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Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean

Haiti case study

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Executive summary

Introduction

There is an increasing global recognition within governments and partners of the potential linkages between social protection and disaster risk management (DRM) in responding to and mitigating shocks. As disasters increase in numbers and in force each year, social protection systems in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have evolved and expanded substantially in the last few decades. For example, the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) allocated to public social investment grew from 15% in 2000 to 19.1% in 2012 (UN Economic Commission for LAC (ECLAC), 2015).

Haiti faces severe development challenges. Not only is it the poorest country in the western hemisphere, it is also one of the most exposed to natural disasters globally (World Bank, 2015). This situation calls for assessing whether social protection can play a role in emergency response in Haiti.

This case study forms part of a wider **Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in LAC** commissioned by the WFP and undertaken by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) jointly with WFP. The objective of the study is to generate evidence and inform practice for improved emergency preparedness and response in LAC linked to more flexible national social protection systems. The main research question for the study is: **What factors enable social protection systems to be more responsive to shocks?**

This question is examined in the context of the response to Hurricane Matthew, which hit the coastal areas in the southwest and to a lesser extent northwest of Haiti in the night of 4 October 2016, resulting in the largest humanitarian emergency since the 2010 earthquake (OCHA, 2016). However, the study also considers the response to the 2015/16 drought, during which almost 90% of farmers lost their spring/summer harvest in the worst affected areas (CNSA, 2015), and the response to the 2010 earthquake where possible. It is important to highlight that the findings in this study are relevant not only for emergencies caused by natural disasters but also by economic and political shocks.

The role of social protection in emergency response

Social protection in Haiti is very fragmented. Existing programmes are characterized by limited coverage, are often ad hoc, cover small geographical areas or narrowly defined, and are scattered across numerous institutions (World Bank *et al*, 2014). Overall, there **is an under provision of social protection services in Haiti** (Lamaute-Brisson 2013; Lombardo 2012).

In terms of non-contributory schemes, which constitute the focus of our analysis, **the school meals programme is the largest safety net in place in Haiti**. It is currently implemented by a variety of actors under the coordination of the *Programme National des Cantines Scolaires (PNCS)*. In addition, there are **two social transfer programmes**. The Social Assistance Fund (**Caisse d'Assistance Sociale, CAS**) is implemented by MAST and funded with a levy on salaries, and **Kore Lavi** which is implemented by a consortium composed of CARE, Action Contre la Faim (ACF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and World Vision (WV), under the supervision of MAST and with funding from USAID.

Key findings

System preparedness

Currently, the ability of Haiti's national social protection system to respond to emergencies is still low. Emergency response remains heavily dependent on international humanitarian assistance. The ability to respond should be assessed in light of the system's capacity to deliver regular programming. The social protection system in Haiti is still fragmented, with limited coverage and resources, without a defined national strategy and with incipient systems and processes.

Despite this limited capacity, there is a growing interest in making social protection schemes in Haiti more shock-responsive. *Kore Lavi*, for example, has already commissioned a study to propose strategies to increase programme responsiveness to shocks (see Zuodar, 2016).

The Civil Protection Directorate (Direction de la Protection Civile, *DPC*) is responsible for the coordination of disaster response activities and the promotion of risk management. However, **due to the absence of a formal legal framework and the number of actors involved in humanitarian assistance, the DPC's overall leadership role has not been as effective as required** (Grünewald and Schenkenberg, 2016).

The absence of comprehensive household data in Haiti is a considerable challenge to inform development and social assistance programmes, as well as for humanitarian assistance. MAST currently hosts the SIMAST database, an extensive social registry that includes over 152,000 households, about 7% of the Haitian population. Out of the total amount of households registered in the SIMAST, 18,200 are also beneficiaries of *Kore Lavi*. At the same time, FAES is developing the "Single Registry of Beneficiaries (Registre Unique des Bénéficiaires (RUB))"¹, which aims to be the national social registry with information from all types of government databases collecting data on the population and including social protection programmes. Interaction between the two to streamline development efforts has been limited so far.

There is a lack of a targeting methodology for the delivery of social protection in emergencies. The targeting methodology used by *Kore Lavi* in regular activities, the Haiti Deprivation and Vulnerability Index (HDVI), was not designed for emergency response and would have its limitation if used for that purpose. The community-based targeting methodology implemented by agencies in the Cash Working Group presents a number of operational constraints. More generally, past attempts to harmonize and standardize community-based targeting methodologies have not been successful so far.

The absence of a payment system for the delivery of cash support is one of the main barriers for rapid and multi-sectoral assistance during emergencies. As it is described below, designing and implementing these delivery mechanisms during the emergency is challenging and can delay the response and reduce its effectiveness.

In relation to funding shock-responsive social protection, scale ups have been largely funded by humanitarian agencies and donors. There are no contingency funds for the expansion of government social protection schemes. Beyond the social protection sector, emergency response and recovery in Haiti is largely funded by humanitarian agencies and donors and through the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF). For example, the CCRIF contributed USD 20 million and USD 7.7 million for the response to Hurricane Matthew and the 2010 earthquake respectively.

¹ FAES and the World Bank have renamed this initiative the "Unified Social Registry (Registre Social Unifié or RSU)".

System response

The social protection system has contributed to responding to Hurricane Matthew. This was achieved mostly through *Kore Lavi* and the school meals programme, because of their fairly stronger capacity, infrastructure, funding mechanisms and coverage. In response to Hurricane Matthew, *Kore Lavi*'s regular beneficiaries in the 11 communes affected by the hurricane received an additional one-month food voucher of US\$ 25. The programme also provided other support to other affected population (see main report). In relation to school meals, PNCS used its stock to provide food assistance to affected populations housed in emergency shelters.

Coordination was a major challenge. Despite improvements and efforts made by DPC and the sectoral working groups, ineffective coordination hindered the response (Grünwald and Schenkenberg, 2016). Coordination challenges were found within the government, between humanitarian actors, and between government and humanitarian agencies. However, the fact that the government led part of the coordination efforts is already considered a step forward compared to previous responses where the international agencies took over the coordination.

Government and humanitarian agencies responded to Hurricane Matthew first with various types of in-kind assistance, in addition to rescue and other activities not covered in this report. After more than two months, cash assistance either replaced or complemented in-kind support.

The use of 'multi-sectoral' cash grants was discussed at length in the Cash Working Group. The real-time evaluation of the response to Hurricane Matthew reports ineffective coordination and perceived competition among agencies as the main challenges in this area (Grünwald and Schenkenberg, 2016).

Cash was provided by humanitarian agencies both in hand through microfinance organisations and electronically. However long internal decision-making processes and equally lengthy contractual process with service providers delayed the introduction of cash transfers in the response.

Policy recommendations

Strengthening the social protection system to deliver its core mandate and regular assistance to food insecure, poor and vulnerable households more effectively will enhance its potential for emergency response. Fragmentation of the system should be reduced, its operational capacity strengthened, and funding and coverage increased sustainably to improve its shock-readiness and responsiveness.

The role of social protection in emergency response needs to be integrated as a crucial component of the upcoming national social protection strategy. It is very important, however, not to overburden this nascent social protection system.

While the development of this national strategy is government-led, humanitarian agencies, development partners, NGOs, and other actors, should contribute to its creation.

The national emergency response approach should envisage stronger coordination and integration of three sectors: national social protection, national civil protection, and humanitarian aid. As opposed to other countries in the region, where the role of humanitarian aid is less prominent, Haiti's social protection system is not only largely funded but also partially implemented by humanitarian agencies and development partners.

To be shock-responsive, the social protection system should deliberately embed DRM. This should form part of its design. Triggers for emergency response should be defined and scale-up scenarios drawn up.

It is necessary to strengthen the role of the DPC, starting from its legal status. This will enable DPC to perform its mandate more effectively, in particular its leading role and the coordination of the various humanitarian actors.

Integrating and further developing SIMAST and RUB will allow improving the timeliness and transparency of targeting during crises. However, as described in Box 2, there are a number of pre-requisites for data in SIMAST and RUB to be useful for emergency response.

In relation to targeting mechanisms, it is necessary to create protocols and establish mechanisms for shock-responsive social protection. Protocols could include horizontal expansions, reaching those in the affected areas that are already in SIMAST and RUB, for example. Moreover, the extent to which the HDVI is a robust tool for targeting those affected by shocks should be assessed and, if needed, the index could be improved or adapted to play this role. However, geographical targeting may be more appropriate during a first response phase, when timeliness is more important than targeting accuracy. Finally, protocols for both horizontal and vertical expansions could be linked to early warning indicators.

Given the infrastructure and coverage of **school meals** in Haiti, the role of these programmes in emergency response could be stronger. **It is recommended to make school meals programmes as shock-proof as possible and to develop protocols for expansion during crises.** Vertical expansions could involve increasing the number of daily meals, the number of days when meals are provided (e.g. including weekends) or covering the school-break period. Horizontal expansions could also be an option, including through giving take-home rations or cash transfers to support affected households, in addition to the meal for the children in school. However, schools should not become food distribution centres, and the support provided to the affected population should not affect regular school activities. Stand-by agreements with providers may need to be in place in order to enable these expansions. Experience has also shown that home-grown school meals schemes can be particularly helpful to rural households to recover from shocks, by providing a secured market for locally grown products.

It is important to develop a delivery platform for rapid and multi-sectoral cash delivery in emergency contexts. The lack of this platform has been one of the main barriers to timely and effective cash support in recent emergencies. Although the use of e-payments in emergencies is on the rise globally, it is important to carefully assess whether this is the best option in the case of Haiti, given the high set-up costs and the challenges associated with the financial system and the telecommunications sector.

It is also recommended to strengthen the coordination of and create stronger links between *Kore Lavi* and CAS, both under MAST. Moreover, there is a need to **increase the role of MAST within *Kore Lavi* towards an institutionalisation of the programme.**

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List of abbreviations

ACF	<i>Action Contre la Faim</i> (Action Against Hunger)
CAS	<i>Caisse d'Assistance Sociale</i> (Social Assistance Fund)
CASSI	CAS (integrated beneficiary registry)
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CCRIF	Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
CNSA	<i>Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire</i>
CFW	Cash-for-work
DEVCO	European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DPC	<i>Direction de la Protection Civile</i> (Civil Protection Directorate)
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
ECLAC	UN Economic Commission for LAC
EPT	<i>Education Pour Tous</i>
FAES	<i>Fond d'Assistance Economique et Sociale</i> (Economic and Social Assistance Fund)
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
FFP	Food for Peace
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoH	Government of Haiti
HDVI	Haiti Deprivation and Vulnerability Index
HTG	Haitian Gourdes
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
OFDA	Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance
MARNDR	<i>Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural</i> (Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development)
MAST	<i>Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail</i> (Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour)
MCNH	Mother and Child Nutrition and Health
MEF	<i>Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances</i> (Ministry of Economy and Finances)

MENFP	<i>Ministère de l'Éducation et de la Formation Professionnelle</i> (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training)
MICT	<i>Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales</i> (Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Communities)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations
OFATMA	<i>Office d'Accident du Travail, Maladie et Maternité</i> (Office of Labour Accidents, Sickness and Maternity)
ONA	<i>Office National d'Assurance Vieillesse</i> (Office of Old Age Insurance)
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PNCS	<i>Programme Nationale de Cantines Scolaires</i> (National School Meals Programme)
RUB	<i>Registre Unique de Bénéficiaires</i> (Social Registry of Beneficiaries)
SIMAST	<i>Système d'Information du MAST</i> (MAST Integrated Beneficiary Registry)
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Family and Population Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WV	World Vision

1 Introduction

There is increasing global recognition within governments and development partners on the potential linkages between social protection and DRM, in responding to and mitigating shocks. This recognition has been clearly expressed, for example, in the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit by SPIAC-B's² commitment to 'support the further expansion and strengthening of social protection systems to continue to address chronic vulnerabilities and to scale up the utilization of social protection as a means of responding to shocks and protracted crises.' In the same line, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development clearly points toward the creation of social protection systems that allow all people to enjoy basic standards of living.

In LAC, natural disasters have occurred increasingly frequently since the 1960s, from 19 disasters per year in the 1960s to 68 per year in the first decade of the twenty-first century (ECLAC, 2015). For this reason, the adoption of mitigation measures to reduce the population's exposure to natural disasters and to restore infrastructure, together with economic and social measures, is becoming increasingly essential.

Meanwhile, social protection systems in LAC have evolved and expanded substantially in the last few decades, with, for example, the percentage of GDP allocated to public social investment growing from 15% in 2000 to 19.1% in 2012 (ECLAC, 2015). Cash transfers have become part of virtually every social protection system in the developing world (World Bank, 2015b), and LAC was a pioneer in developing sophisticated programmes with multiple objectives, such as conditional cash transfers (CCTs), which have been replicated worldwide. The proportion of the population benefitting from CCTs in LAC, for example, increased from 5.7% to 21.1% between 2000 and 2012 (ECLAC, 2015).

In this light, fairly advanced social protection systems and large-scale safety nets seem to provide a unique opportunity to support shock response in LAC. However, social protection systems can involve conflicting objectives, target populations and operational processes when compared with humanitarian interventions, and such issues can impede their ability to play a role in accommodating additional demand for assistance during an emergency.

Haiti faces more severe development challenges than other countries in LAC. It is not only the poorest country in the western hemisphere but also one of the most exposed to natural disasters in the world (UN University, 2016; World Bank, 2015). This situation calls for assessing whether social protection can play a role in emergency response in Haiti.

This Haiti case study forms part of a wider ***Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in LAC*** commissioned by WFP and undertaken by OPM jointly with WFP. The review includes a literature review of experiences in the region and a theoretical framework for the study (Beazley *et al.*, 2016), six case studies (Ecuador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Peru, El Salvador and Haiti) and a final report with recommendations for strengthening the role of social protection in shock response in LAC.

The objective of the study is to generate evidence and inform practice for improved emergency preparedness and response in LAC linked to more flexible national social protection systems. The

² The Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIAC-B) is an inter-agency coordination mechanism to enhance global coordination and advocacy on social protection issues and to coordinate international cooperation in country demand-driven actions. SPIAC's board is chaired by the World Bank and ILO and includes representatives of ADB, IFAD, IMF, ISSA, FAO, OECD, UN-DESA, UNDP, UNESCO, UN-HABITAT, UNICEF, UN Women, WHO, WFP, and others.

main research question for the study is: **What factors enable social protection systems to be more responsive to shocks?**

This question is examined in the context of the response to Hurricane Matthew, which hit the coastal areas in the northwest, southwest and south of Haiti in the night of 4 October 2016, resulting in the largest humanitarian emergency since the 2010 earthquake (OCHA, 2016). However, attention is also paid to the response to the 2015/16 drought, during which almost 90% of farmers lost their spring/summer harvest in the worst affected areas (CNSA, 2015), and to the response to the 2010 earthquake where possible.

Following this short introduction, the next section of this case study describes the context in terms of poverty, vulnerability and social protection in Haiti. Section 3 presents the methodology and theoretical framework employed. Section 4 studies the role of social protection in emergency response, from its preparedness to the actual response. Finally, Section 5 provides some recommendations with the aim of making the social protection system more shock-responsive.

2 Poverty, vulnerability and social protection in Haiti

In this section, we briefly describe first the poverty and vulnerability context in Haiti and then the country's social protection system and its evolution in recent years.

2.1 Poverty and vulnerability

Haiti's poverty profile is at odds with most of LAC's indicators. Unlike in the rest of the region, economic growth continues to decelerate (from 2.8% in fiscal year 2014, to 1.2% in 2015) due to low investment levels as well as an unstable political environment. **Haiti remains the poorest country in LAC and one of the poorest in the world.** It is estimated that more than 6 million out of 10.4 million (59%) Haitians live under the national poverty line of US\$ 2.42 per day and over 2.5 million (24%) live under the national extreme poverty line of US\$ 1.23 per day.³ With unemployment standing at almost 40%, Haiti's Human Development Index was 0.493 in 2015, ranking the country at 163 out of 188 countries.⁴

The population of Haiti is also one of the most exposed to natural disasters in the world. In fact, Haiti has a higher number of disasters per km² than the average of the Caribbean countries (World Bank, 2015). These disasters tend to affect disproportionately the populations settled in flood-prone and coastal areas. In the case of tropical storms, for example, almost half of the damages and losses to the productive sectors have been concentrated in the agricultural sector, as was the case with Hurricane Matthew that hit the country on 4 October 2016. Overall, based on available historic data, weather-related disasters are estimated to have caused damages and losses amounting to about 2% of GDP on average per year during the period 1975–2014 (World Bank, 2015).

Public spending in key sectors such as health, education and social protection remains limited, thus negatively impacting the government's ability to provide services and offer equal opportunities to its population. The limited availability of these basic public services results in a high financial burden on households who often have to spend their scarce resources on private services. As a consequence, **achievements in human capital development are closely linked with household income**, supported by the actions of non-government actors, which have increasingly taken over roles traditionally played by the state, including providing basic services such as health and education (World Bank, 2015). Within this state of affairs, analysts also point to the **lack of social contract between the state and its citizens** (Lamaute-Brisson, 2013).

2.2 Social protection

Although Haiti's social security institutions were established in the late 1960s, a comprehensive social protection system was slow to develop and remains weak to this day. To date, there is still **no legal framework under which to consider social protection**, outside of the organic law of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MAST), the national body officially responsible for providing social protection in Haiti. Yet, over the years, a myriad of government institutions have been linked with social protection mostly under MAST and the Ministry of Economy and Finances (MEF), although not exclusively (see Lamaute-Brisson, 2013). There is, however, an ongoing process for the creation of a national social protection strategy (Lamaute-Brisson, *forthcoming*).

³ www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview (updated 16 September 2016; accessed 24 February 2017).

⁴ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HTI> (accessed 10 April 2017).

Following the January 2010 earthquake, international funding made it possible for the Government of Haiti (GoH) to strengthen its social protection activities by launching the nationwide social assistance strategy *Ede Pèp* (Supporting the Population) in 2012, adopting a life-cycle approach with programmes ranging from social assistance to capacity development and economic inclusion. This signified the height of GoH's investment in social protection championed, under the Martelly administration, by former Prime Minister Lamothe, who placed the FAES⁵, a structure of MEF, directly under his supervision to implement the various programmes of *Ede Pèp*. However, today, these programmes have either died out or are being phased out due to the volatility of international funding and most notably the unavailability of PetroCaribe⁶ funds.

Recent studies show that there is an under provision of social protection in Haiti (Lamaute-Brisson 2013; Lombardo 2012). Existing programmes are characterized by limited coverage, are often ad hoc, cover small geographical areas or narrowly defined, and are scattered across numerous institutions (World Bank *et al*, 2014). Most assistance continues to be supplied through remittances or support from churches, other non-governmental actors, and donor-funded projects. The weak implementation capacity characteristic of a fragile country such as Haiti is exacerbated by the multiplicity of actors operating in social protection.


According to the World Bank (2014), 'few of the poor have access to social protection or formal safety nets. First, access to social security is out of reach for most Haitians, particularly the poor. Second, only a small share of the population benefits from social protection. Because of narrow coverage and limited generosity, social protection benefits are inadequate and play only a marginal role in reducing poverty and inequality and in improving opportunities among the population.'

As in the rest of the region, Haiti's social protection system includes both contributory and non-contributory schemes (Figure 1). Contributory social security schemes are the concern of two institutions: the Office of Old Age Insurance (*Office National d'Assurance Vieillesse* – ONA), which manages the pensions of private sector workers, and the Office of Labour Accidents, Sickness and Maternity (*Office d'Accident du Travail, Maladie et Maternité* – OFATMA). With **only 8% of the population of Haiti working in the formal sector**, the capacity of ONA and OFATMA to collect sufficient fiscal revenue to provide quality services is undermined.

In terms of non-contributory schemes, which constitute the focus of our analysis, **the school meals programme is the largest safety net in place in Haiti**. It is currently implemented by a variety of actors under the coordination of the Programme National des Cantines Scolaires (PNCS). In addition, there are **two social transfer programmes**. The Social Assistance Fund (***Caisse d'Assistance Sociale, CAS***) is implemented by MAST and funded with a levy on salaries paid, and ***Kore Lavi*** is implemented by a consortium composed of CARE, Action contre la Faim (ACF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and World Vision (WV), under the supervision of MAST, with funding from USAID.

⁵ Created in 1990, FAES is responsible for channelling funds from multilateral donors to community projects to expand the population's access to social, economic and financial services, as well as to strengthen local and national capacities in governance (Lamaute-Brisson, 2015).

⁶ PetroCaribe is an alliance between Venezuela and many Caribbean countries, whereby petrol can be purchased from Venezuela at preferential rates part upfront and part through up to a generation-long financing agreement with a minimal interest rate following a grace period of one or two years.

Figure 1: Typology of social protection in Haiti

Source: Author (Based on OPM's social protection typology of 2016)

School meals

Created in 1997 under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training - MENFP (*Ministère de l'Éducation et de la Formation Professionnelle*), PNCS's mission is twofold: first, managing canteens in public schools and, second, coordinating and regulating all the interventions of donors and NGOs in this area. The three main school meals programmes coordinated by PNCS are⁷:

- In line with its first goal, PNCS directly serves about 150,000 school children at national level, with funding of the governments of France and Taiwan, as well as own funding.
- Education for All (*Éducation Pour Tous* - EPT), implemented by MENFP, covers approximately 150,000 school children and is financed by the World Bank, Canada and others.
- WFP's school meals programme serves over 410,000 school children in about 1,400 schools nationwide. The main programme is implemented in nine of the 10 departments, including Grand'Anse and Nippes, both heavily hit by Hurricane Matthew

Social transfers

Funded by a 1% levy on salaries paid, the main activity of CAS is the implementation of a social transfer programme targeted at populations deemed vulnerable due to old age, disability or as a result of being an orphan. In addition, CAS also implements community canteens and supports local health centres.⁸

⁷ See Haiti first National School Meals Policy and Strategy <http://www.menfp.gouv.ht/Doc-Alimentation-Scolaire.html>

⁸ <http://primature.gouv.ht/?p=2859>.

The social transfer programme of CAS relies on self-reporting, with a beneficiary selection process not fully clear or transparent and with strong urban bias. CAS targets about 15,000 vulnerable Haitians with cash transfers done through a monthly distribution of checks at the central office in Port-au-Prince. It is also reported that CAS is politicised and suffering from possible leakage (Lamaute-Brisson, 2015).

***Kore Lavi* aims to establish a replicable safety net system to reduce food insecurity and vulnerability while building resilience.** With funding support from USAID and implemented by ACF, CARE, WFP, WV and MAST, *Kore Lavi* operates in 24 communes in the departments of the Artibonite, Centre, Northwest and Southeast, and revolves around four main objectives:

- 1) the completion of household surveys and the establishment of a management information system (MIS) for targeting, monitoring and coordinating with other interventions (SIMAST);
- 2) the provision of food vouchers to around 18,000 households and their gradual inclusion in Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs);
- 3) the provision of supplementary food rations to pregnant and lactating women, and children under two years of age (mother and child nutrition and health); and
- 4) the institutionalisation of the programme in government and local organisations.

Kore Lavi has still a narrow geographical focus and outreach (see Table 1 below), targeting only 10% of the most vulnerable households surveyed.

Table 1: Key features of CAS and *Kore Lavi*

	CAS	<i>Kore Lavi</i>
Implementation	MAST	CARE, ACF, WFP, WV, MAST
Funding	GoH	USAID
Targeting	The elderly, disabled people and orphans	Households with low Haiti Deprivation and Vulnerability Index (HDVI) score
Database	CASSI (developed by SIMAST)	SIMAST
Amount/month	HTG 1,500 (US\$ 25) in cash	HTG 1,500 (US\$ 25) in food vouchers
Number of beneficiaries	15,000	18,000 food vouchers 37,000 Mother and Child Nutrition and Health (MCNH) 32,000 VSLA members
Geographical focus	Urban	Rural
Outreach	National	Central Plateau, Southeast, Artibonite, Northwest, West (La Gonave)

Source: Key informant interviews

Over time, MAST appetite for absorbing the implementation of *Kore Lavi* has grown, and although both the programme and MAST need to be strengthened before this happens, the prospects of programme institutionalisation are promising. What is more, at present *Kore Lavi* appears to be the only programme that currently has the potential, both in terms of predictable funding (from USAID and with complementary activities stemming from EU's 11th European Development Fund) and implementation processes, to grow into a long-term social protection system that can be shock-responsive.

Box 1: Social registry and integrated beneficiary registry in Haiti

In recent years, global and national social protection policies have focused increasingly on systems, including integrating data and information management across programmes and beyond. Depending on the country context and the objectives pursued, there are three main (and potentially overlapping) approaches to developing an integrated system for information management. We define these approaches here:

1. **A social registry:** a database/registry that collects and houses comprehensive (i.e. not programme-specific) information on potential beneficiaries within the country. The primary function of social registries is to support the implementation phases of outreach, intake/registration, and assessment of needs and conditions for the purposes of determining potential eligibility for enrolment in selected social programmes.
2. **An integrated beneficiary registry:** a database/registry that is created by integrating the programme MISs of several different existing schemes, meaning integration is only achieved across data and information on beneficiaries (programme recipients). The main objective of such integration is to provide coordination and oversight, and integrate selected operations and services. This approach is not suitable for targeting since it includes beneficiaries only.
3. **Virtual registry:** a registry (which is not necessarily physical) created by ensuring the interoperability of existing databases through web service access. When linked to a national ID and/or civil registry this approach can ensure a comprehensive (100% of the population), cross-sector and 'pro-active' (linked to life-cycle events) overview of a country's population that can be used for social protection purposes.

Using data for emergency response

However important the role of **social registries** may be in this context, it is important to stress that they are **not always fit for the role of supporting horizontal expansion or piggybacking**. This is because of the very nature of emergencies, which can affect households across the social spectrum and shake up the poverty profile of affected areas.

The key factors determining the usefulness of existing social registries for shock-responsive purposes include the following:

- Representing a **large enough snapshot of a country's population**. This is only the case where either a) a census-survey is applied to all households (not only those who have been pre-identified as poor, as for example in Indonesia); or b) where data-exchange from administrative data sources populates the registry with relevant information on all citizens.
- Including **information for both current beneficiaries** (e.g. those who have been ranked as poor and selected as eligible for social assistance programmes) **and potential beneficiaries** (e.g. the near poor). This is not the case for integrated beneficiary registries, for example.
- Containing data which are **useful and relevant for assessing contextual vulnerabilities after a shock**. For example, this may not be the case for those registries that primarily aggregate data from existing administrative sources (e.g. data on consumption levels, food security, asset ownership, etc.). On the other hand, geo-referenced data could be particularly useful. Collecting relevant information may require early collaboration with the country's disaster management authority and humanitarian agencies.
- **Containing up-to-date information** – i.e. having a frequent, strong and valid data-updating strategy in place.

Integrated data and information management for social protection in Haiti

The absence of comprehensive household data in Haiti poses an important challenge on informing development and social assistance programmes, as well as for humanitarian assistance. MAST currently hosts the SIMAST database, an extensive social registry that includes over 152,000 households, about 7% of the Haitian population. Out of the total amount of households registered in the SIMAST, 18,200 are also beneficiaries of Kore Lavi. At the same time, FAES is developing a "Registre Unique des Bénéficiaires (RUB)", which aims to be the national social registry with information from all types of government databases collecting data on the population and including social protection programmes. Interaction between the two to streamline development efforts has been limited so far. Institutional actors involved should join efforts and

elaborate a strategy for the creation of a unique national social registry, embedding it within the wider social protection strategy. A constructive collaboration between MAST and FAES should be fostered building on key technical aspects and methodologies that have been developed so far. This would facilitate the creation of a national social registry that will be well accepted by the main stakeholders and institutionalized by government.

Source: Author and Barca (2017).

3 Research methodology

In this section, we present a framework that helps us understand the two key dimensions of a shock-responsive social protection scheme: system preparedness and responsiveness. We also present the overarching research questions and describe briefly the tools and fieldwork.

3.1 Theoretical framework

3.1.1 System preparedness

In this study, we assess the level of preparedness of the social protection system based on three aspects that are essential for a prompt and effective response: **targeting system**, **delivery system** and **coordination and financing**. Below we describe each of these in turn. Although these are not the only three processes involved in effective preparedness, both international experience and the relevant literature highlight how crucial they are (Bastagli, 2004; OPM, 2016).

Figure 2: Typology of system preparedness for shock-responsive social protection



Source: Author.

Targeting system

Social protection programmes tend to rely on a variety of targeting mechanisms, including demographic, geographic and poverty targeting. Many of these mechanisms are designed to detect well-established conditions – for example, chronic poverty or belonging to a certain age group – and rely on the use of administrative registries and household surveys. Consequently, they are not conceived as tools to detect sudden changes to well-being and livelihoods or seasonal vulnerabilities. In order to be effective in emergency response, it is necessary to engage during the planning and preparation phase in an assessment of existing targeting tools, and then adapt them or create new complementary systems, to be able to reach beneficiaries affected by different kinds of shock.

Delivery system

Rapid delivery of benefits, either cash or in-kind, is of course crucial for effective support. During emergencies, the capacity to deliver faces challenges due to the urgency of the situation, the constraints imposed by the particular shock (such as infrastructure collapse), and the coordination of different actors (Bastagli, 2014). Delivery mechanisms implemented by social protection schemes

typically include manual transfers, delivery through a banking system, mobile money and other types of e-payments.

Coordination and financing

Preparedness should also include a significant level of planning and coordination among the actors involved in emergency response. This includes not only actors in the social protection field but also those working in DRM and humanitarian aid. This involves international, national and subnational levels, as well as government and non-government organisations.


However, the challenge of achieving coordination among these different actors should not be underestimated. The social protection and DRM sectors not only have different objectives and target populations (with some areas of intersection, though not all areas intersect), as well as different methodologies and traditions, but most importantly they also involve different actors.

3.2 System response

When policy-makers consider the use of a social protection system to address emergency needs, there are a number of strategies that they may employ to scale up the overall level of support that the system provides to vulnerable people. Based on OPM (2015), we tentatively consider five main types of scale-up. These can be used in combination:

1. **Vertical expansion:** increasing the benefit value or duration of an existing programme or system:
 - adjustment of transfer amounts/values;
 - introduction of extraordinary payments or transfers.
2. **Horizontal expansion:** adding new beneficiaries to an existing programme or system:
 - extension of the geographical coverage of an existing programme or system;
 - extraordinary enrolment campaign;
 - modifications of entitlement rules;
 - relaxation of requirements/conditionality to facilitate participation.
3. **Piggybacking:** using a social protection intervention's administrative framework, but running the shock response programme separately:
 - introduction of a new policy by the government, with or without support from humanitarian actors.
4. **Shadow alignment:** developing a parallel humanitarian system that aligns as well as possible with a current or possible future social protection programme; and
5. **Refocusing:** adjusting the social protection system to refocus assistance on groups most vulnerable to the shock.

Figure 3: Typology of shock-responsive social protection



Source: OPM (2015)

3.3 Overarching research questions

The main research question for the study is: **What factors enable social protection systems to be more responsive to shocks?** Keeping this in mind, we developed the following overarching questions to guide the analysis:

- What relevant national and local laws and regulations and policies exist in relation to shock-responsive social protection?
- What priorities does the national social protection strategy signal, e.g. for addressing poverty, vulnerability, resilience, etc.? Does it offer a role for shock response?
- What targeting mechanisms are used by the largest social protection programmes? How are beneficiaries identified? How frequently? Does a national database exist? Is it integrated with other databases?
- How are the benefits of the main social protection programmes delivered (both cash and in-kind)?
- What design and implementation features of the social protection system have elements of flexibility and adaptability to facilitate rapid and adequate shock response?
- What is the evidence of the effectiveness – in terms of promptness and adequacy (e.g. coverage, transfer levels, etc.) – of social protection support in the event of each of the major shocks identified?
- Has there been any recent experience of coordination between, or integration of, social protection and DRM policies?
- Is there space for dialogue and collaboration between these two sectors? How could this dialogue be promoted?

3.4 Research tools and fieldwork

The research consisted of three phases: a literature review, fieldwork and analysis. In relation to the first phase, we conducted a thorough review of legislation, policy plans and strategies, manuals of operations, periodic reports, and programme reviews, assessments and evaluations. Our theoretical framework and the research questions presented above guided the review. The literature review of experiences in LAC conducted as part of this assignment (Beazley *et al.*, 2016) and the global literature review conducted by OPM (OPM, 2016) also informed this review.

Fieldwork was conducted from 23 January to 3 February 2017. The research team was led by Kokoévi Sossouvi (OPM) and integrated by Alessio Orgera (WFP). Support was provided by Félix-Antoine Véronneau (WFP). The research was conducted in Port-au-Prince and in the Hurricane Matthew-affected area around Jérémie (Grand'Anse), traditionally the food basket of the country. The research tools used were:

- **Direct observation:** Direct observation involves the study of particular events, spaces and behaviours directly and in 'real time', meaning that the researcher becomes part of the environment he or she is studying. In this regard, the research team visited the *localité* of Lori in the *section communale* of Marfranc in the commune of Jérémie (Grand'Anse department). We were unable to travel to Les Cayes in the South department due to the limited time available and the uncertainties linked to road access. It is our understanding that the response was implemented in a similar fashion in both these locations designated as the most severely hit by the hurricane.
- **Key informant interviews:** Key informants were prioritised for interview from the *Kore Lavi* consortium including MAST, WFP, ACF and WV, but also from: GoH institutions such as Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (*Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural – MARNDR*), DPC and local authorities; UN system actors including WFP, OCHA, UNDP, IOM and ILO; and the international aid community as well as affected communities. Key informant interviews are useful to triangulate findings from other data sources, and to generate questions, since key informants can share information not known to most people. Data were collected using semi-structured interviews, complemented by selected tools.

The list of key informants interviewed can be found in Annex A.

The third phase consisted of analysing the data collected and findings from the literature review and answering the research questions. Preliminary findings were shared with WFP staff from the regional office and other offices in the region to gather feedback to help in identifying further areas to be covered. This report, which has been peer-reviewed, is the output of this research.

4 The role of social protection in emergency response

4.1 How prepared is the social protection system to respond to emergencies?

Global and regional research on shock-responsive social protection confirms that **mature social protection systems tend to be able to play more effective roles in emergency response** (Beazley *et al*, 2016 and OPM, 2016). Stronger systems, processes and administrative capacity, greater coverage, a wider variety of services provided and higher level of integration provide systems with more scope to expand or refocus when a shock hits. More incipient social protection systems, with low coverage and weak processes and operational systems, limited political traction and taxpayer support, are more constrained when it comes to responding to emergencies.

The fragility that Haiti experiences poses additional challenges in the design and implementation of effective and sustainable social protection interventions (World Bank *et al*, 2014). Households facing a mixture of acute and chronic needs require a combination of flexible, short-term responses, as well as long-term interventions. However, the focus so far has primarily been on emergency response rather than on building the foundations of a long-term social protection system; the ongoing efforts to developing a national social protection strategy may create the right foundations (Lamaute-Brisson, *forthcoming*).

This lack of a solid foundation, the fragmentation in the sector, the scarcity of strong systems with high coverage and the lack of a cash delivery platform, challenge the role that social protection can play in shock-response. Moreover, efforts to make this incipient national social protection system more shock-responsive have been limited, outside of the recent efforts made by *Kore Lavi* consortium members (see Zuodar, 2016).

Based on the theoretical framework described in Section 3.1, we focus our analysis of system preparedness on **three key aspects: coordination, targeting and delivery.**

In terms of preparedness, **a distinction must be made between slow-onset emergencies (e.g. drought, economic or political crisis, etc.) and rapid-onset ones (e.g. hurricane, earthquake, etc.).** This latter subset can further be disaggregated between disasters with warning signs like a hurricane or some volcanic eruptions and those that, despite being known to be likely, occur in more unexpected ways, e.g. an earthquake. Indeed, the level of preparedness is always a function of the likely occurrence of a given event. Prepositioning of goods in addition to emergency protocols are typical activities for ‘predicted’ rapid-onset emergencies whereas contingency plans that set out response protocols are more characteristic of ‘unpredicted’ emergencies like earthquakes.

When the earthquake hit Haiti in 2010, the school meals programme was already the most important social safety net in the country. Few social assistance programmes were in place under MAST, and most of those that were have now faded away,⁹ with CAS being the main one that still exists today. *Kore Lavi* had not begun. While some evidence of response is documented (e.g. the hot meals WFP

⁹ The social assistance pillar comprised three axes, under the coordination of MAST: (i) Social housing managed by the Public Enterprise of Social Housing Production (*Entreprise Publique de Production de Logement Social*) (the Housing and Public Buildings Construction Unit (*Unité de Construction de Logement et Bâtiments Publics*) under the supervision of the Prime Minister, had a similar mission); (ii) Direct monetary transfers to disadvantaged people managed by CAS; and (iii) Support for disabled people through the National Council for the rehabilitation of disabled persons (*Conseil National pour la Réhabilitation des Handicapés*). See Lamaute-Brisson, 2013.

provided to children and community canteens operated by CAS),¹⁰ not much on the preparedness of the social protection system pre-earthquake can be found in the literature. This is perhaps because the earthquake was much unexpected. Hence our focus below will be on the 2015/16 drought and Hurricane Matthew.

4.1.1 Coordination and financing

In Haiti, the highest level of institutional responsibility for disaster risk reduction and management lies with the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Communities (*Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales* – MICT). Within MICT, the Civil Protection Directorate – DPC (*Direction de la Protection Civile*) is responsible for the coordination of disaster response activities and the promotion of risk management (IFRC, 2015). Thus, humanitarian responders and social protection actors seek guidance from the DPC following an emergency.

However, not every response is coordinated by DPC. When it comes to the food security sector, for example, the CNSA, attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, becomes the focal point during slow-onset disasters, such as droughts and crop or livestock diseases. Therefore, food security actors tend not to work closely with the DPC. This limits the good coordination and coherence between sectors of any emergency responses.

Every year, DPC conducts its annual routine simulation exercise involving a range of humanitarian actors in the design of contingency plans. This also took place before Hurricane Matthew. However, all the informants interviewed commented that the **scale of the devastation caused by the hurricane in many ways outweighed the capacity of DPC to coordinate the response.**

Due to the absence of a formal legal framework, the DPC's overall leadership role has been controversial (Grünewald and Schenkenberg, 2016). Haiti does not have a national disaster law and, as a result, the DPC does not have a legal basis, nor a line in the national budget.

Moreover, evidence also suggests that DPC has limited capacity in terms of planning activities; the real-time evaluation of Hurricane Matthew¹¹, for instance, points to a number of gaps in terms of data management (especially collection) where inaccurate planning figures were used (e.g. inflated estimates or outdated numbers) (Grünewald and Schenkenberg, 2016). In the same vein, stakeholders and the real-time evaluation reported challenges with information management in the days prior to the hurricane.

Overall, there is little evidence of government's horizontal and inter-ministerial coordination in preparation for emergency response. This creates challenges to ensure that social protection, as well as other sectors, contribute to the emergency-response. Coordination with civil protection and humanitarian agencies is of paramount importance.

In relation to sectoral emergency-response planning, there is also limited preparedness and clarity of roles and responsibilities of the sectoral working groups (Grünewald and Schenkenberg, 2016). Each of the respective line ministries (or government departments) serves as the Chair of the relevant sectoral working group. For example, the CNSA is in charge of food security and the Ministry of Public Health and Population is in charge of health coordination. The effectiveness of these sector

¹⁰ For example, <http://fr.wfp.org/histoires/repas-scolaires-PAM-haiti-depuis-aide-d-urgence-au-developpement> and <http://primature.gouv.ht/?p=2859>.

¹¹ <http://www.alnap.org/resource/23920>

working groups is in practice heavily dependent on the capacities of the ministries in charge, which are variable.

Regarding the Cash Transfers Working Group, it must be noted that MAST's lead role was not planned before the response, nor formalised during it. The involvement of MAST in the Cash Working Group had the benefit of creating a platform for CARE and WFP, the two main actors involved in cash transfers, to coordinate their response more closely (Grünewald and Schenkenberg, 2016). However, for a number of reasons, coordination efforts among different actors did not result in a joint response strategy. After a first phase of three months blanket in-kind response using prepositioned stocks, diverging assistance modalities were implemented even in some neighbouring communities.

Despite efforts to coordinate the work between aid agencies and local authorities, it seems that the urgency of the emergencies undermines this limited preparatory work. In the case of the Hurricane Matthew, the coordination process at the department and local levels has been evaluated as 'a mixed bag of experiences' (Grünewald and Schenkenberg, 2016). For example, the real-time evaluation points out that mayors have played significant roles, both with positive and less positive outcomes, and that precisely to avoid aid 'politicization', in many places agencies bypassed the municipal level and went straight to the sub-communal and community administrative levels.

In relation to funding shock-responsive social protection, scale ups have been largely funded by humanitarian agencies and donors. There are no contingency funds for the expansion of government social protection schemes. Beyond the social protection sector, emergency response and recovery in Haiti is largely funded by humanitarian agencies and donors and with the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF). For example, the CCRIF paid USD 20 million and USD 7.7 million after the disasters of Hurricane Matthew and the 2010 earthquake.

Lastly, in relation to preparatory plans to fund responses through social protection, it must be noted that **contingency funds allowed *Kore Lavi* to expand.** While MAST had no funding to scale up CAS in any manner, financial resource allocation by implementing *Kore Lavi* consortium members was a key preparedness measure of assistance delivery. Pre-authorized funds were used to plan response activities that subsequently translated into plans for vertical expansion of *Kore Lavi*.

4.1.2 Targeting system

At present **there is no official nationwide social registry** on which emergency response can draw for targeting. As mentioned above, both RUB (FAES) – when ready – and SIMAST (MAST) have the potential to offer a basis from which to determine such a strategy, although this is threatened by their current limited strategic alignment.

Having said this, **in the absence of national census data in Haiti, SIMAST is a major achievement.** A survey of all the households in a given area of intervention is carried out by staff from CNSA affiliated with *Kore Lavi*. Then, SIMAST applies the Haiti Deprivation and Vulnerability Index (HDVI) algorithm composed of 20 indicators added through a weighting system to single out households that are not only expenditure poor but also exhibit deprivation in multiple living conditions dimensions (e.g. educational achievement and services, labour, food security, resources at home and dwelling services, etc.). Calculated on a scale of 0 to 1, the higher the HDVI score, the higher the level of deprivation.

However, the HDVI was not designed for emergency response and it may have its limitations when used for this purpose. Indeed, regional experience has shown that even when targeting mechanisms successfully reach the target populations of social protection schemes, they may not be suitable for emergency response (see Beazley *et al.*, 2016). The HDVI was designed to detect


well-established household conditions and not necessarily to detect sudden changes to wellbeing and livelihoods (Zuodar, 2016).

These limitations were illustrated during the response to the 2015/16 drought implemented in the Northwest by ACF, a *Kore Lavi* consortium member, as part of their own emergency response programme. While using only indicators of food insecurity, ACF only found a 5% convergence with beneficiaries covered by *Kore Lavi* in the same area. This highlights the fact that **the aspects of structural vulnerability captured by SIMAST and those of a shock-induced vulnerability such as food insecurity unsurprisingly differ greatly.**

SIMAST's limited geographical coverage (Central Plateau, Southeast, Artibonite, Northwest and La Gonave),¹² also hinders its shock-responsiveness. In fact, **Hurricane Matthew affected most significantly areas where *Kore Lavi* was not implemented.** Without SIMAST nor national census data, a key challenge was to first ascertain the number and actual location of the people affected by the crisis.

In addition to the limited geographical coverage of SIMAST, **a set of harmonized targeting methodologies and data collection mechanisms was not available at the onset of the crisis**¹³. As a result, main aid agencies resorted to a variety of community-based targeting methodologies based on their priority sector and according to their own objectives. The targeting processes followed by WFP and CARE are briefly described in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Example of a community-based targeting process used by CARE following Hurricane Matthew



Source: Author.

In most instances, these community-based targeting processes could take up to six weeks as it needs to be conducted at the lowest administrative level (*localité*). Moreover, due to limited planning, four months after the hurricane the Cash Transfers Working Group was still issuing guidance on the appropriate targeting methodology.¹⁴ Moreover, in practice, **many aid agencies did not reach the**

¹² It must be noted that *Kore Lavi* was recently allocated additional funding received from EU to widen its geographical coverage.

¹³ Although there are experiences of targeting mechanisms used for emergency response in areas not covered by *Kore Lavi* prior to Hurricane Matthew, like for example WFP's scorecard for the 2015-2016 drought response.

¹⁴ Cash Working Group email of 06 February 2017 from Rachel Bannerman.

localité, undermining the essence of community-based targeting: community leaders have the knowledge to identify affected households and are accountable to community members.

4.1.3 Delivery system

The contingency plans of *Kore Lavi* consortium members as humanitarian response agencies outside of their social protection interventions, like those of most actors involved in the response of Hurricane Matthew, included **prepositioning of food and non-food items**. For example, mayors and the DPC had bought food and basic items from local shops as reserves, including water, for the emergency shelters. UN agencies and international NGOs pre-positioned staff, resources and relief items (e.g. tarpaulins, water tablets, small equipment for road clearing, etc.) As such, in-kind assistance was the first form of assistance prioritised for delivery to affected populations (Grünewald and Schenkenberg, 2016).

With regards to cash-based assistance, **progress made with cash transfers at scale following the 2010 earthquake seems to not have been capitalised upon over the years**. In 2012, out of 14 humanitarian mobile money programmes carried out worldwide, six were implemented in Haiti (Dalberg, 2012). Today, while the landscape of financial service offered has changed (although the banking system remains underdeveloped), there appears to be only timid experimentation with regards to delivery mechanisms. This may be due to loss of institutional memory within aid agencies or the dominance of mobile network operator Digicel, largely overshadowing the reach of its rival Natcom on mobile money service, thus narrowing implementers' view of services available outside this mainstream channel (such as domestic and international third-party payment technology providers).

While in-kind assistance delivery was well planned (although implementation later faced challenges due to security and logistical concerns), there was limited preparedness on not only cash assistance modalities, as mentioned above, but also on cash delivery mechanisms.

4.2 How has the social protection system contributed to emergency response?

Social protection has contributed to emergency response in Haiti mostly through *Kore Lavi* and the school meals programme. These programmes have fairly stronger capacity, infrastructure, funding mechanisms and coverage than other schemes, and although they had not been designed for emergency response they managed to play a substantial role following the 2015/16 drought and Hurricane Matthew, as described below. Other social protection programmes were less involved in the responses. In the case of CAS for example, MAST had no funding to scale-up following the Hurricane Matthew.

It is important to mention that this type of response, in which fairly stronger programmes are used despite not being design for emergency-response, goes in line with regional experience: when using the social protection system to respond to emergencies, countries rely on existing systems and programmes with relatively greater coverage and stronger administrative capacity. Depending on the context, this could mean expanding a conditional cash transfer programme, and/or a social insurance scheme, or school meals (Beazley *et al*, 2016).

4.2.1 In-kind and cash response

Following Hurricane Matthew, *Kore Lavi* was allocated additional funding of US\$ 1 million from USAID/Food for Peace to contribute to the response to the hurricane and activate the emergency

responsiveness of its safety nets programmes, as well as to support the active engagement of its key partners.

MAST demonstrated its active engagement in relief efforts through early deployment missions to the southern regions, hardest hit by the hurricane, with support from *Kore Lavi*. Staff from Port-au-Prince conducted fact-finding assessments and supported the participation in emergency coordination mechanisms and response activities of MAST teams at the departmental level. This rapid involvement and responsiveness of MAST appears to be the result of the effort made by WFP and USAID to introduce and discuss shock-responsive mechanisms for *Kore Lavi*, for example, through the elaboration of an initial study (Zuodar, 2016). This contributed to narrowing down the main potential response modalities, providing orientation to stakeholders, and helping increasing the involvement of MAST.

Kore Lavi's administrative capacity was also used to support CNSA in conducting early market and food security assessments in Hurricane Matthew-affected areas. The results supported the design of some of the consortium's cash-based interventions.

Box 2: *Kore Lavi's* response to the 2015/2016 drought

***Kore Lavi* was better placed to respond to the 2015/16 drought than to Hurricane Matthew, first, because this was a slow-onset emergency and, second, because it affected areas where *Kore Lavi* was already being implemented.** The fact that GoH itself was slow to issue a National Emergency Drought Response Plan also gave all actors involved in the drought response ample time to organise themselves. The response included a mix of vertical and horizontal expansion, the latter characterised by an important use of cash-for-work (CFW) activities.

An interesting area of analysis of the difference in both responses is that of targeting. When analysing the shock-responsiveness of a social protection system, the type of emergency is highly relevant. Indeed, depending on whether we are faced with a slow-onset emergency like the drought of 2015/16 or a rapid-onset one like Hurricane Matthew, targeting mechanisms can be adapted differently. With this in mind, Table 2 provides a comparison of the response to the drought and to Hurricane Matthew, which shows that, despite the shortcomings mentioned above, SIMAST was capitalised during the drought more strongly than during the hurricane in areas where *Kore Lavi* was already present. Effectively the drought affected those previously more vulnerable in greater proportion, while the hurricane affected all households indiscriminately. For example, while better-off households living in houses with a concrete roof may not have lost their homes, they may have lost their livelihoods as livestock perished and fields were destroyed. In addition, these households would most likely bear the burden of hosting poorer relatives who lost both their home and livelihoods. Thus, **to fully account for shock-induced vulnerability, additional targeting was required** in both cases.

Table 2: A comparison of targeting methodologies used by *Kore Lavi* during the drought and the hurricane responses

Emergency	2015/16 drought	Hurricane Matthew
Type	Slow-onset crisis	Rapid-onset crisis
Area affected	Affected area mostly covered by SIMAST	Most affected areas not covered by SIMAST, except High Artibonite, Northwest and La Gonave
Targeting	Immediate assistance provided to existing beneficiaries already recorded in SIMAST + additional community-based targeting	Use of <i>Kore Lavi</i> -designed form ¹⁵ + additional community-based targeting

¹⁵ Although this might be interpreted as a short form of the HDVI questionnaire, it was instead a list of criteria to categorise households based on the presence of vulnerable individuals (handicapped, single-headed, pregnant women, large number of children under 5). The tool was used more as a checklist than an actual questionnaire. As WFP opted for blanket coverage initially, this tool was only used by CARE. WFP reintroduced vulnerability criteria (as a series of points to take into consideration) with community leaders who were compiling beneficiary lists at a later stage when it

Delivery	Issue with vulnerability dimensions considered the SIMAST. Overlap of 5% of beneficiaries of ACF programme supporting affected vulnerable people using 100% food security indicator + geographical focus in Northwest and Haut-Artibonite	In the Northwest, immediate assistance provided to existing beneficiaries already recorded in SIMAST + additional community-based targeting using <i>Kore Lavi</i> -designed form
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Government and humanitarian agencies responded to Hurricane Matthew first with various types of in-kind assistance, in addition to rescue and other activities not covered in this report. After more than two months, cash assistance either replaced or complemented in-kind support. Response strategies depend on the type and magnitude of the shock, the effects on markets, infrastructure and other aspects that can affect service delivery, the capacity to assist the affected population, and the objectives of the response (Beazley *et al*, 2016). They are therefore very context specific. While in some cases, like for instance in Ecuador's response to the 2016 earthquake, food and cash support are part of two separate stages of support, the first one related to immediate relief and second one to relief and early recovery (Beazley, 2017), in other countries like in Philippines, these were combined (Bankable Frontier Associates, 2015). In the case of Haiti, the preparatory work done for food assistance allowed for a rapid in-kind response, while the cash response was developed and markets recovered.

The component of *Kore Lavi* that was most easily scaled up was the food vouchers. Thanks to a network of over 1,000 food vendors associated with the programme, an additional one month food voucher of US\$ 25 value was transferred in December 2016 to regular *Kore Lavi* beneficiaries in the 11 communes affected by the hurricane.

A flexible response strategy, assisting the affected population with food, cash or both, responded not only to the time required to develop the cash assistance but also to market conditions. According to the real-time evaluation of Hurricane Matthew (Grünewald and Schenkenberg, 2016), 'while the difficult supply situation and the destruction of market stocks induced significant price increases and reduced availability in some areas, the evaluation found that urban markets recovered quickly, and that beneficiaries preferred receiving cash to in-kind assistance. In a number of affected remote areas, markets were often badly hit, and only slowly resumed their activities four to six weeks after the disaster. Inevitably, markets in the most affected mountainous or remote coastal areas, which were functioning in a haphazard way even before the hurricane, will be slower in picking up their daily routines.'

The use of 'multi-sectoral' cash grants was discussed at length in the Cash Working Group. **Ineffective coordination and perceived competition among aid agencies are reported by the real-time evaluation as the main challenges in this area** (Grünewald and Schenkenberg, 2016). The **lack of a cash delivery platform** prior to the crisis was also one of the main barriers to a rapid and multi-sectoral cash delivery. This resulted in aid agencies coordinating different sectors, such as shelter and early recovery, implementing their own cash-based interventions.

Cash was provided by humanitarian agencies including *Kore Lavi* partners both in hand through microfinance organisations and electronically in neighbouring communities, with long internal decision-making at times on how to proceed and equally lengthy contractual process with service providers. Little was done ahead of the emergency to improve the speed of cash delivery to the hands of affected populations.

became clear that blanket coverage could not be achieved due to larger-than-expected population numbers (source: interviews with WFP).

In relation to the size of the cash transfer, WFP's cash-based assistance of about US\$ 60 was calculated based on the monetary conversion of 80% of the 2,100 Kcal food ration and according to the stakeholders interviewed, most agencies aligned themselves to this amount. It exceeds the scope of this research to assess whether this amount was adequate to achieve the intended impact. The scale-up of *Kore Lavi* is described below.

Vertical expansion

- An additional one-off food voucher of US\$ 25 value was transferred in December 2016 to 10,331 regular *Kore Lavi* beneficiaries in the 11 communes hardest hit by the hurricane in Northwest, High Artibonite and Southeast.
- ACF and WV scaled up existing *Kore Lavi* interventions with 5,220 conditional and unconditional cash transfers for three months / cycles targeting 1,740 beneficiary households in the La Gonave and Northwest departments.
- 61 VSLAs in three communes of the South East department were provided with US\$ 25 per person for their members and most affected neighbours (a total of 2,715 persons) to support VSLA members' social funds and agriculture planting activities. This was a one-off contribution delivered under *Kore Lavi*.

Horizontal expansion

- 1,000 hot meals and water were provided to victims in emergency shelters and inmates in prisons in Grand'Anse, Southeast, South, and Port-au-Prince.
- In November and in December 2016, a double food ration was distributed to beneficiaries of the *Kore Lavi* MCNH¹⁶ component in the four communes affected by the hurricane which do not have a safety net component.
- *Kore Lavi* extended its accountability hotline mechanism to non-*Kore Lavi* areas and beneficiaries supported by the emergency cash-based interventions in southern regions of the country.

4.2.2 School meals response

School meals are the largest safety net programme in Haiti. **In the days following Hurricane Matthew, PNCS used its school meals stock to provide food assistance to affected populations housed in emergency shelters in the Grand'Anse department.** WFP's school meals programme, which covers about 110 school facilities in the Jérémie area, was not scaled up for the emergency response, primarily for security reasons. In agreement with its donor, the Canadian government, WFP used stocks intended for the school meals programme for general food distributions.

In the Nippes department, WFP home-grown school meals programme was suspended for a period of two months after the hurricane. Operations resumed the first week of January 2017, when WFP started procuring food directly from local markets. While many affected farmers were not able to provide food to schools in the short-term, the home-grown school meals scheme was an important incentive for local farmers to re-engage in farming after the hurricane, contributing to a faster recovery.

¹⁶ The third strategic objective of *Kore Lavi* is improving maternal and child nutritional status. This is achieved through increasing household practice of appropriate nutrition behaviours to prevent malnutrition, improving the capacity of community-based entities to promote appropriate nutrition practices to prevent malnutrition, and strengthening the capacity of health facilities to deliver appropriate nutritional services.

On the other hand, *Kore Lavi* developed a ‘catering services’ model which offered the possibility to provide cooked meals for the general population, following Hurricane Matthew, particularly as populations were displaced from their homes, thus making it difficult for them to cook at home. CARE also funded 40 school meals caterers in the Abricot Commune (Grande’Anse department) to prepare food for displaced families taking refuge in schools and churches.

4.3 Key findings

1- The ability of Haiti’s social protection system to respond to emergencies effectively is still low and, and remains highly dependent on humanitarian aid. The ability to respond should be assessed in light of the system’s capacity to deliver regular programming. The social protection system in Haiti is still fragmented, with limited coverage and resources, without a clear national strategy and with incipient systems and processes.

2- Despite this limited capacity, there is a growing interest in making social protection schemes in Haiti more shock-responsive. *Kore Lavi*, for example, has already commissioned a study to propose strategies to increasing programme responsiveness (see Zuodar, 2016). This study was well received by government and partners outside the programme. Moreover, the increasing use of cash assistance in emergencies in Haiti also points to a stronger coordination between humanitarian aid and social protection. Furthermore, an early draft of the national social protection policy highlights its role in emergency response (Lamaute-Brisson, *forthcoming*)

3- Despite this limited capacity, the social protection system has contributed to responding to recent emergencies. This was achieved mostly through *Kore Lavi* and the school meals programme, because of their fairly stronger capacity, infrastructure, funding mechanisms and coverage.

4- SIMAST and RUB are promising targeting platforms both for the delivery of regular social protection programming as well as for emergency response. SIMSAT was instrumental in responding to recent crises; more so to the 2015/2016 drought that affected areas covered by *Kore Lavi* than to the Hurricane Matthew.

5- There is a lack of a targeting methodology for the delivery of social protection services in emergencies. The targeting methodology used by *Kore Lavi* in regular activities, the HDVI, was not designed for emergency response and would have its limitation if used for that purpose. The community-based targeting methodology implemented by agencies in the Cash Working Group faced a number of operational constraints. More in general, attempts done in the past to harmonize and standardize community-based targeting methodologies have not been capitalized.

6- Coordination is a major challenge; this is the result of fragmented and weak systems combined with frequent shocks and great need. Despite improvements and efforts made by DPC and the sectoral working groups, ineffective coordination has hindered the responses (Grünwald and Schenkenberg, 2016). Coordination challenges are found within government, within humanitarian aid, and between government and humanitarian aid.

7- Preparatory work for in-kind emergency assistance enabled fast response. Such preparatory work involved DPC and mayors, *Kore Lavi* and humanitarian agencies.

5 Policy recommendations

1- Strengthening the social protection system to deliver its core mandate and regular assistance to food insecure, poor and vulnerable households more effectively will enhance its potential for emergency response. Fragmentation of the system should be reduced, its operational capacity strengthened, and funding and coverage increased sustainably to improve its shock-readiness and responsiveness. **The role of social protection in emergency needs to be integrated as a crucial component of the upcoming national social protection strategy.** It is very important, however, not to overburden this nascent social protection system. A right balance needs to be found between regular social protection activities and flexibility for emergency response; the national social protection strategy is the right framework to achieve this balance.

2- While the development of this national strategy is government-led, humanitarian agencies, development partners, NGOs, and other actors, should contribute to its creation. Social protection in Haiti is delivered by a wide range of actors and hence a legitimate and effective strategy would need to involve all of them.

3- The national strategy should spell out clearly roles and responsibility of different national and international actors, in order to ensure effective coordination of different sectors involved. As opposed to other countries of the region, in which the role of humanitarian aid is less prominent, in the case of Haiti social protection is not only largely funded but also partially implemented by humanitarian agencies and development partners.

4- To be shock-responsive, the social protection system should deliberately embed DRM. This should form part of its design. Triggers for emergency response should be defined and scale-up scenarios drawn up. A clear communication plan must be designed to inform both partners and beneficiaries on this. For example, the possibility of channelling emergency funds through *Kore Lavi* for horizontal and vertical expansion should be envisaged. Suitable platforms for advocating embedding more shock-responsive social protection features in humanitarian response are the Social Protection Sectorial Table and the Cash Working Group.

5- It is necessary to strengthen the role of the DPC, starting from its legal status. This will enable DPC to perform its mandate more effectively, in particular its leading role and the coordination of the various humanitarian actors.

6- Humanitarian agencies could consider responding with the strategies referred as ‘piggybacking’ and ‘shadow alignment’ in our theoretical framework (see Section 3.1), in order to not only assist the affected population but also strengthen government systems. There is significant regional and global evidence about this type of responses (see Beazely *et al*, 2016 and OPM, 2016).

7- Integrating and further developing SIMAST and RUB will allow improving the timeliness and transparency of targeting during crises. However, as described in Box 2, there are a number pre-requisites for data in SIMAST and RUB to be useful for emergency response. Not only the type of data collected but also the frequency are of paramount importance. Moreover, data exchange between SIMAST and RUB and humanitarian agencies could be explored, with the provision of adequate data protection.

8- In relation to targeting mechanisms, it is also recommended to create protocols and mechanisms for shock-responsive social protection. Protocols could include horizontal expansions, reaching those in the affected areas that are already in SIMAST/RUB but not necessarily benefiting from any programme for example. Moreover, the extent to which the HDVI is a robust tool for targeting those affected by shocks should be assessed and, if needed, the index

could be improved or adapted to play this role. Furthermore, if community-based targeting will be used by government and partners to identify those outside SIMAST/RUB, then it is recommended to develop a methodology that can be quickly and effectively implemented by all actors involved. However, geographical targeting may be more appropriate during a first response phase, when timeliness is more important than targeting accuracy. Finally, it is also suggested that protocols for both horizontal and vertical expansions could be linked to early warning indicators. Refer to Zuodar (2016) for additional recommendations in this line.

9- Programmes expected to expand during emergencies, like *Kore Lavi* and school meals, should create protocols to temporarily revise, soften or waive conditionalities and rules could be put in place, which would enable horizontal expansions.

10- Given the infrastructure and coverage of *school meals* in Haiti, the role of these programmes in emergency response could be stronger. It is recommended to make school meals programmes as shock-proof as possible and to develop protocols for expansion during crises. Vertical expansions could involve increasing the number of daily meals, the number of days when meals are provided (e.g. including weekends) or covering the school-break period. Horizontal expansions could also be an option, including though giving take-home rations or cash transfers to support affected households, in addition to the meal for the children in school. However, schools should not become food distribution centres, and the support provided to the affected population should not affect regular school activities. Stand-by agreements with providers may need to be in place in order to enable these expansions. Experience has also shown that home-grown school meals schemes can be particularly helpful to rural households to recover from shocks, by providing a secured market for locally grown products.

11- It is important to develop a delivery platform for rapid and multi-sectoral cash delivery in emergency contexts. The lack of this platform has been one of the main barriers to timely and effective cash support in recent emergencies. Although the use of e-payments in emergencies is on the rise globally, it is important to carefully assess whether this is the best option in the case of Haiti, given the high set-up costs and the challenges associated with the financial system and the telecommunications sector¹⁷.

12- It is also recommended to create stronger links between *Kore Lavi* and CAS, both under MAST. Efforts have already been made in terms of training in data management and technology transfer of CASSI linked to SIMAST but more needs to be done. Possible working arrangements could be to define *Kore Lavi* as the rural mirror of CAS with additional activities. When working in urban areas, *Kore Lavi* could target beneficiaries on behalf of CAS.

13- There is a need to increase the role of MAST within *Kore Lavi* towards an institutionalisation of the programme. While it is already actively progressing upwards along a defined scale of institutionalisation as part of its objectives, *Kore Lavi* needs to be integrated in the above mentioned National Social Protection Strategy. Further down the line, looking at the experience of *Ede Pèp*, it would also be appropriate to consider national scale-up and allocation of government funding to the programme, which is essential for its sustainability. In this process of institutionalisation, the level of operational involvement of MAST needs to be clearly defined. At this stage, it seems more appropriate for MAST to ensure governance of *Kore Lavi* rather than assuming an implementation role focusing in rooting, validating and institutionalising the various aspects of the programme at an adequate level (e.g. operational, norms and coordination, advocacy, etc.).

14- Since shock-responsive social protection is still a fairly new policy area, it is important to both contribute to and learn from the international body of evidence. In this sense, it is

¹⁷ Zuodar (2016) recommends the use of mobile phone technology.

recommended that Haiti participates in regional and global forums and that experiences in the country are evaluated.

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Annex A List of interviewees

Name	Position	Institution	Interview date
Wendy Bigham	Deputy Country Director	WFP	24 Jan 2017
Cédric Charpentier	Head of Programme	WFP	24 Jan 2017
Charlie Rapoport	Cash-Based Transfers Consultant	WFP	24 Jan 2017
Erica Demuru	Cash-Based Transfers Consultant	WFP	24 Jan 2017
Jean-Carrel Norceide	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Officer	WFP	24 Jan 2017
Pierre Anthony Garraud	Surveys and Studies Manager	CNSA	24 Jan 2017
Raynold Saint-Val	Head of Publications	CNSA	24 Jan 2017
Hilaire Jean-Ulysse	Nutrition Consultant	CNSA	24 Jan 2017
Afurika Juvéal	Chief of Party - Kore Lavi Programme	CARE	24 Jan 2017
Jean-Michel Vigreux	Country Director	CARE	24 Jan 2017
Florence Cadet	Programme Manager	FFP/USAID	25 Jan 2017
Jymior Guerisma	Program Management Specialist	OFDA/USAID	25 Jan 2017
Odney Pierre Ricot	Director of Studies and Programming Unit	MAST	25 Jan 2017
Jean-Robert Brutus	Social Protection Senior Consultant	MSI	25 Jan 2017
Fabien Sambussy	Country Director	IOM	25 Jan 2017
Suranga Mallawa	Shelter Sector Coordinator	IOM	25 Jan 2017
Philippe Verstraeten	Emergency Response Team Leader	OCHA	25 Jan 2017
Nadège Mbairaroua	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA	25 Jan 2017
Michel Boulay	Head of Office	OCHA	26 Jan 2017
Magalie Benjamin	Emergency Team Leader	CARE	26 Jan 2017
Elsa Maarawi	SBGV Sub-Sector Coordinator	UNFPA	26 Jan 2017
Guillaume Sylvera	Civil Protection Regional Office Coordinator	DPC	27 Jan 2017
Alexis Sylvestre	Departmental Director – Grande-Anse	MAST	27 Jan 2017
Mariejeva Bellevue	Head of Personnel – Grande-Anse	MAST	27 Jan 2017
Ferdinand Ngueyap	Head of Office	WFP	27 Jan 2017
Kesnel Mézy	Project Manager	CRS	28 Jan 2017
Serge Raphael	Safety Nets Technical Officer	CARE	28 Jan 2017
Rita Sciarra	Head of Poverty Reduction Unit	UNDP	30 Jan 2017
Raphy Favre	National School Feeding Programme Consultant	WFP	30 Jan 2017
Norbert Stimphil	Chief Coordinator	EPT	30 Jan 2017
Pierre Norzeron	Programme Officer	DEVCO	30 Jan 2017
Carline Jean-Paul	Programme Assistant	ECHO	30 Jan 2017
Silvia Severi	Head of Unit	DEVCO	30 Jan 2017
Paul Sitnam	Director, Hurricane Matthew Response	World Vision	31 Jan 2017

Pierre Jean-Louis	Food & Cash Programme Manager	World Vision	31 Jan 2017
Gianluca Gondolini	Projects Coordinator	FAO	31 Jan 2017
Aloys Nizigiyimana	Agricultural Projects Coordinator	FAO	31 Jan 2017
Joseph Félix	Civil Protection Response Coordinator	DPC	31 Jan 2017
Nolex Fontil	Director of Studies and Programming Unit	MARNDR	1 Feb 2017
Félix-Antoine Véronneau	Deputy Chief of Party – <i>Kore Lavi</i> Programme	WFP	1 Feb 2017
Hans-Müller Thomas	National Coordinator PASMISSI	FAES	1 Feb 2017
Vladimir Adam	MIS Manager	FAES	1 Feb 2017
Fanette Brandalac	Deputy Country Director – Programmes	ACF	1 Feb 2017
Delphin Sula	Nutrition Programme Manager	ACF	1 Feb 2017
Junior Joseph	Fresh Food Programme Manager	ACF	1 Feb 2017
Sylvie Dupuis	Principal Technical Adviser	ILO	1 Feb 2017
Nathalie Lamaute-Brisson	Social Protection Consultant	Independent	2 Feb 2017