF is complementary to the Common Humanitarian Funds and CERF, it highlights the challenge that such bilateral instruments go against the principle of

harmonised programming by donors at country level, and may impede progress towards it (LaGuardia and Poole, 2016).

Practical, historical and political reasons (especially in conflict affected areas) explain why DAC governments channel few funds directly to the public sector of recipient countries. Two major constraints that have caused donor governments to display an increasing preference over the last decade for entrusting their larger volumes of funds to a small number of trusted UN and international NGO partners are, first, the convenience of programming at scale, and, second, that these organisations have become 'adept at responding to [...] accountability requirements' arising from increased parliamentary scrutiny in the donor countries (Poole, 2015, p. 20). In some cases the country government is viewed as unable to deliver its obligations to its citizens, or may be seen as the instigator of the crisis (Harvey, 2009). Some donors justify it in terms of adhering to principles of neutrality and independence, despite the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles, and despite many examples of the feasibility of adhering to them while working with governments (GHA, 2015; Harvey 2009, 2010)<sup>6</sup>. At least some donors (e.g. ECHO) have regulations that restrict direct funding of governments (Maunder *et al.*, 2015). Funds from non-DAC donors and private sources are more likely to go to national governments (GHA, 2015; Poole, 2015). Between 2009 and 2013, non-DAC governments channelled one-fifth of their humanitarian assistance (\$0.8 billion) through the public sector, compared to just 8% for OECD DAC donors (GHA, 2015).

#### 5.1.4 Which crises are funded?

At times of great demand and finite resources there are difficult decisions to be made as to where resources should be positioned. Donors prioritise certain crises over others and respond to institutional preferences. Although flexible funding is a pillar of Good Humanitarian Donorship principles, between 85% and 90% of funds from DAC donors are earmarked for certain crises or sectors (Scott, 2015). There is significant variation between appeals, and it is clear from the literature that funding priorities, political factors and public profile can create uneven distribution of assistance, which could be addressed by a better division of labour.

- **Donors prefer protracted relief in a few countries over many years.** The 20 major recipients of humanitarian assistance in 2013 received most of the total given in the previous ten years, and largely in conflict-affected and fragile settings. Few had experienced sudden-onset disasters (GHA, 2015). This results in particular crises being consistently prioritised. Over the past five years, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and the West Bank and Gaza have consistently appeared in the top ten recipients list, due to protracted or recurrent crises, while a number of 'forgotten crises' in Nepal, Myanmar, India, Djibouti and Algeria have remained repeatedly deprioritised. Many of these are long-term conflicts and refugee crises. However, in 2014, forgotten crises included slow-onset emergencies and disasters in Haiti, Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Niger. Most long-term spending is in countries with high levels of poverty and low levels of government spending, highlighting the need for both multi-year funding and better links with development finance (GHA, 2014; Poole, 2015).
- **It is generally easier to raise funds for responses to natural disasters and pandemics than for economic crises** (Marzo and Mori, 2012). Conflict-related and complex crises see a slow response compared to natural disasters on account of factors such as lack of access, limited sustained media and political attention, and the lack of a visible trigger event (Poole, 2015). This was the case in Somalia in 2011 and was widely criticised (Bailey, 2012; Hillier and

<sup>6</sup> That is to "strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and coordinate effectively with humanitarian partners."

Dempsey, 2012). The South Sudan, Syria, Central African Republic and Yemen appeals, also remained more than 50% unfunded six months after their launch (GHA, 2014).

- **This is particularly true for funding from private sources.** Priorities for private spending are not the same as those of government donors and tends to focus more on rapid-onset natural shocks (e.g. Ebola, earthquakes) than to slow-onset, chronic crises and internal conflict. For example, there were record levels of private funding in 2005 and 2010 in response to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami and the Haiti earthquake, whilst private donors were the largest international humanitarian contributor to the Typhoon Haiyan response in 2013. A UK Disasters Emergency Committee appeal in response to a natural disaster raises three times more than a conflict-related appeal (GHA, 2014, 2015).
- **At times of peak demand, funding may be diverted to meet the most visible and acute needs,** reducing funding for chronic crises. This reportedly happened in 2010 as donors responded to the Haiti earthquake, and in 2014 due to the scale of the Syria refugee crisis (Poole, 2015). In 2014, 57% of funding was concentrated on five major acute emergencies: Syria, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Iraq, and the Ebola response (GHA, 2015).
- Finally, the literature also suggests that there is systematic underfunding for recovery activities, as well as funding allocated towards fragile states (Steets, 2011).

### 5.1.5 How much of this goes on social protection-related interventions?

We noted in section 3.2, above, that only some humanitarian assistance activities relate to activities that align with social protection. Funds are not assigned to sectors in a way that makes it evident how much of either the \$25 billion annual international assistance, or the unquantifiable domestic response to emergencies, can be classified as 'social protection'. Using the OECD DAC criteria cited in Box 1, we might expect it to cover part of the 'material relief' and 'emergency food aid' components. Using the UN's 12-sector classification, we can rule out some sectors such as 'mine action', but might expect that parts of the categories of, for example, 'food', 'shelter and non-food items' and 'multi-sector' may have a social protection component (see GHA, 2015, for the categories). The GHA (2015, p.79) notes that,

*It remains hard to know exactly how much is spent on specific activities. In some cases funding is deliberately unearmarked or simply goes unspecified in reporting. In other cases activities or approaches are mainstreamed into wider programmes, making visibility difficult.*

The GHA (2015) cites cash transfer programming and disaster prevention and preparedness as two of the three major cross-cutting areas where, given their multisectoral nature, there is a lack of reliable data on how much is spent and by whom. Estimates of emergency cash transfer programmes for 2014 range from just over \$200 million, recorded in UN OCHA's Financial Tracking Service, to a budgeted \$3.6 billion in the Cash Learning Partnership's (CaLP's) Cash Atlas (GHA, 2015). However, many known large-scale emergency cash transfer programmes, such as the WFP's \$600 million of support to Syrian refugees in 2014, appear in neither database (GHA, 2015).

## 5.2 Trends in financing for social protection programmes

Social protection programmes are funded either domestically, through taxation or member contributions, or externally, through donor support. A common feature of most low-income countries is that they mobilise only a small share of their revenues through taxation, and face many tax policy challenges (Mascagni *et al.*, 2014). Many remain dependent on commodity exports, and rely on easy-to-collect taxes such as international trade taxes. This makes them vulnerable to price

volatility and the deterioration in the terms of trade observed over the past decades, and tends to crowd out other types of taxation (Cherrier, 2015).

In many such countries, external financing therefore represents an important, if not the main, source of funding for social assistance (World Bank, 2014a). Two-thirds or more of financing for social safety nets in countries ranging from Liberia and Burkina Faso to the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia is donor-financed (World Bank 2012, 2014a). Programmes are increasingly incorporated in the government's budget (e.g. Kenya, Lesotho, Zambia) with counterpart government financing, though many remain low in coverage (McCord, 2009; World Bank 2014a). Recent growth, and the option of rationalising existing social protection programmes, may give some room for domestic expansion of social protection; nonetheless, given the current coverage levels this is likely to require external donor financing in the short to medium term (Niño-Zarazúa et al 2010, 2011; World Bank, 2012).

### 5.3 Funding for DRR / DRM initiatives

The importance of investment in disaster prevention and preparedness was agreed in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in March 2015. Despite this, funding for disaster risk reduction (DRR) is limited and fragmented across humanitarian, developmental and climate change funding mechanisms (Kellett and Caravani, 2013). Kellett and Peters (2014) cite nine different financing mechanisms—individual funds, or types of national fund or appeal—that allow for preparedness funding, though none cover the full range of what they term the 'preparedness continuum' across both development and humanitarian activities, from drawing up relevant legislation to stockpiling goods in the event of an emergency<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, not all financing mechanisms are present in every country.

Analysis of funding to DRR is curtailed by the current system of accounting for aid. The most comprehensive report on DRR financing highlights that funding has been volatile except in the past few years and remains a small fraction of humanitarian assistance (less than 5%); the World Bank and the Government of Japan are the main funders, accounting for more than 50% of total financing; and while financing goes to countries that are highly vulnerable to risks, it is concentrated in a small number of middle-income countries (Kellett and Caravani, 2013). Most international funding goes to countries with a national disaster management authority (GHA, 2015).

### 5.4 Financial mechanisms for managing disaster risk

Humanitarian responses, especially through consolidated appeals, are often implemented significantly after the onset of disasters. To incorporate the unpredictability and uncertainty of crises into programming, it is recognised that financing tools need to adapt to changing contexts. The concept of having funds to draw on in an emergency, often incorporated into development programmes and with a 'crisis modifier' (that stipulates the circumstances under which the programme moves from its development funding to its humanitarian funding) is growing in popularity as a risk financing tool (La Rosa, 2015). The HSNP in Kenya and Ethiopia's PSNP are two better known examples of social protection programmes with risk financing mechanisms (see section 7 for a full description). Common features of the two are the introduction of contingency planning after many years of programme maturation; significant donor financing for its operation, particularly for contingency funding; and the concentrated geographical scope of all interventions.

<sup>7</sup> Examples include the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, and the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund. See also the pooled funds listed in section 5.4.3 below.

Linneroth-Bayer *et al.* (2012) provide a comprehensive overview of traditional and innovative mechanisms designed to ensure that money is available after a disaster, especially one relating to natural hazards. They group these into four main categories at the government level: solidarity; savings and credit; traditional insurance; and innovative risk-pooling or risk-transfer mechanisms (Table 2). A fifth category, informal risk-sharing (e.g. through remittances and community savings groups) is relevant to household rather than to governments. The innovative products such as risk pooling or catastrophe bonds are now widely considered in the literature to be feasible for developing countries to manage shock-responses to high-impact disasters against which it might not be feasible to retain sufficient reserves, thanks to innovations in measuring and modelling risk, financial products and payment distribution (Bastagli, 2014; GHA, 2015; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; Marzo and Mori, 2012; McCord, 2013a).

**Table 2 Mechanisms for governments to manage disaster risk**

Characteristic	Mechanisms
Solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bilateral / multilateral assistance</li> </ul>
Savings / credit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reserve funds</li> <li>• Post-disaster credit (borrowing)</li> <li>• Diversions from other budgeted programmes</li> </ul>
Traditional insurance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Property insurance for state assets</li> </ul>
Innovative insurance-related mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sovereign risk financing (e.g. catastrophe bonds)</li> <li>• Contingent credit</li> <li>• Regional catastrophe insurance pools</li> <li>• Index-based crop and livestock insurance for households</li> </ul>

Source: Linneroth-Bayer *et al.* (2012) [abridged]

The first mechanism, bilateral and multilateral assistance—essentially post-disaster relief—has been discussed above. In this subsection we review the literature on mechanisms for savings / credit, and the innovative insurance-related mechanisms, which are most relevant for shock-responsive social protection. However, even with such mechanisms, if a country's capacity to cope with a disaster is exceeded, international aid to support such responses may still be needed (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). Recently there have been policy discussions on 'Forecast-based Financing' (FbF) within the humanitarian community—a new operating model being piloted by the Red Cross Climate Centre whereby humanitarian funding is released to take anticipatory, pre-defined action after a forecast is issued but, crucially, before a hazard event strikes. Research from a pilot in Bangladesh suggests that FbF in this region could have an impact of at least three times the value of the initial investment in terms of reducing beneficiary losses, however its effectiveness relies on the presence of effective systems for delivery of assistance, ideally embedded in long-term nationally owned structures. Costella (2016) therefore concludes that this model has potential to finance shock-responsive social protection.

### 5.4.1 Savings and credit (borrowing)

Governments can save in preparation for a shock, and hold contingency reserve funds to draw on in a crisis (Linneroth-Bayer *et al.*, 2012). Examples include catastrophe funds to provide humanitarian relief and early recovery in the event of a disaster such as India's Calamity Relief Fund (Bastagli 2014), or the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (NDRRMF) in the Philippines which finances a range of disaster-related expenditures. These types of fund are common in Latin American countries (Linneroth-Bayer *et al.*, 2012).

A benefit of such a fund is that this explicitly provides for emergency response within the development budget—reducing the need for emergency appeals. A major challenge is that such funds can lead to struggles between ministries or sectoral interests for use of the funds, which can create delays. The NDRRMF in Philippines was found to be too bureaucratic to be able to disburse rapidly in the case of crisis; therefore the government created the Quick Response Fund, which focuses on emergency response. Such reserve funds have limited capacities and may not be large enough to cope with more extreme events. For example, following Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the size of the Quick Response Fund and the process to replenish it were found to be inadequate (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). There can also be pressure to use the funds even in the absence of a crisis, if they are perceived to be sitting 'unused' (Bastagli, 2014; Linneroth-Bayer *et al.*, 2012).

This approach is integrated into the design of the PSNP in Ethiopia, to allow a rapid mobilisation of additional resources in the event of an emergency. The government manages a contingency budget comprising 20% of the annual PSNP budget. The separate fund of \$160 million, based on an in-principle donor commitment, established a risk financing mechanism (RFM) for mobilisation of up to \$80 million additional funds for a particular crisis each year. These mechanisms are based on an established Early Warning System (EWS) that is in place to monitor the situation and trigger the release of funds (see section 7 for further detail). Nevertheless, the Government of Ethiopia remains dependent on donor finances for these mechanisms, and so such provisions, whilst state managed, are only guaranteed for the life of the donor-funded programme (currently to 2020).

It is noted in section 7 that phase II of the HSNP in Kenya incorporates a shock-response component, which scales up based on trigger indicators founded on remote sensing data (vegetation cover index). However, for this mechanism to function in the long term, it will require a predictable source of funds as provided under the PSNP in Ethiopia. Discussion on the long term prospects for this fund in Kenya is still in the early stages. The ambition is for such a dedicated risk financing pool of funds to be established, with contributions from donors and government, perhaps through an independent trust fund managed in common. It is envisaged that in extreme years, if reserves were insufficient, then part of the shock-response function could also be risk financed through an insurance-type mechanism such as the Africa Risk Capacity (see 5.4.3 below). Preliminary discussions on this got underway in 2015 with the concept presented to DFID, the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, WFP and ECHO (Maunder *et al.*, 2015).

Governments may have the possibility to borrow funds in the event of a crisis, though one would expect this to be an option of last resort, once other budgeted options have been exhausted. Developing country governments may be able to divert funds from existing loans, such as from the World Bank, though this may entail a slow process of requesting a reallocation of the budget (Linneroth-Bayer *et al.*, 2012).

#### 5.4.2 Contingent credit

Contingent credit facilities—a form of borrowing—can be used by governments to rapidly finance post-crisis needs such as social protection payments. These agreements between governments and commercial banks or international financial institutions give governments guaranteed access to loans after a shock, at a pre-agreed rate and are leveraged by trigger indicators (e.g. a rainfall index in the case of drought) (Bastagli, 2014; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012). This can be faster and more predictable than *ad hoc* borrowing in response to a crisis. One disadvantage of these instruments is that they increase debt (Bastagli, 2014; McCord, 2013a). A related challenge is that such lending has been highly concentrated in middle-income countries, leaving low-income countries behind. There are a range of such financing instruments available through the World Bank:

- The World Bank launched the multi-donor Rapid Social Response (RSR) programme in 2009 to support low-income countries and fragile states following the triple F crisis, with a focus on scaling up targeted social transfers (especially cash transfers), improving access to basic social services including health, nutrition and school feeding programmes, and expanding labour market initiatives (World Bank, 2014a). RSR projects cover 62 countries and about half of the projects are in Africa. The RSR has been extended to June 2018, and has shifted from crisis response to supporting social protection system building, and learning and knowledge sharing (World Bank, 2014a).
- In 2007, the World Bank introduced Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Options (Cat-DDOs) to their Development Policy Loans. Similar instruments have subsequently been introduced by other development partners such as the government of Japan. The Cat-DDO provides member countries with a contingent credit line of up to \$7 million, that provides immediate liquidity if the government declares a state of emergency in the aftermath of a natural disaster to respond to rehabilitation needs (GFDRR 2016). As well as providing immediate liquidity, Cat-DDOs also act as a mechanism incentivising DRR activities, since eligibility is contingent on a government building ex-ante capacity to manage risks arising from natural hazards. It is the first financing instrument linking disaster response funding to proactive risk reduction (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). Cat-DDOs have proven to be effective for implementing DRM strategies. For example in Seychelles, the Cat DDO facilitated prior actions in two key policy areas to strengthen the regulatory framework for DRM and integration of DRM into development planning and decision-making (GFDRR, 2016). Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) suggest such an instrument could help governments finance the upscaling of social protection for shock-response. However, governments still tend to favour cash in hand at the expense of contingent instruments, which has limited uptake. Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) recommend that one way to improve uptake would be to remove the current trade-off between the Bank's financial instruments by separating the budget allocated to contingent instruments from that which is allocated to traditional lending.
- The CERC can be added as a 'zero-dollar' component within standard investment projects. This allows for existing funds to be quickly reallocated to emergency recovery activities in the event of a disaster, without the need for project restructuring, since the line is already included in the budget. In 2016, the World Bank launched the El Niño preparedness initiative which systematically includes CERCs into the existing portfolio to provide "bridge financing" for immediate response and recovery. Meanwhile the Immediate Response Mechanism (IRM) is encouraging the introduction of CERC in all standard lending operations. This adds to the resources that can be quickly mobilised for emergency response, by allowing up to 5% of an undisbursed International Development Association (IDA) portfolio in an affected country to be channelled through the CERC. In 2015, Niger consolidated the CERCs in four projects under the IRM, meaning the government can access up to 5% of undisbursed IDA balance in the case of a declared emergency. Madagascar and Mozambique are in the process of finalising their IRMs (GFDRR, 2016).

### 5.4.3 Regional catastrophe insurance pools

Risk insurance involves the pooling of risks or the transfer of risks to a third party. There are now several examples of donor-supported regional mechanisms that offer quick-disbursing index-based coverage against a range of natural disasters. The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), established in 2007, currently pools disaster risk across 16 countries. It was the first regional disaster insurance facility, using parametric (i.e. index-based) insurance to provide member governments with immediate liquidity for financing responses and early recovery in order to limit the financial impact of hurricanes, earthquakes and extreme rainfall events (Ghesquiere *et al.*, 2013; GFDRR, 2016). A similar facility, the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI)—a joint initiative by the World Bank and the Secretariat of the Pacific

Community, with grant funding from the Government of Japan—has been piloted since 2013 in several Pacific island countries that are vulnerable to weather-related shocks. This includes the Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. The aim is to test the viability of a market-based catastrophe risk insurance product to provide these governments with timebound but immediate budget support in the aftermath of a major disaster. The programme also provides technical assistance and capacity building to improve public financial management of natural disasters (World Bank, 2014c).

In both cases, the facility acts as a risk aggregator. The participating countries can pool their country-specific risks into one better diversified portfolio, which can reduce premium costs compared to single-country approaches to reinsurers. Payouts are based on index-based triggers, in this case the occurrence of a pre-defined weather event, rather than an assessment of actual losses on the ground, meaning funds are disbursed rapidly. Whilst the PCRAFI programme is still in the early stages, the World Bank (2014c) has published some lessons learned. The facility has been triggered in 2014 in Tonga following a tropical cyclone, when just over \$1 million was paid out in only two weeks. In 2015, in response to Cyclone Pam the PCRAFI provided Vanuatu with \$1.9 million to support immediate post-disaster needs. GFDRR (2016) reports that, whilst this payout is limited compared with the total required to cover losses and the costs of reconstruction (\$184 million), it was still eight times larger than the government's annual reserves for emergency relief, and seven times higher than the annual insurance premium paid by the government.

The rationale for these facilities is to provide immediate funds to ensure rapid and effective post-disaster response and continued provision of core public services. There is nothing to suggest that such payouts could not be linked to, and finance the scaling up of, social protection programmes for crisis response where these exist. The pilot has demonstrated that the international reinsurance market is willing and able to supply catastrophe risk insurance at very competitive prices: in both cases the risk pooling among countries has resulted in cost savings of up to 50% of the premium for participating countries compared to a single country approach.

However, the World Bank also points out that this product is not for all disaster losses. Other financial instruments, such as national reserves and contingent credit, are more appropriate to cover more frequent but less severe events. Furthermore, donors (in this case Japan) continue to play a critical role in ensuring the participation of low-income countries through the provision of premium subsidies.

Another mechanism referenced repeatedly in the literature on shock-responsive social protection is the African Risk Capacity (ARC) initiative, that provides regional risk pooling across African countries. Loosely modelled on the CCRIF, it was established as a specialised agency of the African Union in 2012. It is an extreme weather insurance mechanism, financed by participating country premiums and a one-off injection by the donor community. Pay-outs to policy holding governments are triggered by a satellite-measured rainfall index, and will occur when rainfall is below a drought threshold defined by the participating country. The initial risk insurance products were launched in 2014. The first annual review of the facility in 2016 (DFID, 2015) showed some good progress. Four countries had purchased insurance for a total of five growing seasons and the facility made its first payments in January 2015 to Senegal, Niger and Mauritania, totalling \$26.5 million. According to the WFP, payouts were released before an appeal for the Sahel was even formulated. ARC aims to increase the number of member countries and the scope of its disaster coverage to cover cyclones and flooding (GHA, 2015). Nevertheless, this early review highlighted some challenges in the preparation and approval of implementation plans by affected members, and administrative issues such as non-compliance with requirements of the fund (e.g. having authorised bank accounts) (DFID, 2015).

The ARC has incorporated use of social protection systems into several countries' contingency plans. As mentioned above in the case of Kenya, it can be envisaged that governments could use these payouts to finance the rapid scaling up of social protection measures following a weather-related shock, subject to establishment of appropriate rules governing the use of the funds and contingency plans. However, the mechanism is designed to provide financial support in the event of extreme weather events, and governments decide the trigger point. Therefore, a payout would not be triggered for lesser events where populations may still require assistance. It is likely that such a mechanism may best act as a complementary measure, but not be the only mechanism on that a government relies to finance shock-response.

#### 5.4.4 Technical assistance in risk financing

A key part of ARC's work is through the ARC Agency, a capacity building arm of the initiative that provides support to governments in DRM, EWS and contingency planning, prior to the governments taking out a policy. In addition to providing financial instruments, development partners led by the World Bank are providing technical assistance to countries to help them develop their national disaster management funding mechanisms and assess sovereign insurance options. In response to increasing country demand, the World Bank launched the Africa Disaster Risk Finance initiative (ADRF) in 2016, to assist countries in Africa to better manage climate and disaster risks. This is part of the "Building Disaster Resilience to Natural Hazards in Sub-Saharan Africa" Programme, financed by the EU. It aims to help countries build their financial resilience to disasters through developing multi-risk financing strategies at regional, national and local levels for informed decision making; improving financial response capacity post-disaster; and mitigating the financial impacts of disasters. Technical, legal, operational and institutional support is provided to help governments evaluate and implement the necessary policy reforms and financial instruments. A specific area of focus is developing new mechanisms for provision of social protection (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016).

### 5.4 Implications for shock-responsive social protection

A number of declarations and reports propose improvements to humanitarian financing. These signal the international community's interest in encouraging DRM and emergency response to be factored into national government budgets and long term development. The Future Humanitarian Financing Initiative recommends improving anticipation and analysis of humanitarian issues and contexts; investing in nationally led responses and enabling a more efficient division of labour and bridging liquidity gaps; improving efficiency of operations, and reducing transaction costs (Poole, 2015). The outcome report of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, a meeting of global heads of state in Addis Ababa in July 2015, recognises the need for coherence between humanitarian and development finance to 'ensure more timely, comprehensive, appropriate and cost-effective approaches to the management and mitigation of natural disasters and complex emergencies' (United Nations, 2015, p.23). The document also recognises the need for fiscally sustainable and nationally appropriate social protection systems. It observes,

*We encourage consideration of climate and disaster resilience in development financing to ensure the sustainability of development results [...] We commit to investing in efforts to strengthen the capacity of national and local actors to manage and finance disaster risk (United Nations, 2015, p.22).*

Adding to these, the OECD recommends more development programming in protracted crises including through common or shared context and risk analysis and scale up of social protection mechanisms (Scott, 2015). Other recommendations include multi-year planning, programming and

financing, now authorised by USAID and DFID; strategic partnerships instead of project grants; and reviewing of funding for disaster response and recovery, in relation to which Scott (2015) recommends learning from the Pacific where several countries (Japan, New Zealand and Australia) have made more explicit commitments to disaster reduction, and more generally to risk financing (La Rosa, 2015; Scott, 2015; Steets, 2011).

Nonetheless, the use of social protection financing to respond to shocks bears its own risks. From a shock-responsiveness perspective, while social protection mechanisms need additional financing to respond to shocks, they often need to do so when the macroeconomic environment is adverse as a result of the shock. A counter-cyclical approach to investments in social protection is needed: expenditure may need to *increase*, not decrease, at the time of an economic crisis (McCord, 2013a; Ortiz and Cummins, 2013). However, this goes against the macroeconomic and fiscal prudence often espoused by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IEG, 2011). Moreover, even where countries succeed in increasing their expenditure in the early years of an economic shock, as was widely the case at the time of the global economic crisis in 2008–09, they may revert to a contractionary policy—cutting back public spending—if it continues for a long time. This has been seen since 2010 in relation to the economic crisis, and it affects funding for the social sectors (Ortiz and Cummins, 2013)<sup>8</sup>.

The low coverage of many long-term social protection programmes, and the need for external financing if support were to be increased (especially if the state of the economy is adverse), create challenges to social protection systems becoming more responsive to shocks. The unpredictability of donor financing further hampers the likely expansion of social protection, as most donor financing for social protection is linked to projects and programmes, and tied to specific time cycles (e.g. Phase 2 of Kenya's Hunger Safety Net Programme, HSNP, from 2013 to 2017, and the PSNP from 2015 to 2020). These challenges highlight the need for considering other risk financing strategies, including risk pooling and identification of contingency plans and finances, if government social protection systems are to be leveraged to provide assistance to those affected by covariate shocks.

Donor assistance will be crucial in filling the gap in resource-constrained countries, including most low-income and fragile states. The question of how to provide counter-cyclical financing in a systemic crisis requires some thought (Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012). Providing humanitarian response through the resourcing of a social protection system may be a challenge for donors: there may be a need to have more flexible funding arrangements, to reduce separations between humanitarian and development funding streams, and in some cases, new regulations (Hinds, 2015; Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2014; Maunder *et al.*, 2015; Mosel and Levine, 2014). For example, ECHO is presently unable to disburse through government systems (Maunder *et al.*, 2015).

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<sup>8</sup> See section 7 for examples.

## 6 Contextual determinants of the effectiveness of a shock-responsive system

### Key points:

- Donors recognise that commitment to social protection is an intrinsically political decision, yet have hitherto not always engaged with domestic political agendas, resulting in an increased risk that interventions are perceived as externally imposed and gain little traction.
- Political economy issues must be carefully considered in discussion and analysis on shock-responsive social protection programming. Issues of relevance are likely to include politics of humanitarian and development financing and mandates, domestic political factors affecting the building of effective scalable programmes, and factors in the establishment and use of risk financing.
- Fragility and conflict can exacerbate poverty and vulnerability to shocks, which in turn can fuel further conflict. Social protection systems that might address this vulnerability can themselves be constrained by the weak capacity, infrastructure and markets engendered by a conflict, limiting their ability to respond when most needed.

### 6.1 Political economy

Within the context of an overall expansion in social protection to improve development outcomes over the last ten to fifteen years, there are knowledge gaps in both theoretical frameworks for, and comparative analysis of, political structures and norms that facilitate or constrain sustainable social protection systems (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Bastagli, 2013; Jones *et al.*, 2010; Lavers and Hickey, 2015; UNU-WIDER, nd). However, there has been a recognition over the last couple of decades of the importance of political economy influences on the design, implementation and outcomes of social policies and systems generally, and some literature on safety net and social insurance programmes in particular; yet international donors have until recently failed to engage with political economy factors that underpin poverty (Graham, 2002; Jones *et al.*, 2010; Jones and Shahrokh, 2013). That said, others suggest that donors increasingly recognise that the degree to which national governments commit themselves to social protection policies is an intrinsically political decision, shaped by enabling and constraining political factors (Hickey *et al.*, 2009).

Among the many different pilot and large-scale long term social transfer programmes and national social protection strategies that have been developed, experiences and outcomes have varied (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). These variations (in Africa and elsewhere) can be linked to different facilitating and constraining political economy factors, and the failure to analyse and take them into account (Jones *et al.*, 2010; Lavers and Hickey, 2015). Coverage and fair outcomes also depend on the degree to which different groups are represented and heard by policymakers (Bastagli, 2013). Lavers and Hickey posit that the likelihood of success of external actors (e.g. donors) in promoting social protection depends on the compatibility of these ideas with existing national political settlements, their underlying interests, and the ideas of those factions that have power. Likewise, Barrientos and Hulme (2008) also find that extending social protection requires a favourable political environment in which demand for social protection can lead to effective government response. They suggest it is useful to differentiate between political conditions needed for the introduction of social protection initiatives, and those required for the sustainability of programmes (*ibid.*).

Pritchett (2005) suggests that while technical and administrative policy elements are addressed during policy design, political economy elements—what is politically supportable—are often underestimated or not considered at all. Lavers and Hickey (2015) outline a theoretical and methodological framework—an adapted ‘political settlements’ framework—that helps frame ‘elite commitment to social protection as an outcome of the interaction of domestic political economy and transnational ideas’, to explain differences in national social protection experiences and

outcomes. This situates social protection within a broader policy context, and highlights the influence of underlying power relations in society.

There is little literature explicitly on the political economy around shifting social protection policies and systems to be more shock-responsive. However the findings of this review highlight that there are a number of political economy issues that must be considered, including:

- Political factors affecting the **design and implementation** of shock-responsive social protection programmes. There are several possible political challenges (see section 7):
  - Scale up of social protection for shock-response relies on the rapid release of funds based on evidence of an impending crisis, through links to an early warning system (see the PSNP and HSNP). However, the functioning of such a mechanism relies on agreement on what constitutes trigger indicators, and on political inclination to implement contingency plans on the basis of these indicators in the manner of ‘no regrets’. In recent emergencies, donors have been reticent to fund a response until a crisis is visible (see section 8.7).
  - Political and power dynamics can impact on decisions about the targeting of scaled-up payments. This issue was brought to light in the 2015 emergency scale-up of the HSNP, where the most ‘politically acceptable’ allocation of payments between administrative units was not necessarily the most effective from a humanitarian perspective (see section 7.1).
  - Such dynamics can also affect how the value of any social protection provided for shock-response is calculated. In the HSNP, the value of the emergency payments was not in line with the size of the food basket covered by parallel humanitarian interventions (Mauder *et al.*, 2015). On the Kenya Urban Food Subsidy programme (see section 0), discussions with the Government of Kenya led to the value of the emergency cash transfer being set in line with the value of other social assistance payments. This led to the adoption of the programme as a long-term social assistance programme by the Government of Kenya. However, it meant that the emergency transfers were not of sufficient value to meet the level of humanitarian need (Smith and Mohiddin, 2015).
- The politics of **humanitarian and development financing**. We have seen that a move towards shock-responsive social protection systems may require increased financing from development partners which has not yet been forthcoming. At the same time, humanitarian agencies may be wary of such an approach if its implication is a reduction in funding for international agencies (Mauder *et al.*, 2015).
- Establishing and using **risk financing**: a main challenge of the use of reserve funds for financing shock-response is political struggle between ministries for their use, and pressure to ‘use them or lose them’ (see section 5). Meanwhile, to be effective, risk financing should be invoked before the shock it is designed to alleviate occurs. As mentioned in section 7, in the case of PSNP, early warning data were available in some areas some five months before the government called on the risk financing mechanism. Official reports point to a lack of clear understanding of the early warning system in some regions (Risk Financing Mechanism Management Committee, 2012). It is clear from other literature that political factors also played a part, with some federal and regional level actors preferring to use humanitarian resources rather than triggering risk financing (Mauder *et al.*, 2015; Ministry of Agriculture, 2015).

Some literature explicitly focuses on the political economy of DRM, preparedness and response. Wilkinson (2012) suggests that ‘political economy perspectives of disaster and public policy processes are beginning to receive more attention’, responding to indications that ‘national governments endorse disaster risk management but have not yet matched this nominal commitment with adequate policies or funding’. This is reflected in Williams (2011), who explains that effective DRR ‘is not simply a technical challenge... but reflects the need to generate necessary political incentives to make DRR a priority issue’.

However, while more recent, the political context of aid in debates on linking relief, rehabilitation and development is recognised to be important. The Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI has traced this changing political context. Whereas the humanitarian principles underlying humanitarian interventions are focused on human security, they argue that with the launch of the ‘global war on terror’ post 9/11, the western security agenda has become more prominent within the aid agenda, blurring boundaries between development and humanitarian aid, foreign policy and military intervention. Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005) consider that this may mean that aid may be allocated according to the strategic (and security) priorities of donor governments, rather than relative need.

## 6.2 Fragility and conflict

Fragility and conflict have two bearings on the analysis of shock-responsive social protection systems. First, conflict-related crisis is a type of covariate shock in itself. Second, fragility and conflict affect a state's ability to deal with other types of covariate shock such as natural disasters or economic crises. Our research focuses on the latter, i.e. how features of fragility—at both a national and regional level—affect shock-responsive programming, regardless of the shock.

Fragility and conflict-affectedness are not synonymous. Fragility exists on a spectrum of which violent conflict is only one part (Maier, 2010). Other forms of fragility can arise from divisions between national, ethnic or religious groups, or the absence of political will. Most development agencies use the term ‘fragile and conflict-affected states’ (FCAS) to describe cases where the state fails to perform functions necessary to meet citizens’ basic needs and expectations, including the assurance of basic security, law and justice, and provision of basic services and economic opportunities (McLoughlin, 2012). DFID (2005, reported in McIntosh and Buckley, 2015 forthcoming) defines fragile states as ‘those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor.’

Natural hazards, conflict and fragility combine to exacerbate the vulnerability of the poorest (e.g. Kostner and Meutia, 2011; UNDP, 2011). This convergence of hazards poses significant challenges for governments and agencies seeking to achieve progress in insecure environments, and strains the humanitarian system (DFID, 2014a). The challenges of delivering effective social protection in FCAS countries are manifold (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; Haider, 2011; Kostner and Meutia, 2011; Ovadiya *et al.*, 2015; Simmons, 2013). They include:

- exacerbated poverty and vulnerability to shocks. Food security of households is often particularly problematic, owing to the disruption of food production, difficulties in preparation and storage, and greater uncertainty about the value of investing resources in future agricultural production given the increased risk of loss. This in turn can create further conflict, resulting in reduced resilience to future shocks;
- weak state capacity;
- weakened physical or financial infrastructure and markets. Fragile states often suffer in particular from a shortage of passable roads and a lack of entrepreneurs, leading to less competitive markets and higher transport costs. They also import a large share of food and have fewer means to stabilise food prices or mitigate the impact of higher prices;
- a lack of social cohesion; and
- a need for developing citizens' trust in the state and managing conflict among certain groups.

The consequences for social protection programming of the challenges identified above are summarised by Haider (2011) and Ovadiya *et al.* (2015) as including the following:

- weak state capacity constrains the ability of governments both to plan and to ensure the safe delivery of social protection programmes;
- weak and/or damaged infrastructure risks limiting the options for payment mechanisms, e.g. because of the absence of a banking system;
- weak markets bring a possibility of creating inflation; and
- a lack of social cohesion, meaning that programmes can end up being regressive either by design or during implementation. Fragile countries may have longstanding, politically difficult-to-revoke social protection policies that benefit very small and/or fairly well-off populations. Even where this is not the case, there may be a greater risk of corruption, diversion and capture of cash by elites or by armed groups. If some parts of a country are fragile and some are not there may be the risk of discontent at a lack of assistance in less affected areas.

In some countries that have faced extreme protracted conflict or fragility, and where there is an inability of a national government to deliver core functions, state-run social protection systems simply do not exist. Somalia is one such example, where the nascent social protection system is largely led by humanitarian agencies. As insecure contexts stabilise, opportunities to sustain longer term social protection programmes can develop. However, the association between FCAS status and the maturity of the social protection system is by no means straightforward, since sophisticated social protection systems exist in countries that have subsequently fallen into conflict or fragility, for example through political upheaval.

Where social protection interventions exist in FCAS countries they may fulfil the full range of preventive, protective, promotive and transformational roles highlighted in Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004), and may facilitate rehabilitation and the restoration of livelihoods after conflict ceases (Scott, 2012). Ovadiya *et al.* (2015) find that FCAS countries tend to have a stronger focus on social assistance than any other type of social protection. Across all 36 fragile states looked at there is a noticeable trend toward cash transfers, public works, and skills development programmes / self-employment support; and maintained support for community-based services.

DFID (2011) states that specific issues relating to experience of what works in cash transfer programming in conflict-affected countries needs to be further documented, to improve design and implementation. A review of evidence of the use of public works programmes and social transfers found that, despite increasing interest in the productive impacts of such programmes and their potential to mitigate the risks of violent conflict, the body of evidence is still weak. This found scarce evidence to support the claims often made about how public works programmes support economic growth, or to substantiate assumptions that this growth and job creation will reduce conflict. It highlights that the relationship between such social protection interventions and violent conflict is complex, working through multiple causal mechanisms that are not necessarily cumulative, linear or even positive (Beazley *et al.*, 2015). There is also limited evidence on the impact of social protection programming and policies on social cohesion, although Ovadiya *et al.* (2015) suggest that social protection can be an important platform for promoting voice and participation through programme processes; improving social inclusion through temporary labour market participation; and smoothing social tensions and building trust in response to sudden shocks as well as longer term fragility.

## 7 Country experiences of shock-responsive programmes

### Key points:

- There is clear evidence of the potential beneficial impact of social assistance and particularly social transfers in the form of cash transfers. In-kind support or food distribution will be appropriate where markets function poorly, where foreign assistance is only available in-kind, or where strategic grain resources need to be rotated. The adoption of other options, such as subsidies or school feeding, may offer a pragmatic response to future shock-response, and be the most feasible and cost-efficient option where institutional weakness and limited existing systems constrain intervention options.
- However studies highlight challenges encountered by social protection provision in the event of a shock. The need for timely and rapid response is a major challenge. So is the provision of adequate levels of support.
- A critical prerequisite for effective crisis response is that it must be available quickly. Countries that have well established social transfer programmes are better able to launch more immediate and effective policy responses. As responses are linked to existing programmes this may limit the policy options, as they will depend on the instruments already in use. To have a significant impact, existing programmes need to be scaled up significantly in both coverage and value. The feasibility of expansion will depend on the availability of data on those in need; mechanisms to expand delivery; and the availability of additional resources.
- Meeting the needs of informal sector workers affected by crises remains a challenge, as they are excluded from social security and also from most social assistance in low-income countries, where cash transfers are highly rationed and tend to exclude those with available labour.

### 7.1 Experience with social transfers

Social transfers are a commonly used shock-response instrument, especially in low- and middle - income countries. Policy decisions to adjust these in a shock have included horizontal and vertical expansion and the introduction of new programmes. Expanding established programmes typically facilitates rapid and effective response, especially to existing beneficiaries. There remains a critical issue of scale: low coverage limits the impact of such changes (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014). In several programmes, benefit and transfer levels were too low to provide adequate support after a shock, in some cases even after adjustments were made (Devereux, 2012; Grosh *et al.*, 2011; McCord, 2013a). Reaching new beneficiaries is more difficult than supporting existing caseloads. There is also an issue concerning policy levels and coverage, once the effects of a shock have been addressed, and the question of political feasibility of scaling back in non-crisis times. Scaling down a policy which was extended to cover new caseloads and/or increased in value can prove politically challenging (McCord, 2013a).

#### 7.1.1 Introduction of new transfers

Examples include Colombia's *Familias en Accion* programme, launched in 2001 in response to a recession, and the *Programa de Asignación Familiar* in Honduras, introduced in 1990 to alleviate the burden of macroeconomic adjustment. Both later evolved into long term safety nets (Bastagli, 2014). During the triple F crisis, Guatemala's *Mi Familia Progres*a programme was launched and scaled up to cover 24% of the population within a year. In Pakistan, the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) was introduced in 2008 to reduce the impact of the triple F crisis on the poor (Khawaja *et al.*, 2010).

#### 7.1.2 Horizontal expansion

As a response to the triple F crisis, many countries in Latin America extended the coverage of their social transfer programmes. *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil and *Oportunidades* in Mexico expanded to reach a million more beneficiaries after the triple F crisis, in Brazil's case by relaxing the eligibility

criteria (Bastagli, 2014; Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). In Costa Rica, the *Avancemos* programme, established in 2006 with just 8,000 beneficiaries, had expanded to 151,000 by 2009. Similarly in Paraguay, the Tekopora programme increased coverage from 14,000 to over 80,000 families in 2009. In Colombia, *Familias en Acción* increased its number of beneficiaries by almost 50% in 2009. In Peru, the Juntos programme expanded to 300,000 new beneficiaries between 2008 and 2010. In Ecuador, the coverage of the BDH (Human Development Grant) increased from 1 million to 1.2 million between 2008 and 2009 (Beazley *et al.*, 2016).

Beazley *et al.* (2016) report that, in Latin America and the Caribbean, such expansion of safety net programmes has been used less frequently for humanitarian responses to natural disasters than in the case of economic shocks. In recent years in Brazil, poor non-citizens, including refugees from Syria, have been enrolled onto the *Bolsa Família* programme. By 2015, nearly 16,000 families with at least one foreign person were receiving support. In Chile, non-beneficiaries of the *Solidario* programme who were affected by the 2010 earthquake were also supported if their monthly income was below \$836. One challenge can be the difficulty in removing beneficiaries from the programme following the crisis. For example, in the Dominican Republic, the *Solidaridad* programme almost doubled, from 1.2 million individuals in 2007 to 2.1 million in 2008, and it has remained almost constant since.

Examples of the horizontal expansion of a social transfer programme in Kenya, and of the PSNP in Ethiopia at times of natural disaster are detailed in Box 2 and Box 3 below. Also in Kenya, responding to the triple F crisis, the government accelerated plans to expand its Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, increasing coverage from 25,000 households in 2008, to 100,000 by 2010 (Fiszbein *et al.*, 2011). In 2012, Lesotho faced three humanitarian crises in quick succession (widespread drought, followed by early frost and flash floods). Analysis showed there was a good deal of overlap between those worst affected and the beneficiaries of the Child Grant Programme, an unconditional cash transfer through the Ministry of Social Development supported by UNICEF. UNICEF supported both the horizontal expansion of the programme, to include drought-affected households in areas where it was not yet present, and vertical expansion, topping up the payments of beneficiary households. UNICEF considered that this response was efficient as processes and systems were already in place, and the programme was already in a planned process of expansion (Mauder *et al.*, 2015).

Food transfers—including school feeding programmes—can also be scaled up in this manner. This tackles the vulnerability of cash transfers to inflation, so can be used in contexts where a cash-based response is not appropriate. Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) report that school feeding programmes are the most common social protection instrument globally (although they reach less than 15% of the poor, on average, in each country (World Bank, 2015b). Furthermore, Bundy *et al.* (2009) highlight that school feeding programmes are efficient to scale up in times of crisis because they rely on existing infrastructure and human resources. The expansion of school feeding was reportedly widely adopted as an immediate response to the triple F crisis, with support from WFP and the World Bank Global Food Crisis Response Facility. For example, it was one of the main scale-up responses to the triple F crisis in Bangladesh, when the Vulnerable Group Feeding programme was expanded by 25% to reach 7.5 million households (Demeke *et al.*, 2009).

## Box 2 Example—horizontal expansion of the Kenya HSNP

The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) has been operating since 2007, to provide regular cash transfers to reduce poverty, hunger and vulnerability among pastoralists in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands of Kenya's four northern counties: Turkana, Marsabit, Wajir and Mandera. Funded initially by DFID and AusAid, in its first phase from 2007-12 it provided exclusively long term support to 69,000 households with chronic needs. On occasion, it expanded vertically to provide additional transfers to existing beneficiaries in a drought emergency.

Under Phase 2, which began in 2013, the HSNP is housed at the Government of Kenya's National Drought Management Authority, and is increasingly financed from the government budget. In this phase the HSNP has increased its caseload of regular beneficiaries to 100,000 households. It has introduced a shock-response component that expands horizontally to an additional temporary caseload in the early stages of a food crisis as part of the national drought management response (DFID, 2012a). DFID's business case supports the rationale in terms of efficiency and effectiveness relative to humanitarian appeals, considering that working through the HSNP system will generate cost and time savings compared to traditional emergency responses (DFID, 2012a).

The HSNP began Phase 2 with a mass registration aiming to reach all households in the four counties, reaching 374,000 in total (NDMA, 2015a, 2015b). All households are issued with bank accounts and a bank card, a MasterCard, provided they have appropriate identification. Those on the regular programme—27% of households in the region—receive bi-monthly payments into their account, currently KES 5,400. The remainder may receive one-off payments at the same rate of KES 2,700 (£20) per month in the event of an increased risk of shock, depending on the geographical areas most at risk, for each month they are deemed at risk. Payment is triggered automatically by a vegetation condition index derived from remotely sensed satellite data that indicates, at certain pre-agreed levels, a 'severe' risk of drought, in which case affected subcounties are allocated resources sufficient to scale up to 50% of their population, or 'extreme' risk, where the additional allocation permits scale up to 75%.

The emergency payment was first triggered in April 2015. An internal review of the first payment noted that it was generally successful, with over £3 million being disbursed to 90,000 temporary beneficiary households within just two weeks of being triggered, and that the use of the vegetation condition index was justified (Slater, Bailey and Harvey, 2015). Two main challenges were identified. First, the distribution of county allocations among communities and households was not systematic. Second, there was confusion as to why some households had become eligible while others remained ineligible, since the wealth ranking exercise that determined the order of entry of households onto the programme had been undertaken up to two years previously, and people were unaware of their ranking (Anonymous, 2015). The emergency payments have been released several times since then, in 2015–2017. The first challenge was addressed in these subsequent payments by using a modified version of the formula used by the Government of Kenya's Commission for Revenue Allocation to allocate resources to administrative units. This allowed the county allocation to be redistributed among subcounties, so that all received at least some additional funds, even if they were not classified as in 'severe' or 'extreme' need, as this was considered the most politically acceptable option. A full qualitative assessment of the operations and impact of the initial emergency payments is being undertaken by OPM at the time of writing.

### 7.1.3 Vertical expansion

Such initiatives were undertaken by many countries in Latin and Central America, during the triple F crisis. In some countries this was a policy decision, in others the benefit rates of programmes increased because they are tied to the minimum wage, which itself increased considerably due to the crisis. The Government of Chile provided one-time payments as temporary relief to beneficiaries of a number of its social assistance programmes (Bastagli, 2014). In Brazil, in response to the triple F crisis, Bolsa Familia benefits were raised by 10% while in Mexico Oportunidades payments to the poorest families increased by 24% (Bastagli, 2014). In other instances of vertical expansion the increased value has been permanent. In Mexico, Prospera increased benefits during the triple F; this additional support remained as part of the basic programme after the crisis (Beazley *et al.*, 2016).

Recently, vertical expansion of social transfer programmes has become a policy response to natural disasters. In Ecuador, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano conditional cash transfer (CCT) has an Emergency Grant that can be activated to provide beneficiaries with additional financial support at times of crisis. Following the 2012 floods, 40,000 beneficiaries received an additional USD \$90 (World Bank, 2016). In Chile, a lump sum was paid to beneficiaries of the Chile Solidario programme affected by the 2010 earthquake. In Guatemala, a Calamity Grant is provided to recipients of the CCT Bono Seguro residing in those areas where a state of emergency is declared. In Argentina, the government gave additional benefits to child grant and social pensions recipients in response to the flooding of 2015 (Beazley *et al.*, 2016).

Programmes have also been implemented in Asia and the Pacific, by governments and with support from humanitarian actors. In the Philippines, in response to Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, the Department for Social Welfare and Development, with support from WFP, provided top-up cash and in-kind support to regular beneficiaries of its Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) CCT programme for an extra two months. The top-up meant that for that period the transfer covered 100% of the food basket (Maunder *et al.*, 2015; Zimmerman and Bohling, 2015; Bowen, 2015; UNICEF, 2015a).

In Vietnam, a one-off cash transfer to the poor was implemented in its 2009 stimulus package (Binh, 2010). In Bangladesh, the value of cash pensions for the elderly and widowed poor was revised upwards (Hossain *et al.*, 2012). Following Tropical Cyclone Winston in Fiji in February 2016, which affected 540,400 people (62% of population), the Government of Fiji, with support from the World Bank, responded by topping up the cash transfers for beneficiaries of all the national social protection programmes (F\$600 for Poverty Benefits Scheme beneficiaries and F\$300 to beneficiaries of other schemes (Doyle, 2017; DFAT/World Bank, 2016). Following the Nepal earthquake in 2015, UNICEF used the existing social assistance system as an effective way to quickly reach a large cohort of the population that was in need of support. UNICEF provided a top-up cash grant of NRs. 3000 to existing beneficiaries of the government Nepal's social assistance programmes, reaching approximately 434,000 people in 19 districts (Kukrety, 2016). Similarly in Africa, vertical expansion of social transfers during times of drought has been implemented in Kenya through the HSNP, in Ethiopia through the PSNP and in Lesotho. The experience of vertical expansion of the PSNP in Ethiopia is in Box 3, below.

This is reportedly a very quick and cost efficient policy response once markets are functioning, although its restriction to existing beneficiaries is a concern where coverage rates of the poorest and/or the population most affected by the disaster are low (Maunder *et al.*, 2015; DFAT/World Bank, 2016; Bowen, 2015; Kukrety, 2016; Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). It is also important to complement top-ups with an information campaign to make households aware of the payments and their purpose (DFAT/World Bank). One issue in the case of steep inflation is whether the value of the transfer keeps up. A comparison of the increase in the Oportunidades transfer with the rate of inflation shows that beneficiaries were not protected in full from food price inflation (Bastagli, 2014).

Between 2014 and 2016, school feeding programmes were vertically expanded during periods of climatic shocks in Nicaragua, Honduras and Haiti, providing either additional meals per day or meals during the holiday season to students in municipalities in affected areas (Beazley *et al.*, 2016).

### Box 3 Example—vertical and horizontal expansion of Ethiopia's PSNP

The Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), originating in 2005 to reduce reliance on annual emergency food aid appeals in chronically food insecure *woredas* (districts), is implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and supported by a donor coalition. In its most recent phase it has been operating a continuum of four risk management instruments (Gray and Asmare, 2012; Hobson and Campbell, 2012; Maunder *et al.*, 2015):

1. First, it provides six months of regular transfers per year (cash, food or a mix) to households identified by communities as chronically food insecure. Most get transfers as wages on public works projects; 15-20% 'direct support' beneficiaries (the disabled, elderly, pregnant women) have no work requirement.
2. The second stage comprises *woreda* and regional contingency budgets, 20% of the annual PSNP budget. Some 5% is to be spent at the discretion of *woreda* officials (normally to address exclusion errors and transitory needs); 15% is held at regional level, to address transitory need only. The regional budget is dependent on corroborating data from the early warning system and the existence of contingency plans to be activated when a shock is anticipated or occurs.
3. In 2009 an RFM was introduced to mobilise additional resources in an emergency. Based on an in-principle donor commitment, it allows for up to \$80 million to be mobilised for a crisis each year. The established early warning system triggers the release of funds.
4. Finally a fourth instrument, the Humanitarian Requirements Document, is released twice a year and defines the needs of non-beneficiaries, mostly in terms of food aid, though there is a cash element for non-food requirements such as water, health and education provision (Gray and Asmare, 2012).

The federal government triggered the RFM in August 2011 to address the transitory food needs of about 9.6 million people in PSNP districts, of whom two-thirds were existing PSNP clients and one-third non-beneficiaries, who received up to three months' support. The literature highlights that the mechanism significantly reduced the 'typical' humanitarian timeline for response. It took nine months from the launch of the humanitarian appeal to leverage all funding. By comparison from request to disbursement of funds the RFM took six weeks, although as noted in section 6, there were still some significant delays in the government making the initial request to draw down the RFM funds. Furthermore, it was able to easily scale down after the crisis. In 2014 it was triggered again, but with some challenges in timeliness. When the preconditions of contingency planning and financing are met, the RFM is considered far more efficient and effective for dealing with covariate shocks, since it provides a preventive response to transitory needs (Hobson and Campbell, 2012). A World Bank review estimated that assistance through the PSNP in response to the Horn of Africa food crisis in 2011 was cost-efficient, at \$53 per beneficiary compared with \$169 through the UN on account of its established distribution networks (The World Bank Group, 2013).

#### 7.1.4 Piggybacking

Beazley *et al.* (2016) report that there are few examples of humanitarian assistance piggybacking on social protection systems to respond to disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is because governments in this region are relatively strong, and have tended to lead the responses to such shocks, and since social protection programmes are generally well established these have been leveraged through vertical or horizontal expansions. However, they suggest that this could be a good way for international humanitarian assistance to channel support through and strengthen government systems. Following the 2016 earthquake, the government of **Ecuador** provided beneficiaries of social assistance programmes with additional temporary benefits, through the same payment system. These programmes also expanded coverage horizontally, reaching new beneficiaries. In addition, WFP piggybacked on the existing administrative systems which reported increased the coverage and cost-efficiency of their response (Beazley, forthcoming). Such approaches have been implemented by a number of humanitarian agencies in other regions.

The Social Welfare Fund is a government social assistance programme in Yemen, targeting cash assistance to the poorest and most vulnerable people, delivered through the Post Office. In October 2011, Oxfam implemented a humanitarian response providing cash transfers to vulnerable households in Al Hodeidah governorate during a period of worsening food crisis. Rather than

create a parallel system, it partnered with the Social Welfare Fund and the Post Office in order to take advantage of the social assistance programme's administrative structures and deliver cash at scale. Oxfam made use of and verified the Social Welfare Fund's beneficiary lists, which was much faster than the alternative of community-based targeting, and also made use of the same delivery mechanism. It negotiated with the Post Office to use their mobile vans, to take cash distribution closer to villages. Oxfam was able to distribute cash to half a million people in Yemen—the largest emergency cash distribution it had ever undertaken (Oxfam, 2013).

A similar initiative is planned for the Syrian refugee response in Turkey in 2017. ECHO plans to support an Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) for 1 million vulnerable refugees to meet their basic needs. The ESSN is anchored on and aligned with government systems, building upon the social assistance administrative processes of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, so as to guarantee longer term ownership and integration of the programme into the national social protection system, and working in partnership with the Turkish Red Crescent. Funds will flow directly to the Turkish Red Crescent, and payments will be made using their independent debit card system (ECHO, 2016).

Interestingly, UNICEF is complementing the ESSN with a cash transfer for education for refugee families with children. In terms of its design—the regulations, conditionality, targeting process and grant size—in many respects this could be considered a horizontal expansion of Turkey's national CCT for Turkish children. However, it is making use of the operational processes of the ESSN, with funding bypassing the national government, and payments managed by the Turkish Red Crescent (Smith, 2016).

Beazley *et al.* (2016) caution that piggybacking on government systems may raise concerns about whether key principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence will be challenged.

### 7.1.5 Shadow alignment

In the absence of an appropriate programme that can be used or extended to respond to a crisis, Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) argue that it is possible to introduce new programmes or initiatives, in such a way as to strengthen or reform the social protection system to make it more shock-responsive.

In 2009, the prices of basic food items in urban areas of Kenya escalated by up to 133% owing to prolonged drought and the global escalation of food prices. Over 4 million people in urban informal settlements were at risk of starvation. This population is vulnerable to a range of shocks and especially to rising prices, being highly dependent on the market for almost all their household needs. Concern and Oxfam designed a cash transfer programme, with the objective of addressing the food crisis in urban areas as well as reducing vulnerability of the urban poor to future food crises, through evidence-based advocacy to the Government of Kenya about inclusion of the urban poor in safety net programmes. The agencies, engaging with the government, made certain compromises in the design of the humanitarian cash transfer programme to achieve the longer term objective of improving access to social protection for the urban poor. One documented example was the transfer size. Both agencies wanted to fund up to 50% of households' monthly expenditure needs, but after consultation with the government the transfer value was set at under 30% so as to be in line with the government guidelines for social assistance. On the one hand this ensured better buy-in from the government, required for achievement of the longer term objective; on the other the amounts given were not commensurate with the level of identified humanitarian need, and did not take into account variation in family size. However, the programme was adopted by the government and implemented in Mombasa (Smith and Mohiddin, 2015).

In 2013 the political turmoil and severe drought led to a major food and nutrition crisis in the north of Mali. After initially responding in an ad-hoc way, as the extent of humanitarian needs unfolded and the political context became more stable, NGOs funded by ECHO came together to align some aspects of their emergency cash transfer responses in the north, under a programme known as the CCFS, in 2014, and again in 2016 (known as the CCTS). These aimed to provide direct support to the poorest households as well as laying foundations for greater resilience building. In 2016 the CCTS was aligned in its value and frequency with the transfer provided by the national cash transfer project in the south, Jigisèmèjiri (Soumaré, 2016). The intention was that this 'shadow alignment' would facilitate an eventual transition to the long term cash transfer and minimise confusion if the two programmes were to operate in the same areas.

In the humanitarian response to the drought in Guatemala in 2014, the government and humanitarian actors explored the potential for responding through the social protection system. The lack of a robust, cash-based social assistance programme with only limited coverage of social transfers in the dry corridor meant that scaling up an existing programme was not feasible. WFP designed a cash-based emergency response that ran parallel to the social protection system, with the government eventually taking over and replicating some aspects of the support, strengthening the capacity of the system for future shock-response. In Haiti, a consortium of humanitarian agencies (CARE, ACF, WFP and World Vision) with funding from USAID have been supporting the Government of Haiti in establishing a replicable safety net system to reduce food insecurity and vulnerability. The Kore Lavi programme is implemented in 24 communes and provides vouchers and food rations, with the intention that it becomes institutionalised as a programme within the government as a mechanism that also strengthens the country's capacity to respond to natural disasters (Beazley *et al.*, 2016).

### 7.1.6 Refocusing

In numerous instances social transfers have been scaled *down* after a shock (specifically macroeconomic crises): this fits the 'refocusing' response in OPM's typology (see section 4.2 above). This strategy fits with austerity policies implemented in economic crises; Ortiz and Cummins (2013) reviewed adjustment measures being considered in 174 countries between 2010 and 2013 as a response to the triple F crisis, and found nearly half planning to cut, not increase, their social assistance:

*80 governments in 55 developing and 25 high-income countries are considering rationalizing their spending on safety nets and welfare benefits, often by revising eligibility criteria and targeting to the poorest, which is a de facto reduction of social protection coverage. This policy approach runs a high risk of excluding large segments of vulnerable populations at a time of economic crisis and hardship (Ortiz and Cummins, 2013, p.36).*

Nearly all Eastern European and Central Asian countries were considering this strategy during the triple F crisis, as were several in southeast Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean and Latin America; it was less often proposed in sub-Saharan Africa. As, 'the world's austerity debates have taken place mostly in high-income countries, particularly in Europe', the refocusing of social transfers has been particularly prominent in high-income countries (Ortiz and Cummins, 2013, p.16). These initiatives have generally been *ad-hoc* policy changes rather than part of a system of planned retrenchment in the event of a crisis.

However, refocusing of social assistance programmes in response to shocks can have positive impacts in terms of assisting those affected by the crisis. Programmes to vulnerable groups can be ringfenced amid cuts; programme resources can be redirected to focus on more vulnerable

caseloads; or there can be a refocusing of payment schedules to provide money at the time people most need it. For example in Mongolia, the universal Child Money Programme was initially maintained amid cuts in public expenditure following the 2008 crisis and the transfer was made more progressive by providing marginally more money to successive children, given the higher poverty rate among larger families, to distribute resources to some of the worst affected (Bastagli, 2014). In Mexico, the payments made to beneficiaries on Prospera can be brought forward in order to respond to calamities such as hurricanes and droughts (Beazley *et al.*, 2016). In Haiti, following Hurricane Matthew, the national school feeding programme reallocated its food stock to provide food aid to hurricane affected populations (Sossouvi, forthcoming). In Mali, during the 2013-14 crisis, there was an influx of displaced children into an area where WFP was running a school feeding programme. In the absence of extra funding, WFP made an effort to accommodate extra demand through a refocusing of resources via reduced rations (Laanouni *et al.* 2014).

## 7.2 Experience with other types of social protection

### 7.2.1 Public works programmes

Scaling up public works programmes has been popular following financial crises, especially where alternative social protection for those of working age (both social assistance and insurance) is limited. There is a belief that they are easier and cheaper to target than cash grants, as they can be more 'self-targeting' if wages are set low. McCord (2013a) reports a belief among proponents that they can be implemented more quickly and are politically easier to discontinue after a crisis compared to cash and food transfers. McCord also points out an ideological reluctance among many donors and governments to provide income to the poor of working age without requiring them to work. Policy measures include horizontal and vertical expansion of existing programmes and creation of new programmes.

- Expansion of programmes: After the triple F crisis, the World Bank helped to scale up public works programmes in many places, e.g. South Africa's Expanded Public Works Programme (McCord, 2013a). In Bangladesh, the government tripled its Food for Work programme (renamed Rural Infrastructure Development Programme); allocations to the Rural Employment and Road Maintenance Programme also increased (Grosh *et al.*, 2011). In the Pacific, the potential for incorporating a disaster response into existing public works programmes (such as the Rapid Employment Project in the Solomon Islands) has been noted (Costella and Ivaschenko, 2015). Meanwhile, Mexico's Temporary Employment Public Works Program has built-in mechanisms for rapid vertical scale-up in response to a shock (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016).
- Creation of new programmes: In response to the financial crisis in 1997, all East Asian countries launched public works programmes (Bastagli, 2014; Marzo and Mori, 2012). After the triple F crisis in 2008, the Government of the Philippines developed the Comprehensive Livelihood and Emergency Employment Programme requiring government departments to use 1.5% of their operating budgets for emergency job creation. In Kenya, the Kazi Kwa Vijana programme was launched in 2009 to employ youth in rural and urban areas (Mwega, 2010).

Sometimes public works programmes have softened the impact of the crisis by smoothing income flows, stimulating consumer spending, maintaining social cohesion, and contributing to infrastructure development (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014; Grosh *et al.*, 2011; Marzo and Mori, 2012; McCord, 2013a). The literature concludes that such programmes were probably the single most important measure to mitigate effects of the 1997 crisis in East Asia, given the large size of the informal sector in most countries in the region. However, reviews of the evidence on public works programmes in shock-response conclude that the effectiveness of public works for shock-response cannot be guaranteed (Bastagli, 2014; McCord, 2013a):

- Public works programmes exclude labour-constrained households, often some of the most vulnerable to the impact of a shock—children, the elderly, the disabled and the chronically ill (Ahmed *et al.*, 2010).
- Setting low wages for self-targeting may mean that the support is not sufficient to help participants to deal with the impact of the shock (Wiggins *et al.*, 2010).
- If demand exceeds available places, this can create tensions, and increases the likelihood that poorer and less well connected households are excluded (Ahmed *et al.*, 2010).
- McCord (2013a) cites evidence from the implementation of new public works programmes for crisis response to show how many such programmes have faced considerable delays, meaning they were not effective for crisis response. She concludes that the prior establishment of systems and administrative capacity is as important as on other social transfer programmes.

## 7.2.2 Fee waivers and subsidies

Subsidies can be introduced or expanded during crises to lower the prices of basic goods including food grains, fuel and fertilisers (Bastagli, 2014). Whilst they are known to generate significant inclusion errors and can be costly as a result, they are relatively easy to implement, with limited administrative requirements (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014; McCord, 2013a; Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). They are an option when more targeted support is not feasible, and can be politically appealing for reducing social tensions. On the other hand, subsidies can be vulnerable to policy 'refocusing': cutting subsidies rather than increasing them can also be a policy measure at times of crisis (Ortiz and Cummins, 2013). In addition, subsidies can be difficult to exit from when the crisis is over (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016).

Examples of subsidies used for shock-response include rice subsidies in Egypt and Haiti during the triple F crisis (Bastagli and Holmes 2014; Marzo and Mori, 2012). In Haiti these were comparatively well targeted, with lower errors of exclusion compared to other commodity subsidies (Marzo and Mori, 2012). In Egypt, the food subsidy programme was expanded to include 15 million additional people, avoiding an increase in the poverty rate from 22 percent to 31 percent due to food price increases (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016; World Bank, 2011, in Bastagli, 2014). The nature of the subsidised commodity affects the extent to which the subsidy effectively mitigates the effects of the crisis on vulnerable groups. McCord (2013a) reports that fuel subsidies are effective in addressing urban poverty, whilst subsidies for staple foods can benefit the poorest.

The financing of subsidies during crises can generate a fiscal challenge. In Indonesia, after the 1997 financial crisis, the system of generalised subsidies including for fuel was used as a safety net for crisis response. This led to public discontent when the government later attempted to scale them back (Bender and Rompel, 2010).

## 7.2.3 Social care services

As mentioned in section 3, in many countries the provision of social care services for vulnerable groups is low. The issue of how such systems can be used in an emergency is therefore to some extent irrelevant. An extensive search of the literature has found almost no discussion on planning for or execution of the scale up of social care services in the event of a disaster. Effective social work depends on human resources: any scaling-up of services would be contingent on the availability and capacity of trained staff. The few examples below could all be classed as examples of horizontal expansion of existing services to meet additional needs during a crisis:

- The floods that affected Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014 highlighted challenges for Social Work Centres in expanding and coordinating social care and protection services to meet the

new and complex needs resulting in the flood-affected municipalities. Some Social Work Centres were themselves also affected by floods, destroying premises and resources and also affecting personnel. UNICEF, other donors and national and international NGOs supported the Social Work Centres in order to assist the vulnerable population. This included financial resources, personnel, assistance with case registration and provision of psychosocial support. Based on these lessons the government, in cooperation with UNICEF, recently drafted a practical manual to define the roles and responsibilities of Social Work Centres in crisis situations caused by disasters from natural hazards (Buljubašić *et al.*, 2015).

- In Colombia, following the arrival of over 20,000 Venezuelan refugees in 2015, the government scaled up social care services through establishing mobile units, to provide refugees with psychosocial care and legal advice (Beazley *et al.*, 2016).

In the absence of further literature on experiences with scaling up social care responses, the scaling up of a nutrition programme in a crisis generates lessons as to how it might work. In Kenya the government has adopted Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) to respond to acute child malnutrition. Concern Worldwide's CMAM Surge Capacity Model aims to strengthen the capacity of the health system to withstand and recover from short term increases in demand. It has been tested in areas of Kenya and Uganda that are vulnerable to recurrent droughts contributing to spikes in malnutrition (Erasmus, 2012; Kopplow, 2012). Health facility staff are trained to monitor new admissions and analyse indicators of worsening nutritional status such as rainfall, conflict and population movement. Through this, staff determine whether demand is likely to exceed certain thresholds and request surge support. A pre-defined support package is released. Key lessons that could be applicable to shock-response for social care services are:

- A successful surge capacity model requires the identification and monitoring of indicators that correlate with an impending increase in the demand for services, the setting of thresholds for decision-making and the timely analysis of information to trigger a response.
- The package of support should be agreed in non-emergency times to enable appropriate contingency planning.
- Government and community health workers have ownership and determine when and how they require additional NGO / donor support.
- Indicators and targets for scale down are also needed.

#### 7.2.4 Social insurance

Social insurance has strong potential as a tool for shock-responsive social protection, as it is designed to act as an automatic stabiliser in the aftermath of a shock (Bastagli, 2014). In several middle-income countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and also in low-income countries such as Vietnam, governments implemented policies in response to the triple F crisis that have aimed to expand coverage of this social protection instrument. This has led to higher social insurance coverage and benefit levels (Bastagli, 2014; Bastagli and Holmes, 2014). The type of social insurance with greatest potential to provide support following a covariate shock is unemployment benefits, given that a covariate shock may affect access to the labour market. This provides automatic cover for those who lose their jobs and incomes, and this was the main policy adjustment in response to the triple F crisis in Europe and Central America (McCord, 2013a). Others included extended pension provision and health insurance. Examples include:

- **Vertical expansion.** Uruguay changed the regulations for unemployment insurance to allow payments to be extended from six to eight months during this and future recessions (Beazley *et al.*, 2016). In Brazil, a similar, temporary extension of benefits was provided for workers in the 'worst affected sectors' who were laid off at the height of the crisis (Grosh *et al.*, 2013). Costa

Rica extended the grace period for health insurance coverage after loss of employment from three to six months. El Salvador allowed workers to maintain social security coverage for six months after loss of employment and Mexico's Social Security Institute extended health insurance coverage for up to six months for dismissed workers and their families. The Dominican Republic allowed low-income workers who were laid off to keep their health insurance for a year (Grosh *et al.*, 2013). The Bahamas introduced a temporary measure under the National Insurance Scheme to pay up to 13 weeks of benefits just under the minimum wage (Beazley *et al.*, 2016). The Government of Vietnam approved a 15% increase in pensions during the triple F crisis (Binh, 2010). In China and Uruguay, changes to the contributory pension system were made to reduce the contribution period and reduce the age at which benefits could be drawn, to increase income streams to those previously employed in the formal sector (McCord, 2013a).

- **Horizontal expansion.** Some schemes have relaxed eligibility requirements and contributions so as to effectively expand coverage during crises. An example is the reform of the solidarity fund in Chile. Following the triple F crisis, eligibility requirements were relaxed, so contributions did not need to be made every month. This plus improvements to the solidarity fund benefits increased the number of beneficiaries from 10,000 to about 30,000 per month between late 2008 and late 2010 (Grosh *et al.*, 2013). Some countries have created temporary reductions or exemptions to contributions for employers and employees, to reduce costs of programmes and stimulate employment or raise earnings of low-income workers (ILO, 2011). Thailand, China and Japan have all adopted such exemptions or reductions (Asher, 2010; Hagemeyer, 2009). This approach needs confidence that reserves exist to finance both current and future benefits.

We were unable to find examples of expansion of social insurance schemes in response to disasters from natural hazards. This is not surprising, since in low-income countries and also many middle-income countries, coverage and benefit levels are generally low owing to the informality of the labour market. This, and limited administrative capacity, pose a challenge to expansion of such schemes for crisis response (McCord, 2013a; Scholz *et al.*, 2010). Even in Europe and Central Asia where unemployment insurance is common, 'eligibility was tight, coverage low, and benefit periods short', with only one-third of those employed in the formal sector being covered (IEG, 2011:136 in McCord, 2013a). McCord concludes from the literature that conditions for the use of such schemes as a future crisis response are unlikely to be met (McCord, 2013a).

### 7.2.5 Active labour market policies

Active labour market policy responses include measures to protect jobs or promote job creation, by reducing labour costs for employers. These have included:

- **Wage subsidies.** Argentina's Programa de Recuperacion Productiva expanded in 2008 in response to the triple F crisis, increasing coverage of participating workers from 14,000 in 2007 to 144,000 in 2010. The government provided a monthly income support to workers which companies could deduct from salaries, to reduce costs (Grosh *et al.*, 2013).
- **Short-time work / reduced hours.** This was reportedly the most common type of support to labour demand in OECD countries in the triple F crisis, as schemes were already in place. Governments improved benefits or relaxed eligibility and administrative requirements to increase take-up. This proved effective in preserving jobs in the immediate aftermath; however, it was important that this support did not persist for too long, or it risked affecting the recovery (Bastagli, 2014). In Vietnam, the government also implemented policies that encouraged reduced working time rather than redundancies. This was supported by businesses, since it reduced the costs of recruiting and re-training. In Turkey in 2009, partial unemployment benefits were extended from three to six months, and payments were increased by 50% in

firms that adopted reduced working hours and the conditions for unemployment insurance (Bonnet *et al.*, 2012).

- **On-the-job training** to sustain labour demand for those on reduced hours, and training and retraining for the unemployed. In Uruguay and Chile, workers in a work-share programme could spend time that they were not in work on training. In Mauritius, the National Employment Foundation established a scheme to enable companies in the manufacturing and tourism sectors to send their employees for training instead of laying them off, protecting some 6,000 employees while improving their skills. At the time of the triple F crisis, China's economic stimulus package also included a nationwide vocational training scheme to assist laid-off and migrant workers (Bastagli, 2014). Again such measures can be combined with unemployment benefits. For example in Bulgaria and Korea, unemployed workers who participate in training opportunities get an extension of unemployment benefits (Bastagli, 2014, McCord, 2013a).
- **Job creation initiatives.** In Vietnam during the triple F crisis, a National Job Creation Fund provided loans to informal sector and family businesses, which reportedly supported the creation of over 250,000 new jobs in 2009. The government also continued its programme to send more workers abroad through provision of vocational training for overseas workers and initiatives to enter new labour markets (Binh, 2010).

McCord (2013a) concludes that these measures are not likely to offer significant or cost-effective benefits where there are high levels of informal employment.

## 8 Operational issues with shock-responsive social protection

### Key points:

- Targeting issues (coverage of social assistance programmes; the groups who are included on these programmes; and the time to implement) can represent a significant challenge to using social protection systems and programmes to rapidly meet needs in a disaster. The quickest and cheapest option is most likely to be to increase the value or duration of transfers to existing beneficiaries, on programmes that are already well targeted towards and/or have high coverage of those vulnerable to shock. Social transfer provision in many low- and also middle-income countries is very limited, and may be too small (in terms of the numbers of beneficiaries and the extent of geographical coverage) to provide a significant shock-response.
- For programmes to reach new caseloads in a targeted (not blanket) fashion, data availability is a critical prerequisite. Registries that collect information on vulnerable groups beyond existing programme beneficiaries are therefore considered to be powerful tools for shock monitoring and response. Unless deliberately designed to do so, it is unlikely that programmes in low-income countries will have this available. Even where such information is available it risks being out of date.
- Effective use of social protection systems following a shock requires strong administrative capacity and functioning infrastructure for delivery of transfers. A key lesson is that having a social protection system in place is critical to effective social protection provision in the event of a shock. The coverage of shock-responses is therefore likely to reflect the distribution of coverage in established operational systems. Capacity may be limited in low-income countries and the crisis may cause further disruption.
- Private sector partnerships with payment service providers and the emergence of e-payment systems hold much promise for delivery of both long-term social assistance, and assistance during a crisis in middle and low-income countries. Depending on the maturity and coverage of these payment systems it may be necessary to consider more than one type of payment channel. It is also important to consider potential damage or disruption caused by disasters and steps to be taken in the event that this occurs.
- Examples exist of *ex ante* and well-functioning donor coordination processes, strong coordination within government, and links between social protection, disaster response and emergency response mandates, although in many situations this is still challenging. Intra-agency coordination and inter-agency coordination are both important.
- Humanitarian aid parallel to use of social protection following a shock is likely to still be required. Appropriate planning for disasters between social protection and humanitarian actors has potential to improve coordination between both operations, and thus their efficiency and effectiveness.

Social protection systems have administrative processes and systems in place for targeting beneficiaries, making transfers (where applicable), managing information and coordinating with other actors. On the one hand, these form part of the attraction of using social protection systems for emergency response, since systems do not have to be started afresh (World Bank, 2016). Indeed Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) concludes that even in low-income countries, social protection systems offer potential to increase resilience to natural hazards. They also emphasise that to do so effectively, the systems need to be rapidly scalable and flexible to allow rapid adjustments at times of crisis. The design of social protection administrative systems, the rules regulating existing social protection policy in non-crisis times and the systems' administrative capacity may pose a challenge to rapid scale up, (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016; Bastagli and Holmes, 2014).

Here we review some of the main lessons in terms of the effective use of different aspects of social protection systems from the implementation of the programmes cited in the subsection above.

### 8.1 Targeting and registration

We noted in section 4.4.3 the challenge of the potentially limited overlap in the caseload of households receiving regular social protection and those affected by a covariate shock. Much social protection provision is targeted using combinations of demographic categories, community-

based targeting and means or proxy-testing, often with a geographical focus. To maximise relevance for households vulnerable to shocks, these criteria need to correlate with vulnerability factors related to covariate shocks (Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012). All mechanisms will have benefits and challenges. Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) stress that responses to a crisis need to balance targeting accuracy with timeliness. Both Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) and World Bank (2016) highlight that whatever mechanism is chosen, it will be important to have a system for raising and addressing targeting errors. In Pakistan, the grievance redress system in the second phase of the Citizen's Damage Compensation Program cut exclusion errors from an initial 61% to 32%.

### 8.1.1 Poverty targeting (community-based or proxy means-tested)

Proxy means-testing (PMT), that uses a set of easily identifiable indicators such as housing quality to develop a wealth ranking for households, is one way to target the chronic poor. However, if the ranking is undertaken in advance of a shock, a household's rank may not necessarily be a good indicator of its well-being as a result of the covariate shock, since better off households may be severely affected (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; McCord, 2013a). PMTs are generally based on slowly changing household characteristics (like assets), and are implemented infrequently owing to their time consuming and data-intensive nature, meaning that they cannot capture sudden changes in income and consumption (McCord, 2013a; Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016). After a shock, the process may be too complex to implement rapidly, so households not already enrolled may miss out. The latter is problematic on national programmes with tight poverty targeting (e.g. aiming to reach the 'bottom 10%') in contexts where a far larger percentage of the population share similar wealth characteristics, such as in Lesotho where the Child Grant Programme targets families in the bottom quintiles, but 80% of the population lives on \$2/day or less (Maunder *et al.*, 2015).

The literature suggests that, given the current distribution of social protection programmes, those programmes that target the chronically food insecure in drought-affected locations might have a greater overlap in caseload in an emergency caused by food insecurity than in the event of an economic crisis such as the triple F crisis, in which one of the worst affected groups was the working poor in urban areas who were not generally included in social assistance schemes (McCord, 2013a; Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013).

Kenya's HSNP, in Phase 2, ran a census-style registration of every household in the region it covers, then assigned long term social protection support to a minority of these that were among the poorest. This process, which includes the opening of bank accounts and the issuing of a bank card to all households, has been effective as a way of reaching additional households in a crisis. However, it has created some confusion within communities as to why some households who have been registered receive regular cash, while others receive occasional amounts and still others receive none. Targeting was mostly done using a PMT with limited community verification; as this was some years ago and households are unaware of their ranking, it is understandable that some perceive the order of scale up to new households to be a mystery.

With the HSNP operating in four counties of northern Kenya, its ability to scale up in those areas is much greater than its ability to respond in other counties that might be drought-affected, and where it does not operate. Equally, it was not a useful way of reaching those affected by the food price rises during the triple F crisis, as it has rural coverage and the impacts were felt in urban areas (Bastagli and Holmes 2014).

### 8.1.2 Categorical targeting

Programmes that target categorical groups (such as older people or children) may be less effective for reaching the desired caseload in a humanitarian crisis felt by all, such as natural hazards (Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013). The experience of the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines nuances this, in that the category targeted by the 4P programme—extremely poor families with children—were considered to be badly affected, but were by no means the only affected group. A significant portion of disaster-affected households could be reached quickly using 4P beneficiary lists; however, this had to be coordinated with humanitarian assistance delivered through the international response system to reach those not included (Smith, 2015; Bowen, 2015).

Kenya has three other social protection programmes within its National Safety Nets Programme that have national coverage: the Older Persons Cash Transfer, the People with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer and the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children. No provision is currently made for these to scale up in an emergency. While they have the benefit of the geographical coverage, their beneficiary lists have the drawback of being limited to certain categories. Any attempt to use programmes such as these, in Kenya or elsewhere, would require consideration of how to register households from outside the normal caseload.

When UNICEF supported the government of Nepal to vertically expand their existing social transfer programmes following the 2015 earthquake, this was based on the same categorical targeting that was used in the social assistance programmes. Kukrety (2016) reports that these categories were simple and easily understood by affected communities. In this way, UNICEF were able to quickly reach a large cohort of those who were poor and vulnerable prior to the crisis, and who were therefore likely to have been badly affected. However, this also excluded households who may also have been poor and vulnerable but who were not included in the social protection programmes, as well as other non-poor families who were adversely affected by the disaster.

In the case of Turkey and the ongoing efforts to link humanitarian assistance for refugees with government social protection systems, eligibility for the ESSN will be based on data from the government of Turkey's registry of refugees. This contains only basic demographic data and no socioeconomic criteria. It is therefore proposed that this is complemented with additional socioeconomic vulnerability criteria (Smith, 2016; ECHO, 2016). Meanwhile on their complementary CTP for education, UNICEF plan to use the Turkish CCT's administrative systems, but rather than using the programme's PMT, which is time consuming to apply and is based on indicators relevant for Turkish citizens, eligibility for Syrians will be based on demographic criteria (Smith, 2016).

### 8.1.3 Geographical coverage

Given that many disasters tend to affect specific areas, geographical targeting is often used in planning humanitarian response to shocks (Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012). It is often possible to know in advance the areas that are most vulnerable to climate-related shocks. This knowledge can be built into the design of social protection systems: Bastagli and Holmes (2014) cite the example of the evolution of safety nets in Bangladesh to target particular areas with high levels of poverty and which are also vulnerable to seasonal food crises related to flooding and other weather events. In the Philippines there was a high coverage of the population in the geographical area most affected by the typhoon (Smith, 2015). In contrast, recent analyses of social protection shock-response preparedness in Mozambique and Zimbabwe identify the limited geographical reach and population coverage of existing programmes as a critical constraint (McCord, 2013a).

## 8.2 Management information systems

Centralised registries of information on actual and potential social assistance beneficiaries have begun to be developed in several countries. These may facilitate the scaling up of existing programmes or the development of a response programme that piggybacks on these systems, if they can be used to quickly identify other households—for example, those who were just above the threshold for regular programme receipt, and who are likely to have been badly affected by the shock (Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012; McCord, 2013a). Box 4 highlights the different types of registries and considerations for use in shock-response. Hallegatte *et al.* (2016) suggest that the presence of a social registry with large coverage can make it possible to introduce dynamic targeting for emergency response, in which potential beneficiaries of such programmes are segmented before a disaster into risk categories, based on indicators such as their income, assets, location, or occupation (like farmers and fishermen). These defined target groups could then receive varying levels of support following a crisis. They recommend that social registries should include demographic, socioeconomic, and location information on households.

Some examples include the following:

- In Brazil, individuals can register at any time on the *Cadastro Unico* administrative registry, on which information is updated at least every two years, meaning it was useful for capturing rapid changes in circumstances during the triple F crisis (McCord, 2013a). The registry includes households with a per capita income below half the national minimum wage, a threshold that is higher than the eligibility threshold of existing social transfer programmes (i.e. those that are not currently beneficiaries of social protection but are considered some of the most vulnerable to economic shocks or disasters). This feature ensures that the Bolsa Familia cash transfer scheme can be rapidly adjusted to include a new caseload when shocks occur (Hallegatte *et al.*, 2016)
- Part of the proposed consolidation of Kenya's National Safety Nets Programme includes the establishment of management information systems for each programme that can be read by a 'single registry' to track households across all programmes simultaneously (Wyatt *et al.*, 2014).
- In Pakistan, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) conducted a small pilot research project in Sindh province, comparing community-based targeting with targeting based on the National Socio Economic Registry, the basis of the targeting system on BISP. Results suggested that this piggybacking on national systems results in a higher level of operational efficiency (IRC, 2016).
- In its next phase, Ethiopia's PSNP (2015-20) will expand to 10 million people. From 2015, the regular PSNP and the Humanitarian Requirements Document will use the same assessments and a unified registry based on wealth ranking. At present it has a caseload of 7.8 million chronic cases and 2.2 million transitory cases. By 2020 those 'transitory' cases identified as chronic will move over to the PSNP, and the transitory caseload will drop to a maximum of 1.7 million, covered by contingency finance. The RFM funds will be pooled with funds for the Humanitarian Requirements Document, and this will be used to support additional, transitory and acute caseloads during crisis years (Maunder *et al.*, 2015; Ministry of Agriculture, 2014).
- In Vietnam, a national poverty list records information on households below the poverty line. However the administratively complex process has meant that this list was only updated every five years. In 2009, only those who had already been registered as 'poor' could be considered for assistance despite changes to circumstances caused by the triple F crisis, which presented an obstacle to expanding coverage to the new poor in a timely fashion. Since then, discussions on how to strengthen Vietnam's shock-responsiveness have focused on the possibility of an annual update of the poor list with the opportunity for households to apply to be put on it on a rolling basis (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014; Kuriakose *et al.*, 2012).

## Box 4 Management information systems and their use for shock-response

Depending on the country context and the objectives pursued, there are three main (and potentially overlapping) approaches to developing an integrated system for information management:

1. *A social registry*: a database/registry which collects and houses comprehensive (i.e. not programme-specific) information on potential beneficiaries within the country. The primary function of social registries is to support the implementation phases of outreach, intake/registration, and assessment of needs and conditions for the purposes of determining potential eligibility for enrolment in selected social protection programmes. This could form the basis for targeting of an emergency response.
2. *An integrated beneficiary registry*: a database/registry which is created by integrating programme management information systems of several different existing schemes, meaning integration is only achieved across data and information on social protection beneficiaries (programme recipients). The main objective is to provide coordination and oversight, and integrate selected operations and services across programmes. This type of registry includes only existing social protection beneficiaries, so has limited use for further targeting.
3. *Virtual registry*: a registry (which is not necessarily physical) created by ensuring the inter-operability of existing databases through web service access. When linked to a national ID and/or civil registry, this approach can ensure a comprehensive (100% of the population), cross-sector, and 'pro-active' (linked to life-cycle events) overview of a country's population, that can be used for social protection purposes.

### Using data from such registries for emergency response

However important the role of such data management systems may be in this context, it is important to stress that they are not always fit for supporting horizontal expansion of an existing social protection programme, or for piggybacking on an emergency response. This is because depending on the context, emergencies can affect households across the social spectrum, and alter the poverty profile of affected areas. The key factors determining the usefulness of existing social registries for shock-responsive purposes include the following:

- Representing a large enough snapshot of a country's population. This is only the case where either a) a census-survey is applied to all households (not only those who have been pre-identified as poor, as for example in Indonesia) so that the database includes as close as possible to all of the population; or b) where data-exchange from administrative data sources populates the registry with relevant information on all citizens.
- Including information for both current beneficiaries (e.g. those who have been ranked as poor and selected as eligible for social assistance programmes) and other potential beneficiaries (e.g. the near poor). This is the case for social registries, but is not the case for integrated beneficiary registries, for example.
- Containing data which are useful and relevant for assessing contextual vulnerabilities after a shock. For example, this may not be the case for those registries that primarily aggregate data from existing administrative sources (e.g. data on consumption levels, food security, asset ownership, etc.). This may require early collaboration with the country's disaster management authority and humanitarian agencies. On the other hand, if these registries collect geo-referenced data, this could be particularly useful for highlighting those households within the affected area, for blanket targeting, or for further assessment of verification of disaster-related vulnerabilities.
- Containing up-to-date information – i.e. having a frequent, strong and valid data-updating strategy in place. This is a recognised challenge of centralised registries, although there are efforts to make these more dynamic.

Source: adapted from Barca and Chirchir (2016)

- In Tonga, the World Bank is working with the government's Social Protection and Disability Division on the development of a registry of poor households for informing the CCTs, as part of a strategy to building a disaster-responsive function into the CCT programme (Doyle, 2017).
- Following experiences with scaling up Nepal's social assistance programmes in response to the earthquake in 2015, the World Bank are implementing a 'Strengthening Systems for Social Protection and Civil Registration Project'. This is establishing a comprehensive national population register to support targeting of social protection programmes with a view to supporting future shock-response (Doyle, 2017).

Data protection is one concern in all contexts, but especially in regions affected by conflict or where the data collected may be politically sensitive; it is also at risk of advancing surveillance in developing countries (Hosein and Neist, 2013).

### 8.3 Payment mechanisms

A key condition for effective shock-response is the existence of effective payment systems (McCord, 2013a). This may include manual systems or those using bank cards or new technologies such as mobile phones. Several commentators and evaluations have underscored that e-payment systems are a promising way to deliver aid to recipients with speed, precision and flexibility, even in challenging environments (Smith *et al.*, 2012; Bastagli 2014). However, they also risk being relatively expensive as an emergency response if the infrastructure is not already well set up, or if humanitarian agencies have to invest in new systems that are then only used for a short time (O'Brien *et al.*, 2013). The adoption of e-payment systems takes time and faces challenges including the coverage of agents and vendors; liquidity; and failure of the technology. Nonetheless, e-payment systems are increasingly being introduced in cash transfer programmes in countries prone to crisis (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014; O'Brien *et al.*, 2013).

A good example of experience in using e-payment systems at large scale in response to humanitarian crises is provided by Pakistan. Here, the government's rapid response to 1.3 million people affected by the floods in 2011, the Citizen's Damage Compensation Programme (CDCP) was implemented through a partnership with United Bank Limited through 'Watan' debit cards. Whilst there were understandably difficulties in deploying a system so new to people, rapidly and at such a large scale, the platform was able to deliver payments relatively effectively and securely in a matter of weeks, which would not have been feasible with manual approaches (Smith *et al.*, 2012). Critical elements to success were the government's strong partnership with the bank, and the use of existing payment agent networks. The Visa system was familiar to bank partners, regulators and vendors, helping reduce setup time (CSR Asia, 2014). Two key factors that helped extend the programme's reach to previously unregistered beneficiaries were the free-of-charge issue of over 400,000 new national ID cards by the Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority, and the rapid roll-out of biometric screening equipment across all card registration centres (CSR Asia, 2014). There were challenges reported in remote rural areas where agent coverage was much sparser, and there was sometimes a shortage of cash, making it difficult for beneficiaries to access the transfer (Ovadiya, 2014; Smith *et al.*, 2012).

The e-payment system is found to have had longer lasting impacts beyond the immediate effect of the CDCP. These include the improved outreach of branchless banking; the extension of the bank's agent network, especially in areas it may not have prioritised before the floods; and the establishment of card-based disbursements as standard for government transfers in Pakistan (Pasricha and Revzi, 2013). The World Bank report that use of such technology adds to the credibility and transparency of the programme which helps in mobilising political and public support (World Bank, 2016).

Other examples in the literature of the use of e-payments for shock-responsive social protection include the following:

- In Vietnam the government is piloting e-payment systems, and alternative arrangements to manual delivery (by local officials, through the post office and local banks) are being explored to improve social assistance payment delivery. Commentators have argued that moving away from a manual payment system could increase transparency and accountability and reduce errors and costs. It could also free up processing time of local officials currently involved in the

delivery of cash benefits, increasing their ability to concentrate on other service delivery functions such as communication and outreach to beneficiaries.

- In Kenya, the use of programme-specific smartcards under Phase 1 of the HSNP and the distribution of point-of-sale devices in traders' shops proved successful at delivering assistance effectively to mobile populations in remote rural locations (Oxford Policy Management and the Institute of Development Studies, 2012). Under Phase 2, the opening of Equity Bank accounts for all households in programme areas is beginning to show evidence of being effective in the shock-responsive component of the programme.
- In the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan, top-up payments of nearly \$6 million to 4P beneficiaries made use of the existing payment platform, either via cash card (31%), especially in urban areas where cash machines were more readily available (though some were damaged by the typhoon), or over the counter (69%) (Smith, 2015; Zimmerman and Bohling, 2015). Across the country, beneficiaries were already familiar with the system and no training was needed, since e-payment delivery mechanisms had been part of the programme since 2007 (Zimmerman and Bohling, 2014). Some minor difficulties were experienced by the financial service providers in managing the additional monthly payment (Smith, 2015).

## 8.4 Coordination of shock-responses among social protection institutions

Administration of social protection can be complicated after a crisis due to the surge in demand for support, involvement of actors concerned with disaster response, and potentially disruption of infrastructure; there is a risk of overburdening institutions that have limited administrative resources if they are also made responsible for coordination of the crisis response (Bastagli, 2014; McCord, 2013a). A review of experiences in the literature on social protection highlights some lessons.

- Kuriakose *et al.* (2012) and Bastagli and Holmes (2014) note that after the triple F crisis in Pakistan, the absence of a central body responsible for the coordination of social assistance programmes was a key challenge to effective shock-response. They compare this to Bangladesh, where the government established a unit dedicated to the monitoring of shock effects and coordination of responses. Bastagli (2014) provides examples of the establishment of institutions for coordination of responses to the triple F crisis. In Burundi this included setting up a steering committee across eight government departments to coordinate the expansion of the school feeding programme whereas in Liberia a School Feeding Unit was established within the Ministry of Education.
- The PNSP in Ethiopia is implemented almost entirely through national government systems, decentralised through regional and local administrations, and national government staff. Literature suggests that changes to the government structure leading to coordination of social protection support through a single central agency, which works closely with other national agencies and subnational authorities, is more effective for managing scale-up in crisis times than putting multiple agencies in charge<sup>9</sup> (La Rosa, 2015; Pelham *et al.*, 2011; Slater and Bhuvanendra, 2013). The PSNP has established effective vertical linkages, though it is recognised that capacity constraints at regional and local levels affect implementation and communication between departments has been weak (The World Bank Group, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> Pelham *et al.* (2011) report that in the early years of the PSNP there were management struggles between the Food Security Coordination Bureau (under the Ministry of Agriculture) responsible for implementation and the Ministry of Finance and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency who were involved in emergency transfers. This led to confusion, delays and inhibited the responsiveness of the programme. In 2008, the Government brought these departments under a single state minister.

- In order to support coordination of the shock-response component, in Phase 2 Kenya's HSNP has moved under the control of the National Drought Management Agency (NDMA) under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning (Wyatt *et al.*, 2014).
- Bastagli (2014) notes the importance of advanced planning for coordination of implementation during crises and its inclusion within the standard operating procedures of the programme. The example provided is that of Colombia's *Familia en Accion*, where the operation manual specifies adjustments to the programme in response to crisis. This includes defining the role of the programme in disasters, within the framework of a disaster response plan; specifying modifications to the cash transfer such as waiving conditions; and linking up with institutions coordinating disaster response and contingency financing. The same approach is taken on the PSNP, with detailed manuals explaining the procedures for implementation of contingency budgets and the RFM (Risk Financing Mechanism Management Committee, 2012).

## 8.5 Coordination of social protection and DRM

Furthermore it is important to involve the dedicated governmental and non-governmental institutions with a mandate for disaster risk management (DRM). This requires the engagement and buy-in from all key government departments and other stakeholders (World Bank, 2016).

For example, the effective functioning of shock-responsive social protection for weather-related shocks is based on linkages with national early warning systems. Data must arrive in a timely fashion and must also be analysed and acted upon. The literature highlights the example of the Government of Bangladesh's response to cyclone Sidr in 2007. A National Disaster Management Strategy already existed, which provided integrated risk management and response plans across sectors based on early warning triggers and incorporated safety nets as part of the response. Strong coordination and linkages between national and local level actors and sharing early warning information triggered the immediate implementation of safety nets comprising cash, rice and shelter grants. Resources were available prior to the impact of the shock being known and without the need to launch an appeal (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014; Pelham *et al.*, 2011).

In Ethiopia, the RFM trigger is based on an established early warning system. When the RFM was triggered in 2011, whilst the response after the decision to trigger was extremely rapid, there was a delay of several months from when data became available to when the regional governments requested release of the RFM resources. According to the RFM Guidelines, such early warning should be provided by the Livelihood Early Assessment Protection (LEAP) system of the PSNP and the federal government's Early Warning System (the Livelihood Impact Assessment Sheets (LIAS)). At the time the LEAP system was still under development and there was a lack of clarity regarding the harmonisation of the LIAS in the RFM. So, while there was a warning far earlier in the year that people in PSNP areas would require support, this was not provided by the 'official' early warning process in the RFM Guidelines, and so was not acted upon (Hobson and Campbell, 2012; Maunder *et al.*, 2015; Risk Financing Mechanism Management Committee, 2012).

## 8.6 Coordination of social protection and humanitarian response

As Marzo and Mori (2012) point out, humanitarian response measures will still be necessary, especially as social protection programmes and systems are still emerging in most low-income countries, and since it will not be feasible or appropriate to scale up existing programmes to meet 100% of needs in each context. Coordination between social transfer programmes and short term emergency response measures (led by government departments with the mandate for disaster response, and non-governmental agencies) will continue to be an important feature of shock-responsive social protection. Beazley *et al.* (2016) highlight the challenges of doing so when, in

practice, social protection and civil protection sector run in parallel, without much coordination; the former traditionally associated with helping the chronic poor, and the latter leading emergency responses.

The World Bank (2016) recognises the need for a solid institutional coordination framework to clearly articulate roles and decision-making processes. Countries are increasingly developing national coordination structures and strategies that incorporate social protection, DRM and humanitarian response. For example: in Niger, the government, with donor support, has developed a national contingency plan for managing weather-related shocks that includes ensuring access to food through social assistance, protection of household assets and developing early warning indicators (Bastagli, 2014). In Latin America, several countries have established inter-ministerial committees to increase coordination. In Colombia, the *Familias en Acción* programme's operations manual specifies programme adjustments and related implications for implementation in the event of a crisis, including the role of the programme within the disaster response plan and coordination with institutions leading on disaster response (Bastagli, 2014). In Nicaragua the *Sistema Nacional para la Prevención Mitigación y Atención de Desastres* (SINAPRED), the body in charge of prevention, mitigation and response to disasters, is led by the Presidency and integrated across every line ministry, showing a multidimensional approach to shock-response. The SINAPRED has committees at every level, from national to local, in order to improve vertical coordination (Beazley *et al.*, 2016). There are similar structures developed in Philippines in the form of the National and the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committees (Bowen, 2015).

Nevertheless, non-governmental humanitarian actors often operate independently (according to humanitarian principles) rather than with government institutions and systems (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014). Some examples of both effective and less effective coordination between national social protection systems and the broader humanitarian community include:

In the case of the vertical expansion of the Government of Philippines' 4P social transfer programme for shock-response following typhoon Haiyan, Smith (2015) reports that one of the main lessons for success was effective and early coordination between WFP and the Department of Social Welfare and Development. The prior existence of a memorandum of understanding for collaboration, and a track record of WFP having provided resources directly to the government for humanitarian response sped up the process of agreement. This is similar to experiences in Lesotho, when UNICEF provided funds to support the expansion of the government's child grant (Maunder *et al.*, 2015).

In the response to the 2007 cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh, there was reportedly a reluctance of donors and NGOs to support the national safety net response, leading to duplication of assessments and parallel response programmes that caused confusion on the ground. In Pakistan during the response to the earthquake, aid agencies also did not coordinate their interventions with the existing state-led cash transfer mechanisms, including Zakat and the Bait-ul-Mal, which are designed to reach the poorest (Pelham *et al.*, 2011).

In Ethiopia, we described above the coordination between regular PSNP transfers and the Humanitarian Response Document implemented by humanitarian agencies. Even here there have been misunderstandings about which populations might be covered by core PSNP support, which by contingency budgets, and which required humanitarian assistance (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014). There was no clear understanding between levels of government and development partners on the sequencing of RFM-financed versus humanitarian responses. There was a widespread perception that the RFM should only be triggered very occasionally, while emergency responses could be provided every year (Ministry of Agriculture, 2015). Several reports also note the discrepancy in the value of assistance provided to households through the scaling-up of the PSNP and to those who received humanitarian support. The ration provided under the RFM in 2011 was

not a full food basket because it was designed to meet needs earlier in the response, while households supported under traditional humanitarian response received a fuller ration (Hobson and Campbell, 2012; Maunder *et al.*, 2015; Ministry of Agriculture, 2014; Risk Financing Mechanism Management Committee, 2012; Sida *et al.*, 2012). The next phase of the programme is making several changes based on lessons learned, to improve coordination of disaster response through social protection and humanitarian systems (Ministry of Agriculture, 2015):

- The geographic resource allocation of the PSNP, targeting only specific *woredas*, excludes many chronically vulnerable Ethiopians and contributes to continued provision of emergency assistance in PSNP *woredas* for a recurrent transitory caseload of more than 4.7 million people. This means that contingency budgets and emergency responses have been used to plug gaps created by insufficient coverage of the predictable safety net. Gradually the PSNP in Phase 4 will become a national programme with an annual caseload of 10 million clients. This will cover 8.3 million chronic food insecure clients, meaning many of the households currently receiving transitory assistance will be included in the long term programme. The programme will retain capacity to scale up to support an additional 1.7 million transitory clients if need exists. Transitory needs will be determined using data generated by the early warning system through a joint seasonal assessment conducted in December each year.
- Rather than restructuring the instruments (PSNP Contingency Budgets and the RFM), efforts will focus on addressing weaknesses in the system to ensure they are used as planned. This will include building capacity for greater decentralisation of decision-making for triggering scale up; making clearer the triggers and simplifying the procedures for implementation; and monitoring the use of contingency budgets.
- The value will increase to improve food consumption and asset protection. Transfers will equate to the value of 15 kg of cereal and 4 kg of pulses per month, commensurate to the kilocalories provided by the humanitarian food basket. This will be disbursed either in the form of this mixed food basket, its cash equivalent, or, on a pilot basis, through vouchers. A key aspect will be the introduction of a predictive inflation buffer for cash transfers.

In Kenya, recent developments suggest that efforts are being made to strengthen integration and coordination between humanitarian and development sectors. The overall strategy of the UN Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan is to gradually transition out of humanitarian aid for chronically vulnerable caseloads, and to integrate emergency responses into early and extended recovery plans and social protection such as the HSNP in the north, and the expanded long term social assistance of other programmes in the National Safety Nets Programme (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014). To complement this, ECHO is funding WFP's Complementarity Initiative, which provides strategic coordination support to the National Social Protection Secretariat, and building the systems to deliver the national portfolio of social protection initiatives. WFP aims to fully integrate its food assistance programmes into the national social protection system, and the data into the government's national single registry, which can then form the basis of strategic decisions for humanitarian response targeting (Maunder *et al.*, 2015).

The EU is funding the Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE) which aims to build the resilience of vulnerable populations to drought through joint planning between humanitarian and development staff and the use of development cooperation and humanitarian funding instruments. The multi-sector programme includes support for life-saving activities, for recovery and for investment in longer term development, such as livestock health and natural resource management (Bastagli, 2014). Shocks are anticipated within the programme design, and flexible funding aims to respond to these.

## 8.7 Preparedness and planning

One of the points at which social protection, DRM and humanitarian assistance intersect is in thinking about activities to improve preparedness to avoid or mitigate a humanitarian crisis. The urgency of these activities has been brought to light most recently following the famine in Somalia after the drought of 2010-11. Many academics and practitioners agree that this famine could have been avoided, and it presents a useful case study through which to examine the potential of greater preparedness to mitigate the effects of shocks (Bailey, 2012; Various, 2012). Levine *et al.* (2011), in a paper already in final draft when the famine was declared, present a framework for thinking about and improving preparedness. They diagnose a key challenge as being to link any activities that are undertaken to promote preparedness—the setup of early warning systems, or the creation of contingency planning exercises—to a trigger that should set the system responses and plans in motion when a crisis is identified or predicted. The lack of agreement of the trigger, and political inclination on the part of donors to delay triggering a response until a crisis is visible, are just some of the contributory factors. Levine *et al.* issue a call for preparedness to be taken more seriously, and provide a checklist of tasks that can be undertaken in advance of a crisis to improve the speed and effectiveness of a response.

Other researchers have documented the lessons learned by the humanitarian community from the 2011 famine in Somalia. Maxwell and Majid (2014) discuss the work of Tufts University and the Rift Valley Institute in providing empirical evidence for prevention or early mitigation of such crises in the future. The research focuses on the causes of the crisis and what was learned from the responses of different groups with regard to famine prevention, preparedness and humanitarian response. In addition to clear triggers as highlighted by Levine above, they recommend 'no regrets' programming—interventions that will have a beneficial impact even if the crisis turns out not to be as bad as anticipated; 'crisis modifiers', the budget lines in longer term programming that can quickly shift programming objectives without being delayed by fundraising, as described in section 5.4 above; and 'scalable safety nets' of the sort being discussed in the present research.

Flawed financing architecture is identified as another factor that may contribute to a lack of preparedness, since finance for humanitarian work is primarily released after a crisis and supports discrete activities, rather than being a continuous stream of funding for a comprehensive preparedness system (DFID, 2013a; Hillier and Dempsey, 2012; Kellett and Peters, 2014). Kellett and Peters present evidence from five countries—the Philippines, Niger, Sudan, Myanmar and Haiti—to show that financing across the 'preparedness continuum' (between development and humanitarian response) needs to be more coordinated in order to be more effective. No mechanism they examined adequately financed emergency preparedness across the continuum. In addition, they found that the bulk of international funding was not concerned with building the long term capacity of national systems of preparedness but was reinforcing a project-led approach.

The crisis in Somalia and the Horn of Africa prompted the establishment of an initiative funded through ECHO's Enhanced Response Capacity (ERC) consortium, on 'Building institutional capacity for timely food security emergency response to slow onset crises at scale', and implemented through Oxfam GB, Save the Children UK, Concern Worldwide and Oxfam Intermon. For this initiative, Oxfam developed pre-crisis market analysis through piloting market assessments and the creation of guidance material, to help improve the preparedness of responding agencies to predicted or recurrent crises. For Oxfam, a key element of preparedness is strengthening existing market systems (Brady, 2014). Programmes with these objectives are based on the understanding that working towards stronger, more accessible, effective and equitable market systems can help build the resilience of local populations. However, this work is often divided between how emergency relief can be delivered through existing market systems and how these systems can be strengthened in crisis contexts; and longer term support for producers to strengthen their positions

in agricultural market systems. Oxfam is beginning to develop an aligned approach that will help ensure that livelihoods programmes are prepared to deal with shocks, and also ensure that emergency response interventions incorporate a longer term sustainability aspect.

Following the establishment of the ERC, the consortium developed the Situation and Response Analysis Framework (SRAF) for humanitarian actors, to complement their ongoing early warning and preparation activities (Save the Children, 2014). The seven-step framework outlines a process by which forecasts, local knowledge, good coordination and communication can help agencies predict, plan for and deliver appropriate and timely responses. The SRAF adopts guiding principles that responses should be timely and based on need, and funding mechanisms rapid, with baseline analyses used for better contingency planning and repeated regularly to improve their effectiveness. Out of these arise its seven recommended steps for contingency planning:

1. Develop a crisis calendar and crisis market map
2. Model detailed scenarios
3. Set strategic objectives
4. Select appropriate interventions
5. Identify agency roles and responsibilities
6. Map start-up timelines
7. Write up and communicate the contingency plan

Key recent positive experiences in preparedness include the following:

- Pakistan's cash transfer, BISP, was implemented initially as a short term response to the triple F crisis of 2008, but also with a medium term objectives to develop into a long term social protection programme (O'Leary *et al.*, 2011). It is an unconditional cash transfer programme delivering Rs1,000 (\$11) to female beneficiaries in households with a monthly income below Rs6,000 (\$64). As part of BISP, the national identification system and the banking system were strengthened and these have been used in the responses to subsequent disaster and conflict-related shocks. This has led to increased linkages between safety nets and disaster responses (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014).
- Bangladesh also improved preparedness by integrating across sectors, learning lessons from its experience of past disasters such as the 1998 and 2004 river floods. When cyclone Sidr hit in 2007, the authorities drew on the National Disaster Management Strategy for existing risk management plans. The early warning system triggered the safety nets which began distributing cash, rice and house-building grants even before the main impact of the cyclone was felt (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014).
- In Mozambique the government has coordinated its national disaster management around its "Master plan: Director Plan for Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Disasters". Under this it has conducted DRR activities such as reforestation and adaptation of the agricultural system to drought. The National Centres for Emergency Operations have been given the responsibility of coordinating all disaster responses, while the Instituto Nacional de Gestao de Calamidades (INGC) leads DRM activities. Its contingency plans for effective evacuation, response and recovery assistance have contributed to more effective operations and fewer casualties (Harkey, 2014).
- In India, Barve and Yadav (2014) have examined how preparedness activities led to a more effective response to cyclone Phailin in 2013. Since the super cyclone of 1999 which caused extensive damage, the Odisha state government has a disaster management plan which has included increasing community awareness of disaster preparedness, the construction of cyclone shelters along the coastline, training of local response teams, improvement of the knowledge management systems of relevant institutions, and better coordination with relief

agencies. Cyclone Phailin was similar in magnitude to the super cyclone of 1999, but caused fewer casualties thanks to the government's greater preparedness.

## 8.8 How to measure the effectiveness of the response

Actors working in social protection, humanitarian response and DRR are exploring how best to measure—in terms of both methods and indicators—the success of a system or programme that works across different disciplines.

Each discipline faces its own challenges in monitoring and evaluation (M&E). For instance, in DRR there is a 'reverse logic' in that 'success' is the avoidance of a disaster, so there is a need to measure a non-event—the opposite to a traditional M&E system that measures change (Oxfam, no date). Puri *et al.* (2014, p.9) call this the, 'evaluation of preventive action'. Vulnerability to disaster is often the result of several factors, not all of which will be addressed by a programme, so it can be difficult to identify a clear programme logic against which to measure change. Regarding humanitarian assistance, there is often a difficulty in attributing an effect to a specific intervention. First, there may be a wide range of actors working in the same geographical area or the same sector (Puri *et al.*, 2014). Second, groups in urgent need of humanitarian assistance cannot be denied a response for the sake of serving as a counterfactual: this precludes the common method of attribution used in long term social protection programmes, whereby a 'treatment' (e.g. a cash transfer) is applied to one group of households but held back from another and the difference in well-being of the two groups is compared (DFID, 2012b; Puri *et al.*, 2014). Third, baseline data are often absent, especially in the case of sudden-onset disasters, and the need for rapid response prevents either the detailed construction of counterfactual groups or the implementation of a baseline survey (Few *et al.*, 2014; Puri *et al.*, 2014). The insecurity of an environment compounds the challenge of collecting M&E data, including as a result of not being able to conduct interviews in person and not being able to apply standard metrics of effectiveness consistently (Humanitarian Outcomes, 2014).

One solution to the problem of isolating the effect of an intervention is to use the concept of 'contribution analysis' to describe the relative importance of e.g. post-disaster interventions in aiding people's recovery, which is distinct from a focus on attribution which is deemed problematic when many agencies are involved in a response. Few *et al.* (2014) offer practical guidance on how to implement this approach to measure the role of interventions in disaster recovery. Puri *et al.* (2014) consider other options including the range of quasi-experimental approaches that are widely used to measure the impact of social protection initiatives, as well as rapid assessments.

As for what is measured, the literature suggests a range of impact and operational indicators. These include both output indicators such as the number of people served, and outcome measures of cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness, the effectiveness of planning and coordination, and programme impact. The latter should measure the achievement of programme objectives. Here a 'shock-responsive social protection' system that aims to meet emergency as well as long term social protection objectives faces further challenges: whereas a humanitarian agency might perceive its objectives to be to save lives, a social protection system might aim to increase, say, dietary diversity or household consumption. An agenda is forming around the need to establish metrics for evaluating 'resilience building', which may identify indicators that are common to the objectives of both type of programme (see e.g. the Institute of Development Studies' Adaptive Social Protection programme, e.g. Béné *et al.*, 2012). Individual sectors are also developing relevant indicators: globally, five priority areas for reducing vulnerability to disaster have been identified for states and other actors in the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2015), supported by the interagency group Characteristics of a Disaster Resilient Community, and are the basis for developing indicators for measuring the impact of DRR work (Twigg, 2009). These entail

ensuring that DRR is a national priority, enhancing early warning, using knowledge to build a culture of safety and resilience, reducing risk, and disaster preparedness.

There are useful tools emerging out of initiatives focusing on building resilience to crisis, and that are attempting to monitor and measure changes in resilience of populations attributable to programmes covering multiple disciplines. The OECD's resilience systems analysis toolkit recognises the importance of both 'system resilience indicators' and 'negative resilience indicators'. System resilience indicators (or outcome indicators) look at the resilience of the main components of the system over time, including how overall well-being and the system is affected when shocks occur—for example, how political capital is affected by an actual earthquake, or how social capital is affected by new or escalating conflict. Negative resilience indicators look at whether people's strategies to boost resilience have negative impacts on other areas of the system—for example, resorting to negative coping strategies, or negative impacts on certain vulnerable people. It highlights the need to measure process and output indicators (see OECD, 2014 for further detail).

## 9 Research gaps

Several papers point out that shock-responsive social protection remains, for the most part, a concept to be tested, and that very little evidence yet exists, particularly from low-income countries and fragile states (Bastagli and Holmes, 2014; Browne, 2014; La Rosa, 2015; Maunder *et al.*, 2015). Recent literature has highlighted a set of future research questions to build evidence in the field of shock-responsive social protection. The most comprehensive list of questions are proposed by Bastagli and Holmes (2014) and Pelham, Clay and Braunholz (2011). The list presented here includes the suggested areas for research from these two sources, along with our own suggestions based on the gaps we identified in the first edition of this literature review (2016). Our research on shock-responsive social protection in six country casestudy contexts aims to fill some of these gaps.

- To what extent can shock-responsive social protection be viewed as a purely technical issue and to what extent do political economy factors play a part in effective design and implementation? There is a tendency to treat as technical questions that, in essence, call for broader discussions on a country's vision of society. Aspects that call for government / citizens' attention include e.g. tightly targeted assistance and its risks for social cohesion; and the role of traditional mechanisms.
- What adaptations to usual safety net targeting and delivery mechanisms are needed? How can social transfer programmes be scaled up and down rapidly and efficiently? And what adaptations to the administrative processes and systems are required in order to scale up other social protection instruments?
- Who should be the primary beneficiaries: those who have suffered larger losses, or those who have lost critical assets and income earning opportunities and may become critically poor? Which groups need support, and what are the most appropriate instruments to provide it? Can the 'new poor' and the chronically poor be serviced in a single instrument? What are the trade-offs and tensions?
- Are regular social protection programmes in reality too small to make more than a marginal difference: despite the resources and literature devoted to them, is there a risk of overstating their impact?
- Are foreign aid actors overpushing (cash) transfers, neglecting root causes of poverty (fertility, land issue, climate change and the future of pastoralism, etc.) and maintaining status quo rather than transformation (Harland 2011)?
- To what extent, and how, are social care services scaled up (or down) following shocks?
- Which programmes work best in which circumstances, and how should they be adapted to local conditions? What is the potential of alternative and second-best approaches to shock-response, such as social insurance, social care services and subsidies (excepting fossil fuel subsidies), not just social transfers?
- For how long should these programmes be implemented?
- What are the best options for the financing of scalable social protection in middle- and low-income countries? Is a portfolio of financing mechanisms most appropriate?
- What process will best ensure that high-level political or bureaucratic attention does translate into political commitment (policy formulation), as well as broader system-wide commitment (for effective policy implementation)? Research indicates the importance of involving in agenda-setting mid-level actors who later would become involved in policy formulation; in the absence of effective forums or institutional mechanisms for discussing, negotiating and resolving differences, decisions tend to be taken through the exercise of formal authority and informal power relationships (Pelletier *et al.* 2012).
- Where are the citizens / beneficiaries in social protection policy design (Cherrier 2014a)?

## Annex A How can donor responses best be integrated with domestic responses? Summary of major initiatives relating to shock-responsive social protection

During the preparation of this literature review, it was apparent that numerous multilateral and regional bodies are conducting or have recently conducted research or interventions on the theme of making social protection programmes more responsive to shocks, or else are managing broader initiatives that may include this topic as an element. We summarise here the activities of that we are aware, at global and regional level. We welcome additional contributions of major initiatives (other than direct interventions) that we can incorporate in future updates.

### A.1 Global initiatives

Initiatives are listed in alphabetical order of the agency, then the programme.

Agency	<b>African Union</b>
Programme	<b>African Risk Capacity (ARC)</b>
Type of programme	2 – Technical assistance
Geographical focus	<b>Pan-African</b>
Date	<b>Launched 2010 (within WFP); later developed as a specialised agency of the African Union</b>
Main features	<p>ARC was established as a Specialised Agency of the African Union to help member states improve their capacities to plan, prepare and respond to extreme weather events and natural disasters, therefore protecting the food security of their vulnerable populations. It has evolved from its 2010 inception as a specialised unit within WFP, with the aims of providing contingent funds in the case of severe weather events (limited now to water-satisfaction needs of a single crop that countries select), to improve upon the existing process of donor appeals process leading to responses up to nine months after the emergency event. Value proposition: Cost of emergency is nine times higher than prevention. ARC member states have formed into ARC Limited and contribute to the contingency fund to ensure insurance coverage. The broader ARC Agency, based in Johannesburg, works on capacity building, information sources, etc. The package includes early warning, contingency planning, insurance and climate adaptation financing.</p> <p>Insured countries use the insurance for six months of activities—either cash transfers or food distribution—selected by government.</p>
Further information	<a href="http://www.africanriskcapacity.org/">http://www.africanriskcapacity.org/</a>
Agency	<b>CaLP</b>
Programme	<b>CaLP Global Programme</b>
Type of programme	4 – Strategy
Geographical focus	<b>Global</b>
Date	<b>2015–17</b>
Main features	<p>CaLP aims to improve the quality of emergency cash transfer programming by raising awareness of cash transfers as an effective mechanism for emergency response, building capacity in the use of cash and vouchers, gathering evidence through action research, and encouraging knowledge sharing. One of the challenges it identifies for its current two-year global programme is, 'bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and development programming by linking emergency CTP [cash transfer programming] to social protection programming in order to increase resilience of affected populations'. This agenda has previously included the conduct of research, such as the 'Fit for the Future' report which explored the use of institutional frameworks for emergency cash</p>

	<p>transfers over the next decade, and the elaboration of a Capacity Assessment Tool for assessing national institutionalisation of emergency cash transfers. In 2015-16, CaLP invested in developing published guidance for humanitarian practitioners on linking humanitarian assistance to social protection. In 2017, two online training courses will be published which complement this guidance and which also incorporate findings of this OPM research programme and other global experiences with shock-responsive social protection. CaLP has established a technical working group on linking humanitarian CTP with social protection.</p>
Agency	<b>DFID</b> funding through <b>KPMG</b> (fund manager for projects run by different NGOs) and to <b>ODI</b> (Knowledge manager)
Programme	<b>Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED)</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research; 2 – Technical assistance; 3 – Implementation (through grants)
Geographical focus	<b>Africa / Asia:</b> projects operate across 13 countries: including six Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Senegal, Niger, and Mauritania; and seven others: Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Myanmar, and Nepal.
Date	<b>2014–18</b>
Main features	<p>This £47 million programme aims to help 5 million people in developing countries to become more resilient to climate extremes, as well as to help improve national policies and institutions to better integrate DRR, climate adaptation and development approaches (Standley, 2013).</p> <p>Its objectives are to directly build resilience to climate change in a number of communities; to build evidence on what works in adaptation and DRR; and to develop national and international capacity and capability on response to climate related disasters.</p> <p>BRACED operates through grants to NGOs and their partners to scale up proven technologies and practices in the Sahel and DFID focal countries at most risk across Africa and Asia. These have been awarded as 3-year grants to 15 projects managed by a Fund Manager, led by KPMG, who oversee the contract and financial management of the grants, monitor project progress, and manage due diligence and compliance.</p> <p>DFID have also appointed a Knowledge Manager, led by ODI, who are working to generate new knowledge, evidence and learning on resilience and adaptation in partnership with the BRACED projects and resilience community.</p>
Further information	<p><a href="http://www.braced.org/">http://www.braced.org/</a></p> <p><a href="http://www.odi.org/projects/2808-building-resilience-adaptation-climate-extremes-disasters-braced">http://www.odi.org/projects/2808-building-resilience-adaptation-climate-extremes-disasters-braced</a></p>
Agency	<b>DFID</b>
Programme	<b>High-Level Panel on Cash Transfers</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research
Geographical focus	<b>Global</b>
Date	<b>Jan–Sep 2015</b>
Main features	<p>The High-Level Panel on Cash Transfers examines the transformative potential of cash transfers for humanitarian response and the humanitarian system. During 2015, guided by a secretariat housed at ODI and chaired by the Center for Global Development, it has undertaken a scoping of the current humanitarian cash transfer architecture, identified blockers and challenges, and undertaken analysis to identify possible options for making this more effective. A series of research papers has been produced during 2015, culminating in a final report that declared 12 recommendations on the use of cash transfers in emergencies, of which one is to, 'leverage cash transfers to link humanitarian assistance to longer term development and social protection systems' (ODI, 2015).</p>
Agency	<b>DFID</b>
Programme	<b>Shockwatch: Social protection and the response to shocks</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research

Geographical focus	<b>Global (case studies include Bangladesh, Kenya, Pakistan, Vietnam)</b>
Date	<b>2012–16</b>
Main features	<p>This examined the social protection policy design and implementation details that facilitate adequate shock-response and the readiness of social protection systems, institutions and policies to respond to different kinds of shocks. A social protection shock readiness literature review and appraisal toolkit were published by ODI in June 2013, and the research has been deepened through further work on designing crisis response in low-income countries.</p> <p>The literature review explores expectations and experiences of scaling up social protection in response to the triple F crisis of 2007–09 in low- and middle-income countries. The toolkit examines how to assess the range and likelihood of potential shocks, how to identify a variety of shock impacts, how to identify vulnerable populations, over-viewing current provision and previous shock-responses, analysing shock-response capacity, drawing conclusions regarding shock readiness and using the diagnostic process to identify strategic action points (McCord, 2013b).</p>
Agency	<b>European Union: DEVCO</b> (directorate for development and cooperation)
Programme	<b>SOCIEUX</b>
Type of programme	2 – Technical assistance
Geographical focus	<b>Global</b>
Date	<b>2013–16</b>
Main features	Technical assistance facility that provides expert practitioners on demand for peer-to-peer assignments to support the development of social assistance, social insurance, financing and M&E of social protection, and the improvement of access to basic social services (European Commission, 2015). Technical assistance is applicable to all social protection, not confined to humanitarian contexts.
Agency	<b>European Union: ECHO</b> (directorate for humanitarian aid and civil protection)
Programme	<b>Country case studies of social protection initiatives in the most fragile and conflict-affected states</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research
Geographical focus	<b>Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, South Sudan, Somalia</b>
Date	<b>2015–16</b>
Main features	Rapid case studies providing an overview of emerging practice in the provision of multi-year social assistance, especially cash transfers and safety nets, in FCAS contexts.
Agency	<b>European Union: ECHO</b>
Programme	<b>Global Evaluation of ECHO's Cash and Voucher Programmes 2011-2014</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research
Geographical focus	<b>Global</b>
Date	<b>2015</b>
Main features	A review of the ten countries which were ECHO's major focus for cash and voucher transfers during 2011–14. Includes an examination of the coverage of social protection programmes in those countries.
Agency	<b>World Bank</b>
Programme	<b>Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research; 2 – Technical assistance; 3 – Implementation
Geographical focus	<b>Global</b>
Date	<b>Ongoing</b>
Main features	Global partnership, funded by 24 donors, that supports the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-30 by enabling high-risk, low-capacity developing countries to better understand and reduce their vulnerabilities to natural hazards and adapt to climate change.

	Includes a series of case studies on exploring the potential for social protection systems to scale up in response to a crisis (Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Uganda; soon also in Mauritania)
Agency	<b>World Bank</b>
Programme	<b>Rapid Social Response program</b>
Type of programme	2 – Technical assistance
Geographical focus	<b>Global</b> (half sub-Saharan Africa, half elsewhere)
Date	<b>2009–18</b>
Main features	Multi-donor programme established to help low-income countries develop social protection systems. Has portfolio of projects identified through regular calls for proposals. Originally established as a crisis response mechanism to help countries cope with the triple F crisis of 2008 (Phase 1, 2009–13). Gradually began to place more emphasis on a 'catalytic role' and preparedness for future crises (Phase 2, 2013–18) (World Bank, 2014a). Also includes support to peer-to-peer learning, communities of practice, operational toolkits
Agency	<b>World Bank</b>
Programme	<b>10-Year Social Protection and Labour Strategy</b>
Type of programme	4 – Strategy
Geographical focus	Global
Date	<b>2012–22</b>
Main features	The main objective of the World Bank's 10-year Social Protection and Labour Strategy is to help countries move from fragmented approaches to harmonised systems (World Bank, 2012). It cites its aim as to make these systems more inclusive of the vulnerable, and more attuned to building people's capacities and improving the productivity of their work; and to build sustainable and affordable safety nets, to protect families from shocks and enable people to manage risk and improve resilience.
Agency	<b>World Food Programme (WFP)</b>
Programme	<b>Evaluating Partnerships with Existing National Safety Nets for Emergency Payments</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research
Geographical focus	<b>Indonesia, Philippines</b>
Date	<b>2015</b>
Main features	The WFP is seeking to incorporate more cash payments to complement in-kind payments in times of natural disasters and economic shocks. It commissioned Bankable Frontier Associates to study potential partner programmes in the Philippines (4Ps) and Indonesia (Program Keluarga Harapan, PKH) to explore the potential for, and challenges of, leveraging existing national government social protection programmes to implement and scale up WFP's cash transfers in both relief and recovery contexts. Final reports have been disseminated for each country.
Agency	<b>World Food Programme</b>
Programme	<b>R4 Rural Resilience Initiative</b>
Type of programme	3 – Implementation
Geographical focus	<b>Senegal, Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia</b>
Date	<b>Since 2011</b>
Main features	This initiative is taking a comprehensive risk management approach to help communities to be more resilient to climate variability and shocks (R4, 2014). The programme combines four risk management strategies: improved resource management through asset creation (risk reduction); insurance (risk transfer); livelihoods diversification and microcredit (prudent risk taking); and savings (risk reserves).
Agency	<b>UNICEF</b>

Programme	<b>Social Protection Strategic Framework</b>
Type of programme	4 – Strategy
Geographical focus	<b>Global</b>
Date	<b>Since 2012</b>
Main features	At headquarters level UNICEF is aiming to systematise evidence and identify research gaps on the potential linkages, and to facilitate knowledge exchange between countries. This document proposes improving practice in linking social protection and humanitarian action, including fragile contexts, as a critical issue, citing it first among its 'Key emerging areas for social protection'.

Note: (1) 'Type of programme' is classified as: 1 = Research; 2 = Technical assistance; 3 = Implementation; 4 = Strategy. (2) 'Status of programme' is classified as: 1 = Under consideration; 2 = At planning stage; 3 = Underway; 4 = Completed.

## A.2 Regional initiatives

### A.2.1 West Africa

Agency	<b>AGIR (Global Alliance for Resilience)</b>
Programme	<b>AGIR</b>
Type of programme	2 – Technical assistance; 3 – Implementation
Geographical focus	<b>Sahel</b>
Date	<b>Since 2012</b>
Main features	ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS joined forces to create the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) - Sahel and West Africa in 2012 (ECHO, 2015a). AGIR aims to promote resilience among vulnerable populations by creating greater synergy between emergency actions and between long term strategies aimed at addressing the root causes of food crises. This approach requires the concurrent implementation of long term, structural programmes and short term actions aimed at addressing the immediate needs of the most vulnerable populations. Long term programmes include human capacity building at all levels, and support for communities in their efforts to build resilience through strengthening community governance, basic social services, community food storage systems and other infrastructures, community early warning and prevention mechanisms.
Agency	<b>DFID</b>
Programme	<b>Sahel Climate Information Systems and Communication</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research
Geographical focus	<b>This project will be looking into weather and climate information for social protection in the Sahel, covering Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mali.</b>
Date	<b>2015 / 16 for 3 years</b>
Main features	Composed of a multi-sectoral team with partners from the Met Office, Walker Institute, Reading, NRC, and the Internal Displacement Centre, Geneva (International Committee for the Red Cross). A key aim is to develop a Sahel-led integrated information system with climate data, livelihoods data, and ensure climate-sensitive development priorities. The project will include a mapping of existing systems / approaches. Major work areas in: climate information, use of information (including from household economy analysis) in developing triggers in specific livelihood zones; strengthening regional / institutional coordination. The Walker Institute in particular will be building evidence from the Adaptive Social Protection programme outlined below.
Agency	<b>DFID</b>
Programme	<b>Providing Humanitarian Aid for Sahel Emergencies (PHASE)</b>
Type of programme	2 – Technical assistance; 3 – Implementation
Geographical focus	<b>Sahel</b>

Date	<b>2014–17</b>
Main features	PHASE is a £139 million programme that aims to reduce mortality and food insecurity and the impact of conflict and natural disasters (DFID 2014a). Most of the funds (£107.5m) are to be dispersed through a Transfer Agreement with ECHO to provide £40m to multilaterals (ICRC, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF) for support for food, nutrition, water and sanitation materials, health, nutrition and water and sanitation activities, and shelter, protection and non-food items for conflict affected people; £43.5m for NGOs for support to vulnerable people; and £21m for NGOs, WFP and UNICEF to develop community based early warning systems and build preparedness for lean seasons. The programme is based on the principle that if programme funding is more predictable, the cost to respond to disasters is reduced, particularly for slow-onset crises.
Agency	<b>United Nations</b>
Programme	<b>Integrated Strategy for the Sahel</b>
Type of programme	4 – Strategy
Geographical focus	<b>Sahel</b>
Date	<b>Since 2014</b>
Main features	The strategy is articulated around three strategic goals: governance, security and resilience (OSES 2014). In the area of resilience, recognising the chronic nature of humanitarian needs in the Sahel, a three-year (2014-16) strategic response plan has been developed to promote an integrated multisectoral response and stronger partnerships between the humanitarian and development communities. It aims to reach 15m people. The social protection component of the strategy is being steered by UNICEF.
Agency	<b>USAID</b>
Programme	<b>RISE Resilience in the Sahel Enhanced</b>
Type of programme	2 – Technical Assistance; 3 – Implementation; 4 – Strategy
Geographical focus	<b>West Africa/Sahel; Focus on Niger and Burkina Faso; additional leveraging in Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, and Chad</b>
Date	<b>Launched in 2012 for 5 years</b>
Main features	RISE, a USAID initiative based on joint analysis and planning, brings together humanitarian and development assistance to address the root causes of persistent vulnerability in the Sahel. RISE is part of USAID's larger Resilience Agenda—a shared commitment among international donors and country leadership to help the most vulnerable escape cycles of crisis and sustain progress, catalysed by the 2011 crisis in the Horn of Africa. Launched in 2012, RISE commits more than \$130 million in new assistance over the first two years of a five-year effort to build resilience in targeted zones in Niger and Burkina Faso to help communities get ahead of the next shock. It has focused efforts to strengthen institutions and governance, increase sustainable economic wellbeing, and improve health and nutrition in geographic zones selected through rigorous analysis. This will be integrated with existing humanitarian and development assistance to give an estimated 1.9 million of the area's most vulnerable a chance to break the cycle of crisis and lessen the need for humanitarian assistance in the future. Across the Sahel, RISE will leverage existing U.S. assistance in new ways—together with development partners, civil society, local governments, and AGIR.
Further information	<a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/RISE_resilience_in_the_sahel_enhanced.pdf">https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/RISE_resilience_in_the_sahel_enhanced.pdf</a>
Agency	<b>World Bank</b>
Programme	<b>Adaptive Social Protection</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research; 2 – Technical assistance
Geographical focus	<b>Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal</b>
Date	<b>2014–18</b>

Main features	This DFID funded programme aims to increase access to effective adaptive social protection systems for poor and vulnerable populations (World Bank, 2014b). These are defined as flexible programmes that can protect poor households from climate and other shocks before they occur (through predictable transfers, building community assets, and other programmes that help them cope) and by scaling up to respond to extreme events when they hit. Most funds will be disbursed as grants directly to governments for piloting promising innovation approaches. The programme also has a substantial research component.
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Note: (1) 'Type of programme' is classified as: 1 = Research; 2 = Technical assistance; 3 = Implementation; 4 = Strategy. (2) 'Status of programme' is classified as: 1 = Under consideration; 2 = At planning stage; 3 = Underway; 4 = Completed.

## A.2.2 East and Southern Africa

Agency	<b>European Union</b>
Programme	<b>Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE)</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research; 2 – Technical assistance
Geographical focus	<b>Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia</b>
Date	<b>Since 2012</b>
Main features	With sustained high levels of undernutrition and recurrent droughts and emergencies requiring continuous humanitarian assistance, this €270 million programme is responding to calls for increased investments in resilience (ECHO, 2015b). It aims to improve the links between humanitarian and development assistance by promoting the use of a common framework by partners; improved information exchange and earlier consultations on plans and interventions, with a better focus on comparative advantages.

Note: (1) 'Type of programme' is classified as: 1 = Research; 2 = Technical assistance; 3 = Implementation; 4 = Strategy. (2) 'Status of programme' is classified as: 1 = Under consideration; 2 = At planning stage; 3 = Underway; 4 = Completed.

## A.2.3 Asia / Pacific

Agency	<b>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)</b>
Programme	<b>Declaration on Social Protection</b>
Type of programme	4 – Strategy
Geographical focus	<b>Asia</b>
Date	<b>Since 2013</b>
Main features	ASEAN made a declaration on Social Protection under which it aimed to build an ASEAN Community comprising three mutually reinforcing pillars: Political and Security Community, Economic Community and Socio-Cultural Community by 2015 (ASEAN 2013). Its main principles are to ensure equitable access to social protection as a basic human right, and that social protection should be adaptive to risks and vulnerabilities faced by individuals and the region.
Agency	<b>Asian Development Bank (ADB)</b>
Programme	<b>Social Protection Strategy</b>
Type of programme	4 – Strategy
Geographical focus	<b>Asia</b>
Date	<b>Since 2003</b>
Main features	The ADB's Social Protection Strategy (Asian Development Bank 2003) states that the policies and programmes under the strategy will aim to help people break the cycle of poverty, increase productivity, improve human capital and reduce their vulnerability to risk. This is echoed in their Social Protection Operational Plan 2014-2020 (Asian Development Bank 2013), which states that the ADB aims to help governments develop national social protection strategies and integrate the objectives of these strategies into their national development

	plans, poverty reduction strategies and programmes for climate change adaptation and disaster risk management.
Agency	<b>DFAT</b>
Programme	<b>Strategy for Australia's Aid Investments in Social Protection</b>
Type of programme	4 – Strategy
Geographical focus	<b>Indo-Pacific</b>
Date	<b>2015</b>
Main features	Pursuit of three strategic objectives: 1) improve social protection coverage in the Indo-Pacific, 2) improve the quality of social protection systems, and 3) enhance partner governments' ability to make their own informed choices about social protection options. Priority areas of engagement will be in two broad areas: 1) refining and developing social protection systems, and 2) strengthening partner government and other stakeholders' knowledge on social protection.
Agency	<b>World Bank</b>
Programme	<b>Strengthening Social Protection Systems to Manage Disaster and Climate Risk in East Asia and Pacific (funded through Rapid Social Response grant)</b>
Type of programme	1 – Research
Geographical focus	<b>Philippines, Vietnam, Fiji, Tonga</b>
Date	<b>2015</b>
Main features	Research into the use of social protection for DRM

Note: (1) 'Type of programme' is classified as: 1 = Research; 2 = Technical assistance; 3 = Implementation; 4 = Strategy.  
(2) 'Status of programme' is classified as: 1 = Under consideration; 2 = At planning stage; 3 = Underway; 4 = Finished.

## Annex B References

*Note: references added in the second edition of this literature review are in italics.*

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