



The role of evidence in policymaking in Uganda

A political
economy
analysis

April 2021



About SEDI

Strengthening Evidence for Development Impact (SEDI) is a five-year programme (2019–2024) that is working on increasing the use of evidence by policymakers in Uganda, Ghana, and Pakistan. In partnership with country governments, this programme aims to develop capacity and promote innovation in increasing evidence-informed decision making. SEDI is funded by UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO).

The SEDI consortium is led by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) and comprises national, international, and regional partners. The national lead organisations – the African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET) in Ghana, the Economic Policy Research Centre in Uganda and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Pakistan – provide programme leadership and coordination in each country. These national organisations are authoritative voices in policy processes and will ensure effective engagement and a sustainable legacy for SEDI.

The international partners – the International Network for Advancing Science and Policy (INASP), the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and OPM – as well as the regional partners – the African Institute for Development Policy (AFIDEP) and the Africa Centre for Evidence (ACE) – contribute their knowledge and years of experience in working with governments across the world to promote evidence-informed development. They provide technical thought partnership, facilitate cross-country learning, and collaborate on programme delivery.

The content of this paper is the sole responsibility of the authors and does not represent the opinions of SEDI or the FCDO. Any errors and omissions are also the sole responsibility of the authors. Please direct any comments or queries to sedi@opml.co.uk.

Suggested citation: Ahaibwe, G., Golooba-Mutebi, F., Barungi, M., Birabwa, E., Kakuru, M., Ramadhan, H., Muhangi, L., Hitchen, J., Fischer-Mackey, J., Akumu, M., Bartoldus, R., Bennett, S., Ssali, S., and Leach, B. (2021) *The role of evidence in policymaking in Uganda: a political economy analysis*, SEDI: Oxford.

Cover design: Litmus Ink.

Image credits: “Child seeing health care provider” by [AIDS Vaccine](#) is licensed under [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#), “Women create terrace” by [World Bank Photo Collection](#) is licensed under [CC BY-NC-ND 2.0](#), “Intertwined” by [Alex Radelich](#) on [Unsplash](#), and “Coffee beans in woman hands in Uganda, Africa” by [MehmetO](#) is licensed under ‘Standard License’ by Shutterstock.

Copyright: © 2021. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

This report has been compiled by the EPRC and authored by the following people:

Macro-level policymaking:

Gemma Ahaibwe (EPRC)

Fred Golooba-Mutebi

Mildred Barungi (EPRC)

Elizabeth Birabwa (EPRC)

Medard Kakuru (EPRC)

Family planning:

Hizaamu Ramadhan

Lawrence Muhangi (Reproductive Health Uganda)

Jamie Hitchen

Humanitarian:

Julia Fischer-Mackey

Marrienne Akumu

Rick Bartoldus (International Rescue Committee (IRC))

Sheree Bennett (IRC)

Gender:

Sarah Ssali (Makerere University)

Beryl Leach (3ie)

Overarching advice has been provided by Fred Golooba-Mutebi, Jamie Hitchen, Carmen Leon-Himmelstine, Alina Rocha Menocal, and Louise Shaxson (ODI), Emily Hayter and Clara Richards (INASP), and Radhika Menon (Oxford Policy Management).

In-country research



Supported by



The role of evidence in policymaking in Uganda: a political economy analysis

Sectoral focus on the humanitarian, family planning, and gender sectors

April 2021

Executive summary

Project introduction and objectives

SEDI is a five-year programme funded by the FCDO. It is designed to strengthen the use of evidence in policymaking in selected sectors in Ghana, Pakistan, and Uganda to contribute to more effective and efficient decision making.

This diagnostic report analyses the political economy of policymaking and the evidence ecosystem in three pre-defined sectors in Uganda: humanitarian, gender, and family planning (FP). Its aim is to identify key opportunities and constraints that each sector presents for the use of evidence and policymaking, and the potential for SEDI to deliver politically smart interventions, which would increase the use of evidence by policymakers over the next four and a half years. Following the submission of the final report, a decision will be taken by FCDO and the supplier on preferred sectors. Here we draw out relevant findings and insights that can inform this decision.

The primary question that was answered in this analysis phase was ‘what role does evidence play (or not play) in shaping/influencing decision making and policymaking at macro and sector level?’ Below we present key highlights from the analysis.

Macro-level policymaking in Uganda

Opportunities

- There is buy-in, and interest in, evidence use in key macro entities such as the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), the National Planning Authority (NPA), and Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBoS), which helps build a favourable environment for SEDI. Actors like OPM, NPA, and UBoS have put in place institutional structures and mechanisms for facilitating evidence use. The various working groups would be important entities for SEDI to engage with in the inception and implementation phases.
- Although SEDI has missed the opportunity to feed into the National Development Plan (NDP) process, the programme could still engage with NPA for strengthening the evidence-informed planning process at multiple levels. SEDI’s engagement could promote strengthened links between research institutions, donors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the Government of Uganda (GoU) – the analysis highlights that stronger networks could promote collaborations for evidence use.
- Overall, there is sufficient level of buy-in for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) evidence. SEDI can engage with OPM, Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA), and M&E units to develop, refine, improve, and implement an improved and expanded approach to strengthen M&E evidence use.
- Through the various platforms that bring donors/development partners (DPs) together, SEDI, with support from FCDO, could push for increased access to donor-commissioned evaluation findings. These platforms include the local DP groups, and the Deliver as One programme of UN agencies.
- As Uganda continues with a decentralised system of governance and some decision making functions may devolve, SEDI could look at interventions that can also promote evidence use for decision making at lower levels.

- This analysis highlights a reliance on nationally representative quantitative data, including statistics and monitoring data. SEDI could push for the use of various kinds of evidence, including qualitative research studies, evaluations, and stakeholder feedback, factoring in gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) considerations. It could also support efforts to make existing data more accessible and user-friendly.

Challenges

- Although OPM's M&E directorate can be a great champion for SEDI, it is understaffed and involved in multiple technical support projects. An assessment will have to be made about the extent to which it can commit time and resources to SEDI. We would also need to map other ongoing capacity-strengthening initiatives with other key actors to avoid duplication and overcrowding.
- The GoU is currently most focused on infrastructure (road and energy) development. The pre-selected sectors, such as gender and FP, may not necessarily receive as much attention due to competing priorities in the government policy agenda.

Humanitarian sector

In line with guidance from FCDO Uganda, the humanitarian section of this report specifically focuses on refugees and epidemics. These two subjects are heavily intertwined, both geographically and structurally, and are at the forefront of the humanitarian response in terms of need and international attention.

The GoU has been lauded globally for its progressive refugee policies – its open-door policy and partnership with international actors to meet refugee needs have helped build this reputation. The roles of OPM and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) are intertwined in the humanitarian sector. OPM's engagement with refugees relies on funds raised by UNHCR, which gives UNHCR the opportunity to suggest certain policies, processes, and priorities that OPM may not be similarly prioritising. There does appear to be high-level recognition of the need for data within OPM, and resources have been provided to ensure that it is collected and analysed.

Opportunities

- The humanitarian sector has several potential entry points for SEDI. There is already established infrastructure for generating evidence within the sector, as well as generalised support for evidence use. The humanitarian sector also provides opportunities to experiment with working with decision making across national and lower levels, noting that implementation gaps (which often occur at the district level) are sometimes more significant than policy gaps (which occur at the national level).
- The existence of coordination mechanisms that are focused on improving evidence use, such as the new Assessment Technical Working Group (TWG), could be a potential entry point for SEDI. The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) Secretariat could also potentially be a good target. However, SEDI's support would have to be complementary and not duplicate existing support.
- The health sector in the humanitarian space is an area that SEDI could operate in, with the Ministry of Health (MoH) and district health offices (DHOs) as potential points of focus. Targeting the interface between the DHOs and the MoH could potentially overcome barriers and combine the benefits of working with both the MoH and DHOs.

- There is an opportunity for SEDI in improving the use of client feedback in decision making, as the two domains are not currently as integrated as they could be.
- Improving access to and use of existing portals, such as the UNHCR Population Registration and Identity Management Ecosystem (PRIMES) and the Health Management Information System (HMIS), is another area that SEDI could look into. There may also be opportunities to improve the use of undervalued types of evidence, such as qualitative and quantitative evidence on GESI. SEDI may, however, encounter some resistance here.

Challenges

- The findings of this report strongly suggest that SEDI's engagement with OPM might run into some challenges. Given that OPM is one of the most influential government actors in the humanitarian response, this would have implications for the scope of SEDI's work.
- The sector is undergoing constant shifts in roles and responsibilities between government, international actors, districts, and offices of the GoU. These shifts have the potential to create confusion and uncertainty for implementation (e.g. if SEDI chooses a target organisation whose role could change during implementation).
- The relationship between international and government actors may be challenging. SEDI is focused on government actors, while international actors in this sector sometimes have influence over decision making.
- SEDI has missed a series of key opportunities to influence the sector, which include the development of the Health Response Plan and the district development plans.
- Lastly, SEDI needs to consider whether or not it can actually add new value to the humanitarian sector, or whether it would be crowded out by existing investment given that this sector is already heavily supported by international actors in implementation, planning, policymaking, and evidence generation and use.

Family Planning

Uganda's population growth rate of 3% per annum is one of the highest in the world. Some of the critical gendered drivers of this rapid growth and high fertility rate in Uganda are the high number of teenage pregnancies, early marriages, higher high school drop-out rates for girls, and unwanted pregnancies resulting from low contraceptive use.

FP has remained on the government agenda and the upcoming NDP III has identified access to FP as a critical intervention for improving human capital. However, FP – like other issues – has to compete with the many other critical priorities on the government agenda. The opposition of some cultural and religious leaders to FP is a key deterrent. Negative attitudes to modern contraception among men and women, as well as supply-side challenges, have also affected the uptake of FP. While NGOs play a key role in FP advocacy, this has mainly been at the community level.

Opportunities

- The level of buy-in for, and interest in, using evidence is quite high among key players like the MoH and the National Population Council (NPC).
- Institutional structures such as the Health Policy Advisory Committee and other TWGs can help in facilitating engagement and garnering support from a diverse set of influential stakeholders.

- The governance and management structures of the MoH routinely use monitoring data, research, and evaluations to inform policy processes and programmatic reporting. This requirement is embedded in the planning processes at all levels. There are champions within the MoH, departments, and agencies who have the technical expertise and who can recognise the importance of evidence. M&E units in the MoH are also potential entry points for engagement.
- SEDI could support efforts to improve access to existing data, its quality and user-friendliness, or promote the use of different types of evidence, factoring in considerations of GESI.
- The MoH would benefit from having a more straightforward research agenda and it could be supported to diversify the relationships it has with research institutions, in order to source from a wider pool of evidence. There could be an opportunity here to work with the MoH to develop a more rigorous process for setting the research agenda and selecting research partners.
- Explicitly linking FP with population dynamics would also make it more politically aligned as the focus would be on demographic dividends; this is a priority area for the GoU.
- In terms of interdependences, the epidemic component of the humanitarian sector and FP both fall within the mandate of the MoH. If SEDI chooses to work in both sectors, SEDI interventions could be complementary and work across different departments of the same ministry.

Challenges

- While the rules of the game in the policymaking processes are influenced and shaped by the formal legal and policy frameworks, informal institutions play a critical role in FP. Some cultural and religious gendered norms and beliefs may be at odds with the use of evidence in policymaking related to aspects of FP.
- Donors are the major funders in this sector. These funders, in turn, support NGOs to carry out advocacy at the community level. It is unclear how SEDI will be able to engage with a patchwork of donors and NGOs working in different regions and on different aspects of FP.
- The MoH is under-resourced in terms of domestic funding. It is unclear whether it will be able to commit time and resources to SEDI.

Gender

The creation of the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD) in 1998, and support from OPM, have been instrumental in the push for gender mainstreaming within government. These efforts have been bolstered by the introduction of gender and equity budgeting certificate requirements.

Uganda has as many as 20 policies and strategies that directly or indirectly promote gender equality. However, they focus mainly on poverty reduction and sustainable development in simple terms, of equalising participation of males and females, and do not pay sufficient heed to the gendered drivers of the inequities they are seeking to rebalance.

It is not unusual for cultural and religious leaders, who are key stakeholders through the Culture and Family Affairs Department, to make it very difficult for progressive policies for gender equality fronted by the Gender and Women's Affairs Department to be enacted.

These conservative stakeholders can frustrate legislation, policy, and programming on gender-based violence (GBV) and challenge the implementation of the Sexuality Education Framework.

While Uganda has enacted several laws aimed at ensuring gender equality, the majority of the existing gender laws focus on criminality and legislating against violence. Quotas have helped increase women's participation in politics, but inequality and social inclusion remain critical issues.

International actors influence what data government agencies collect and use, and participation in international policy frameworks has improved monitoring and reporting on development progress. However, the perception of credible data being defined as nationally representative quantitative data hinders government agencies from seeking data or qualitative research on issues affecting minorities and marginalised populations.

Opportunities

- While MoGLSD is the line ministry that leads on gender equality policymaking, all the ministries have mandates to mainstream gender and are supposed to comply with gender-responsive budgeting requirements.
- Given the cross-cutting nature of gender, SEDI could approach it using three possible configurations:
 - SEDI working within MoGLSD, but primarily with the Directorate of Gender and Community Development and its departments.
 - Working within MoGLSD, but extending collaboration to either or both, labour or social development, avoiding large national programmes, such as youth livelihoods or women's economic empowerment, which are at high-risk of being influenced by politics and may worsen as elections approach.
 - Working with the MoGLSD and other MDAs in collaboration with one or more MDAs.
- In all scenarios, it will be important to explore how SEDI can help expand and deepen evidence use, such as by moving use from mainly descriptive sex-disaggregated statistics to more gender analysis and increased use of research evidence that addresses the social and structural drivers of GESI.
- SEDI can help MDAs expand and deepen their thinking on what type of evidence is appropriate for national policymaking, which would include drawing on subnational evidence to improve adaptive programming for addressing the specific issues of minorities and marginalised populations.
- In terms of key actors, it would be important to engage with MoGLSD, the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), and UBoS, and consider working where there are intersections between them. This would help in capitalising on existing relationships and pathways (e.g. gender and equity budgeting).

Challenges

- Most MDAs usually interpret 'gender' to mean biological sex, and policies and programmes focus on sex-based targeting of women and girls to achieve equitable access to services, or to provide protections or access to resources through policies that

do not look at the gendered social norms or structural inequalities that cause or contribute to harm or limit access.

- There is a need for SEDI to design interventions that account for possible resistance from key stakeholders who may wish to block policies and programmes they do not want to be prioritised.

Cross-cutting considerations for SEDI

- By and large, there are established structures for generating evidence within the sectors, as well as generalised support for evidence use. Nonetheless, in all sectors, gaps in evidence generation and use still exist.
- In addition to internal routine monitoring administrative data generated by MDAs, official data from UBoS, UN agencies, the World Bank, and other donors is seen as credible, impartial, and useful in informing national planning and policies across the three sectors.
- GESI considerations are not adequately factored into the generation and use of evidence across the three sectors. At best, data is disaggregated by sex and age.
- Donors continue to have a moderate to high influence on policymaking in all three sectors, with relatively higher influence in the FP and humanitarian (particularly refugee response) areas. They provide substantial financial and technical support, which gives them the opportunity to guide policymaking. They also offer international data that many MDAs rely on to guide national planning.
- The sector working groups (SWGs) and TWGs in the three sectors provide institutional platforms for promoting opportunities for evidence-informed decision making. These could be a potential entry point for SEDI.
- For the FP and gender sectors, informal institutions underpinned by norms and social and cultural traditions play a critical role. It is important to note that any policy that is likely to change existing structures of informal leadership, or the normative drivers of inequality and exclusion, is likely to be resisted.

Disclaimer

This is the redacted version of a more detailed political economy analysis report. In this public version, sensitive information related to key stakeholders and internal references to SEDI's engagement strategy with national institutions has been removed.

Contents

Executive summary	3
List of tables, figures, and boxes	11
Acronyms and abbreviations	12
1. Introduction	14
1.1 Analysis phase	15
2. Methodology	17
2.1 Methodological framework	17
2.2 Methodological principles: design thinking	18
2.3 Research questions	18
2.4 Research activities	19
2.5 Limitations to the study	20
3. Macro-level policymaking	22
3.1 Foundational factors and implications for policymaking in Uganda	22
3.1.1 Political context	22
3.1.2 The economic context	23
3.2 The role of evidence in policymaking	24
3.3 Evidence ecosystem	28
3.3.1 Stakeholder mapping and power analysis	34
3.3.2 Social network analysis of key stakeholders	36
3.4 Organisational diagnostic	37
3.5 Conclusion	37
3.5.1 Opportunities	37
3.5.2 Challenges	38
4. Humanitarian sector	39
4.1 Introduction	39
4.2 PEA	40
4.3 Evidence ecosystem	43
4.3.1 Stakeholder mapping and power analysis	46
4.3.2 Social network analysis of key actors	47
4.4 Organisational diagnostic of economic development for SEDI	48
4.5 Conclusion: opportunities for and constraints to SEDI in the humanitarian sector	48
4.5.1 Opportunities	48
4.5.2 Challenges	48

5.	Family planning sector	49
5.1	Introduction	49
5.2	PEA of the sector	50
5.3	Evidence ecosystem	53
5.3.1	Stakeholder mapping and power analysis	55
5.3.2	Social network analysis	56
5.4	Organisational diagnostic	58
5.5	Conclusion	58
5.5.1	Opportunities	58
5.5.2	Challenges	58
6.	Gender sector	59
6.1	Introduction	59
6.2	PEA	60
6.3	Evidence ecosystem	61
6.3.1	Social network analysis	66
6.4	Organisational diagnostic	67
6.5	Conclusion	67
6.5.1	Potential for situating gender as a cross-cutting policy priority	67
6.5.2	Working within the MoGLSD Directorate of Gender and Community Development	68
6.5.3	Working within and across MoGLSD	68
6.5.4	Working across MDAs in various potential configurations	69
7.	Conclusion	71
7.1	Points of convergence and divergence across sectors	71
7.2	Potential synergies across the humanitarian, FP, and gender sectors	71
8.	Annex A: An example of evidence-based policymaking	72
9.	Bibliography	75

List of tables, figures, and boxes

Table 1:	Summary of KIs per sector.....	20
Table 2:	Summary of key stakeholders and their power and interest in evidence use.....	35
Figure 1:	SEDI's methodological approach	17
Figure 2:	Research questions	19
Figure 3:	Power and influence mapping in the humanitarian sector	46
Figure 4:	Government actors	47
Figure 5:	Governance and management structures of the MoH	54
Figure 6:	Stakeholder map of power, influence, and interest in evidence use in FP	55
Figure 7:	Social network analysis.....	56
Figure 8:	Mapping of stakeholders of the Gender and Community Development Directorate	62
Box 1:	Defining 'evidence' for SEDI	15
Box 2:	Sectors identified by FCDO as possible entry points in each of the SEDI countries	16
Box 3:	The role of evidence in the development of NDP III	24
Box 4:	GESI in SEDI	27
Box 5:	Generation of gender-related data	31
Box 6:	How gender policies are developed	62

Acronyms and abbreviations

BCURE	Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence
BoU	Bank of Uganda
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEDOVIP	Centre for Domestic Violence Prevention
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DHIS2	District Health Information System 2
DHO	District Health Office
DP	Development Partner
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRDIP	Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project
EOC	Equal Opportunities Commission
EPRC	Economic Policy Research Centre
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith-Based Organisation
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FP	Family Planning
GESI	Gender Equality and Social Inclusion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GoU	Government of Uganda
HMIS	Health Management Information System
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
MDAs	Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MISR	Makerere Institute of Social Research
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoGLSD	Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoST	Ministry of Science and Technology

MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MUSPH	Makerere University School of Public Health
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA	National Planning Authority
NPC	National Population Council
NPGEI	National Gender Priority Indicator
NSS	National Statistical System
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PMA	Performance Management Accountability
PRIMES	Population Registration and Identity Management Ecosystem
PSFU	Private Sector Foundation Uganda
R&D	Research and Development
RIA	Regulatory Impact Assessment
RWC	Refugee Welfare Committee
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEDI	Strengthening Evidence for Development Impact
SRS	Self-Reliance Strategy
STA	Settlement Transformative Agenda
SWG	Sector Working Group
TWG	Technical Working Group
UNAS	Uganda National Academy of Sciences
UBoS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UDHS	Uganda Demographic and Household Survey
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UWONET	Uganda Women's Network
UWOPA	Uganda Women Parliamentary Forum
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

1. Introduction

SEDI is a five-year programme funded by FCDO. It is designed to strengthen the use of evidence in policymaking in selected sectors in Ghana, Pakistan, and Uganda to contribute to more effective and efficient decision making.

As set out in the Terms of Reference for SEDI, the overall impact the programme is seeking to achieve is more efficient and effective programming and policy by government institutions in the three partner countries. The SEDI consortium will seek to do this through two overall objectives that FCDO has defined:

1. Increase the use of robust evidence directly informing policy and programme decisions (referred to as the ‘instrumental use of evidence’) by targeted policymakers in Ghana, Uganda, and Pakistan, both during policy and programme design, and implementation.
2. Increase the use of evidence in processes, systems, and working culture (referred to as the ‘embedded use of evidence’) in government decision-making structures in Ghana, Pakistan, and Uganda; both during policy and programme design, and implementation.

SEDI is being implemented in the three countries in three phases. The analytical phase ran from July 2019 to March 2020, an inception phase is running from March 2020 to January 2021, and the implementation phase from February 2021 to July 2024.

The programme builds on the experiences and lessons from the Department for International Development’s (DFID) Building Capacity to Use Research (BCURE) programme (2013–2017),¹ which recognised that the generation of research alone is insufficient to ensure that policy decisions regarding poverty reduction and other development challenges are informed by evidence, and in turn lead to better development outcomes. The BCURE experience highlighted the often limited demand for, and use of, evidence by policymakers in policymaking processes, from policy and programme design to implementation, and identified a number of key constraints that need to be addressed to improve the use of evidence in policymaking, including the following:

- Political economy factors that constrain the use of evidence;
- High-quality evidence may not exist, be hard to access, may not be available when needed, or may not exist in formats conducive to decision making;
- Limited individual and organisational capacity to use evidence, with few incentives or mechanisms to improve this;
- Timelines and windows of opportunity to use evidence are under-utilised, both by policymakers and by evidence providers; and
- Insufficient and unsystematic coordination between those demanding and those supplying evidence.

SEDI offers an opportunity to examine in detail these constraints and their underpinning assumptions, and to design, pilot, and test possible approaches to addressing them, based on the existing strengths within each of the SEDI partner organisations.

¹ For more information, see Vogel and Punton (2018).

Box 1: Defining ‘evidence’ for SEDI

This report bases its analysis of evidence use on work completed under BCURE, which proposed four broad and overlapping categories of evidence used in policymaking and programming to ensure that ‘evidence for policymaking and programming’ is not solely defined as academic research:

- Statistical and administrative data;
- Analytical evidence from research;
- Evidence from citizens, stakeholders, and role players; and
- Evidence from M&E.

Building on BCURE, over its five-year span SEDI will ground its approaches in lessons about what factors contribute to more effective evidence use (Vogel and Punton, 2018):

- **The importance of thinking and working in more politically aware ways:** using political economy analysis (PEA) to help consider how internal political economy dynamics within specific sectors and organisations shape the potential for catalysing change.
- **Accompanying internal processes of change rather than imposing change from the outside:** building on PEA, using a design thinking approach that considers how to capitalise on existing change processes and internal dynamics.
- **Changing behaviours around the use of evidence requires more than simply building skills through training:** it requires identifying the full suite of changes that could be harnessed at individual, team, organisational, and ecosystem level, and using PEA and a design thinking approach to identify where to begin and why.
- **Catalysing a critical mass of evidence users requires specific and targeted strategies:** drawing on the results of the PEA and organisational assessments of authority, acceptance, and ability to identify a range of individuals, organisations, structures, and systems that the SEDI project can work with in targeted, holistic, iterative, and adaptive ways.
- **Supporting practical tools or targeted pilots to showcase the value of evidence:** identifying practical and useful ‘quick wins’ to demonstrate the efficacy of SEDI and building out from those pilot initiatives.
- **Promoting genuine adoption of reforms for sustainable change:** designing changes in such a way that they become embedded within the operating systems of SEDI’s collaborating organisations.

In addition, SEDI will focus on ensuring that policy decisions in the selected sectors are informed by GESI-sensitive evidence. This recognises that sustainable development outcomes require empowering people who have been marginalised, including women and girls, and reducing the exclusion of minority populations based on disability, age, ethnicity, or religion.

1.1 Analysis phase

Lessons from BCURE and other interventions suggest that, for programmes like SEDI to be effective, certain minimum capacities, institutions, and incentives need to be in place. SEDI has undertaken analysis in Ghana, Pakistan, and Uganda to identify appropriate sectors, organisations, policy processes, and stakeholders that meet these requirements in order to select sectoral entry points that offer the greatest opportunity for SEDI in each country. The ToR for SEDI identified three priority sectors as possible entry points for SEDI in each country, selected by FCDO, as being aligned with, and part of, FCDO’s country strategy (see

Box 2). SEDI's analytical phase has sought to identify key opportunities and constraints that each sector presents for the use of evidence and policymaking for engaging in SEDI as it evolves over the next four and a half years. This detailed analysis will be used to inform FCDO's decision on which sector(s) in each country offers the greatest potential as an entry point for SEDI.

Box 2: Sectors identified by FCDO as possible entry points in each of the SEDI countries

The ToR identified three priority sectors as possible entry points for SEDI in each country, selected by FCDO, as being aligned with, and part of, FCDO's country strategy.

Ghana: Economic Development, PFM/taxation, Health

Pakistan: Planning & Reform for Economic Development, Education Pathways into Employment, Child Labour

Uganda: Humanitarian, FP, Gender

There was a need for the sectors to be more closely defined in discussions with FCDO to keep the frame of the analysis manageable.

SEDI's analytical phase has been led by ODI with research and analysis undertaken by country leads and sectoral partners. This phase has sought to address two core questions that are at the heart of understanding how to improve the use of evidence. For each policy issue:

- How does the policymaking process work and why, and what role does evidence play in that?
- Whose evidence is seen as more/less credible and legitimate, and therefore whose voices count in decision-making processes around policy and programming and why?

BCURE showed that considering the internal political economy dynamics (including power relationships) within policymaking and programming helps us to understand what shapes the potential for catalysing change within sectors, and within organisations in those sectors.

SEDI's methodological approach in this analytical phase is particularly innovative because it has developed a framework, anchored in an overall political economy approach, which explicitly brings together, for the first time, three core themes of work at the heart of the project – sector analysis, an understanding of evidence use, and organisational diagnostics.

This report brings together emerging findings and insights from the analytical phase in Uganda. It is intended to provide an evidence-based foundation for discussion among FCDO and other key SEDI stakeholders about how to shape SEDI for the remainder of the programme. It is structured as follows.

- **Section 2** outlines the methodology developed for this analytical phase.
- **Section 3** describes the key features of the political economy of policymaking in Uganda, and the macro-level political economy issues that influence the demand for and use of evidence at national level.
- **Sections 4, 5, and 6** describe the evidence ecosystem for each sector, provide an analysis of the political economy of the demand and use of evidence for the priority policy issues in each sector, and offer an initial assessment of the authority, acceptance, and ability of key organisations in each sector to participate in SEDI activities.
- **Section 7** presents suggestions for entry points for SEDI during the inception phase.

2. Methodology

2.1 Methodological framework


The overarching question that SEDI seeks to address in this analytical phase is:

What role does evidence play in shaping/influencing decision making and policymaking in the sector and why?

To address this question, the SEDI consortium has developed, with ODI as lead, a methodological framework that is grounded in an overall **political economy approach** with three overlapping lenses. As noted in the introduction, and captured in Figure 1 below, this approach is particularly innovative because, for the first time, it explicitly brings together three core themes of work that are at the heart of the project:

- A **sectoral lens** to understand the political economy of each sector in greater depth. This helps us to understand how policymaking processes work in a given sector and why, through an exploration of how the sector is embedded within a wider system of policy and decision making. The key structural factors are analysed along with the rules of the game and critical sectoral stakeholders to identify how relationships and power dynamics influence policymaking in the sector. This includes an analysis of the role of evidence, any key policy narratives that have emerged and why, and how these suggest priority topics for further investigation.
- An **evidence system** lens to understand relationships between the full range of evidence providers and users, and any intermediary organisations that might broker interactions around the supply and use of evidence (sometimes called the evidence ecosystem). This includes analysis of how and why the macro-level incentives – such as around how research funding is allocated – influence the demand and supply of evidence.
- A **lens focused on organisations**, in particular on public agencies and other relevant organisations with a remit to use evidence. This analyses their relative interest and (signs of) commitment to strengthen or develop their evidence systems, and explores the degree of authority, acceptance, and ability they must use to do so.

Figure 1: SEDI's methodological approach



Source: SEDI methodology slides, 22 August 2019

2.2 Methodological principles: design thinking

Another important innovative aspect of the SEDI project, and this analytical phase, is that it is anchored in **design thinking** as a guiding principle. Design thinking is an approach to project design and implementation that recognises that many situations are ambiguous, and the possibilities for change are complex and fluid. It emphasises:

- **Intent:** a continuous reflection on whether, how, and why the intent of an intervention designed in SEDI could change, during both design and implementation, in response to internal and external factors. Changing intent during an intervention is not seen as a challenge but rather as an opportunity to clarify and reframe what might be possible.
- **Exploration and empathy:** surfacing insights about stakeholders' experiences and empathising with them as people with individual abilities, desires, and social networks.
- **Innovation, testing, iteration, refining, and reformulating:** working with policymakers to envision options for change and desired futures; re-envisioning them during the change process to ensure that new ideas and insights are incorporated throughout.

Design thinking helps navigate the sorts of complex, ambiguous situations that SEDI teams are likely to encounter while working with government departments. It helps teams focus on latent patterns of human behaviour in organisations and on learning by doing, iteratively refining their work based on policymakers' feedback.

As such, SEDI is as much about building capacity and learning across all team members to ensure effective engagement and a sustainable legacy for the programme as it is about strengthening evidence use in government departments. A design thinking approach requires co-design and co-learning between all partners, which demands a considerable investment in building relationships and capacities across the team – and once again, entails a process of uncertainty, experimentation, and learning by doing.

2.3 Research questions

To address SEDI's overarching question on the basis of the framework outlined above, the SEDI team developed a series of sub-questions at four levels, anchored in a political economy approach, and focusing on issues related to gender and social inclusion cutting across all four (see Figure 2 below).

Q1. PEA of the sector: How does policymaking in the sector work and why? What kinds of factors are relatively more or less significant in shaping policymaking in that sector and why? Where does evidence fit into policymaking: is it a minor or a major factor?


Q2. Analysis of the evidence ecosystem: What does the ecosystem of evidence actors look like in the sector: how do all these evidence actors relate to each other, both formally and informally? Where are those relationships strong and where are they weak? What does this imply for how different pieces of evidence are regarded in terms of their quality, credibility, and legitimacy? What does it imply for whose voices are strong in the policymaking process and whose are weak?

Q3. Analysis of the organisational factors shaping evidence use: How does the evidence system work within each policymaking organisation? What organisational factors shape the types of evidence that are prioritised and put forward for decision making? What does this suggest in terms of the authority, acceptability, and accountability within each organisation in relation to the use of evidence?

Q4. Macro-level PEA: What ‘rules of the game’ shape the flow of evidence: how do they influence what evidence is used to inform policymaking? Which actors shape the rules of the game, and what are their interests? What effect does this have on whose voices are heard, especially in relation to issues of gender, inclusion, and equity?

The questions are nested together as in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Research questions



Source: adapted from the SEDI methodology guidance note

The country team in Uganda has adapted these questions to design data collection instruments specific to the circumstances of each of the three sectors. Where appropriate, and following discussions with the FCDO country office, the research team narrowed down the scope of each sector to identify possible policy entry points.

2.4 Research activities

As mentioned earlier, the SEDI analytical phase was intended to run from July 2019 to March 2020. However, for a variety of reasons, often beyond the control of the in-country team, this analytical period did not start in full until mid-October 2019. The design of the methodology for Uganda, including an in-country workshop, took place in late September and early October 2019. The data collection took place over five weeks between mid-October and mid-November 2019. The data analysis was conducted in November and an analysis workshop to support the co-production of the country report was held in Kampala on 14–15 November 2019.

The data collection has included a review of government documents, research papers, and project and programme reports to establish what is already known in each sector in Uganda. With support from the staff of Makerere University College of Health Sciences, each of the sector teams conducted a rapid literature review scan of the political economy analyses of policy process and evidence use in the country for each sector that captured sources from academic databases, institution and organisational libraries, and policy documents.

A set of cross-cutting, macro-analysis key words, such as **political economy, policy, decision making, evidence, and actors**, were developed for each sector, along with sector-specific key words. Search results were then screened using a standardised selection criterion to capture relevant documents; these were then read and analysed by the sector partners, keeping in mind the four streams of questions shaping the report. To date, the humanitarian sector team has reviewed 120 relevant documents, the gender team 52, and

the FP team 19.² The rapid reviews used the methods developed by the ACRES review team. To ensure they were rapid, document searching was both opportunistic, drawing from team members' literature base, as well as a limited academic database search, covering immediately available published and unpublished English-language literature that could be found in a limited timeframe.

Primary data were collected by each sector team through key informant interviews (KIIs) with directors and technical experts from key government and public sector institutions, the private sector, academia, civil society organisations (CSOs), think tanks, and DPs. The in-depth interviews were conducted via face-to-face meetings and the information from the interviews was triangulated with that from other sources, including the literature review. The numbers of KIIs are listed in Table 1 below. The analysis of data included team discussions, validation through triangulation, a validation workshop in Kampala, and knowledge sharing.

Table 1: Summary of KIIs per sector

Sector	Female	Male	Total
Macro-level policymaking	2	16	18
Humanitarian	3	12	15
FP	5	6	11
Gender	7	2	9
Overall total			53

Both the literature reviews and interviews were conducted iteratively, with a review of the literature happening at the same time as interview guides were being produced. Initial interview sessions were held even as the literature review process was underway. However, preliminary findings from the literature reviews informed revisions about areas of concentration and the scope of subsequent interviews, and helped in the adapting of semi-structured interview guides. The analysis process involved triangulating the information from the key informants with the contextual situations from the literature.

This report is a synthesis of separate sector reports produced by the three sector teams and a macro-analysis report produced by EPRC. This synthesis report is not intended to provide a comprehensive account of all the policies in the three sectors. It is a report that represents the teams' best efforts in the time available.

2.5 Limitations to the study

The original intention was to conduct the analysis over a 16-week period; however, due to constraints beyond the control of the SEDI Uganda team the data collection and analysis and production of the first draft of the country report were compressed into a five-week period (from early November to mid-December 2019). This limited the team's ability to use the findings from the literature review to shape KIIs. As noted above, and to mitigate this short timeframe, the literature review and interviews were conducted iteratively instead of sequentially.

The ACRES team at Makerere University provided support to the rapid literature review process, although their standard protocol was found to be quite intensive for the SEDI timeframe, and there was insufficient time to fully adapt it to the sector teams' needs. The

² These numbers reflect the total numbers of relevant documents found in the ACRES screening process; for example, there is simply more academic literature on the humanitarian sector in Uganda than there is in the other two sectors. The final report will detail the full screening process for each sector.

search process was rapid rather than systematic and was confined to academic databases that we had access to. We were, however, able to draw on literature or reports that the SEDI consortium team members had access to.

The Uganda report was revised and strengthened in response to gaps identified by the authors, as well as comments from FCDO and external reviewers, which were received in writing and in person during the analysis workshop (22–23 January 2020). Due to the tight timelines, there was a limit to how much additional research and interviews could be undertaken.

During the initial country workshops, the analysis teams discussed ways to build an explicit focus on GESI into the research and analysis. We continue to develop our understanding of this SEDI focus area. While the macro and sector sections attempt to examine GESI, we have not been able to carry out in-depth analysis in this area, except in the gender sector section (Section 6). Due to the limited time available, we were not able to conduct analysis on whether and how evidence has been used to address the structural drivers of inequality and improve outcomes for marginalised populations. We expect to take this up further in SEDI's inception phase, and for it to be an ongoing priority for SEDI throughout implementation. In the meantime, we have used the literature review as a first step toward developing an electronic means to appraise evidence using a gender and equity coding protocol.

3. Macro-level policymaking

Key findings and implications for SEDI

- There is buy-in and interest in evidence use in key macro-level institutions such as OPM, NPA, and UBoS, which helps build a favourable environment for SEDI.
- There are also institutional structures and mechanisms for facilitating evidence use. The various working groups would be important entities for SEDI to engage with in the inception and implementation phases.
- There is heavy reliance on nationally representative quantitative data, including statistics and monitoring data. SEDI should encourage the use of more diverse kinds of evidence, including qualitative research studies, evaluations, and stakeholder feedback, factoring in GESI considerations.
- As Uganda becomes more decentralised and more decision-making functions are devolved, SEDI could look at interventions that can also promote evidence use for decision making at the local and district levels.
- One of the interventions aimed at strengthening research and development (R&D) capacities within the NDP III period (2020–2025) is developing and popularising a research agenda. In this context, there are opportunities for SEDI to engage with government entities (e.g. the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST)) that engage in framing an overall research agenda.

This section looks at how national-level policymaking processes work and why, and the role that evidence plays, among other factors, in influencing policymaking in Uganda. Section 3.1 looks at the historical and foundational factors shaping policymaking, while section 3.2 looks at the role of evidence in policymaking. Section 2.3 presents the four overarching research questions answered in this report.

3.1 Foundational factors and implications for policymaking in Uganda

3.1.1 Political context

Uganda's political history and current political dispensation have a great bearing on the country's policy structures and institutions, and how evidence is used in policymaking. As an independent country, Uganda has had a tumultuous history. It embarked on independence as a multiparty democracy (1962–1967), but later evolved into a one-party state (1967–1972), then a military dictatorship (1972–1979), and then a multiparty democracy again (1980–1986), before it became a no-party state (1986–2005) and eventually a multiparty state again (2005–present) (Gooloba-Mutebi, 2008). This evolution happened amidst various forms and degrees of political violence and instability, in which the military played key roles (Makara *et al.*, 2009). Also, this history has had a profound influence on state–society relations, with the state and political elites dominating society with issues of high levels of rent-seeking and poor governance (Tripp, 2010; Rubongoya, 2007).

As SEDI works toward achieving its objectives, it will have to navigate any politics that affect the use of evidence. Engagement efforts will have to be made to build credibility and trust, as well as to deal with any scepticism.

3.1.2 The economic context

There has been a reversal in the earlier gains made in poverty reduction. Although Uganda enjoyed relatively high growth rates in the 1990s and early 2000s, the average growth rates have been on a declining trend – average growth between 1990 and 2011 reached nearly 7% before slowing down to about 4% since then (World Development Indicators, 2019). The relatively high growth levels experienced in Uganda up to 2011 have helped reduce poverty levels, in terms of the percentage of the total population. However, although the share of poor persons has reduced from 56% in 1992/93 to 21.4% in 2016/17, in absolute terms, the number of persons living in poverty increased – from 6 million in 1992/93 to 8 million in 2016/17.³

The proportion of vulnerable Ugandans – i.e. those who are not poor but are at risk of falling into poverty – has been rising: from 33.4% in 1992/93 to 43.1% in 2012/13 (Development Initiatives, 2017). This growing number of vulnerable Ugandans suggests that very few people are sustainably transitioning out of poverty.

Poverty reduction has also not been even across geographical and social groups. In terms of regional inequality, the generally pro-poor forms of growth experienced during most of the 1990s had become less inclusive by the late 1990s and early 2000s, with a bias emerging toward the urban and western areas of the country, particularly vis-à-vis the north and east. While poverty has systematically declined, inequality has widened. At national level, income inequity, as measured by the Gini coefficient, stood at 0.36 in 1992 and grew to 0.42 in 2016/17. In addition, Uganda faces multifaceted challenges, including youth unemployment, a large informal sector, low agricultural productivity, weather variability, and high population growth. Furthermore, the agricultural sector (from which many Ugandans derive their livelihood) is faced with high income volatility and uncertainty (EPRC, 2010).

Since the 2000s, Uganda's dependence on aid (particularly through budget support) has been reducing. Recent statistics indicate that the share of the national budget externally financed (through loans and grants) reduced by more than half from 38.7% in financial year 2007/08 to 17.7% by financial year 2017/18 (MoFPED, 2018). The projections by the MoFPED indicate that donor loans and grants as a share of GDP will decrease from 4.8% in the financial year 2018/19 to 0.7% by the financial year 2022/23 (Kasirye and Lakal, 2019).

The GoU, whose major external development finance source is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), has seen stagnation in the value of bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) from OECD-DAC member countries at about US\$ 1.6 billion during the 2006–2015 period. Uganda's share in total bilateral aid more than halved from 9.8% in 2006 to 4.3% by 2015, as the composition and sources of ODA have changed.

The GoU has been a major beneficiary of external development assistance from non-traditional donors, with a significant proportion coming from China, which accounted for over 90% of non-DAC financing between 2000 and 2013 (Munyambonera and Nagawa, 2017). The emergence of new players in external development finance means that the GoU now has more choice over partners (Prizzon *et al.*, 2016). It is worth noting that China is heavily funding the country's infrastructure, which is a sector that has been high on Uganda's development agenda.

³ UBoS Uganda National Household Survey Reports.

However, the sectors under consideration for SEDI (FP, humanitarian, and gender) receive a high amount of funding (mainly as off-budget support) from donors (refer to sector specific sections).

To some extent, the increasing focus on domestic resource mobilisation is linked to the GoU's acknowledgement of traditional donors' disinterest in supporting its current major development priority – infrastructure (mainly energy and roads). Given the relative success that Uganda achieved regarding poverty reduction during the 1990s and early 2000s, in 2010 there was a marked shift from poverty reduction to development. The GoU has favoured investments in productive hard infrastructure development⁴ aimed at successfully harnessing the abundant opportunities around the country and generating economic growth. In a bid to finance the various infrastructure projects as stipulated in the NDP, Uganda's public debt has increased significantly on average from 21% of GDP in 2010 to about 38% in 2016 – the highest rate since debt forgiveness through the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative in 2006 (Lakuma *et al.*, 2018).

3.2 The role of evidence in policymaking

There is a strong focus on the role of evidence in national policy and planning frameworks. However, the implementation of these policies and plans remains weak. Uganda has a range of formal processes for regular planning and budgeting and for developing national policies, laws, and regulations. Two main formal policy processes take place at the national level: long- and medium-term development planning and the development of policies, laws, and regulations. The planning function is largely the responsibility of the NPA. The current development plan (NDP II) was developed in 2015 and runs up to June 2020. The NDPs are five-year plans that feed into Vision 2040 (an overarching plan to transform Uganda into an upper-middle-income country by 2040). While the pre-NDP plans such as the Economic Recovery Plan and Poverty Eradication Action Plan were largely donor driven, the production of the NDP has been internally driven, with relatively less involvement and influence by donors (NPA, 2013). The NDP is implemented through sector strategic plans, local government development plans, sector investment plans, annual work plans, and budgets.

SWGs are key decision-making entities within sectors. They bring together key stakeholders, including donors, government, and CSOs, to discuss not only sectoral policy issues but also development progress and outcomes. This makes the NDP a key benchmark of policies, programmes, and projects. Box 3 below highlights the role of evidence in the development of NDP III.

Box 3: The role of evidence in the development of NDP III⁵

A top-down approach

In consultation with other sectors, the NPA provided the strategic direction of NDP III. This was informed by:

- Situational analysis, evaluation of the previous NDPs, and documenting lessons learnt.
- Analysing what was achieved in NDP II in order for it to be consolidated in the new NDP.
- Analysing the challenges faced during the implementation of NDP II and how they can be mitigated.
- Analysing existing sector reviews.

⁴ As can be seen in the Vision 2040 and NDP I and II.

⁵ Source: KII with NPA staff (October 2019).

- Undertaking diagnostic studies to have a clear understanding of what is happening in the economy and to inform the NDP focus. With funding from the World Bank, the NPA hired consultants to undertake the diagnostic studies and a total of 22 were commissioned.
- After that process, the NPA identified the goals of the NDP and the approach to use. NDP III will use a programmatic approach as opposed to the sectoral approach that was applied in the previous NDPs. The change in the approach was also informed by evidence that suggests multi-sectoral collaboration works better at delivering outcomes.
- NPA identified the objectives, strategies, and 15 programmes to be implemented during the next five years. Strategic interventions are identified for each of these 15 programmes.

A bottom-up approach

This approach mainly involves consultations with key stakeholders:

- The purpose is to get buy-in from various key stakeholders and clearly map out the interventions, outputs, and outcomes for the 15 programmes.
- The first major consultation was at the Kyankwanzi retreat.
- The NPA also presented the high-level strategic plan to politicians and donors.
- The NPA invited CSOs and academia to make presentations and provide their inputs.
- The NPA visited local governments and get their inputs and to validate what was compiled during the top-down approach.
- The NPA made presentations to sectors, Cabinet, and Parliament and is awaiting to the launch of the plan.

The process of developing NDP III demonstrates that there is high-level buy-in and appreciation of evidence for strategic planning. In addition, it shows that the NPA as the lead planning agency of government values evidence from research, evaluation, citizen's data/consultations, and statistics. The previous NDPs went through a similar process, suggesting there is a culture of evidence use in mid-term planning.

The role of research is a cross-cutting issue throughout the new NDP III. The NDP further highlights the GoU's recognition of the role of evidence in policymaking. During the NDP implementation period, GoU hopes to strengthen the research and evaluation function to better inform planning and implementation, strengthen the capacity of the national statistics system to generate data for national development, strengthen the capacity for public policy research to inform planning, implementation as well as M&E, build research and evaluation capacity, and introduce a research and innovation fund (NPA, 2020).

At the sector level, there is recognition of the role of evidence in decision making. However, its use is varied across sectors due to capacity issues, funding constraints, and implementation challenges. A quick review of the situation analysis section of most policy documents reveals that statistics generated by UBoS and administrative data from MDAs are used to inform this component. Also, several reforms have been introduced to enhance the use of evidence in policymaking. The GoU continues to support the setting up of research, planning, or policy analysis units in the various MDAs (GoU, 2013). For instance, the MoFPED and Bank of Uganda (BoU) have well-resourced and functioning research units. However, in some ministries, policy analysis units can be weak, understaffed, and sometimes poorly resourced (GoU, 2013). A lot of the research under these MDAs is commissioned out to international consultants.⁶ Some of this research is funded by DPs, such as the World Bank, FCDO, and UN agencies, among others.

In addition, the introduction of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) as one of the requirements for the policy proposals that are submitted to Cabinet for consideration is an important contributor to policymaking. The RIA increases the information brought to the policymaking process and is an important contributor to rational, evidence-based

⁶ KII (2019).

policymaking (GoU, n.d.). The RIA clearly states the problem, all available options, and the best option. Regarding GESI, the RIA is also expected to highlight how the policy or legislation will have a different impact on women, men, and vulnerable groups, such as poor people, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, etc. If a policy document is not presented together with an RIA, it is rejected and sent back to the initiators of the policy with reasons for rejection.⁷ However, issues arise during the implementation stage; the specific interventions to actualise the policy objectives are not always subjected to the same evidence requirements as the overall policy itself.

Measures have been taken to improve evidence use in certain sectors, such as science, technology, and innovation. One of the key objectives under the National Science, Technology, and Innovation Plan (2012–2018) is to increase utilisation of research findings. The plan highlights increased support to policy-oriented R&D institutions, increased involvement in the dissemination of research results among policymakers, and promotion of demand-driven research. Another plan to replace this is currently in draft form and led by the MoST. The Uganda National Council of Science and Technology has played an important role supporting universities and research centres to develop research capacity, which has led to increased development of science, technology, and innovation capacity (measured by ‘R&D personnel capacity’) (NPA, 2015). The plan is to double the expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP from the current 0.5% to 1% by 2020.

The role of local governments in planning is somewhat limited. In 1997, Uganda took on political, administrative, and fiscal decentralisation, thereby transferring administrative, political, and fiscal authority from the central government to local governments mainly in the form of devolution. The district council, composed of elected officials, is the highest political authority in the district and gives final approval of annual district health plans. The administrative and technical team is headed by a chief administrative officer and is divided into different departments such as health, education, natural resources, etc. According to multiple interview respondents, the national government sets policies and overarching budgets, which the district governments’ representatives are expected to follow.⁸ While district government offices have little power over the size or nature of their own budget, there is some space for interpreting the budget vis-à-vis contextual realities. For example, while a DHO may have a set budget for management of health facilities, they can still make decisions about which specific facilities in their district receive those funds, and how those funds are spent. Planning at the district level is mainly informed by citizens’ evidence/consultations and by internally generated administrative statistics.⁹

There is limited use of different types of evidence in district-level planning and decision making. In a decentralised system, local governments are tasked with the role of planning and service delivery, which should be evidence informed. However, KIIs show that most district-level local governments rely more on citizen evidence and stakeholder consultations to inform planning,¹⁰ save for a few departments that heavily utilise the administrative statistics from the District Health Information System 2 (DHIS2) (see Section 4 for more on district health information management systems). While some small percentage of the budget is allocated for monitoring government projects, the information gathered is hardly used, reducing the monitoring process to only an accountability function. In the context of decentralisation, SEDI will have to consider its engagement strategy with national and district government units to promote evidence use in decision making at different levels.

⁷ KII (2019).

⁸ KII (2019).

⁹ KII (2020).

¹⁰ KII (2020).

Parliament has tried to institutionalise the use of evidence through the setting up of departments to provide evidence. Parliament has various departments that provide evidence and platforms that could be used to influence the policymaking process. Indeed, the Department of Research Services was created specifically to provide evidence to Members of Parliament (MPs). Other major departments that generate evidence are the Department of M&E and the Budget Office.¹¹ Furthermore, the Office of the Leader of the Opposition uses evidence to produce alternatives to government proposals,¹² while another oversight function is provided by accountability committees¹³ (headed by opposition MPs) that, based on evidence from the Office of the Auditor General's reports, have made contributions to holding the GoU to account.

International development actors (principally donors) influence the decision-making process and development focus in the social sectors they are interested in. The dependence on aid to finance development efforts has a bearing on the kind of policies the GoU can formulate, since decisions to extend aid are paradigm driven, whereby aid is extended to advance, or is in support of, specific policies. In many cases, aid is also conditional and tied to support of social sectors. By conditioning aid to particular issues, donors determine or influence policy direction.¹⁴ As discussed above, Uganda has, in the past, depended on aid to a large extent. However, the aid landscape has changed considerably; Uganda is less dependent on aid from traditional donors and is increasingly becoming more reliant on non-concessional loans from emerging lenders such as China. China's priorities and ways of working differ from those of traditional donors: while the traditional donors use the existing institutions to negotiate aid terms, China prefers to deal directly with the State House and through personal relationships with individuals, especially government ministers.¹⁵

Church and trade unions have been influential power actors since the pre-independence period (Okuku, 2002). Cultural and religious groups have stood out on several matters relating to land and specific rights-related legislation, such as the 2009–2015 campaign around the Marriage and Divorce Bill. Similarly, business associations such as Kampala City Traders Association and Uganda Manufacturers Associations remain key actors in negotiating trade and taxation policies, both formally and informally.

GESI and evidence in macro-level policymaking. In addition to discussing gender as a sector in its own right, all sectors analysed in this report have considered GESI as a cross-cutting issue. Box 4 explains how SEDI has conceptualised GESI.

Box 4: GESI in SEDI

SEDI understands sex to mean the biological determination of whether someone is female or male (or intersex), where gender refers to the social and cultural norms, roles and responsibilities, and power relations that are based on one's sex. Robust evidence shows that women and girls across societies are most often in unequal social, economic, and political power positions in relation to men and boys. This disadvantage is based on gendered norms and attitudes reflected both socially and structurally. SEDI's commitment to gender equality is grounded in using a gender-responsive approach in its work. SEDI will work toward evidence use that looks at the differential impacts on women, girls, men, and boys, which can support policy and programming that addresses unequal gendered norms and structures. SEDI will also work toward reducing evidence use in policy and

¹¹ KII (2019).

¹² KII (2019).

¹³ The Public Accounts Committee and the Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities, and State Enterprises.

¹⁴ KII (2019).

¹⁵ KII (2019)

programming that is blind to gender, or that exploits gender inequality to achieve objectives.

Social inclusion in SEDI means that no segment of a population is excluded from receiving the benefits of policy and programming. SEDI uses the eight equity factors included in PROGRESS (O'Neil *et al.*, 2014) as a starting framework and adds gender analytical frameworks to support its GESI commitment. SEDI sees gender equality and social inclusion as linked and intersecting; achieving them requires an intersectional and intersectoral approach where the drivers of inequality and exclusion are explicitly understood and addressed.

There is considerable progress in the formulation of a gender-responsive regulatory framework, including policies and strategies. In addition to various international commitments and ratifications, Uganda has formulated several policies aimed at closing the observed gender gaps. For example, Vision 2040 prioritises gender equality as a cross-cutting enabler for socioeconomic transformation, while the NDP II (2015–2020) makes explicit reference to sector-specific gender issues that relate to women's empowerment and access to sexual and reproductive health information and services. Moreover, the 2007 National Gender Policy ensures gender mainstreaming in addressing development priorities. At the programme level, Uganda is implementing special programmes to address inequality and equity issues. Examples include a youth livelihood programme, an entrepreneurship programme for women, and special programmes for marginalised areas such as the North and Karamoja region.

3.3 Evidence ecosystem

Government measures to institutionalise M&E have spurred the demand for evidence, and over the last few years several steps have been taken to strengthen the institutional environment for M&E. The National Policy for Public Sector M&E was developed in 2013 to provide a framework for assessments of public sector programmes. The OPM is responsible for the implementation of this policy, and has the constitutional mandate to strengthen the M&E system to meet the evidence needs of the public sector.¹⁶

To address the challenge of evaluations being primarily externally driven, OPM established the Government Evaluation Facility in 2013. The facility, with funding from government and donors, commissions and manages evaluations of policies and programmes implemented by ministries, promotes the uptake of findings, and supports evaluation capacity development. The demand for evaluations within the GoU has steadily grown since the setting up of this facility (Rathinam *et al.*, 2018). Donor-funded programmes, such as DFID's Strengthening Evidence Based Decision-Making II (2015–2019), have provided funding to address this demand for evidence. The DFID programme funded process and impact evaluations of flagship government programmes and supported the roll-out of the Prime Minister's Integrated Management Information System in the Ministry of Education, the rapid assessment of public sector organisations, and several evaluation capacity-development activities (3ie, 2020).

OPM has led the effort to create institutional platforms for facilitating discussions on evidence. For example, the National M&E TWG brings together representatives from selected ministries, the NPA, and other government units to discuss M&E reports. The Evaluation Sub-Committee established under this working group includes members from key government institutions, civil society, academia, and donors. It is involved in selecting topics for evaluations and providing feedback on findings.¹⁷ To improve access to evidence, OPM

¹⁶ <https://opm.go.ug/monitoring-and-evaluation/>

¹⁷ <https://opm.go.ug/monitoring-and-evaluation/>; Office of the Prime Minister (2019).

has also worked on building an online database of evaluations and a country evidence gap map, in partnership with the Africa Centre for Systematic Reviews and Knowledge Translation and the Campbell Collaboration (Campbell Collaboration, 2019). The diverse and influential stakeholder membership of these working groups makes them important entities for SEDI to engage with in the inception and implementation phases.

The demand for evidence has been promoted across government units by strengthening of reporting systems at national and local government levels, which has been supported by DPs. The GoU has mandated the production of a number of periodic reports, such as OPM's annual and semi-annual sector performance reports, the annual and semi-annual budget performance reports, and the annual sector and local government performance reports, which have contributed to an increase in demand for evidence (Rathinam *et al.*, 2018). However, as such reports are based on self-evaluation by MDAs, the reports may not always reflect reality.¹⁸

The GoU's M&E priorities and capacities are focused on performance tracking and accountability, as opposed to learning from, or seeing, evaluations as a form of evidence that is well suited to decision making, especially programmes. As discussed elsewhere in this report, interviewees hold a similar view that credible and useful evidence is mainly nationally representative, quantitative statistical data they get from UBoS.

National and local M&E units are often underfunded, have insufficient staffing, or are lacking in technical capacity. This also means that evaluation has not always been consistently aligned to national priorities (Rathinam *et al.*, 2018). A rapid M&E capacity assessment, carried out by 3ie in a selection of ministries, highlighted some persistent issues, including limited staff capacity, budgets, and poor incentives for implementing evaluation recommendations. Donor-driven M&E within the GoU was not integrated with ministry M&E systems. The focus of government units was more on monitoring, rather than evaluation. Finally, the technical language of evaluations, and the impracticality of recommendations, were seen as impediments to their implementation (Rathinam *et al.*, 2018).

There are instances where OPM and champions within selected ministries have played an active role in using evidence for informing decisions related to policy and programmatic changes. For example, the recommendations of a public sector assessment were used to push for a Cabinet stipulation that put on hold the creation of new government agencies and authorities. The Cabinet directive also introduced the idea of consolidating or restructuring existing agencies. Also, senior officials in the MoGLSD worked closely with an independent research team to use the findings of a process evaluation to inform several key changes in the programme design of the Youth Livelihood Programme (3ie, 2020). In both these cases, there was political will, interest, and commitment to make the changes happen, which in turn facilitated evidence use for decision making (Menon and Rathinam, 2020).

To improve evaluation capacity, learning, and use, OPM and 3ie led a capacity-development programme under the DFID-funded Strengthening Evidence-Based Decision-making in Uganda II Programme (2015–2019). It focused initially on improving the ability of government M&E units in selected ministries (of which MoGLSD was one) to commission and produce quality evaluations, including impact evaluations. One of the results was increased understanding and appreciation of the value of, and uses for, evaluations as evidence. Participants learned how evaluation can improve decision making, learning, and performance, as well as increase accountability for results. OPM and 3ie developed a small

¹⁸ KII (2019).

initial pilot to test how to apply BCURE lessons to improve evaluation evidence uptake and use (Rathinam *et al.*, 2018) The value of the main thrust of this pilot was confirmed (Namara *et al.*, 2019).

Demand for evaluation still primarily comes from donors who, in most cases, directly commission consultants and manage them, with varying levels of participation from government staff, which can affect buy-in later. Donors usually use ‘international’ evaluators to lead the studies, although Ugandan consultants are often on the team (Niringiye, 2018; Development Initiatives, 2017). The non-governmental pool of professional Ugandan evaluators is dominated by individuals relying on employment by government evaluations. Their skills and ability to deliver quality evaluations vary (Niringiye, 2018).

Data from UBoS is seen as credible: UBoS is Uganda’s official provider of statistics and is responsible for coordinating and supervising the National Statistical System (NSS). It also ensures collection, analysis, and dissemination of integrated, reliable, and timely statistical information. The credibility of UBoS is derived from its mandate and from the fact that most of its surveys are representative at national, regional, and, in some cases, sub-regional levels. Recently, UBoS has been collecting data that is representative for marginalised areas, such as Karamoja, mountainous regions, and areas that were severely affected by war, among others. This is helpful in programming, as area-specific interventions may be informed by this kind of disaggregated data. Also, UBoS conducts regular surveys and these are helpful in showing trends over time. UBoS considers MDAs as clients and stakeholders in terms of both data use and data production. It supports data producers to build and maintain sustainable systems for data collection, management, and dissemination.¹⁹ For data users, UBoS’s role is to provide them with high-quality statistics that meet their needs in terms of indicator measurement for accountability, planning, and decision making. UBoS engages closely with higher local governments, the NPA, the BoU, academia, and the MoFPED, among others.

However, beyond the high-level summaries that UBoS provides in its reports, very few people in other MDAs are able to analyse and manage the huge household data (raw data) that UBoS collects; much of it remains un-analysed.²⁰ In terms of capacity, UBoS has for many years been considered among the top national statistical offices in Africa (World Development Indicators, 2019). UBoS statistical capacity assessments from the World Bank indicate that its overall score has been above East Africa’s average since 2004. Uganda scores particularly well on periodicity and timeliness, indicating delivery of statistical outputs within standard time. One area in which Uganda does less well is methodology – suggesting that UBoS’s ability to adhere to internationally recommended standards and methods can still be improved (World Development Indicators, 2019). This presents an opportunity for SEDI to support UBoS with adhering to internationally recommended standards and methods. UBoS could also be supported to undertake more in-depth policy analysis for identifying areas where evidence needs to be generated. SEDI could also support MDAs in carrying out in-depth analysis of UBoS’ micro data with a view to unpacking issues that affect their sectors beyond the descriptive statistics.

In terms of gendered evidence generation, UBoS collects data using a gender lens with a bias toward sex disaggregation (see Box 5).

¹⁹ KII (2019).

²⁰ KII (2019).

Box 5: Generation of gender-related data²¹

UBoS collects sex-disaggregated and gender-relevant data from a range of surveys. The Uganda Demographic and Household Survey (UDHS) and the Uganda National Panel Survey reports present data disaggregated into females and males. The UDHS covers an extensive range of topics, including disabilities, reproductive health and FP, women's empowerment, and domestic violence (UBoS, 2016). UBoS recently conducted a time use survey that captures women's and girls' unpaid work using a gender lens. Also, the National Governance, Peace, and Security Survey has dedicated modules around gender-based issues such as violence against women and girls, female economic empowerment, and political participation.

MDAs collect administrative data, and these are also disaggregated by sex. Other statistics about women and girls are generated by CSOs, such as the Development Network of Indigenous Organisations, Forum for Women in Democracy, and Uganda Women's Network (UWONET). They mainly use these statistics for advocacy purposes.

There also exists a National Gender Priority Indicator (NPGEI) framework. The NPGEIs are intended to guide the development and production of gender-responsive indicators. They cover a range of sectors: economy, health, education, leadership and governance, human rights, information and communication technology, energy, water, environment, and agriculture. Since MDAs and local governments are also required to provide some statistics to populate certain indicators, UBoS has been undertaking capacity-building sessions to improve the quality of data collected at local government level. The NPGEI data is used to inform Uganda's annual and biannual reports on the implementation of government priorities and national Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) reports, and to track gender-related indicators for evidence-informed policy and programming.

Government MDAs have units that form part of the NSS, which are also responsible for data, statistics, and information. UBoS contributes 40% of the data to official statistics (Ntawiha and Anderson, 2016). This relatively low proportion highlights the importance of administrative data from other MDAs that contribute the majority of official datasets. The other key official producers of data are the BoU, the Ministry of Education and Sports (in particular, through its Education Management Information System), the MoH (DHIS2), and MoFPED. Administrative statistics are not of sufficient quality and there is limited appreciation and usability of statistics across sectors to inform planning.²² This implies that much of the administrative data that is influencing planning and policy could be inaccurate. Multilaterals contribute more than a tenth (14%) of the primary data in the NSS, with half of this being produced by UN agencies (Ntawiha and Anderson, 2016). Multilaterals participate in surveys and support local partners in collecting and reporting evidence. The challenges here show that there is potential for SEDI to design an intervention that can improve administrative data collection and management in key ministries that SEDI is likely to work with. Strengthening systems here will help improve access to large amounts of administrative data that can be analysed for key policy and programmatic insights.

Citizen involvement in policy development has been introduced, but the extent to which their views are considered remains limited. Barazas (community information forums) were introduced in 2009 to create a platform for technical officers to provide information regarding the status of service delivery to citizens, and in turn pave the way for citizens to participate in the development cycle by monitoring the usage of public funds and other resources (OPM, 2009). The platform was also meant to be used to collect information from citizens by providing them an opportunity to raise issues concerning service delivery. They were introduced following a presidential directive (ISER, 2018). However, they do not

²¹ Source: KII (2019).

²² KII (2019).

happen on a regular basis and the follow-up mechanisms for matters arising from them are not clear (ISER, 2018). There is also a failure to track and address the issues arising from these forums. Besides the barazas, there are claims that when MDAs are formulating policies they consult citizens for their input into the policies.²³ However, it was not clear how these consultations are done and the extent to which citizen input is actually taken up.

The number of research institutions whose purpose is to primarily undertake policy research has been growing over time. However, there are capacity and coordination challenges. Research institutions that have contributed to the generation of evidence include: the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR), EPRC, the Centre for Basic Research, Development Research and Training, Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment, the Uganda National Academy of Sciences (UNAS), and a number of consultancy firms. Some of these institutions (such as EPRC and MISR) receive funding from the GoU, while others are dependent on projects mainly financed by international actors. In addition to funding constraints, challenges in the research system relate to low capacity in research production, lack of coordination in the sector and duplication of efforts, low uptake of research, and poor links with society and industry (INASP, n.d.). Moreover, Uganda does not have a clear research agenda to guide planning, implementation, and policymaking. As a result, research efforts by various public, private, and non-governmental institutions have not been harnessed (NPA, 2020). In fact, one of the interventions aimed at strengthening R&D capacities within the NDP III period is the development and popularising of a research agenda. In this context, there are opportunities for SEDI to engage with government entities (e.g. MoST) that are involved in framing an overall research agenda. The framing should consider policymakers' interests and researchers' incentives, and help bridge research, policy, programming, and practice. Partnerships with organisations will also have to factor in political affiliations.

There is some level of collaboration and coordination between evidence producers and users (i.e. policymakers). Formal coordination between users and providers of evidence is through TWGs (e.g. the National M&E TWG), invitations to present to committees of Parliament, memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between policymakers and providers (e.g. EPRC has one with OPM, and UNAS had one with the research department of Parliament), SWGs and their TWGs, and associations that are composed of both users and producers of evidence (e.g. the Uganda Evaluation Association), among others.

Intermediaries (media, private sector, and CSOs) have a role in brokering evidence. Most CSOs and some private sector organisations are both producers and users of evidence. They commission studies in the event that the evidence they need is either unavailable or inadequate. In addition, NGOs and private sector organisations have a role to play in brokering evidence for use in policymaking. Both the NGOs and private sector have been able to influence policy through various ways: by partnering with MDAs in relation to projects involving policy formulation, where they contribute as members of task forces; as part of TWGs, such as the M&E TWG; and as members of expanded boards of major decision-making organs, such as NPA.²⁴ The NGO Forum (Uganda's umbrella organisation for NGOs) has had several examples of successful engagement in policymaking:

The NGO Forum advised on some issues pertaining to corruption (highlighting loopholes in public spending) and the advice was taken up. Also, the NGO Forum gave an input in the recently amended Financial Act. Also, some changes in the education sector were triggered by policy recommendations made by the NGO

²³ KII with official from Cabinet Secretariat, November (2019).

²⁴ KII (2020).

Forum. The forum had an input in the NGO Act, 2016 – they shared reports that informed the Act, and commented on the draft Act. Also, the forum coordinated with Parliament and gave an input in establishing electoral law reforms.²⁵

On the other hand, the private sector in Uganda has an umbrella organisation, the Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU), which is charged with ensuring that the private sector creates wealth through the establishing and sustaining of a competitive business environment. The PSFU is mandated to carry out policy research and advocacy on behalf of the private sector. It provides a forum for the discussion of policy issues and their impact on the private sector. Given its mandate, the PSFU, on behalf of the private sector, conducts or commissions studies to generate evidence, which is packaged and presented to policy makers in the form of private sector position papers. Examples of recent PSFU publications include its paper on the National Payment Systems Bill and another on the National Budget Framework Paper for FY 2020/21.

The media are also key actors that have done a lot to influence decision-making processes, but this sector is often left out of formal processes. Nevertheless, radio, print, television, and social media platforms have all been instrumental in breaking stories on key policy issues (Kasirye and Lakal, 2019), drawing citizens' attention to issues that would otherwise not be known.

Conflict between data access laws has implications for users. The Access to Information Act (2005) and regulations provide citizens with a mechanism to access public information. However, a study by Twaweza (2019) shows that government information is still not easily accessible to the public in Uganda despite the adoption of this Act.

Even in cases where the evidence is generated by MDAs, some entities still do not have well-functioning processes for externalising the evidence generated in simple and easy-to-share forms or systems. For example, establishing systems that are designed to store data and other policy-relevant knowledge so that staff around the government or policy organisations, and the public can access the knowledge and use it as and when needed. Efforts have been made by some government institutions to increase access to and availability of evidence in Uganda through portals, websites, and other online platforms, but there is a lack of public demand for and skills needed to access and use such government-generated data and knowledge resources. In this context, SEDI could support efforts to curate and make evidence more accessible and usable through portals, dashboards, or other appropriate platforms.

UBoS survey reports are publicly accessible, and through an official request to the Executive Director of UBoS it is possible to access the micro data. Most research organisations and universities have MoUs with UBoS and accessing this data is not a challenge. Some of the donor-funded surveys such as the Uganda National Panel Survey and the UDHS can be freely accessed online, with the only requirement being to register online and highlight the intended use of the data. The other freely accessible data repositories include the Campbell and 3ie evidence map.

The Data Protection and Privacy Act (2019)²⁶ regulates collection, storage, and use of personal data by different entities, including government agencies, corporations, and private institutions operating within and outside Uganda. It outlines the rights of individuals whose data is collected and the obligations of data collectors and data processors, as well as regulating the use and disclosure of personal information. It further regulates and limits the

²⁵ KII (2020).

²⁶ <https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/act/2019/1>

processing of special categories of personal data, including tribe, religion, and health, among others.

Within the framework of this law, the trend of collecting personal data has increased among private sector entities, particularly financial and telecommunication service providers in the country. However, unregulated data processing is still ongoing by both the public and private sectors, in a manner which disregards the standards set by the data protection law.²⁷ The private sector is yet to put in place measures to change their policies and practices as per the obligations under the Act. The major impediment here is delays in formulating regulations for effective implementation of the data protection law by the Ministry of Information Communications Technology, as well as to the national guidance that was mandated to formulate regulations to provide for the Act's accountability and enforcement mechanisms.

There is limited public funding for research and evidence generation. The country's expenditure on R&D was 0.4% of GDP in 2019, while business expenditure on R&D is 0.01% (NPA, 2020). This is way below the target of 1% of GDP by 2020 as stipulated in the NDP II (NPA, 2015). Also, most Ugandan universities do not allocate more than 5% of their annual institutional budgets to research (Kasozi, 2017). The research and knowledge production functions of universities are not emphasised as major purposes for the existence of universities (Kasozi, 2017). Makerere University has primarily relied on donor funding for research activities; indeed, its cooperation with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, worth US\$ 10 million and starting in 2000, has been instrumental in training and research initiatives in the country. However, in 2019 Makerere University was awarded up to UGX 30 billion (US\$ 8 million) by the GoU to support high-impact research and innovation in order to drive Uganda's development agenda. In addition, the draft NDP III has proposed interventions around building research and evaluation strategies, establishing a research and innovation fund, and increasing funding to science, technology, engineering, and innovation to a minimum of 2% of GDP every year (NPA, 2020). This renewed interest in funding for research is a welcome development, not least as it also complements SEDI's objective of advancing the role of research in policymaking.

3.3.1 Stakeholder mapping and power analysis

Table 2 below provides a summary of the key stakeholders in the policymaking process, their power, and interest in evidence use at the macro level. The level of influence of different actors is likely to change depending on the policy issue. The scope of use of evidence among politicians varies depending on the issue at hand. Finally, this analysis is at the organisational level, while it is acknowledged that the level of influence and interest may differ among individuals or groups within organisations.

²⁷ <https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/3385/one-year-what-has-ugandas-data-protection-law-changed>

Table 2: Summary of key stakeholders and their power and interest in evidence use

Type of stakeholder	Stakeholder	Power/level of influence (very high, high, medium, low)	Interest in evidence (very high, high, medium, low)
Government	MoFPED	High: Influential since this Ministry is in charge of resource allocation	High: There is interest in evidence to inform budgeting and resource allocation
	NPA	Medium: NPA is in charge of developing the NDPs that set the policy direction for MDAs	High: Plans are highly informed by different types of evidence
	OPM	High: It has power since it is in charge of monitoring all government policies and programmes	High: Interest is high since it centers evidence in evaluating government programmes
	Cabinet	High: This is the highest policy organ of government	Medium: There is influence of politics for some issues
	Cabinet secretariat	High: Has power to vet policy proposals and decides what policy papers get on the Cabinet agenda	High: Demands that policy proposals are backed by evidence
	Local governments	Low: most policies are formulated at the centre	Low to medium: They tend to mostly rely on administrative data, the quality of which is often poor
	Parliament	Medium to high: Parliament has power since it passes laws	Medium: Strong administrative wing but decision making in the political wing is sometimes overridden by politics
	Committees of Parliament	Medium: Their reports guide the bigger Parliament to make decisions or pass laws	Medium: Sometimes politics overrides depending on issue and influence from executive
	Parliament (Research, M&E, and budget offices)	Low: They do not have much power beyond providing evidence	High: These departments have interest in providing evidence to support MPs in their roles
	UBoS	Medium: It does not have much power beyond providing evidence	Very high: The nature of its mandate supports evidence generation and use
Advocacy forums	Parliamentary forums	Medium: They have been successful in advancing some policies	Medium: They use evidence to vouch for their agendas
Non-state actors	Think tanks	Low: Can only provide evidence and have limited power to guarantee its use	Very high: Their mandate is evidence generation
	NGOs	Low to medium	Medium
	Media	Low to medium	Medium
	Gender-focused NGOs	Medium: They have been seen to influence some policies	High: Most of these organisations use evidence for advocacy

	Citizens/beneficiaries	Low: Most ordinary citizens do not have much voice in decision making	Medium: Interested in accountability
	Religious leaders	Medium: They have a huge following and can sometimes influence the policy direction in regard to the FP and gender sectors	Low to medium: They rely more on religious doctrines
	Cultural leaders	Medium: Some are very powerful and may have an impact on gender-related policies and FP	Low to medium: They rely more on cultural norms
Donors and lenders	Donors (e.g. FCDO, World Bank, UNHCR)	High: Provide development support and implement development programmes	High: Influential in supporting social development. Very interested in social development
	New lenders (China)	High: Provide development support and implement development programmes	Low to medium: Unlike other funders, they are yet to invest in the country's evidence generation

Source: Authors' synthesis based on various interviews and literature review

In the next section, we highlight the relationships among some of the key stakeholders identified in the stakeholder mapping.

3.3.2 Social network analysis of key stakeholders

We undertook a light-touch social network analysis to unpack the key relationships between the identified stakeholders. The major relationships identified were formal reporting, financial support, technical support, collaboration/working group, evidence provision, and formal/informal influence.

There are diverse but related relationships across MDAs and local governments. All MDAs formally report to MoFPED since it is in charge of the resource envelope. Thus, the relationship between all MDAs and MoFPED involves both formal reporting and financial support. However, since MoFPED, OPM, and NPA are the three main major agencies that lead the implementation of the NDP, they do coordinate and report to each other. Furthermore, since OPM is in charge of monitoring government projects across MDAs, all MDAs report to OPM on a quarterly basis.

The other major relationship among MDAs is through SWGs: all ministries have a SWG to which they belong. Membership is determined by MDAs' mandates. For instance, the MoH belongs to the Health SWG while MoFPED and UBoS belong to the Accountability SWG. Strategic planning is done at sectoral level. The relationship between UBoS and MDAs is that of evidence provision, technical capacity and collaboration.

Local governments report to MoFPED and to their respective line ministries at the central government. They also provide data/statistics on key social economic issues to guide policy at central government. In turn, central government provides technical capacity to local governments.

At the top level, all permanent secretaries meet for annual reporting to discuss issues related to their ministries. On the political side, ministers who are also Cabinet members head ministries.

MoFPED, OPM, NPA, and UBoS seem to have the greatest links to other MDAs. Engaging with these institutions during the implementation of SEDI is likely to help in building inroads into other organisations and networks.

The relationship between MDAs and donors mainly involves financial support, capacity building, and collaboration/working groups. As noted earlier, Uganda uses a sector-wide planning approach. Donors who wish to support development through budget support utilise these channels. Donors also continue to provide capacity enhancement for many MDAs. It is also worth highlighting that donors have some informal influence over the agendas of the MDAs they support.

The relationship between MDAs and Parliament is mainly based on formal reporting and accountability. The MoFPED, which is in charge of budgeting, reports to Parliament to have the budget approved. Other ministries also present their ministerial budget framework papers to Parliament for consideration and approval. In addition, the leadership of MDAs may (when deemed necessary) be called by oversight committees to respond to any queries arising out of audit reports. Lastly, the OPM delivers a performance report to Parliament on an annual basis.

Non-state actors collaborate with MDAs through working groups. The majority of non-state actors (e.g. think tanks, NGOs, and the private sector) relate with the GoU through broad working groups, such as SWGs and TWGs. This finding highlights the need for SEDI to engage with working groups and their members in the sector it chooses.

3.4 Organisational diagnostic

Based on our analysis of the political economy and evidence ecosystem, **OPM, NPA, UBoS, and Parliament have been identified as institutions with whom SEDI could explore collaboration.** We conducted a light organisational diagnostic of these bodies to understand their internal organisational AAA (authority, acceptance, and ability) related to this agenda:

- **Authority** refers to the support needed to effect reform or policy change.
- **Acceptance** is the extent to which those who will be affected by organisational reform or policy change accept the need for change and its implications.
- **Ability** refers to the practical side of reform or policy change, as well as the need for time, money, skills, and the like to even start any kind of intervention.

Detailed insights from the preliminary AAA analysis that was undertaken will inform decisions on how SEDI might engage with them.

3.5 Conclusion

This analysis highlights that there are opportunities for and challenges to SEDI.

3.5.1 Opportunities

There is buy-in, and interest in, evidence use in OPM, NPA, and UBoS, which helps build a favourable environment for SEDI. There may be specific opportunities to work with UBoS on strengthening capacity for policy analysis and generating different types of evidence. Although SEDI has missed the opportunity to feed into the NDP process, the programme could still engage with NPA in terms of strengthening the evidence-informed planning process at the sector, district, and local levels.

At the macro level, actors like OPM, NPA, and UBoS have put in place institutional structures and mechanisms for facilitating evidence use. The various working groups would be important entities for SEDI to engage with in the inception and implementation phases. This engagement could promote strengthened links between research institutions, donors, NGOs, and the GoU – the analysis highlights that stronger networks could promote collaborations for evidence use.

Overall, there is sufficient level of buy-in for M&E evidence. SEDI can engage with OPM and MDA M&E units to develop, refine, and implement an improved and expanded approach to strengthen M&E evidence use. Through the various platforms that bring donors/DPs together, SEDI, with support from FCDO, could push for increased access to donor-commissioned evaluation findings. These platforms include the local DPs group and the Deliver as One programme.

As Uganda pursues decentralisation and more decision-making functions are devolved, SEDI could look at interventions that can also promote evidence use for decision making at the local and district levels.

Our analysis has highlighted a reliance on nationally representative quantitative data, including statistics and monitoring data. SEDI could push for the use of different kinds of evidence, including qualitative research studies, evaluations, and stakeholder feedback, factoring in GESI considerations. It could also support efforts to make existing data more accessible and user-friendly.

3.5.2 Challenges

Although OPM's M&E directorate can be a great champion for SEDI, it is understaffed and involved in multiple technical support projects. An assessment will have to be made about the extent to which it can commit time and resources to SEDI. We would also need to map other ongoing capacity-strengthening initiatives with other key actors to avoid duplication and overcrowding.

The analysis also highlights the challenges MDAs face, such as lack of staff, funding, and capacity. SEDI will have to design its interventions keeping this in mind.

Finally, the GoU is currently focusing on infrastructure (road and energy) development. Thus, the pre-selected sectors such as gender and FP may not be high on the government agenda.

4. Humanitarian sector

Key findings and implications for SEDI

- There is already established infrastructure for generating evidence within the sector, as well as generalised support for the idea of using evidence in policymaking.
- The existence of coordination mechanisms that are focused on improving evidence use, such as the new Assessment TWG, could be a potential entry point for SEDI.
- The CRRF Secretariat is a potentially good target for SEDI, because it already has formal roles and responsibilities related to evidence generation and use, and because it has influence over planning for refugee response.
- Improving access and use of existing portals, such as PRIMES, and the HMIS is another area that SEDI could look into.
- Most refugee and epidemic-related data does not adequately look at gender through an analytic lens. SEDI could work in this space to improve the use of qualitative and quantitative evidence on the gendered drivers of inequality.
- Client voices and feedback are also not well integrated into humanitarian decision making. There is an opportunity for SEDI in improving the use of client feedback in decision making.
- The sector also provides opportunities to experiment with working with decision making across national and district levels, noting that implementation gaps (which often occur at the district level) are sometimes more important than policy gaps (which occur at the national level).

4.1 Introduction

In addition to refugee needs and epidemic preparedness and response, Uganda is prone to numerous hazards, including droughts, floods, landslides, and crop, animal, and human diseases. However, in line with conversations with, and guidance from, FCDO Uganda, this report specifically focuses on refugees and epidemics, given that these two subjects are heavily intertwined both geographically and structurally, and are at the forefront of the humanitarian response, both in terms of need and international attention.

On 31 October 2019, the GoU in collaboration with UNHCR estimated its total refugee population to be 1,362,269, meaning Uganda hosts the most refugees of any country in Africa (GoU, 2019). These high numbers are in part attributed to Uganda's open, progressive, and compassionate refugee policy (World Bank, 2016).

Despite the attention paid toward refugees, the needs still outpace the funding available. In 2018, UNHCR's Uganda funding needs totalled US\$ 415,203,072, but the funds available only amounted to US\$ 185,575,414, leaving a gap of US\$ 229,627,658 (UNHCR, 2019). Appeals to donors have been challenged by donor fatigue and competing priorities.

Overall, epidemic preparation and response in the region have received considerable international attention, partly due to the previous HIV/AIDS epidemic and the ongoing Ebola epidemics in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A comprehensive risk assessment in Uganda has been conducted, and the systems for disease surveillance are generally regarded as strong for a low-income country (Ario *et al.*, 2019). Uganda has a robust Ebola surveillance plan in place, with support from the World Health Organization (WHO) and others. Refugees and other border crossers coming from the DRC have had their temperatures checked, since the most recent outbreak began in 2018, to detect potential cases of Ebola. However, it is worth noting that the epidemics affecting Uganda are not limited to Ebola, with other viral haemorrhagic fevers, Cholera, and other acute water

diarrheal diseases, measles, Rift Valley fever, and anthrax all remaining as active or potential epidemic risks. These risks, paired with the complications afforded by Uganda's refugee response and overarching poor health indicators, create a scenario in which epidemic preparedness and response requires particular attention.

The needs of refugees are intertwined with Uganda's larger epidemic response and preparedness efforts (Bamutaze, 2015; Sullivan-Wiley and Short Gianotti, 2017). Refugee populations are susceptible to disease outbreaks because of crowding, poor sanitation, and poor health when they arrive from often-dangerous contexts with few health services. However, the settlements are less crowded, and thus less conducive to disease spread than was the case in the Internally Displaced Persons camps in Northern Uganda during the civil war (1986–2006) (Okware, *et al.*, 2015). Nonetheless, the ongoing influx of refugees into Uganda from Ebola-affected regions of the DRC, and the regular cross-border travel of refugees, creates a potential risk for transmission.

4.2 PEA

Refugee policy in Uganda is influenced by a number of intertwined historical, political, and socioeconomic factors. Uganda's Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) was established with donor support in 1999, and the rights of refugees to work and to choose a place of residence were incorporated into law in the 2006 Refugee Act. The GoU's strategy has three elements: 'First, its regulatory framework, which allows refugees to work and freedom of residence. Second, its assistance model, which has traditionally been based on allocating plots of land in rural settlements. Third, its integrated service delivery, in which refugees have access to the same schools and hospitals as nationals' (Betts *et al.*, 2014). Refugees thus have freedom of movement, the right to work, own property, and access to Ugandan social services. The Refugee and Host Population Empowerment framework updated the SRS model in 2016, and included a policy of supporting refugees and host communities. The NDP II (2016–2020) and the Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA) guide the government's refugee policies (NPA, 2010).

The GoU has been lauded globally for its progressive refugee policies, and this is likely to continue. Its open-door policy and partnership with international actors to meet refugee needs has improved the country's reputation in the international community (Volgelsang, 2017). The policies bring domestic benefits as well, given that the GoU instituted a 70:30 principle for refugee response in collaboration with UNHCR, meaning 30% of all assistance measures should benefit the hosting community, wherever feasible and contextually relevant (UNHCR, 2019).

OPM co-owns the refugee management, registration, and other major refugee-related processes with UNHCR. The Refugee Act of 2006 gives OPM responsibility over 'all administrative matters concerning refugees in Uganda and in that capacity coordination of inter-ministerial and non-government activities and programmes relating to refugees' (GoU, 2006). Internationally, UNHCR is mandated by the UN to lead and coordinate international action for the worldwide protection of refugees. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and wellbeing of refugees.²⁸ In pursuit of this objective, UNHCR works with the GoU, fellow UN agencies, and international, regional, and national organisations to provide protection, shelter, health, water, and education, among other services, to refugees in Uganda. To manage and provide services to refugees, OPM and UNHCR set the agenda of the humanitarian response, direct coordination among different partners, and monitor activities to

²⁸ <http://www.unhcr.org/4371f8f32.pdf>

ensure they adhere to international and national standards and obligations. OPM also supports other emergency responses, including some epidemic responses, while OPM and other ministries set frameworks for service provision that international actors need to follow.

The roles of OPM and UNHCR are intertwined and can be complicated. The different economic resources and international clout of the two entities complicate this interdependent relationship. OPM relies on funds raised by UNHCR, which gives UNHCR leverage in pushing for policies, processes, and priorities that OPM may not always agree with. A re-registration of refugees' exercise was conducted in 2018/19, in which UNHCR's stringent procedures and new equipment were used. When the exercise was completed, the data was handed over to OPM, which has the legal responsibility to use this information in the verification and determination of refugee status. The working relationship has also been affected by a perception on the part of OPM, and the GoU in general, that UNHCR and other donors could be carrying more weight in terms of financial support to the government (Manzi, 2018; Poole, 2019; Oxfam, 2016; Mwenyango and Palattiyil, 2019).

OPM has been comparatively less affected by decentralisation, and its staff in the districts have traditionally been responsible for refugee and other humanitarian responses. Refugee management and protection is a centralised function, with OPM as the designated ministry responsible for refugee affairs. District-level OPM offices or personnel are not part of the local government structure – they are local units of OPM and strictly adhere to their core mandate, which is determination of asylum status and ensuring peace and security in the settlements. As such, these units are not heavily affected by the move to decentralisation.²⁹ The district representatives are not directly involved in any of the policymaking processes that take place within the settlement or in the coordination meetings.³⁰

For epidemics, there is also a shared structure between OPM and the MoH and their relevant district representatives. OPM houses the Department for Disaster Preparedness, and Department for Refugees, and is charged with the 'prevention, preparedness, and response to natural and human induced disasters and refugees' (GoU, 2019). OPM coordinates and partners with other ministries, organisations, and development actors in response to ongoing humanitarian situations and epidemic outbreaks. The MoH, in this instance, also takes on a key role in managing and responding to epidemics by conducting analysis, administering guidance for action, and coordinating partners. The DHOs then serve as the district-level representatives of the MoH, and collect data on epidemics, monitor and provide technical support to epidemic preparedness and response efforts, support coordination between government and international partners, and directly support the implementation of activities, such as disease surveillance. Given the varying levels of district government capacity and international organisations' involvement across districts, these relationships are district specific and dynamic, with roles and responsibilities shifting between actors based on the situation. The nature of who is involved differs as well: for example, technical government officials can be very influential in refugee response in some districts, and less engaged in others.³¹

National and district development plans, as well as decentralisation, have created new district-specific entry points for improved planning around refugee response. For the first time, refugees were explicitly included in the NDP II (covering 2015/16 through 2020/2021) through the STA framework. As an extension of this policy, districts are now

²⁹ KII (2019).

³⁰ District OPM (2019), personal interview.

³¹ KII (2019).

expected to mainstream consideration of refugees in their district development plans.³² Importantly, refugee voices are expected to enter into these discussions via the Refugee Engagement Forum, which creates a connection between refugee representatives and the CRRF Secretariat, although the use of inputs to the Forum is not currently clear.

Engaging with districts can be complicated, given that their specific roles and responsibilities within refugee and epidemic response are complex and constantly changing. The implementation of the split responsibility between central and district government could be better articulated, and this can lead to confusion over the roles of the various actors involved. A report from the IRC describes the situation as follows:

There are competing priorities between local leadership, district leadership, and national authorities, about which projects are the most urgent to fund, and the extent to which refugees should receive assistance compared to host communities. External and internal politics, for example, mean that different branches of governments see the CRRF, [World Bank] International Development Association (IDA18) financing and new coordination differently. Indeed, there have been some parallel processes where OPM management of settlements runs separately from the local governance structures—a set up that produces challenges in trying to shift to a model where all line ministries also cover refugee-related issues. (IRC, 2018, p. 11)

Unclear and shifting roles and responsibilities between international and government actors creates further confusion and contradictions among policies, as well as between policy and practice. In Uganda, refugee response and epidemic preparedness are the responsibility, respectively, of OPM and the MoH. Nonetheless, in practice they both involve a patchwork of international and national funders and implementers, coordinated through various structures owned by different government entities. This range of actors makes it harder to determine how exactly decisions are made. In addition, the apparently divergent imperatives and contradictory statements in official policies make analysing the relationships challenging. For example, enhanced involvement of local governments in refugee management and provision of services under the Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) programme means that many decisions around service provision, which were previously owned solely by OPM and UNHCR, are now shared by the technical arms of the ministries and district governments.

A study found that newer districts were less well networked with those outside the district, and therefore less capable of managing healthcare issues (Ssengooba *et al.*, 2017). These changes have affected many refugee-hosting districts, and districts at risk of epidemics, which then affects these districts' ability to support humanitarian responses.

International lenders and funders, by virtue of their financial strength, can shape and influence policymaking within the sector. The World Bank has become a key actor playing an advisory role on the CRRF Steering Committee after providing US\$ 280 million in funding under the DRDIP to support host communities, UBoS, and infrastructure projects targeting the humanitarian sector.

Although efforts have been made to create forums to represent refugee voices, this remains a largely symbolic gesture. Elected refugee welfare committees (RWCs), which were created to be counterparts to the local council structure, are often consulted by various groups involved in the refugee response. But while the RWCs are influential among members of their community, their ability to influence the decision making of other actors is weak. Recognition of the weaknesses of the RWC structure led to efforts to include refugees

³² <https://opm.go.ug/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-uganda/>

on the CRRF Steering Committee through the creation of the aforementioned Refugee Engagement Forum. However, RWCs still do not have the strength or recognition needed to shape policies or set agendas.

4.3 Evidence ecosystem

The main producers of data and research relevant to the humanitarian sector are the GoU, UN agencies, NGOs, consultants, and academics. Importantly, many of these groups are simultaneously producers and users of evidence, which can contribute to bias in favour of certain types of evidence.

The GoU tends to favour government-produced data. Government data collection is overseen by UBoS, but UBoS has only recently begun working on data collection to inform refugee response. Until recently, its routine surveys did not include refugee settlements. However, UBoS's role in the refugee space is changing. With support from the World Bank, it has recently undertaken the 'Informing the Refugee Policy Response in Uganda' survey, which collected household data in order to analyse the 'socio-economic profile, poverty and vulnerability of refugees and host communities' with disaggregation by gender and age (World Bank Group, 2019). This is now going to become a regular feature in the national surveys. UBoS data was identified by several respondents interviewed, across government and international organisations,³³ as being useful in informing their own research.

As part of its mandate, OPM's M&E department also collects and analyses data on refugee response and disaster and risk management. They rely on statistics from UBoS, donor reports, and reports from research institutions and the NPA.³⁴ The unit also conducts its own assessments of government performance, such as evaluations of government agencies as well as real-time assessments related to the impact of emergencies.

Data collected by local governments – guided by the respective ministry, UBoS, and UNHCR – are the most readily available and used evidence in refugee response planning. District governments collect some data to inform refugee response planning, but this is limited. This data includes registration numbers, assessments of the vulnerability of newly arrived or settled refugees, and health statistics contained in the DHIS2. In addition, district government offices often consider guidance notes and policies from their respective ministries as the most credible form of evidence.³⁵ However, there are capacity gaps in terms of the ability to generate and use rigorous evidence:³⁶

This is most evident in district and ministerial development plans, which are viewed as being 'cut and paste', and not informed by reality or emerging changes.³⁷

Consequently, the district development plans may not be informed by existing current evidence.

Within the UN system, organisations like UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) have units and departments that collect and analyse data, which feeds into the organisational database. For example, WFP develops many assessments that are key for decision making, including market assessments. The refugee registration process is undertaken jointly by UNHCR and OPM officers at different reception centres, and this data includes details about an individual that is then used by different sectors (e.g. those

³³ KII (2019).

³⁴ KII (2019).

³⁵ KII (2019).

³⁶ KII (2019).

³⁷ KII (2019).

addressing the specific needs of children or people with disabilities). This data, which includes biometric information (iris scans and 10-digit fingerprints), is then uploaded and stored on to the different components of the PRIMES. Information uploaded onto the various portals on PRIMES (e.g. proGres and BIMS) is considered as the verified record of the refugee caseload in Uganda and is used for refugee programming. Data about epidemics is collected by agencies such as WHO and the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC). The different sector actors have access to some of the information on the PRIMES portal database but also share data collected through their own assessments and research, as well as their findings at district coordination meetings, sector meetings, and national coordination meetings. The existence of portals such as PRIMES and coordination mechanisms to access, share, and discuss evidence could potentially be opportunities for SEDI.

NGOs and think tanks produce data, research, and evaluations that are relevant to decision making, but this evidence often needs to be proactively offered by international organisations. Institutional donors (including FCDO, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), CDC, etc.) fund most of the relevant research produced by UN systems and NGOs. As noted above, NGOs and think tanks report a need to advocate to international organisations that already have influence (e.g. UNHCR, WHO, CDC, and the World Bank) for evidence they generate to be considered within government decision making.

The use of needs assessment data to inform the Refugee Response Plan for Uganda or its M&E plan is unclear; in reality, M&E units may be working in silos. In line with the Grand Bargain's³⁸ commitment to improve joint and impartial needs assessments, a multi-sectoral needs assessment was carried out in 12 refugee-hosting districts and 30 refugee settlements³⁹ to provide evidence for the development of the 2019/20 Refugee Response Plan for Uganda. However, the ongoing use of this data was not made explicit in the plan and, while a M&E framework exists, there is no mention of research or data needs as part of improving the response (UNHCR, 2018). The literature on M&E data use suggests that the responsibility for data collection and analysis is outsourced to M&E units, which have less regular engagement with decision makers and have less influence on them. This question could be further investigated, while addressing such silos, if they do exist, may present an opportunity for SEDI to improve government data use. Importantly, the relatively new Assessment TWG is working to better coordinate and improve the quality of needs assessments, and other types of assessments, within the larger Inter-Sector Working Group system. This working group is led by UNHCR, WFP, and REACH, and could be a potential partner for SEDI.

A significant barrier to using evidence in the Ugandan humanitarian sector is the quantity, quality, and usability of the evidence available. A report on evidence in the humanitarian sector in the East Africa region concluded that challenges included poor coordination of research and evaluation, lack of longitudinal data, and a lack of shared standards and quality. This is combined with an emphasis on short-term monitoring for reporting that is donor driven, fragmented, and often conducted by international researchers who are disconnected from the local community (Development Initiatives, 2017). Existing literature is heavily focused on evidence use by international donors, and the question of how government policymakers use data is neither raised nor answered (Obrecht, 2017). This is a

³⁸ The Grand Bargain is an agreement between some of the largest donors and aid providers, which aims to get more means into the hands of people in need.

³⁹ This number counts the sub-settlements of Adjumani as separate settlements, instead of combining them into a single settlement as is done in other reports.

significant gap in the literature and makes assessing current use and possibilities for increased use extremely challenging.

A study on the health sector found that the policy and strategy development processes in Uganda follow the principles of evidence-based health policymaking (Kapiriri and Be LaRose, 2019). Specific evidence on health emergencies is collected through disease surveillance systems and the HMIS at the local and national levels. This evidence is used to detect and manage public health emergencies, and also for advocating for more resources and in evaluating the effectiveness of the response efforts. Government decision makers do rely on HMIS, but some observers have questioned the quality and completeness of the HMIS data, calling for the strengthening of the surveillance system (Kapiriri and Be LaRose, 2019). The health sector in the humanitarian space is an area that SEDI could be looking at more closely to assess what is working and not working in improving data use for decision making.

Although individual-level data collected by the humanitarian sector is often disaggregated by sex, as well as by age, most refugee and epidemic-related data does not adequately look at gender through an analytic lens or address the specific needs of women and girls. Disaggregation of data by sex and age is now a standard policy in the humanitarian sector, with one example being the UNHCR's Age, Gender, and Diversity Policy (UNHCR, 2018). However, disaggregation of data is only one component of gender analysis. Many of the analytical framings of gender would require the use of qualitative and quantitative data that are not traditionally captured by humanitarian actors. Gender is not adequately mainstreamed in the humanitarian sector; consequently, there is no real analysis about whether policies impact men and women differently. It was also noted that where efforts have been made to mainstream gender, it has been at the higher policymaking levels and the effects are much weaker at the lower service delivery points.⁴⁰ A rapid review of multi-stakeholder coordination meeting minutes, within the refugee and epidemic space in Uganda, finds them referencing the role that social norms play in refugee and epidemic issues, but these references tend to primarily be anecdotal. Discussions of power as a framing for gender inequality are particularly missing from data collection and analysis. SEDI could work in this space to improve the use of qualitative and quantitative evidence on the gendered drivers of inequality.

Client voices and feedback are also not well integrated into humanitarian decision making. There are ongoing efforts to improve accountability toward affected persons and use client voices and feedback in humanitarian response globally, but many of these efforts are still maturing. In Uganda, there are several necessary but insufficient ongoing initiatives. For example, there is a heavy focus in the Ugandan humanitarian sector on developing a grievance redress mechanism, such as UNHCR's feedback referral and response mechanism, information, and support centres, suggestion boxes, and others. However, complaints mechanisms cannot be the only channel representing client voices as they are only restricted to complaints and do not include preferences or perspectives more generally. They may also be excluding a subset of clients who do not have access to these mechanisms (noting that usage rates are not directly representative of the population).⁴¹

Efforts are underway to integrate indicators related to client preferences and perspectives into standard data collection efforts by NGOs and UN agencies, as well as efforts to build community structures in refugee communities that can provide representation for the larger community (including the refugee welfare councils and the larger Refugee Engagement

⁴⁰ KII (2019).


⁴¹ www.rescue.org/resource/client-responsive-programming-core-resource-manual).

Forum). If these efforts are adequately resourced, are supported to be more gender sensitive, are combined with more qualitative efforts to collect and interpret the voices and perspectives of clients, and are consistently used in decision making,⁴² then theoretically such efforts would be sufficient. However, it is not clear whether these standards are being met. There is an opportunity here for SEDI in terms of improving the use of client feedback in decision making. Opportunities to collect data about the experiences, preferences, and challenges faced by refugees exist in multiple formats and have been developed by various organisations for different contexts (Jean, 2013; Jean, 2014; Bonino, 2014). A UNHCR report (UNHCR, 2019) mentioned a new interagency system for coordinating client feedback, but details on this were not available. This could be an important area of work for SEDI's focus.

4.3.1 Stakeholder mapping and power analysis

A preliminary mapping of stakeholders around using evidence, which is based on our analysis, can be found below. It is worth noting that both 'power and influence' and 'interest in using evidence' have nuanced definitions in this sector, given how intertwined the roles, responsibilities, and power of the various actors are and how widely different the definitions and understandings of evidence are between organisations. The key message from Figure 3 is that donors such as UNHCR, FCDO, the World Bank, European Union (EU), and WFP wield a lot of influence in the humanitarian sectors and their interest in using evidence is high. At national level, the interagency groups and MoH also have relatively high power and level of interest in using evidence.

Figure 3: Power and influence mapping in the humanitarian sector




Source: Authors' construct, 2019. Legend: **Orange**: International actors; **Yellow**: National actors; **Red**: District actors

⁴² Experience shows that the existence of data collection systems alone does not guarantee transformative use, so attention to accountability mechanisms, transparency, and appropriate management are critically important. For more information, see www.cdacollaborative.org/cdaproject/humanitarian-feedback-mechanisms-research/, www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/alnap-cda-study-feedback-mechanisms.pdf, www.unhcr.org/innovation/10-steps-to-setting-up-an-effective-feedback-mechanism/, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c6eb1ce40f0b647aa1b6eb3/Improving.pdf>

4.3.2 Social network analysis of key actors

Based on the stakeholder analysis, the sector focused on five government actors that had the most likely SEDI entry points for the humanitarian sector. Entry points for these groups are described in detail in the next pages, but it is worth noting that there are important interconnections between these five actors, which are described below.

Figure 4: Government actors



Source: Authors' construct, 2019

Key relationships include:

Formal reporting: OPM District → OPM Central. OPM District officially formally reports to OPM Central.

Formal reporting: DHO → MoH. DHO formally reports to MoH. However, because of decentralisation, some DHOs do try to exert some influence over MoH decisions, especially around budgeting.

Influence: CRRF → OPM Central. The CRRF (a multi-stakeholder coordination model on refugee matters focusing on the humanitarian and development needs of both refugees and host communities) is spearheaded by OPM Central, and therefore they have a strong relationship. The work of the CRRF is closely linked with OPM's work on refugees, meaning there is an exchange of information, expertise, and even staff.

Collaboration: MoH – OPM Central. The MoH and OPM have an informal relationship since they are separate government entities. They do, however, collaborate on many issues including refugees, epidemics, and disasters.

Collaboration: CRRF – MoH. The MoH is one of the government ministries that form the CRRF steering group. The steering group consists of 35 members with varying degrees of influence.

Collaboration: OPM District – DHO. Similar to the relationship between OPM Central and the MoH, these two groups share roles and responsibilities around refugee and epidemic response.

4.4 Organisational diagnostic of economic development for SEDI

Similar to the macro-level analysis, an organisational diagnostic (using the AAA framework) was undertaken of the actors identified for the social network analysis. For more detailed information, please refer to Annex A. Detailed insights from the preliminary AAA analysis will inform decisions on how SEDI might engage with these actors.

4.5 Conclusion: opportunities for and constraints to SEDI in the humanitarian sector

4.5.1 Opportunities

The humanitarian sector has several potential entry points for SEDI, and there is already an established infrastructure for generating evidence within the sector, as well as generalised support for the idea of using evidence. The humanitarian sector also provides opportunities to experiment with working with decision making across national and district levels, noting that implementation gaps (which often occur at the district level) are sometimes more important than policy gaps (which occur at the national level).

The existence of coordination mechanisms that are focused on improving evidence use, such as the new Assessment TWG, could be a potential entry point for SEDI. The CRRF Secretariat is also a potentially good target. However, SEDI's support would have to be complementary and not duplicate existing support.

The health sector in the humanitarian space is an area that SEDI could be engaging in, with the MoH and DHOs as potential targets. Targeting the interface between the DHOs and the MoH could potentially overcome the barriers and combine the benefits of working with both.

Improving access to and use of existing portals, such as PRIMES and the HMIS, is another area that SEDI could look into. There may also be opportunities to improve the use of undervalued types of evidence, such as qualitative and quantitative evidence on GESI.

4.5.2 Challenges

SEDI has missed a series of key opportunities to influence the sector, which include the development of the Health Response Plan, the NDP, and the district development plans.

Lastly, SEDI needs to consider whether or not it can actually add new value to the humanitarian sector, or whether it would be crowded out by existing investment given that this sector is already heavily supported by international actors in both implementation, planning, policymaking, and evidence generation and use.

To reiterate, this report specifically focuses on refugees and epidemics and not the entire humanitarian sector. As such, the conclusions should be interpreted in this context.

5. Family planning sector

Key findings and implications for SEDI

- The level of buy-in for, and interest in, using evidence is quite high among key players like the MoH and the NPC.
- The M&E unit in the MoH and the reproductive health departments are potential entities that SEDI could be engaging with as they are responsible for collecting, analysing, and using data.
- SEDI could support efforts to improve access to existing data, its quality, and user-friendliness, or promote the use of different types of evidence.
- The MoH could have a clearer research agenda. SEDI, in collaboration with key stakeholders in FP could develop priorities to close key evidence gaps in FP.
- Working with NPC and its TWG would facilitate engagement with a wider set of stakeholders.
- Given the United Nations Population Fund's (UNFPA) role in the FP space, SEDI's engagement with UNFPA will be important in terms of entering this space at both the national and district levels.
- From the onset, SEDI needs to be mindful of the political and socio-religious factors influencing policymaking in the FP sector.
- Linking FP with population dynamics would also make it more politically aligned, as the focus would be on demographic dividend – a priority area for the GoU.

5.1 Introduction

Uganda's population growth rate of 3% per annum is one of the highest in the world. With this annual growth rate, it is projected that the country's population will reach 47 million by 2025 and continue to increase (UBoS, 2014). About half of the population is under the age of 15, implying the dependency ratio is high and is likely to be a barrier to Uganda's social transformation agenda. Uganda's population dynamics can be harnessed to create valuable demographic dividends, but also present a ticking time bomb if employment opportunities are unable to keep up with demand (Kamara *et al.*, 2019). These population statistics are a result of the high total fertility rate. Fertility rates have only reduced by about 1.5 over a period of 16 years (from 6.9 children in 2000 to 5.4 in 2016) (UBoS and MEASURE DHS/ICF International, 2016).

Some of the critical gendered drivers to the rapid population growth and high fertility rate in Uganda are the high number of teenage pregnancies, early marriages, higher high school drop-out rates for girls, and unwanted pregnancies resulting from low contraceptive use (UBoS and MEASURE DHS/ICF International, 2012).

With a low contraceptive prevalence rate of 39% among married women, and modern contraceptive use of 35% among married women aged 15–49 years, unmet need for FP is 28% among married women (UBoS, 2014). These indicators are a result of limited access to FP information, education, and counselling, as well as limited FP commodity security and staff availability, inadequate skills, and negative social and cultural factors. Discriminatory social norms that drive inequality and practices rooted in patriarchy persist in society. Cultural and religious leaders' opposition to FP continues to be a challenge, as does parental opposition to modern contraceptive use by adolescents. These factors present critical challenges for families and the GoU to adequately plan and invest in health, education, and social development, constraining the realisation of high-quality human capital required to drive the country toward the middle-income status envisaged by the NDP II.

The GoU acknowledges the importance of scaling up modern FP methods as fundamental in enabling women to achieve their rights to health, education, and autonomous decision making about the number and timing of their childbearing (Bongaarts *et al.*, 2012). Uganda's Vision 2040 identifies the demographic challenge as a strategic priority for the country to realise middle-income status by 2040. This mirrors the 2008 Population Policy, which discusses the need for a rapid demographic transition to low fertility and child mortality rates to reduce the high child dependency ratio as one of the foundations to stimulating economic development (NPA, 2014).

FP has remained on the GoU agenda, and the upcoming NDP III identifies access to FP as one of the critical interventions aimed at improving human capital (NPA, 2020). Reproductive health and FP commitments also feature in key strategy documents, such as the Health Sector Strategic Plan, and policies such as the National Adolescent Health Strategy and National Policy Guidelines for Sexual Health & Rights. The Uganda Family Planning Costed Implementation Plan provides national guidance for increased knowledge of, and access to, FP interventions that will support the GoU to meet targets it has set to reduce unmet need for FP to 10%, and increase the modern contraceptive prevalence rate among all women to 50% by 2020.

5.2 PEA of the sector

The MoH is the main driver of FP-related policies given its mandate to deliver sexual and reproductive health services. Responsibility for policymaking lies with the central government entities and the line ministry spearheads the policy development process.

Local governments, particularly the office of the district health officer and health subdistricts, do more of the implementation of the policies and interventions. However, given the centrality of DPs and NGOs in the provision of FP services in Uganda, they are often consulted in the policymaking process. DPs such as FCDO, USAID, and UNFPA also influence policy processes through technical inputs and resourcing, while faith-based organisations (FBOs), CSOs, and NGOs are involved through advocacy based on their direct interface with communities.⁴³

At the historic 2012 London Summit on Family Planning, President Museveni pledged to increase Uganda's budget for FP supplies to US\$ 5 million annually (Sizomu *et al.*, 2014) and reduce unmet FP needs from 40% to 10% by 2022 (Lipsky *et al.*, 2016). This has seen GoU financing for FP interventions increase significantly over the years, but it is yet to hit the target of US\$ 5 million (UNFP, 2017)

*Since the London summit, the President has been giving positive messages about family planning and usually encourages citizens to give birth to children they can look after with an average of four children at least.*⁴⁴

*The influence of the President has helped to change the perceptions of some people about FP including RDCs [resident district commissioners].*⁴⁵

The political support for FP is not without challenges; FBOs and religious and cultural institutions still rake up controversies by championing the cause against FP.

As detailed by Ongolo-Zogo *et al.* (2018), Uganda's health sector policy development process is inherently political, and how the MoH interacts with the presidency, Cabinet,

⁴³ KII (2019).

⁴⁴ KII (2019).

⁴⁵ KII (2019).

Parliament, and other powerful actors in the FP space is not clear. It is in this more closed space that critical decisions are made, in accordance with political calculations.

Socio-cultural and religious norms have been barriers to the uptake of FP, products, and services. Negative attitudes to modern contraception persist among men and women, driven by inaccurate, yet popular, assumptions rooted in socio-cultural belief structures (Guttmacher Institute, 2017).

The opinions of religious and cultural leaders have significant influence. For example, religious groupings have had significant policy influence in the development of the Framework for Sexuality Education in Uganda.

Actors such as the Catholic Church, cultural institutions, and some Muslim clerics oppose FP and are very influential, especially in rural areas where people are still highly conservative and religious.

DPs are aware of these limitations and have supported NGOs to conduct extensive civic education with a mixed record of success. A number of interventions targeting those opposed to FP have been ongoing and some have slowly seen an effect, as the unmet FP statistics have been on a downward trend from 35% in 2000/01 to the current 28% (UBoS and MEASURE DHS/ICF International, 2016). In addition, efforts have been made especially by NGOs and civil society to target individual FP champions for sensitising communities.⁴⁶ More awareness and continuous sensitisation will be needed to improve the situation, however, particularly in rural areas. In entering this space, SEDI would need to be mindful of the political and socio-religious factors influencing policymaking in the FP sector.

Gendered norms, patriarchy, and supply-side challenges also influence the uptake of contraceptives and the effectiveness of FP programmes. Although gender-responsive policies and approaches exist on paper, in reality women face a number of challenges in accessing FP services (Kabagenyi *et al.*, 2016) and the Costed Implementation Plan for Family Planning (2015–2020) recognises that gender inequalities in Uganda affect the ability of women to make household decisions. Even in situations when men are not opposed to use of modern FP methods and consider it a women's issue, other societal factors like peer influence contribute to low uptake of modern FP services, including the influence of gendered and unequal attitudes of religious and cultural leaders (Sizomu *et al.*, 2014; GoU, 2014).

The issue is not only one of lack of access to knowledge, but also lack of supplies and poorly skilled staff (Dougherty *et al.*, 2018).

The financing of FP in Uganda is heavily dependent on donor funding, and investment in M&E and research has also increased. Through the sector-wide approach, DPs such as UNFPA, USAID, and FCDO, among others, finance reproductive health activities, particularly procurement of contraceptives within the country.

In 2017, about UGX 106 billion was received by the GoU and NGOs for FP activities from various sources, including donors and domestic funding; this represents a 34% increase on 2016 (UBoS, 2019a). International organisations remained the main source of funding for FP activities in Uganda in 2017, accounting for 73% (UGX 76 billion) of the total income received in that year (UBoS, 2019a). These resources are channelled through the public sector (government MDAs) or private sector (NGOs and other service delivery points like health facilities).

The highest proportion of the funds from donors is channelled through NGOs. It is worth noting that more capital is being spent generating evidence as a percentage of the FP

⁴⁶ KII (2019).

budget; however, there is not much information on the quality of this evidence or whether it is being used.

FCDO is a key player in this sector. One of the main focus areas in FCDO's gender equality strategy is the provision of modern methods of FP to women and adolescent girls in the country. In addition to working with the GoU, FCDO is contributing to the UNFPA global programme to enhance reproductive health commodity security, as well as supporting Marie Stopes International and the International Planned Parenthood Federation.⁴⁷ Over 2017 to 2022, the plan is to extend this support to 375,000 women and girls across the country.⁴⁸ FCDO is currently supporting the MoH's national FP costed implementation plan. The plan has a component on reducing high fertility rates and improving sexual and reproductive health outcomes (RISE), which is led by UNFPA. The plan was launched in early 2017 and FCDO has committed £10,072,041 to its implementation.⁴⁹

USAID's support for FP interventions has mainly focused on NGOs with respect to supply of commodities under the alternative distribution mechanism through the Uganda Health Marketing Group, among others.

Donors are thus the drivers of FP-related policies and programming. They also finance civil society groups that come out publicly to advocate for FP policy reviews to influence Parliament and MoH policy, as well as decision makers. Donors are engaged and coordinated in the use of evidence through the Health Policy Advisory Committee, which is critical in monitoring implementation of the Compact and provision of advice on the implementation of FP and other health-related policies.

The GoU's policy commitments to FP are yet to lead to increased funding for FP. They have also not translated into effective implementation for meeting the country's need for FP services. Government's allocation of financial resources directly to FP programmes is somewhat limited, a reflection more of limited actual political commitment than of financial incapacity. While the DPs' dominant position in the policy development process is further leveraged to set the FP programming agenda, actual policy implementation is through the MoH and civil society. This has resulted in donors driving the FP policy direction with support from GoU technical officers. For many of the officers, donor support enables them to also pursue their personal goals, such as professional development. SEDI might have challenges making inroads into the FP sector, especially if the MoH must commit time and resources for implementing interventions. Donors are key partners in this space as they are making the bulk of the investments in FP.

UNFPA has been quite influential in shaping FP policy and programmatic direction in Uganda. The MoH's Costed Implementation Plan for Family Planning (2015–2020) had a planned budget of US\$ 236 million, of which US\$ 123 million was to be funded by the GoU and the remainder from DPs (Zlatunich *et al.*, 2015). UNFPA has been the traditional funding partner for FP services in Uganda since 1987, covering the biggest proportion of the FP budget both at national and local level. As the leading health DP on FP, and through the long funding history and large amount of money it continues to dedicate to FP, UNFPA has gained significant influence in terms of shaping FP policy and programmatic direction in Uganda in comparison to other DPs (Golooba-Mutebi *et al.*, 2018). SEDI's engagement with UNFPA will be important for entering the FP space at both the national and district levels.

⁴⁷ DFID Family Planning Aid Performance, Population Matters.
https://populationmatters.org/sites/default/files/dfid_performance.pdf

⁴⁸ DFID: Uganda Profile, July 2017

⁴⁹ DFID development tracker

NGOs play a key role in FP advocacy at the community level. Domestic stakeholders who are pushing for FP within Uganda are mainly community-based groups of FP champions in some districts under UNFPA. FP service provider NGOs and civil society further support them. A combination of these stakeholders tends to build alliances from the community level, attempting to influence district- and national-level decision makers on FP.

5.3 Evidence ecosystem

The production and use of evidence have been somewhat institutionalised at the MoH and in DHOs. The MoH has an M&E unit and each department has an M&E officer. For FP, it is the reproductive health department that is responsible for collecting M&E data.⁵⁰ Within districts, there is a biostatistician responsible for collecting the routine M&E data.

The MoH primarily relies on statistical and monitoring data evidence to inform decision making. A HMIS (DHIS2) has been rolled out to district levels since 2012, using district health information software. Both public and private clinics are required to provide frequent data – including on FP – to the extent that private clinic licence renewals are tied to HMIS self-reporting to the MoH (Wandera *et al.*, 2019). However, there are challenges: the complexity of the forms leads to fragmented and incomplete data; HMIS supervision is inadequate (only a third of staff are in place); and constant training is needed at district levels to ensure staff understanding given high turnover levels (Wandera *et al.*, 2019). Limited attention is given to data collection at already overstretched district and sub-county facilities, and while the data in the national database can be easily retrieved and used for decision making it is, for the most part, not (Wandera *et al.*, 2019).

Given the discrepancies in the DHIS2 data, the MoH corroborates the DHIS2 data with dates from periodic surveys – such as the service delivery point survey by UNFPA and Performance Management Accountability (PMA) 2020 under the Makerere University School of Public Health (MUSPH) – to monitor the trends in uptake of FP and unmet need for FP. Like the DHIS2, the PMA looks at stock discrepancies, number of health workers trained, and method mix, among other things. The PMA also provides trends and bridges the gap in information during the years when UDHS data is not available (the UDHS is undertaken every five years). SEDI could work with the MoH to improve access to HMIS data, as well as improving its quality and user-friendliness.

It would be important to factor in GESI considerations and improve data access for decision makers at the national, district, and local levels.

In addition to routine monitoring data, UBoS-generated evidence is seen as credible, impartial, and useful in informing national plans in the area of FP.⁵¹ The most consulted data sources for FP-related issues are the UDHS survey and the census:

*We majorly rely on evidence that is generated by UBoS since it is the only government agency mandated to provide data and statistics to inform the government development agenda. Other sources of evidence are merely complementary.*⁵²

UBoS also has some good data to support discussions about what can work in terms of FP in Uganda (e.g. how services can be made more youth-friendly), but the challenge is in aligning those ideas with prevailing conservative social values and political considerations,

⁵⁰ KII (2019).

⁵¹ Refer to Section 3 for more information about UBoS.


⁵² KII (2019).

which remain a barrier for adult and adolescent women to access FP services.⁵³ Other sources of evidence identified were MoFPED and independent research institutions.

The MoH also uses evidence, such as DHIS2 data, research, and UBoS survey findings, to set the FP agenda for the annual health sector performance reviews, and subsequent planning and budgeting in line with the Health Sector Development Plan (2015) and the 2014 Uganda Family Planning Costed Implementation Plan.

SWGs and TWGs provide an opportunity for promoting evidence-informed policymaking. The sector-wide approach integrates the different actors working with the MoH, including sector agencies, departments (internal perspectives), line ministries, civil society actors, the private sector, and international partners. Furthermore, the sector-wide approach at national level provides a form of partnership guided by the Compact, which serves as the formal binding instrument in the health sector's long-term institutional arrangements. The instrument is premised on the overall interpretation of the principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (MoH, 2015). Through the provisions of the Compact, which define the priority areas of focus, DPs have provided funding for FP evidence to support programme implementation. Some examples include studies on generating evidence about situational analyses related to demand creation, service delivery, supplies and commodities, financing, stewardship, and management, as well as policy issues that informed the development of district-specific FP costed implementation plans. The research efforts were coordinated through the Health Policy Advisory Committee under the MoH, and the Maternal and Child Health TWG. SEDI could engage with the diverse and influential stakeholders in these groups, which can contribute to the promotion of evidence-informed decision making within MoH. Figure 5 illustrates how these groups fit into the overall governance structure of the MoH.

Figure 5: Governance and management structures of the MoH



Source: Adapted from MoH (2013)

Research institutions and universities play a role in evidence generation given the often limited financial and human resource capacities of government MDAs to conduct research. In addition to routine M&E data, the MoH mainly uses evidence generated from external sources – chiefly the MUSPH and DPs. The NPC also commissions

⁵³ KII (2019).

research and policy studies to generate evidence that is used to inform policy and programming, including providing advice to the President on population matters.⁵⁴ For instance, introduction of self-injections was informed by a study undertaken by PATH; subsequently, the MoH piloted it and realised that it could work since women were willing to inject themselves and there were no social gaps. Based on this success, it was rolled out.⁵⁵

It is worth noting that the MoH currently has no official research priority list, and this is potentially an area where SEDI could support with research institutions, donor partners, and MoH to develop priorities that account for the key evidence gaps in FP. The current lack of a research agenda to guide research implies that some of the work undertaken by research organisations may not directly fill the evidence gaps in the MoH.


5.3.1 Stakeholder mapping and power analysis

An informal mapping of stakeholders by their power and influence, as well as their interest in using evidence, is shown in Figure 6.

From the stakeholder mapping, it is evident that donors are influential and are interested in evidence use. National entities, like MoFPED, OPM, MoH, and NPC, also seem to be powerful and have interest in evidence.

The role of the TWGs such as the MCH, MoH, TWG, as well as the FP consortium are presented in Figure 6 as key stakeholders of power, influence and interest in evidence use in FP.

Figure 6: Stakeholder map of power, influence, and interest in evidence use in FP




Source: Stakeholder map, relationships, and power dynamics in FP (Configuration based on literature review and interviews) Legend: **Orange**: International actors; **Yellow**: National actors; **Red**: District actors

⁵⁴ KII (2019).

⁵⁵ KII (2019).

5.3.2 Social network analysis

Figure 7: Social network analysis



Additional opportunities were identified through social network analysis:

- **Critical relationship building:** It was noted that MUSPH and the government agencies (NPA, National Medical Stores, UBoS, and NPC) are only weakly related, yet the university generates a lot of evidence on FP that could be used by the agencies for policy formulation. Similarly, district local governments are institutions where policy action is operationalised, but they have no connections with research institutions.
- **Tap into under-utilised support:** Adolescent and youth focused CSOs (e.g. Uganda Youth Alliance on Family Planning and Adolescent Health, Uganda Youth and Adolescents Health Forum, and Youth Equality Centre) have strategic target FP subpopulations and are good at policy advocacy. However, they have not been adequately linked to sources of evidence like MUSPH to inform their policy advocacy efforts. Additionally, lower-level local governments, especially Local Council III, have not been prioritised as important structures for use of evidence; although they are the lowest planning units in the local government structures, they currently have no capacity to generate credible evidence.
- **Building networks within the network:** It will be critical to strengthen the linkages between MUSPH and local NGOs/CSOs as advocacy agencies in order to enhance the use of FP evidence by relevant MDAs, as well as by Parliament. This linkage has hitherto been informal.

Risks may include the following:

- **Spoilers:** The religious institutions and kingdoms are possible spoilers given their high societal influence, especially against modern FP methods. Religious institutions' interest is in the use of traditional FP methods, while some kingdoms still advocate for more children to mitigate the effects of the rising number of settlers on their land. NGOs/CSOs are possible entities that can influence these institutions, given their history of providing financial and technical support to them, as well as having structures that are integrated with those of the cultural and religious institutions.
- **Quiet saboteurs:** Male spouses have been identified as influential but silent saboteurs in terms of the use of modern FP methods by their wives. Mitigation measures have included the use of male FP champions to address this challenge.

Additional risks identified through social network analysis include the following:

- **Dependency:** FP funding heavily relies on donors, especially UNFPA, thus raising dependency and sustainability concerns.
- **Dysfunctional/conflicting relationships:** Some NGOs/CSOs have experienced financial management challenges and have lacked donor funding, yet their interventions were critical in increasing access to and use of modern FP services. An inbuilt approach that strengthens their internal capacity to manage resources can be helpful in streamlining the relationships. Strengthening the relationships between NGOs/CSOs and the MoH as funding avenues for expedited accountability of donor funds can also help to address these challenges. That is to say, donors can fund specific FP initiatives that are planned by the MoH through NGOs/CSOs financial management processes.
- **Marginalisation:** NGOs/CSOs focusing on sexual minorities have been marginalised in terms of financial support, as well as inclusion in FP advocacy efforts.
- **Disincentives for change:** Some religious leaders are supportive of FP outside the formal institutional structures. Adopting a strategy for identification of such champions, and directly supporting them outside their institutional structures, will promote the social behaviour changes necessary for increased uptake of modern FP.

5.4 Organisational diagnostic

To better understand what organisations present opportunities for SEDI, we undertook a light-touch organisational diagnostic of the MoH (with reference to FP) and NPC using the AAA methodology.⁵⁶ Detailed insights from this preliminary AAA analysis will inform decisions on how SEDI might engage with them.

5.5 Conclusion

The analysis highlights several opportunities for, as well as constraints to, SEDI. The level of buy-in for, and interest in, using evidence is quite high among key players like the MoH and the NPC. Institutional structures such as the Health Policy Advisory Committee and other TWGs can help in facilitating engagement and garnering support from a diverse set of influential stakeholders. M&E units in the MoH can also be potential entry points for engagement. The governance and management structures of the MoH routinely use monitoring data, research, and evaluations to inform policy processes and programmatic reporting. This requirement is embedded in planning processes at all levels. There are champions with the MoH, departments, and agencies who have the requisite technical expertise and can recognise the importance of evidence.

5.5.1 Opportunities

SEDI could support efforts to improve access to existing data, its quality, and user-friendliness, or promote the use of different types of evidence, factoring in considerations of GESI.

- The MoH does not have a clear research agenda and relies on existing relationships with a few research institutions to source evidence. There could be an opportunity here to work with the MoH to develop a more rigorous process for setting the research agenda.
- Linking FP with population dynamics would also make it better aligned as the focus would be on demographic dividends – a priority area for the GoU.
- In terms of interdependences, the epidemic component of the humanitarian sector and FP both fall within the mandate of the MoH. If SEDI chooses to work in both sectors, SEDI interventions could therefore be complementary across different departments of the same ministry.

5.5.2 Challenges

- While the rules of the game in the policymaking processes are influenced and shaped by the formal legal and policy frameworks, informal institutions underpinned by norms and social and cultural traditions play a critical role in FP. Deep-rooted cultural, religious, and gendered norms and beliefs may thwart the use of evidence in FP-related policymaking.
- Donors are the major funders in this sector. These funders, in turn, support NGOs to carry out advocacy at the community level. It is unclear how SEDI will be able to engage with a patchwork of donors and NGOs working in different regions and on different aspects of FP.
- The MoH is under-resourced in terms of domestic funding. It is unclear whether it will be able to commit time and resources to SEDI.

⁵⁶ For more information about AAA, refer to the Methodology section.

6. Gender sector

Key findings and implications for SEDI

- While MoGLSD is the line ministry that leads on gender equality policymaking, all the ministries have mandates to mainstream gender and are supposed to comply with gender-responsive budgeting requirements.
- Given the cross-cutting nature of gender, SEDI could approach it using three possible configurations:
 - Working within MoGLSD, but primarily with the Directorate of Gender and Community Development and its departments.
 - Working within MoGLSD, but extending the collaboration to the Labour and/or Social Development directorates
 - Working with the MoGLSD and other MDAs in collaboration with one or more MDAs.
- In all scenarios, it will be important to explore how SEDI can help expand and deepen evidence use, for example by moving use from mainly descriptive sex-disaggregated statistics to more gender analysis and increased use of research evidence that addresses the social and structural drivers of gender inequality and exclusion.
- SEDI can help MDAs expand and deepen their thinking on what type of evidence is appropriate for national policymaking, which would include drawing on subnational evidence to improve adaptive programming to address the specific issues of minorities and marginalised populations.
- In terms of key actors, it would be important to engage with MoGLSD, EOC, MoFPED, and UBoS and consider working where there are intersections between them. This would help in capitalising on existing relationships and pathways, for example in gender and equity budgeting.

6.1 Introduction

Uganda's commitment to gender equality is grounded in its constitutional guarantee of equality and freedom from discrimination. This commitment has expanded and deepened since 1995 through the ratification of international and regional conventions and declarations, including the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Declaration and Plan of Action, the African Union Gender Policy, the Maputo Protocol, and the SDGs. Uganda's national gender policy was first introduced in 1997 and was last updated in 2007. The EOC was established in 2007, and it oversees discrimination cases and issues certificates for gender and equity budget papers submitted by MDAs.

The creation of the MoGLSD in 1998⁵⁷ and support from OPM have been instrumental in the push for gender mainstreaming. These efforts have been bolstered by the introduction of gender and equity budgeting certificate requirements through the Public Finance Management Act 2015, the development of the NPGEIs, the National Policy for the Elimination of GBV 2016, and a range of strategies (e.g. to end child marriage and teenage pregnancy in 2015 and the Sexuality Education Framework of 2018) and implementing legislation, such as the Domestic Violence Act 2010 and Persons with Disabilities Act, which was amended in 2019 to protect women's rights, as well as greater recognition of the importance of gender in successive NDPs.

⁵⁷ The GoU formed the Ministry of Women in Development under the President's Office in 1988. In 1992, it became the Ministry of Women in Development, Culture and Youth. In 1994 it was renamed the Ministry of Gender and Community Development and in 1998 it merged with two other ministries to become the MoGLSD.

In fact, there are now almost 20 policies and strategies directly or indirectly for promoting gender equality. However, they focus mainly on poverty reduction and sustainable development in simple terms of equalising the participation of males and females. They ignore the gendered drivers of the inequities they are seeking to rebalance (Mugisha *et al.*, 2019). Box 4 earlier captured how SEDI defines GESI.

6.2 PEA

Although a gender focus is a government-wide commitment and mandate for all MDAs, the MoGLSD is the main driver of gender-related policies and programmes. The MoGLSD is the mandated ministerial lead on gender, for which there is a specific directorate (Figure 8). It also has mandates for employment, the labour force, and social development. This means that tackling gender inequalities is cross-cutting and intersecting within the MoGLSD itself. For example, there are major national programmes on women's economic empowerment and cash transfer social protection programmes, where differential gendered needs and impacts extend beyond the Gender and Community Development Directorate. Creation of gender as a ministerial sector, as well as housing it with other sectors, has two main intra-ministerial effects. On the one hand, it highlights the GoU's focus on social justice and equity, which gives precedence to work on gender equity and equality, especially as it affects women. On the other hand, this clear commitment and focus does not always match the priorities of some ministry staff, who see the attention given to gender – symbolised by its leading position in the name – as overshadowing the Labour and Social Development directorates.⁵⁸

This is part of a wider definitional challenge. In Uganda, 'gender equality' is not about changing unequal social norms; it is about affirmative action to improve female underrepresentation, as well as being an important element within vulnerable groups such as children, youth, people living with disabilities, and the elderly (Ssali, 2019). This focus is also reflected in what is measured, what is considered evidence related to gender equality, and how it is used in decision making.

As Figure 8 shows, the Directorate of Gender and Community Development engages with a multiplicity of stakeholders that have competing interests and are some of the strongest opponents of going beyond helping women and girls as individuals, or going beyond women and girls achieving numerical parity with men and boys.⁵⁹ These conservative stakeholders can frustrate legislation, policy, and programming on GBV. This is because some religious leaders are concerned that policies and legislation will be about redefining domestic relations in ways that could redefine women's roles and positions in the household and marriage.⁶⁰

A multiparty political system and a strong presidency limit efforts to develop and implement policies and programming that address the structural dimensions of gender inequality (Ssali, 2019). MoGLSD, in reporting on Uganda's progress over the past five years in its Beijing +25 report, does not shirk from describing the 'persistent patriarchy' that perpetuates gender inequalities in public and private spaces (MoGLSD, 2019, p. 13). However, that sort of frankness and consensus about the causes and consequences of inequality and exclusion does not carry over in similar ways into laws, policymaking, or programming.

⁵⁸ KII (2019).

⁵⁹ KII (2019).

⁶⁰ KII (2019).

While Uganda has enacted a number of laws aimed at ensuring gender equality, the majority of the existing gender laws focus on criminality and legislating against violence. A recent review of the laws related to gender shows that they focus predominantly on criminality and legislating against violence (Ssali, 2019).

Quotas have helped increase women's participation in politics, but inequality and social inclusion remain deeply entrenched. Uganda has high rates of participation in politics by women, due in part to the 2006 Electoral Law that established national and subnational quotas for women. But once social institutions of discrimination are factored in, Uganda's performance is average for the East African region and continent. Inequality and social exclusion remain deeply entrenched and are maintained by patriarchal power relations and inequitable practices, beliefs, and social norms (UBoS, 2015; MoGLSD, 2019; Ssali, 2019).


The MoGLSD has champions of gender equality at the highest levels of policymaking within the ministry. In terms of having gender equality champions at high levels, the Ministry has had strong female ministers who are 'historicals,' such as Janat Mukwaya, who recently retired (December 2019) as Cabinet Minister for Gender, Labour and Social Affairs. She had the credibility of being a former military officer, war veteran, and NRA politician. Other notable examples include the State Minister for Gender and Culture, Peace Mutuuzo, and State Minister for Youth and Children Affairs, Florence Nakiwala Kiyingi. These three leaders have been key to passing gender-sensitive policies and legislation through Cabinet, such as the examples provided in the introduction.

6.3 Evidence ecosystem

Although several stakeholders may be consulted for agenda setting or issue identification, only a few wield much influence over policymaking. MoGLSD becomes alert to a need or problem warranting policy intervention either due to CSOs advocating about it, from the media reporting on it, from academia writing about it, or from its own programmes within communities.⁶¹ CSOs and academia are valuable because they have a grassroots presence, and going to the grassroots is too expensive for the GoU. However, beyond being consulted, these actors do not wield much significant power in policy formulation when compared with other MDAs, UBoS, or donors.

⁶¹ KII (2019).

Figure 8: Mapping of stakeholders of the Gender and Community Development Directorate



Source: Authors' construct, 2019

As noted in other sector sections, official data from MoFPED, UBoS, UN agencies, the World Bank, and donors are the main sources of evidence in gender-related policymaking. This is because MoGLSD is required as a matter of policy to use official data in policymaking, which is provided primarily by MoFPED, UBoS, UN agencies, the World Bank, or donors. Many of the other MDAs have data repositories and robust information management systems, while donors have international datasets that are considered more robust and reliable than the data from CSOs and academics.

Box 6 highlights how gender policies are typically drafted and which stakeholders provide inputs to the process. It shows that the policies mainly draw on evidence that is valued by the technical team, which is usually from UBoS, MoFPED, or donor data. Policies are influenced by a mix of factors: evidence, budget implications, law, and powerful stakeholders, such as religious and cultural leaders.

Box 6: How gender policies are developed⁶²

As with all government policies, gender policies are drafted by a technical team in response to a proven need (arising from the UBoS data, media reports, evidence of donors, or public pressure). The technical team values and uses evidence, mainly in the form of UBoS, MoFPED, or donor data, and mainly to describe the problem being addressed. There may not be time, budget, or skills in the team to conduct secondary research to gather more evidence or do deeper analysis. Further exploration about how these teams work could be useful. One question could be to ask how insular the policy drafting process is from implementation, which would benefit from additional and varied evidence.

⁶² Various KIIIs (2019).

The draft policy is then presented to senior management, whereby all senior technical leads in the ministry give their input. Drafts are then costed by MoGLSD economists. A policy that will cost a lot to implement is unlikely to be accepted. At various points in the process, influential stakeholders important for acceptance and implementation may have inputs through formal or informal consultations. CSOs may be lobbying for change, for example in developing the national GBV policy, but their positions and the evidence they provide will be less impactful on the process.

Policies that move forward to Cabinet have been influenced by a combination of evidence, law, financial implications, and by power, position, and relationships with key stakeholders. Religious and cultural stakeholders will have shared their views through formal consultative inputs and through their informal influence in MoGLSD through the Department of Culture and Family Affairs.

International actors influence what data government agencies collect and use.

International actors, notably the UN agencies and donors, derive their power from three sources. Firstly, they are mandated to ensure government agencies comply with international instruments relating to gender. Secondly, they provide the majority of the resources – both financial and technical – for government programmes promoting gender equality.⁶³ Finally, they offer the international data that many MDAs rely on to guide national planning. For example, one of the SDG requirements is to collect sex-disaggregated data: *‘The donors are here to provide funding and technical expertise to the bureau [UBoS] to enable it to collect gender-disaggregated data’*.⁶⁴

Participation in international policy frameworks has improved monitoring and reporting on development progress. A major catalyst for improving monitoring, measuring, and reporting on development progress has come from Uganda’s participation in international policy frameworks, such as the SDGs, CEDAW, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Maputo Protocol, as well as the progress reports Uganda is required to submit to institutions like the UN Commission on the Status of Women (for CEDAW).⁶⁵ These commitments require sex-disaggregated data and have spurred capacity development to collect and use gender-sensitive data to demonstrate Uganda’s progress.

For instance, in 2016 UBoS, in collaboration with ministries and sector experts, academia, and DPs, developed 106 NPGEIs around six themes: economy (24), education (28), health (35), human rights (6), ICT (5), and leadership and political participation (5). Of these indicators, 66 have sex-disaggregated data (UBoS, 2016). The development of the NPGEIs reflects a growing demand for MDAs to demonstrate the impact of their policies and programmes and to measure how well they are achieving their targets. These requirements are set to increase and be better enforced under NDP III.

This reporting reflects the GoU’s general belief that qualitative data or research cannot be nationally representative, as it would be too expensive to do so. Much research evidence is seen as too localised and not generalisable for national policies or programmes. For data generated from research or surveys to be considered credible by the GoU, researchers need to inform them about their work before starting, consult with them

⁶³ Examples include the DFID-funded, £11 million Support for Uganda’s Response on Gender Equality (SURGE) Programme (2015–2020) and DFID and Irish Aid’s funding of CEDOVIP to tackle domestic violence. Substantial donor support flows through UNFPA, such as Denmark’s US\$ 20 million (2018–2023) and DFID’s RISE programme (£11 million) for reproductive health and family planning, as well as through NGOs working in that area in Uganda. The EU is funding UN agencies to implement a US\$ 42 million programme, Spotlight, to eliminate GBV against women and girls by 2030. Donors also fund UNHCR, UNDP, and UN Women for programming supporting women, girls, and gender equality. These examples illustrate the substantial role of donor partners in funding gender equality in Uganda. A full accounting of donor funding is beyond the scope of this report.

⁶⁴ KII (2019).

⁶⁵ KII (2019).

about it during implementation, and achieve a minimum level of buy-in. Evidence generated this way is more likely to be used and disseminated in government.

Otherwise, there is a preference for nationally representative data or research, which is what UBoS provides and for which it has become a trusted evidence source: *‘Qualitative data is considered to be of minimal quality. UBoS data is considered to have more weight in terms of evidence’*.⁶⁶ Furthermore, according to another MDA representative, *‘government agencies such as UBoS are believed to be more credible because their evidence is considered consultative and exhaustive’*.⁶⁷

This perception of credible data being defined as nationally representative quantitative data militates against having detailed data on issues affecting minorities and marginalised populations. UBoS produces national statistics, which average data from large samples. Local variations and minorities are not visible in the data. For example, while national statistics portray the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) as being negligible, in the districts of Kapchorwa and Bukwo it is widespread and should require state intervention.⁶⁸

This practice is rooted in gendered norms, beliefs, and relations that need to inform policy and programming, which require qualitative as well as quantitative designs and methods to inform decisions. There are significant amounts of data being collected in ways that make them suitable for quality gender-responsive analysis that can produce useful evidence for decision making. Currently, this potential is limited by government incentives to use only descriptive data. They reward a focus on sex disaggregation and addressing women’s and girls’ needs without looking at the gendered social and structural drivers affecting both women, men, girls, and boys that perpetuate inequity and exclusion (Ssali, 2019). Monitoring and statistical data from UBoS can compensate for weak M&E capacities across MDAs, which are mostly due to limited staffing, skills, and budget, as well as high turnover. A lack of wide support for seeing evaluation findings as important and useful evidence for decision making limits their impact (3ie, 2019; Niringiye, 2018). Recent programmes such as the DFID-funded Strengthening Evidence-based Decision-Making led by OPM, as well as priority being given to strengthening M&E capacities and evaluation evidence use in NDP III, may be the basis for potential partnerships for SEDI (see also below).

The analysis highlights opportunities for SEDI to broaden access to, and the use of, different types of evidence, moving beyond nationally representative quantitative evidence to qualitative research and evaluations. SEDI can help MDAs expand and deepen their thinking on what type of evidence is appropriate for national policymaking, which would include drawing on subnational evidence to improve adaptive programming for addressing the specific issues of minorities and marginalised populations. SEDI would, however, need to consider how government agencies could be incentivised to use different types of evidence

The emphasis on gender-responsive and equity-focused budgeting is driving compliance with gender mainstreaming mandates in MDAs, increased collaborations, and capacity development. The Public Finance Management Act 2015 requires accounting officers to consider balanced development and gender and equity responsiveness in preparing budget framework papers. The Act requires the Minister of Finance, in consultation with the EOC, to issue certificates confirming that the budget framework paper is gender and equity responsive, as well as specifying the measures taken to equalise opportunities for women, men, persons with disabilities, and other marginalised groups. These requirements

⁶⁶ KII (2019).

⁶⁷ KII (2019).

⁶⁸ KII (2019).

have driven two developments that will be crucial for gender mainstreaming in evidence use beyond the MoGLSD: increased collaboration between MDAs, capacity building for gender-responsive planning, and equity budgeting. This potential opportunity is discussed in more detail later.

MDA mandates remain a key factor in determining for whom and how policy is made and how evidence is used in practice. The mandate to make gender-relevant policy lies with the MoGLSD. UBoS has the mandate to collect data, while the EOC has the mandate over social equity. While clarity of mandates has enabled the streamlining of functions, it also has a danger in potentially restricting gender issues to the MoGLSD. Moreover, it also raises the likelihood of having gender equality become mainly about affirmative action for women and girls. These MDAs are described in more detail later.

Other MDAs do have mandates to ensure that gender equality is mainstreamed in their respective MDA. However, participants in our KIIs did not prioritise gender issues, which they see as a MoGLSD responsibility. That perception potentially affects the data collected, even within MDAs' own information management systems:

MDAs do not appreciate gender's importance and the challenges that may occur. Adherence to gender policies by government agencies is problematic...for example, the whole of Ministry of Health does not have a [gender] focal point. Relatedly, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has gender work undertaken by the planners other than the having a separate gender focal point. There is a feeling that gender belongs to the MoGLSD.⁶⁹

There is also a lack of clarity as to how gender is understood among policymakers and its application to policy: 'This leads others [outside of MoGLSD] to reduce gender analysis to just a statement and a few statistics'.⁷⁰ This confusion around gender is worsened by its broad application within the MoGLSD, especially by actors in the other two directorates.⁷¹

The SEDI country team had anticipated seeing language in the NDP III that would prioritise improved coordination and collaboration across MDAs to deliver gender mainstreaming and gender equality commitments. Instead, there is a mixed bag, with more limited attention being paid in sector-specific ways. For example, in the chapter on mining there is a commitment to a framework for gender mainstreaming, human rights, equity, and ending child labour. Under oil and gas extractives, an unreferenced link is made to GBV, but no actions are described. For climate change, the commitment is to balanced female participation in local management of water resources and for gender-responsive resilience M&E systems in local government.

Most of the attention to gender comes in the chapter on human capital development. It has an explicit gender-responsive objective, to 'Reduce vulnerability and gender inequality along the life cycle' (NPA, 2020, p. 161). However, the associated actions focus mainly on increasing social protections. The tension between patriarchy and gender responsiveness can be seen. Falling girls' enrolment in secondary school and technical and vocational education and training is examined, but gendered reasons are not listed. However, in a long list of problems facing adolescents, harmful cultural practices are listed, as well as 'gender-related socio-economic exclusions' (NPA, 2020, p.160). Nonetheless, although the country's high level of teenage pregnancy is listed, there is no mention of the religious and cultural beliefs that challenge effective FP.

⁶⁹ KII (2019).

⁷⁰ KII (2019).

⁷¹ KII (2019).

The chapter on community mobilisation and changing mindsets reflects the continuing influence of religious and cultural norms, beliefs, and powerful stakeholders in limiting what types of evidence and analysis will be acceptable, and consequently limiting gender responsiveness: ‘The role of cultural and religious institutions in instilling and nurturing values, norms and behaviours towards a common goal have not been harnessed’ (NPA, 2020, p.174). However, in the same paragraph, the text reinforces that certain social norms and beliefs can be subject to gender-responsive policy and actions by identifying ‘negative cultural practices’ that need to be eliminated, which include child sacrifice, FGM, and GBV (NPA, 2020, pp. 174–175).

Further, the tension between conservative patriarchal forces and social change plays out in the action list for this chapter. MoGLSD is charged with ‘conducting awareness campaigns and enforcing laws against negative and/or harmful religious, traditional or cultural practices and beliefs’ (NPA, 2020, p. 176). Then, the very next action calls for central and local government and non-state actors to change attitudes and mindsets.

6.3.1 Social network analysis

Forty-six partners or key actors were mentioned in KIIs. The top players were donors, MoGLSD, MoFPED, EOC, UBoS, academia, and CSOs. Since MoGLSD leads on gender, all informants reported working with it. This interaction often involves getting policy direction on gender for their own programme implementation within their sectors.

EOC, which reports to MoGLSD, interacts with MDAs because it is responsible for reviewing and certifying their gender and equity budgeting as a way of tracking compliance with gender and equity mandates. All the informants courted MoFPED for budget support. Informants from MoFPED reported that they focus on macro-data, leaving gender issues to MoGLSD and EOC. UBoS was also courted by all the informants. As the only source of what was perceived to be nationally representative official data, UBoS is in a privileged place, where others in the sector seek them out for data.

Donors are both powerful and influential due to their ability to provide trusted, easily accessible international data and evidence, monitor Uganda’s implementation of international commitments, and provide technical support for gender mainstreaming in the different MDAs.

Academia largely interacts with MoGLSD for localised data. Otherwise, the relationship between the MoGLSD and academia is limited to the validation of research data in meetings. CSO informants mentioned having a lot of work with the MoGLSD, but there does not seem to be a reciprocal relationship. Collaboration usually only involves MoGLSD invitations to CSOs to attend validation meetings. Of these main players, the dominant ones are MoGLSD, EOC, and MoFPED.

From a SEDI perspective, the network analysis (although limited) shows that it would be important to engage with these three key players and consider working where there are intersections between them. This would help in capitalising on existing relationships and pathways, for example in gender and equity budgeting.

6.4 Organisational diagnostic

The research team analysed organisational authority, acceptance, and ability to gain preliminary insights into the potential for MDAs to partner on interventions in SEDI. We focused on the key players: MoGLSD, EOC, and UBoS.⁷²

6.5 Conclusion

6.5.1 Potential for situating gender as a cross-cutting policy priority

During the national workshop held in Kampala in January 2020 to review the first draft of the country analysis, discussions highlighted the challenges of approaching gender equality and mainstreaming as a sector. While MoGLSD is the line ministry that leads on gender equality policymaking, all the ministries have mandates to mainstream gender. All ministries must comply with gender-responsive budgeting requirements. Does the nature of gender as a cross-cutting, intersecting policy priority and the distribution of policy requirements across ministries support SEDI, look at combinations of players and potential partners and interventions in addressing GESI?

Another challenge arose in the workshop that is related to the discussion of gender as a sector. Participants pointed out that it will be important to align with current government priorities, as outlined in the NDP III. As discussed earlier, the new plan does not offer *explicit* signals of a move to prioritise gender equality and mainstreaming, which bolsters a case for looking at gender in a more integrated way within national priorities.

SEDI research shows that MDAs most often interpret ‘gender’ to mean biological sex, and that policies and programmes focus on sex-based targeting of women and girls to achieve equitable access to services, or to provide protections or access to resources through policies that do not look at the gendered social norms or structural inequalities that cause or contribute to harm, or that limit access.

Interviews uncovered the perception that commitment to gender equality means targeting women and girls as opposed to targeting groups that may be a priority. In this way, promoting women and girls’ equality competes with promoting youth or people living with disabilities. This is an example of where SEDI could work within MoGLSD across the three main directorates to find opportunities to use evidence to eliminate this false competition and strengthen government responses.

To the extent possible, in the revision phase we have adapted our approach to consider some potential points of entry and opportunities for SEDI to work on GESI on a cross-cutting basis, using three possible configurations:

1. Working within MoGLSD, but primarily with the Directorate of Gender and Community Development and its departments.
2. Working within MoGLSD, but extending collaboration to the Labour and/or Social Development directorates.
3. Working with the MoGLSD and other MDAs in collaboration with one or more MDAs.

In all scenarios, it will be important to explore how SEDI can help expand and deepen evidence use, for example by moving use from mainly descriptive sex-disaggregated

⁷² See Section 3 for a more detailed discussion on UBoS.

statistics to more gender analysis and increased use of research evidence that addresses the social and structural drivers of gender inequality and exclusion.

SEDI will be helping MDAs expand and deepen their thinking on what type of evidence is appropriate for national policymaking. Insisting that all data be nationally representative and mainly quantitative keeps crucial data and evidence invisible or simply not there. It marginalises research and evaluation evidence. More mainstreaming and coordination of researchers and policymakers is needed if research evidence is to be given greater consideration in policymaking (Orem *et al.*, 2012). Consequently, all SEDI work would support expanding demand for a wider range of evidence sources and relationship building. The latter would involve inventories of existing evidence, facilitating access, including translation, and brokering, among evidence producers and users.

6.5.2 Working within the MoGLSD Directorate of Gender and Community Development

The analysis shows that policymaking starts with an institutionalised process and with a technical team that uses evidence and would be open to improving evidence use. There is potential for improving evidence use through the policy cycle. It would help to get more information on the type of evidence the team uses for policy formulation, and how many resources are available for research to strengthen evidence use in drafting and revision. It would also help to know more about how the policy cycle works. Limited information shows more limited use of statistical data in policies, but more gender and equity analysis, and other types of evidence being used for programming, and reporting on global commitments or donor-funded projects.

Reports show the capacity to apply gender analysis and identify discriminatory gendered social norms and beliefs. The NDP III calls for improved policy research and evaluation capacities (NPA, 2020, p. 202), which might be a point of entry for working with the NPA and OPM. More exploration would be needed.

There are explicit, monitorable policies, programmes, and legislation readily available and of interest, for example on GBV. There is an opportunity to work intensively with this directorate, particularly the Department for Gender and Women's Affairs, to strengthen use of existing gender data, such as the NPGEIs and the GBV database. Risks include barriers to evidence use that does not have associated incentives, as well as risks associated with going against powerful actors who are against a change, regardless of evidence.

6.5.3 Working within and across MoGLSD

There are several potential areas that have been identified in this regard, including working at the intersections of gender and disabilities. There is support for prioritising this area and evidence of where building collaboration around evidence use could increase the impact of work in this area. The Persons with Disabilities Act was amended in 2019 to protect women's rights to have children and right to a family life, which had to overcome some discriminatory beliefs about women living with disabilities. The timing could be conducive to working in this area.

There is also potential for working across to the Labour directorate. The GoU is placing heavy emphasis on economic development, including transforming the labour force, developing extractives, and tackling subsistence and smallholder agriculture and rising poverty in some regions. This priority has significant intersections with gendered determinants of inequality that affect economic development and the labour force. This

priority intersects with youth livelihoods and women's economic empowerment. As the NDP III was only circulated during the workshop, it has not been possible to explore this area further, but it is worth further consideration.

Another area that would benefit from further scoping would be working at the intersection of women, gender, and ageing. This would cut across social protection and contribute to priorities listed in the draft NDP III on gender equality throughout the life cycle, which are contained within the chapter on human capital development.

6.5.4 Working across MDAs in various potential configurations

There are several potential areas for working with MDAs that emerged from the analysis. There is some overlap between what has potential for more focused work in MoGLSD and what would involve collaboration across one or more MDAs, based on their shared mandates for gender mainstreaming in their sectors. Underlying each potential area is a challenge of overcoming prevailing ministerial views that, despite their having gender mainstreaming mandates, responsibility for gender rests with MoGLSD. Another is an overall lack of resources for gender mainstreaming and an overreliance on donors for priority work.

GBV is a major issue for the GoU and civil society and a well-defined area where demand exists for strengthening evidence use. MoGLSD is collaborating on this with UBoS, the MoH, the Ministry of Justice, and Uganda Police, as well as with the Centre for Domestic Violence Prevention (CEDOVIP) and UWONET, well-respected CSOs with a long history of advocating for eliminating GBV and influencing policy, programming, and legislation informed by quality evidence. While the demand is there and potential for collaboration high, GBV is a very crowded area, not least because of the funding coming from donors.

Currently, the GoU's response to GBV is captured in multiple documents and policies found across different MDAs. A forthcoming toolkit will bring all of them together to aid smooth implementation. This work is being undertaken collaboratively between the MoGLSD, MoH, the Uganda Police, and the Ministry of Justice. Apart from the actors mentioned above, others engaged in collecting data on gender equity budgeting for GBV include MoFPED, the Ministry of Local Government, and the Ministry of Public Service. SEDI could explore the prioritisation to tackle GBV. An immediate possible intervention might include working to support analysis and use of UBoS's Violence against Women and Girls Survey.

Gender-responsive budgeting is also an area of potential interest. The mandates of the EOC and MoFPED in holding MDA budgets accountable for meeting gender and equity criteria and monitoring compliance form a powerful basis for developing SEDI interventions with MoGLSD, EOC, and MoFPED. EOC has a Department for Research and M&E that needs further exploration to understand more fully how it might be a point of entry. There is also some potential for interventions aimed at improved evidence use in programmes and budgets for vulnerable and marginalised populations. There would be room to explore how compliance might include using gendered differential impact analysis in addressing subpopulations, such as youth, people living with disabilities, the elderly, and refugees. These are not separate, competing constituencies. It would be important for SEDI to help MDAs get certification. Budgeting relies on established ways of working and tight deadlines. SEDI would need to be able to meet demands and there would be less leeway if SEDI causes delays or does not deliver to tight timelines.

Increasing the gender responsiveness of statistical and survey data and national standard indicators could also be a priority. Working with UBoS, and possibly OPM, there is demand for expanding how data is analysed and used by government. According to the NDP III, UBoS will lead on strengthening statistics for gender and other cross-cutting issues (NPA, 2020, p. 202). Current assumptions could be tackled, such as qualitative data being too limited for national policymaking, and that policies need to be based on nationally averaged data. A bias toward statistical data is limiting the types of evidence being used, which is coupled with a lack of trust in evidence sources outside of government, UN agencies, and donors.

Launching the National Gender Equality Indicators (NPGEIs) has been welcomed, but also criticised for having too many data gaps, measurement gaps, lack of understanding about what they mean, and how to use them. Consequently, they are not currently supporting improvements to legislation. SEDI could help improve use of indicators, possibly by helping at the intersection of improved qualitative indicators and use, including increasing the analysis, translation, and reporting of data.

More exploration is needed on how SEDI can increase the demand for subnational evidence that can improve the adaptation of programming to local contexts. Programming for marginalised, localised excluded populations needs subnational data, so SEDI could help improve programming evidence, design, implementation, and results. This could be a pilot investment. Barriers include a lack of incentives to change the type of evidence currently being used, while demand for evidence that addresses inequality and exclusion may be lower than expected.

7. Conclusion

This section aims to synthesise key insights that emerge as points of convergence or divergence across all three sectors followed by specific narratives that have emerged for each SEDI sector. The objective of this section is not to recommend one SEDI sector over the other, but rather to lay out the analysis done so far, the strengths and weaknesses that have emerged for each sector, and explore synergies and complementarities between different sectors.

7.1 Points of convergence and divergence across sectors

- Although there are gaps in the generation and use of evidence in all the sectors, by and large there are established structures for generating evidence within the sectors, as well as generalised support for the idea of using evidence.
- In addition to internal routine monitoring administrative data generated by the MDAs, official data from UBoS, UN agencies, the World Bank, and donors is seen as credible, impartial, and useful in informing national planning and policies across the three sectors.
- Data collected across the three sectors does not adequately use gender as an analytic. At best it is disaggregated by sex and age.
- Donors continue to have a moderate to high influence on policymaking in all three sectors – with relatively higher influence in the FP and humanitarian (particularly refugee response) areas. They derive their influence from the fact that they provide the majority of the resources, both financial and technical. They also offer international data, which many MDAs rely on to guide national planning.
- The SWGs and TWGs in the three sectors provide an opportunity for evidence-based policymaking. These could be a potential entry point for SEDI.

7.2 Potential synergies across the humanitarian, FP, and gender sectors

- Given the cross-cutting nature of gender, all MDAs have mandates to mainstream gender and comply with gender-responsive budgeting requirements. Based on this context, gender has synergies and interdependencies with the other two sectors and may not necessarily be looked at as a standalone sector.
- The epidemics component of the humanitarian sector and FP both fall within the mandate of the MoH. If SEDI chooses to work in both sectors, there will be complementarity of SEDI interventions across different departments of the same ministry.
- Issues of FP and gender are intertwined. Gender norms do influence FP and reproductive health behaviours. Indeed, there are several similarities in terms of stakeholders.

8. Annex A: An example of evidence-based policymaking

The role of evidence in the formulation of the National Fertiliser Policy

Wednesday 4 May 2016 marked a major milestone for the EPRC as Cabinet approved the **National Fertiliser Policy**, its strategy, and investment plan for Uganda.

The process to develop the fertiliser policy was initiated in 2010, when EPRC, through its research, highlighted that Uganda's soils were no longer fertile and required use of fertilisers to bolster soil nutrients for better agricultural yields. The strong case for fertiliser use made by EPRC attracted the **Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa** to finance a project that supported the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) in the process of formulation and approval of the national fertiliser regulations, strategy, and policy. Through several public and nationwide consultative events, and use of strong policy linkages, MAAIF and EPRC were able to constructively engage various policy actors in the development and eventual endorsement of the National Fertiliser Policy, its regulations, and strategy, which are intended to guide and promote the use of fertilisers by Uganda's farmers.

Key highlights leading to endorsement of the policy

The development of the National Fertiliser Policy began in 2010 after EPRC recognised declining soil fertility as one of the major challenges to increasing agriculture productivity in Uganda, as stipulated in the then Agricultural Development Strategy and Investment Plan for 2010/11–2014/15. Based on this recognition, EPRC developed a project proposal titled '**Towards Uganda's Fertilizer Policy, Regulations and Strategy**', and was able to secure a three year grant from Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa to implement the project, effective September 2010. The project aimed at establishing an institutional framework that promotes increased fertiliser use for higher agricultural productivity in Uganda. It further aimed at supporting the process of formulation, approval, and popularisation of the Uganda National Fertiliser Strategy, policies, and regulations. It also focused on creating awareness among stakeholders of the need to use fertilisers for increased agricultural productivity. It is through this project that EPRC was able to work closely with and support MAAIF in the process of formulation and approval of the National Fertiliser Policy, regulations, and strategy.

Evidence was critical in informing the entire policy process

With support from this project, EPRC researchers were able to analyse the status of use of inorganic fertilisers in Uganda to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues within the fertiliser industry. Several legal, regulatory, and policy documents were reviewed during the preliminary stages to identify the gaps that should be addressed by the policy. This process also involved conducting a SWOT analysis of the fertiliser subsector in terms of availability of policies, institutions, capacities, and experiences. It was established that, although efforts had been made over the years to regulate and control the use of agricultural chemicals in the country (**Agricultural Chemicals Control Act, 2006**), there was no clearly articulated and documented policy framework to guide the manufacture, distribution, sale, and use of fertilisers. The findings generated were then used to develop and package messages and materials that were used to raise awareness and influence various policy actors on the need for a fertiliser policy for Uganda.

Stakeholder consultations and engagements enriched policy formulation

Having generated sufficient evidence to justify the importance of a fertiliser policy for Uganda, EPRC and MAAIF embarked on nationwide consultations where district stakeholders were consulted. Separate consultative workshops were held in eastern, mid-western, north-western, and central Uganda. The objective of these workshops was to create awareness about the draft policy and gather expert views on how to make the policy realistic and implementable. In June 2011, with **Think Tank Initiative** funding, EPRC was able to bring together an impressive gathering of specialists at a national conference exploring the potential of fertilisers to transform agriculture in Uganda. The Centre continued to maintain momentum among the relevant stakeholders, while discussing how to promote fertiliser use and create a well-functioning fertiliser market. Because of this, in July 2011 EPRC was invited to make a presentation to the Sessional Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture on the state of fertiliser use in the country. This was followed by a Cabinet request for EPRC's publications on the topic. In July 2012, a national validation workshop was held to verify and provide final input to the draft policy, which was ultimately presented to the policymaking technical committees at MAAIF. The policy was presented to the Agricultural Chemicals Control Technical Committee and the Agricultural Chemical Board in September 2012. The policy was further revised and then submitted to the top policy management of MAAIF for review. They reviewed and adopted the policy in December 2012.

Development of the National Fertiliser Sub-Sector Development Strategy and Investment Plan: 2015/16–2019/20

Following the adoption of the draft policy, EPRC and MAAIF then embarked on the development of a **National Fertilizer Strategy and Investment Plan** to guide the execution of the fertiliser policy and regulations. This is a tool for guiding the fertiliser subsector to achieve sustained availability of fertilisers in sufficient quantities, of the right quality, at affordable prices, and in a timely fashion, while upholding environmental health. The National Fertiliser Strategy was developed through a highly consultative and participatory process. A series of meetings and workshops were held with various stakeholders, including MPs, between July and October 2013. The draft strategy was validated at a national stakeholder workshop in November 2013 and later on presented to the two technical committees and the top policy management of MAAIF for consideration. However, due to unforeseen circumstances in the policy environment, the process stalled.

Final interventions toward approval of the fertiliser policy and strategy

In January 2016, the process was rekindled, and the draft policy and draft national strategy were submitted to the Cabinet Secretariat for review and to MoFPED for issuance of a Certificate of Financial Implications. Unfortunately, the certificate of financial implication was not issued due to lack of clarity on how the implementation of the policy was going to be financed within the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework of the sector. Likewise, the Cabinet Secretariat could not consider the documents due to lack of a **RIA** of the fertiliser policy as prescribed in the Uganda Policy Guidelines.

Through the breadth of its expertise and policy networks, EPRC, with the support of a consultant, was able to conduct a RIA in fulfilment of the Cabinet requirement. A workshop to validate and refine the RIA of the fertiliser policy was held on 13 April 2016, prior to submission of the policy to Cabinet for approval. The RIA aims at assessing the likely social, economic, and political implications as well as the persons, groups, and communities likely to be affected once the policy is adopted. It also stipulates the sanctions and enforcement

mechanisms, among others. As the RIA was being finalised, MAAIF was able to obtain a Certificate of Financial Implications from the MoF on 26 April 2016. With all the policy requirements fulfilled, the National Fertiliser Policy and its strategy and investment plan were tabled before Cabinet on 4 May 2016 for approval.

On that same day, the policy was finally endorsed by the Cabinet chaired by the Head of State President Yoweri Museveni. It was thus a momentous day for both EPRC and MAAIF, as their five-year effort to formulate a fertiliser policy paid off, on the last day of the outgoing Cabinet (2011–2016).

Source: <http://eprcug.org/press-media/news-opinions/457-eprc-efforts-payoff-as-cabinet-approves-national-fertilizer-policy-and-strategy-for-uganda>

9. Bibliography

- 3ie (2020) www.3ieimpact.org/our-work/uganda
- 3ie (2020) 'Building evidence culture within government: the Ugandan case', www.3ieimpact.org/blogs/building-evidence-culture-within-government-ugandan-case
- Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. and Woolcock, M. (2012) 'Escaping capability traps through problem-driven iterative adaptation', *PDIA Working Paper 299*, Center for Global Development, Washington DC.
- Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. and Woolcock, M. (2015) 'Building capability by delivering results: Putting Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) principles into practice', in *A Governance Practitioner's Notebook: Alternative Ideas and Approaches*, OECD-DAC Network on Governance, Paris.
- Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. and Woolcock, M. (2017) *Building State Capability*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Ario, A.R., Makumbi, I., Bulage, L. *et al.* (2019) 'The logic model for Uganda's health sector preparedness for public health threats and emergencies', *Global Health Action* 12, p.1664103.
- Asingwire, N. *et al.* (2019) 'Impact Evaluation of youth-friendly family planning services in Uganda', *American Journal of Preventative Medicine*, Uganda. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2018.06.010>
- Awortwi N. (2011) 'Non-state social protection actors and services in Africa: Governance below the state', *Governance below the State*, Routledge, London.
- Awortwi, N. and Aiyede, E.R. (2019) 'Politics, public policy, and social protection in Africa: Evidence from cash transfer programmes', *Evidence from Cash Transfer Programmes*, Routledge, and London.
- Bagyendera, J.K. (2016) 'Evidence-informed decision-making landscape for Uganda', Provide and Equip, Uganda.
- Bagyendera JK. (n.d.) 'Uganda Evidence Ecosystem Map'. <https://aenweb.blob.core.windows.net/aenweb/files/files/1.-Bagyendera-2018.pdf>
- Bamutaze, Y. (2015) 'Disaster risk governance in ecosystem-dependent livelihoods exposed to multiple natural hazards in Uganda'. In: Companion, M (ed.) *Disaster's impact on livelihood and cultural survival*, CRC Press. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100075>
- Betts, A., Bloom, L., Kaplan, J., *et al.* (2014) *Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular Assumptions. Oxford Humanitarian Innovation Project*. University of Oxford: Oxford.
- Bonino, F. (2014) 'Humanitarian Feedback Mechanisms: Research, Evidence, and Guidance'. (Authored with Jean, I. and Knox Clarke, P.). ALNAP, London.
- Bongaarts, J., *et al.* (2012) 'Family planning programs for the 21st century: Rationale and design', *The Population Council*, ix, 94, New York.
- Booth, D. (2011) 'Aid effectiveness: Bringing country ownership (and politics) back in', *Working Paper 336*, Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Booth, D. and Unsworth, S. (2014) 'Politically smart, locally led development', *Discussion Paper*, Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Booth, D. and Harris, D. (2013) 'Applied political economy analysis: Five practical issues', London: Overseas Development Institute.

- Booth, D., Harris, D. and Wild, L. (2016) 'From political economy analysis to doing development differently: A learning experience', Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Bukenya, B. and Gooloba-Mutebi, F. (2019) 'Political settlements and the delivery of maternal health services in rural Uganda'. *Effective States and Inclusive Development Working Paper No. 113*. Department for International Development, London.
- Bukenya, B. and Muhumuza, W. (2017) 'The politics of core public sector reform in Uganda: Behind the façade'. *Effective States and Inclusive Development Working Paper No. 85*. Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID), Manchester.
- Campbell Collaboration (2019). Campbell partnership evidence and gap maps (EGMs). <http://chs.mak.ac.ug/afcen/map/>
- Carbone, G. (2008) *No-party Democracy? Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Co.
- Colenbrander, S., et al. (2015) 'Consensus and contention in the priority setting process: examining the health sector in Uganda', Uganda.
- Conroy-Krutz, J. and Logan, C. (2012) 'Museveni and the 2011 Ugandan Election: Did the Money Matter?' *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 50, No. 4: 625–655.
- Fiona Napier, F., Rono, K., Nyamugasira, W., and Nampewo, S. (2016) Development Initiatives, 'Humanitarian evidence systems mapping in East Africa'. [Humanitarian-evidence-systems-mapping-in-East-Africa_Feb2016.pdf \(devinit.org\)](#)
- Dougherty, A., et al. (2018) 'Knowledge and use of family planning among men in rural Uganda'. *BMC Public Health*, Vol 18, 10.
- EPRC (2019) Uganda's Vision of Middle Income Status: Why the Growth of the Middle Class Matters? Research Series No. 150. Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC).
- Faustino, J. and Booth, D. (2014) 'Development entrepreneurship: how donors and leaders can foster institutional change', *Working Politically in Practice Series – Case Study No. 2*. Overseas Development Institute, London; and the Asia Foundation, San Francisco.
- Fritz, V., Levy, B. and Ort, R. (eds.) (2014) *Problem-driven political economy analysis: The World Bank's experience*, World Bank, Washington DC.
- Gauri, V. (2013) 'Redressing Grievances and Complaints Regarding Basic Service Delivery'. *World Development*, 41: 109–119.
- Goldman I, Byamugisha A, Gounou A, et al. (2018) 'the emergence of government evaluation systems in Africa: The case of Benin, Uganda, and South Africa', *African Evaluation Journal* 6.
- Gooloba-Mutebi, F. (2008) 'Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-Making', *Working Paper No. 27*, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.
- Gooloba-Mutebi, F. and Hickey, S. (2013) 'Investigating the links between political settlements and inclusive development in Uganda: Towards a Research Agenda'. *Effective States and Inclusive Development Working Paper No. 20*. DFID, Uganda.
- Gooloba-Mutebi, F. and Hickey, S. (2016) 'The Master of Institutional Multiplicity? The Shifting Politics of Regime Survival, State-building and Democratisation in Museveni's Uganda', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, University of Manchester, Uganda.

- Gooloba-Mutebi, F., Bukenya, B. and Seruwagi, G. (2018) 'The Political Economy of Sexual and Reproductive Health Services in Uganda', Report for United Nations Population Fund and DFID, Uganda.
- GoU (2006) 'Uganda Refugee Act', Uganda. Available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b7baba52.html>
- GoU (2013) 'A Guide to Policy Development & Management in Uganda'. Cabinet Secretariat. Available at <http://regulatoryreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Uganda-Revised-Guide-to-Policy-Development-Mgt-2013.pdf>
- GoU (2014) 'The National Population Council Act, 2014'. Available at <http://popsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/National-Population-Act-2014.pdf>
- GoU (2018) 'National Population Policy'. Available at <http://npcsec.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRAFT-NPP-JUNE-2018.pdf>
- GoU (2019) 'The Official Government of Uganda Inter-Ministerial/Agencies Monthly National Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning Bulletin: 15th November–15 December 2019'.
- GoU Ministry of Health (2018) 'Mid-Term Review Report for the Health Sector Development Plan, 2015/16 – 2019/20', MoH, Uganda.
- Green, D. (2016) *How Change Happens*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Guttmacher Institute (2017) 'Factsheet: Contraception and Unintended Pregnancy in Uganda', Guttmacher Institute, New York. <https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-contraception-and-unintended-pregnancy-in-uganda.pdf>
- Hardee, K, Wright, K and Spicehandler, J. (2015). Family Planning Policy, Program and Practice Decisionmaking: The Role of Research Evidence and Other Factors. 10.13140/RG.2.1.1379.8883.
- Harris, D. (2013) 'Applied political economy analysis: A problem-driven framework', Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Hickey, S. and Izama, A. (2016) 'The politics of governing oil in Uganda: Going against the grain?' *African Affairs*, 116/463, 163–185.
- INASP (2017) Accessing and contributing to global research: the problem of the last kilometre. Available at: <https://www.inasp.info/sites/default/files/2018-04/LRI%20%E2%80%93%20NREN%20article.pdf>
- Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2019) *The Grand Bargain*. Available at: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain-hosted-iasc/>.
- IRC (2018) 'New Responses to the Refugee Crisis: Promises and Challenges in Uganda. A case study of World Bank financing for refugee-hosting nations', International Rescue Committee, Washington DC.
- ISER (2018) *An assessment of the role and effectiveness of Barazas in decision making processes*. Initiative for Social and Economic Rights (ISER).
- Izama, A. and Wilkerson, M. (2011) 'Uganda: Museveni's Triumph and Weakness', *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 3: 64–78.
- Jean, I. (2013) "'We are here": IFRC's Experiences of Communication with and Feedback to Affected Populations in Haiti'. ALNAP/CDA case study (Authored with Bonino, F.) ODI/ALNAP, London.
- Jean, I. (2014) "'Investing in listening": International Organization for Migration's Experience with Humanitarian Feedback Mechanisms in Sindh Province'. ALNAP/CDA case study (Authored with Bonino, F.). ODI/ALNAP, London.

- Jean, I. and Bonino, F. (2013) “We are committed to listen to you”: World Vision’s Experience with Humanitarian Feedback Mechanisms in Darfur’. ALNAP/CDA Case Study. ODI/ALNAP, London.
- Kabagenyi, A. *et al.* (2016) ‘Socio-cultural inhibitors to use of modern contraceptive techniques in rural Uganda: a qualitative study’ <https://doi.org/10.11604/pamj.2016.25.78.6613>
- Kabagenyi A, Reid A, Ntozi J, Atuyambe L. (2016) ‘Socio-cultural inhibitors to use of modern contraceptive techniques in rural Uganda: a qualitative study’, *Pan African Medical Journal*. doi: 10.11604/pamj.2016.25.78.6613.
- Kapiriri, L. and Be LaRose, L. (2019) ‘Priority setting for disease outbreaks in Uganda: A case study evaluating the process’, *Global Public Health* 14: 241–253.
- Kasirye, I. and Lakal, J. (2019) ‘The political economy of Development effectiveness in Uganda’, *Southern Voice*. Uganda.
- Kasozi, J. (2017) ‘The effect of working capital management on profitability: A case of listed manufacturing firms in South Africa’, *Investment Management and Financial Innovations* No. 14 (2-2).
- Khisa, M. (2015) ‘Political Uncertainty and its Impact on Social Service Delivery in Uganda’, *Africa Development / Afrique et Développement*, Vol. 40, No. 4.
- Kitamirike Ka. (2018) ‘Civil Society Influence on Political and Public Policy Reform in Uganda – A Political Economy Analysis’, Public Policy Institute. World Alliance for Citizen Participation, (CIVICUS).
- Lakuma, Corti & Mawejje, Joseph & Lwanga, Musa & Munyambonera, Ezra. (2018). The Distributional Impacts of Fiscal Consolidation in Uganda. *EPRC Research Series* No. 144. Uganda
- Leahy, E., and Akitobi, E., (2009) ‘A Case Study of Reproductive Health Supplies in Uganda’, Population Action International, Uganda.
- Lipsky, A., Gribble, J, Cahaelen, L., and Sharma, S., (2016). Partnerships for Policy Development: A Case Study From Ugandas Costed Implementation Plan for Family Planning. *Global Health: Science and Practice*. Doi:10.9745/GHSP-D-15-00300. Makara, S., Rakner, L. and Svasand, L. (2009) ‘Turnaround: The National Resistance Movement and the Reintroduction of a Multiparty System in Uganda’, *Journal of International Political Science Review* 30, No. 2: 184–201.
- Manzi, A., (2018). Exploring Response of Local Community to Challenges of Hosting Refugees: The Case Study of Nakivale Camp, Isingiro District, Western Uganda. Thesis for Degree of Master in Conflict Resolution, Kampala International University in Tanzania.
- Menon, R. and Rathinam, F., (2020). Building evidence culture within government: the Ugandan case. Evidence Matters Blog. International Initiative for Impact Evaluation
- Ministry of Education and Sports (2018) ‘National Sexuality Education Framework’. Ministry of Education and Sports. Available at <http://www.rhu.or.ug/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NATIONAL-SEXUALITY-EDUCATION-FRAMEWORK.pdf>
- MoFPED (2018) ‘The Background to the Budget FY2018/19’. Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Kampala.
- MoGLSD. (2019). National Report on implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (+25) . Kampala: MoGLSD.
- MoH (2013) ‘Guidelines for Governance and Management Structures’.

- MoH (2015) 'Health Sector Development Plan 2015/16 – 2019/20'. Ministry of Health. Available at file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/Health-Sector-Development-Plan-2015-16_2019-20.pdf
- Mugisha, B. *et al.* (2019) 'Political Economy Analysis of the Gender Equality Legislative Landscape in Uganda', Makerere University, Uganda.
- Munyambonera, E.F. and Nagawa, M. (2017) 'Perspectives and Emerging Issues of Uganda's External Development Finance Landscape', EPRC, Kampala.
- Mwenyango, H. and Palattiyil, G. (2019) 'Influencing to Tackle Poverty and Injustice: Learning from the past, looking to the future, 15 Jan 2019.' *International Social Work*.
- Mwenyango, H. and Palattiyil, G. (2019) 'Health needs and challenges of women and children in Uganda's refugee settlements: Conceptualising a role for social work', *International Social Work*: 0020872819865010.
- Namara, R. *et al.* (2019) 'Building evidence culture within government: the Ugandan case Evidence Matters', *Towards equitable, inclusive and sustainable development*. <https://www.3ieimpact.org/blogs/building-evidence-culture-within-government-ugandan-case>
- Ninsiima, A.B. *et al.* (2019) 'Institutional and contextual obstacles to sexuality education policy implementation in Uganda', *Sex Education*, DOI:10.1080/14681811.2019.1609437.
- Niringiye, A. (2018) 'Diagnostic on the supply and demand of evaluators in Uganda. Twende Mbele', CLEAR-AA, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa.
- NPA (2010). Second National Development Plan (NDPII) 2015/16 – 2019/20. National Planning Authority (NPA).
- NPA (2013) 'Political Economy Thematic Report: Mid-Term Review of the Uganda National Development Plan', National Planning Authority, Kampala.
- NPA (2015) 'Second National Development Plan – NDP II 2015/16–2019/20', National Planning Authority, Kampala.
- NPA (2020) 'Third National Development Plan (NDP III) 2020/21–2024/25', National Planning Authority, Kampala.
- NPC (2019) 'The State of Uganda Population Report 2019: Promote Social Protection: Ensure Equity and Equality in harnessing the Demographic Dividend'. National Population Council (NPC). Available at <https://bettercarenetwork.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/State%20of%20Uganda%20Population%20Report%2C%202019.pdf>
- Ntawihwa, W. and Anderson, B. (2016) 'Uganda's data ecosystem: A quantitative review of data production in Uganda'. Development Initiatives. Available at <http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Uganda-Data-Ecosystem-Report-Part-One.pdf>
- Nuwagaba, A and Muhumuza, F. (2016) 'Who is growing? Ending Inequality in Uganda.' Oxfam. Available at https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/oxfam_in_uganda_inequality_report_compressed.pdf
- O'Neil, J. *et al.* (2014) 'Applying an equity lens to interventions: using PROGRESS ensures consideration of socially stratifying factors to illuminate inequities in health' *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology* 67.
- Obrecht, A. (2017) 'Using Evidence to Allocate Humanitarian Resources: Challenges and Opportunities'. ALNAP Working Paper. London: ALNAP/ODI. Available at file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/alnap-eaar-resource-allocation-2017.pdf

- Okuku, A. J., (2002) 'Ethnicity, State Power, and the Democratisation Process in Uganda', IGD Occasional Paper No 33. Institute for Global Dialogue.
- Okware, S.I, F.G. Omaswa, S. Zaramba, A. Opio, J.J. Lutwama, J. Kamugisha, E.B. Rwaguma, P. Kagwa and M. Lamunu,. (2002) 'An Outbreak of Ebola in Uganda'. *Tropical Medicine & International Health* 7(12):1068–1075.
- Ongolo-Zogo, P. Lavis, N. J, Tomson, G. and Sewankambo, K.N. (2018) 'Assessing the influence of knowledge translation platforms on health system policy processes to achieve the health millennium development goals in Cameroon and Uganda: a comparative case study'. *Health Policy Plan* 33(4): 539-554.
- Orem, J.N. *et al.* (2012) 'Research, evidence, and policymaking: The perspectives of policy actors on improving uptake of evidence in health policy development and implementation in Uganda', *BMC Public Health* vol. 12, 109.
- Poole, L. (2019). *The refugee response in northern Uganda. Resources beyond international humanitarian assistance. Overseas Development Institute (ODI)*.
- Pritchett, L. (2013) *Folk and the formula: Fact and fiction in development*, World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki.
- Prizzon, A., Greenhill, R. and Mustapha, S. (2016) *An age of choice for development finance: Evidence from country studies*, Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Rathinam, F., Tripathi, S., Menon, R., Byamugisha, A. and Lubanga, T (2018) 'Evaluation capacity needs assessment and capacity building plan for the Government of Uganda'.
- Reid, R.J. (2017) *A History of Modern Uganda*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Rubongoya, B. J. (2007) *Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda: Pax Musevenica*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Saifuddin, A., Qingfeng, L., Li, L., and Amy, O.T. (2012) 'Maternal deaths averted by contraceptive use: An analysis of 172 countries', *The Lancet*. Vol. 380, Issue 9837.
- Sejjaka, S. (2004) 'A Political and Economic History of Uganda, 1962–2002'. In: Bird F., Herman S.W. (eds) *International Businesses and the Challenges of Poverty in the Developing World*. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522503_ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304737518_A_Political_and_Economic_History_of_Uganda_1962-2002.
- Sizomu, A.A., Brucker, M. and Muwonge, M. (2014) 'Family Planning in Uganda: A review of national and district policies and budgets'. DSW (Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevoelkerung) Available at http://www.dsw.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/DSW_Uganda-Budget-Study_30062014.pdf
- Ssali, S. (2019) 'A matrix and analysis of gender equality laws and policies in Uganda', School of Women and Gender Studies and University Forum on Governance.
- Ssengooba F, Kawooya V, Namakula J, *et al.* (2017) 'Application of social network analysis in the assessment of organization infrastructure for service delivery: a three-district case study from post-conflict northern Uganda', *Health Policy Planning* 32: 1193–1202.
- Steering Group for the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in Uganda (2017) 'Terms of Reference', Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Kampala.
- Sullivan-Wiley, K. and Short Gianotti, A. (2017), 'Risk Perception in a Multi-Hazard Environment' in *World Development*. DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.04.002

- Tetui, M., Coe, A., Hurtig, A., Ekirapa-Kiracho, E. and Kiwanuka, N.S. (2017) 'Experiences of using a participatory action research approach to strengthen district local capacity in Eastern Uganda'. *Global Health Action*, 10: sup4, 1346038, DOI: 10.1080/16549716.2017.1346038
- Tripp, A.-M. (2010) *Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado, United States.
- Tromp, N. and Hekkert, P. (2019) *Designing for Society*, Bloomsbury, London.
- Bason, C. (2017), *Leading Public Design. Discovering Human-centered Governance*. Policy Press, Bristol.
- UBoS (2014) 'The 2014 National Population and Housing Census (NPHC)', Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Kampala.
- UBoS (2017) 'Uganda National Household Survey 2016/17 Report', Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Kampala.
- UBoS (2019) 'Gender issues in Uganda: an analysis of GBV, asset ownership and employment', Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Kampala.
- UBoS (2019a) '2018 Resource Flows Survey on Family Planning in Uganda: Main Report', Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Kampala.
- UBoS and MEASURE DHS/ICF International (2012) 'Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2011', Kampala, Uganda, and Calverton, Maryland.
- UBoS and MEASURE DHS/ICF International (2016) 'Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2011', Kampala, Uganda, and Calverton, Maryland.
- UNDP (2017) 'Uganda's Contribution to refugee protection and management: Summary of study'. UNDP, Uganda. Available at <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/64687>
- UNFPA (2008) 'Family Planning and the Environment: Stabilizing Population Would Help Sustain the Planet. New York: United Nations', www.unfpa.org/rh/planning/mediakit/docs/sheet3.pdf.
- UNFPA Evaluation Office (2018) 'Evaluation of UNFPA support to the prevention, response to and elimination of gender-based violence and harmful practices 2012–2017: a case study', UNFPA, New York.
- UNHCR (2018). Joint Multi-Sector Needs Assessment. *Identifying Humanitarian Needs among Refugee and Host Community Populations in Uganda* www.unhcr.org/5aa13c0c7.pdf
- UNHCR (2019) 'Uganda Country Refugee Response Plan: The integrated response plan for refugees from South Sudan, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo'. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/69674.pdf>
- UNICEF (2018) 'Uganda: Political Economy Analysis, prioritising investments for children'. UNICEF Uganda. Available at <https://www.unicef.org/uganda/reports/uganda-political-economy-analysis>
- USAID (2016) 'Applied political economy analysis (PEA): Field guide. USAID draft working document', Washington DC.
- Vogel, I. and Punton, M. (2018) 'Results in development – Final Evaluation of the Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence (BCURE) Programme', Itad, United Kingdom.
- Vogelsang, A. (2017) 'Local communities' receptiveness to host refugees. A case study of Adjumani District in times of a South Sudanese Refugee Emergency'. Master Thesis, Utrecht University, Netherlands

- Wandera, S. *et al.* (2019) 'Facilitators, best practices and barriers to integrating family planning data in Uganda's health management information system'.
- World Bank (2016). An Assessment of Uganda's Progressive Approach to Refugee Management. World Bank, Washington, DC.
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/24736> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. URI <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24736>
- World Bank Group (2019) 'The World Bank in Uganda: Overview', www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda/overview.
- Zlatunich, N. and Couture, T. (2015) '2015 Gap Analysis for Uganda Family Planning Costed Implementation Plan, 2015–2020'. USAID Policy Brief. Available at https://www.healthpolicyproject.com/pubs/840_UgandaCIPbrief.pdf.

Sedi



www.sediprogramme.org



sedi@opml.co.uk



[@SEDI_programme](https://twitter.com/SEDI_programme)