

GEFA Evaluation of HSNP Phase 3

Process Review of the Economic Inclusion Programme (EIP)

Report 1: Assessment of the EIP targeting process

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**Oxford Policy
Management**



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All opinions expressed, and any mistakes, remain the responsibility of the authors.

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Executive summary

Background and context

The Government of Kenya (GoK) has made significant progress in strengthening its National Safety Net Programme (NSNP). The NSNP seeks to increase resilience and improve the welfare of poor and vulnerable households by creating a framework for the coordination and harmonisation of Kenya's four main cash transfer programmes. Building on this, the GoK is committed to developing an integrated social protection system, moving beyond cash transfers and toward enhancing the social and economic inclusion of poor and vulnerable households and individuals.

To support the advancement of Kenya's social protection sector, the GoK, World Bank, and the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) have designed the Kenya Social Economic Inclusion Programme (KSEIP). KSEIP aims to: strengthen social protection delivery systems; increase access to social and economic inclusion interventions; and improve the shock responsiveness of the safety net system, including support to building capacity within GoK to fully take over implementation of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP).

The Economic Inclusion Programme (EIP)

Economic inclusion programmes have been implemented by NGOs in Kenya for more than 10 years and have shown promising results in terms of poverty reduction. To move towards scaling up economic inclusion approaches, a pilot programme is being implemented by the Department of Social Development (DSD) of the Ministry of Public Service, Gender, Senior Citizen Affairs and Special Programmes (MoPS), with technical assistance provided by a consortium led by the Global Development Incubator (GDI), together with BOMA and Village Enterprise.

The design of the EIP is grounded in a poverty graduation approach and focuses on fostering the economic inclusion of extremely poor households by delivering a sequenced, time-bound, and targeted set of interventions to selected households and participants. These interventions comprise regular consumption support, skills training, asset transfer/seed capital, facilitating of savings groups, and mentoring.

The GDI consortium has been tasked with adapting their economic inclusion approaches to be implementable by the GoK and through the GoK's systems. Two separate models of the EIP are piloted. Model A is being implemented with support from BOMA, while Model B is being implemented with support from Village Enterprise. Although the key components of the programme are largely the same across the two models, the two differ in terms of duration (24 months for Model A and 18 months for Model B) as well as their targeting approach.

In addition to providing technical assistance to the implementation of the EIP, the GDI consortium is mandated to build the capacity of GoK staff – at national-, county- and sub-county-levels – to deliver the EIP. The GDI consortium is currently implementing the EIP activities for the first phase of the EIP while delivering a capacity-building component with the aim of preparing the GoK to implement the activities for a second phase of the EIP (with backend support from the consortium) and, potentially, later, leading the scale-up of the EIP to additional cohorts and counties across Kenya.

The process review

Oxford Policy Management (OPM) is providing technical assistance to the implementation of KSEIP and Phase 3 of FCDO's support to HSNP through the Monitoring, Evaluation and Knowledge (MEK) component. One of the objectives of the MEK component is to “assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the economic inclusion implementation process, with a focus on operational lessons and recommendations for scale-up”. The process review is complemented by an impact evaluation, which is implemented under a separate workstream and assesses the impact of the EIP.

The process review is designed to provide timely insights into what has worked or not in terms of two selected core EIP implementation processes – targeting and mentorship – during phase one, assess the extent to which the programme design and implementation is compatible with the GoK's systems and structures, and explore whether the GoK has the required capacity to deliver the programme. This first round of the process review is focussed on the process of identifying, selecting and enrolling participants for the EIP (i.e., targeting). This focus was chosen because (i) the EIP is implementing two different and complex targeting approaches that differ between models A and B, both of which are new to the GoK and DSD, and therefore present opportunities for learning; and (ii) the success and impact of the EIP depends on whether the right households, who have the potential to engage with economic activities, are selected for participation.

The process review aims to answer research questions related to the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the EIP's targeting process. To do this, the review drew on a number of data collection methods and tools. These included: a desk-review of programme and policy documentation; analysis of programme monitoring data; primary qualitative research comprising key informant interviews (KIIs) at the national-, county- and sub-county levels; and analysis of quantitative and qualitative impact evaluation data.

Key findings

Targeting outcomes: Reaching the intended number of households

The EIP aimed to enrol 7,500 households for the first phase of the pilot. Targeting activities began in July 2021 but at the time of writing (September 2022) the enrolment process was still ongoing.

Overall, by 31 August 2022, 7,595 households had been identified and approved to participate in the EIP across the five pilot counties. These households had passed the required checks through Kenya's Integrated Population Registration System (IPRS) and had been captured in the CCTP-MIS. However, follow-up verification visits indicated that 386 of these households had deceased, migrated, or were unable or unwilling to participate in the programme – likely due to the long delays between the start of targeting and completion of the IPRS checks – and therefore, the programme had moved only 7,162 households to the account opening stage. Of these, only 56% of households had received their first consumption support payment and 31% had received the asset transfer.

Targeting outcomes: Reaching the intended households

Among the 7,500 households, the EIP aimed to enrol 1,875 households (25%) who are existing NSNP beneficiaries. The EIP was able to identify 1,441 households enrolled in the NSNP, comprising 20% of the total EIP households (7,162). In all counties but Marsabit (where the HSNP is implemented), the EIP faced severe challenges in identifying enough NSNP households that met

the programme's eligibility criteria in terms of poverty status and having a household member who would be considered able to participate in the programme.

The results of the baseline survey conducted as part of the EIP impact evaluation indicate that the EIP targeting approach managed to identify households that meet the EIP's eligibility criteria in terms of poverty status. In all three counties covered by the evaluation (Marsabit, Kisumu and Taita Taveta), the results show that at least 86% of selected EIP households live below the national consumption and food poverty lines. The extreme poverty headcount was also calculated to be high among EIP households with 53% to 62% of EIP households reporting total household expenditure below the national extreme poverty line. However, it was not possible to conduct an estimation of inclusion and exclusion errors, and therefore, these findings only reveal that the majority of selected households are poor but not whether they are in fact, the poorest households.

Perceived legitimacy of the targeting process among community leaders is high who expressed satisfaction with the targeting process and agreed that the programme mostly selected the 'right people'. Community leaders in Model A villages appreciated the '*bottom-up approach*' to targeting using the Community Based Targeting (CBT) approach and concluded that this resulted in a selection of households who '*really need help*'. In Model B areas, the perceptions among community leaders were slightly more mixed. On the one hand, many community leaders thought that the process (which excluded the CBT component) was '*free of bias*' and appreciated the fact that all households were surveyed by people from outside the community. On the other hand, interviews suggest less buy-in from some community leaders who were not included in the selection of the households but that instead '*the selection was done by a machine*'.

Targeting outcomes: Reaching the intended households in the intended time

The implementation of the targeting activities required significantly more time and resources than expected and resulted in programme implementation delays of over one year. The original target date for the first payment to all 7,500 households was set for July 2021, which would have marked the start of the EIP. This date was revised to January 2022 and then became a moving target due to the wide-reaching challenges in implementing the targeting process. By August 2022, the process was still ongoing and only 7,162 households had been approved and moved to the account opening stage.

Implementation Challenges

The targeting process faced several severe challenges, with two of these challenges contributing significantly to the delays in finalising the targeting process: 1) identifying NSNP households; and 2) verification of households' data using the Integrated Population Registration System (IPRS).

As part of the design of the EIP, it was agreed that the programme would target 25% of households already enrolled in the NSNP. However, meeting the 25% NSNP target proved challenging and, in all counties apart from Marsabit, the target could not be met. To identify additional NSNP households, both BOMA and Village Enterprise had to relax the qualification criteria for NSNP households in terms of maximum age and poverty scores, though very few additional NSNP households qualified. Further, a supplementary targeting exercise for NSNP households was conducted between February and April 2022 with the aim to increase the overall proportion of NSNP households. This targeting exercise followed a slightly different approach to the targeting process outlined in the Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) with both BOMA and Village Enterprise receiving lists of households enrolled in the NSNP to be compared to the household registration lists to identify any overlap or identify households that had been missed during the data collection. After re-targeting, the proportion of households enrolled in the EIP who are also enrolled in the NSNP across all counties increased from 18% to 20%. Overall, the combination of an

overambitious target for including NSNP households in the EIP, the lack of a customised targeting approach for identifying NSNP households, and infrequent recertification of NSNP households contributed to the EIP missing its enrolment target for NSNP participants and to significant delays in the participant targeting process.

The challenge that caused the most significant delay in finalising the targeting process has been the verification of potential participants' identification data against the IPRS. This verification step is a statutory requirement for all social protection programmes run by the GoK to ensure that programme participants are Kenyan citizens and forms part of the standard targeting process of the NSNP. Initial delays in the verification process were encountered due to the data supplied to the Directorate of Social Assistance (DSA) for verification not being in the required format. However, once rectified and submitted to DSA, the lists returned from verification showed a very high degree of mismatch between the IPRS data and the registration data. The mismatches were caused by collection of incorrect ID numbers, confusion about whose ID information to capture, poor quality of the registration data and the lack of currency of the IPRS data. Some of these issues were caused by a lack of clarity around the requirements of the IPRS verification process prior to designing and implementing the targeting process. The result of the high number of mismatches was that verification and consequently enrolment took place in several, iterative batches over many months. Reports indicate that delays in finalising the IPRS process have contributed to higher-than-expected participant dropout with some potential EIP households citing disinterest in the programme.

Compatibility of approach with government systems

Despite significant similarities in objective and process, the EIP targeting mechanism of models A and B were not aligned with the NSNP Harmonised Targeting Mechanism (HTM) and the EIP did not draw on data from the Enhanced Single Registry (ESR), a social registry which is currently being rolled out by the GoK. The ESR applies an adapted version of the HTM which also involves collecting information from households to apply a PMT that helps verify the poverty status of potential beneficiaries in addition to other categorical criteria. One key difference between the targeting implementation steps of the ESR/HTM and EIP's Models A and B is that the ESR/HTM builds in the IPRS checks automatically at the registration stage during data collection in the field, while the EIP conducted IPRS checks manually at the enrolment stage. This has the potential to correct any errors straight away and avoid some of the challenges and delays experienced at the EIP enrolment stage.

In addition, the EIP targeting process was supported by parallel data management platforms due to delays in completing the Management Information System (MIS) for the EIP (also called the CD-MIS). The use of these parallel systems contributed to challenges and delays in transferring data between systems. This also poses a challenge for Phase 2 of the programme as the EIP MIS will not have been tested during Phase 1.

The findings of this review show that for efficiency, sustainability, and coherence, it is important that the targeting processes of economic inclusion models are adapted to be implemented through existing government systems and not vice versa. Although ESR data was not fully available at the start of the first phase of the EIP, an adaptation of the HTM for the EIP during the pilot stage could have been a strategic opportunity to facilitate coherence and improve the conditions for subsequent scale-up of the EIP. The GoK has invested significantly in the ESR and the design of the HTM, which underpins it, and use of these systems could minimise the additional workload and reduce the cost of targeting for the EIP significantly. Given the similarities in the steps involved, this review finds that the HTM could easily be adapted to meet the additional targeting requirements of the EIP (e.g. community entry and sensitisation, community based validation, and verification of additional criteria).

Another key learning is that it is crucial to involve the right set of stakeholders from inception onwards, to gain an understanding of the GoK's processes and requirements. DSD is mandated to deliver the EIP on behalf of the State Department for Social Protection (SDSP) and has been closely involved in all phases of design and implementation of the EIP. However, DSD does not have operational experience of delivering social assistance, which lies with DSA for the Consolidated Cash Transfer Programme (CCTP) and the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) for HSNP. While these stakeholders were consulted during the inception and design stages of Phase 1, often in large, multi-stakeholder workshops, they should be brought into the implementing partnership going forward to ensure that operational lessons and requirements are shared with the implementing consortium. This type of partnership would have resulted in better awareness of the GoK's processes and requirements, particularly for targeting and enrolment, which would have mitigated some of the implementation challenges and delays experienced. Some (but not all) of the challenges faced with the IPRS verification could have been avoided if the data collection instruments and data collection training had been designed with the IPRS requirements in mind or if the GoK's existing data collection tools had been adapted and utilised.

Capacity of GoK to deliver the targeting approach

The capacity-building approach implemented by the GDI consortium during the pilot phase has been effective in raising awareness of graduation approaches but may not translate into changed practice. Most officials found workshops and training to be useful ways to enhance their knowledge of key graduation implementation processes, including targeting. However, among the implementing consortium, there was a perception that workshops and learning sessions were not always reaching the intended audience. In terms of learning-by-doing, while there are good working relationships between the consortium and government officials involved in implementation, several county-level officials felt they had not been able to sufficiently engage in field activities to fully internalise the EIP targeting process. This may be due to extremely high workloads and competing priorities.

At the same time, the review finds that the EIP's targeting approach for both Models A and B is human resource intensive particularly in relation to the role of mentor supervisors and mentors. To implement the targeting approach as it is currently designed, DSD will need to engage mentor supervisors, mentors, and enumerators, either by increasing their staff complement or by managing the contracts of mentor supervisors, mentors, and enumerators. The former will result in a large increase in the cost of employment, which is unlikely to be feasible given fiscal constraints, while the latter approach will require personnel to manage the contracts of mentor supervisors, mentors and enumerators further increasing the workload of staff. The cost of engaging and managing mentors to deliver the EIP could be reduced somewhat if mentors do not need to be engaged for the targeting process as well.

The approach to capacity building needs to consider the context of constrained capacity and high staff turnover to ensure sustainability. DSD officials face high workloads, especially on the county- and sub-county levels, which has been exacerbated by the introduction of the EIP and other activities under KSEIP. This in turn results in high turnover rates that pose a challenge to sustainably building government capacity. Therefore, it is important that the consortium's approach to capacity building focuses on institutionalising capacity in entrenched systems and processes, rather than focusing on building the capacity of individuals. This includes ensuring that the right documentation of processes is available to facilitate handover processes that may not otherwise take place. At the same time, the GoK should consider how to strengthen its own handover processes, which is especially important for the sustainability of several new programmes that are being piloted by SDSP (including and beyond the EIP).

Recommendations and topics for reflection

The process review workstream aims to provide timely and relevant insights into key implementation processes that the EIP implementers can use to reflect on and adjust programming going forward. As such, the approach to this work is centred around independently documenting what took place and facilitating reflection workshops, during which stakeholders discuss the recommendations emerging from the findings and whether and how these should be implemented. Recommendations are accompanied by a number of guiding questions to facilitate reflection and discussion.

The following recommendations emerge from the findings of this report:

1. Draw on ESR data to select households and participants for Phase 2 and adjust the remaining operational processes required for EIP targeting accordingly.
2. Improve the compatibility of EIP data management systems with those in use by the GoK by prioritising the development, interoperability, and piloting of the CD-MIS.
3. Develop clear, uniform eligibility criteria for the EIP, including for ‘the ability to participate’ and the categorical inclusion criteria to ensure preference to marginalised groups is given uniformly across counties.
4. Consider revising the 25% target quota for NSNP households for the next phases of the EIP, taking an approach of giving preference to eligible NSNP households over non-NSNP households rather than setting fixed quotas.
5. Strengthen coordination and engagement between DSD and the GDI consortium and other parts of government, particularly those with operational expertise in targeting social assistance including SPS, DSA and NDMA.
6. Clearly define the implementation arrangements and roles and responsibilities for targeting at the county and sub-county levels for the implementation of phase 2.

In addition to these programme-specific recommendations, the process review identified several recommendations aimed at strengthening the GoK’s systems and processes:

7. Ensure currency of the ESR data by frequently updating data.
8. Update the HTM PMT model using the latest KIHBS data once this is available.
9. Prioritise the development of interoperability of the various MIS to ensure smooth operational delivery of Kenya’ emerging integrated social protection systems, including the ESR, CCTP, HSNP and EIP.
10. Strengthen hand-over processes, especially at the county and sub-county-level to ensure that institutional capacity development and learning is not lost when individuals move position or leave the civil service.

These recommendations are specific to the first process review report focused on targeting. While there are already many other learnings emerging – specifically in regard to the delivery of the EIP intervention package – these topics are the focus of the second process review report, which was delivered in 2023 in line with the EIP implementation timelines.

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List of abbreviations

| | |
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| CBS | Community-Based Screening |
| CBT | Community-Based Targeting |
| CBV | Community-Based Validation |
| CCTP | Consolidated Cash Transfer Programme |
| DSA | Directorate of Social Assistance |
| DSD | Department of Social Development |
| EIP | Economic Inclusion Programme |
| ESR | Enhanced Single Registry |
| FCDO | Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office |
| GDI | Global Development Incubator |
| GoK | Government of Kenya |
| HSNP | Hunger Safety Net Programme |
| HTM | Harmonised Targeting Mechanism |
| HTT | Harmonised Targeting Tool |
| IPRS | Integrated Population Registration System |
| KIHBS | Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| KSEIP | Kenya Social Economic Inclusion Programme |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MEK | Monitoring, Evaluation, and Knowledge |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MLSP | Ministry of Labour and Social Protection |
| MoPS | Ministry of Public Service, Gender, Senior Citizen Affairs and Special Programmes |
| NDMA | National Drought Management Authority |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NSNP | National Safety Net Programme |
| OPM | Oxford Policy Management |

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| PCA | Principal Component Analysis |
| PMT | Proxy Means Test |
| PPI | Poverty Probability Index |
| PRA | Participatory Rural Appraisal |
| PTT | Participant Targeting Tool |
| PWR | Participatory Wealth Ranking |
| SCSDO | Sub-County Social Development Officer |
| SDSP | State Department for Social Protection |
| SPS | Social Protection Secretariat |
| ToC | Theory of Change |

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and context

The GoK has made significant progress in strengthening its NSNP. The NSNP seeks to increase resilience and improve the welfare of poor and vulnerable households by creating a framework for the coordination and harmonisation of Kenya's four main cash transfer programmes: the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC); the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OP-CT); the Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer (PWSD-CT); and the HSNP. The first three of these programmes are collectively known as the CCTP and are managed by SDSP. The HSNP is managed by NDMA. All four cash transfers are collectively known as the NSNP.

Building on the NSNP, the GoK is committed to developing an integrated social protection system, moving beyond cash transfers and toward enhancing the social and economic inclusion of poor and vulnerable households and individuals.

1.1.1 The KSEIP

To support the advancement of Kenya's social protection sector, the GoK, World Bank, and the UK's FCDO have designed KSEIP, which comprises the following three components:

1. **Strengthening social protection delivery systems:** to enhance the coverage and functionality of the Single Registry and improve the efficiency of other delivery mechanisms.
2. **Increasing access to social and economic inclusion interventions:** through (i) the Nutrition Improvement through Cash and Health Education programme; and (ii) piloting the EIP.
3. **Improving the shock responsiveness of the safety net system:** to expand the coverage of the safety net system and strengthen financing arrangements to provide timely support during climate-induced droughts. This includes support to building the capacity within GoK to fully take over the management, leadership, and coordination functions required to deliver HSNP.

1.1.2 MEK component

This MEK component is providing technical assistance to the implementation of KSEIP and Phase 3 of FCDO's support to HSNP. The MEK component has the following objectives:

1. to assess the quality of HSNP programme delivery throughout the transition of the programme's implementation to GoK;
2. to assess the capacity needs of GoK as regards managing HSNP and to inform capacity building and transition plans and processes;
3. to assess the progress made in building capacity within GoK to successfully manage and finance the HSNP;
4. to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the economic inclusion implementation process, with a focus on operational lessons and recommendations for scale-up; and
5. to assess the impact of economic inclusion interventions on households' poverty and wellbeing.

To achieve its objectives, the MEK component is being implemented through four distinct workstreams:

- **Workstream 1 – Monitoring:** This workstream: (i) monitors the service delivery quality of HSNP during the process of transition and once implementation is fully transferred to GoK; and (ii) examines the effectiveness with which monitoring and reporting is managed in the existing counties, and rolled out to the additional four counties, as well as documenting how this is implemented during the transition period.
- **Workstream 2 – Capacity assessment:** In 2021, this workstream assessed the capacity of NDMA to deliver HSNP and advised on what the identified capacity issues mean for the transition to full GoK management, including the implications for capacity building. It is also providing ongoing monitoring of the capacity building and transition process.
- **Workstream 3 – Process review:** The process review focuses on the economic inclusion sub-component of KSEIP to provide insights into what has worked (or not) in terms of selected core implementation processes during the pilot phase of the implementation of the EIP. It also assesses the extent to which the programme design and implementation is compatible with GoK systems and explores whether the GoK has the required capacity to deliver the programme and its implementation processes at scale.
- **Workstream 4 – Impact evaluation:** This workstream also relates to the economic inclusion sub-component of KSEIP, and involves conducting an impact evaluation to determine whether and to what extent the EIP had a positive effect on their target population in the counties covered by the pilot programme. Further, the impact evaluation aims to assess to what extent the design of the EIP is relevant given the context and the needs of its target population and to what extent the programme's impact is sustained over time.

Together, Workstreams 3 and 4 constitute the evaluation of the economic inclusion component of KSEIP.

While they will deliver separate outputs, one of which is this report, they should be regarded as complementary workstreams that together address evaluation questions across the whole range of the OECD-DAC criteria. The process review aims to answer questions related to the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of selected EIP implementation processes (see Section 2.2.1), while the impact evaluation predominantly aims to address evaluation questions related to relevance, impact, and sustainability. The evaluation questions addressed by the process review can also be found in the process review design note, which is Addendum 5 to the inception report of the MEK component (OPM, 2021a).

The MEK component has a common approach to evaluation governance and management, which is outlined in detail in its inception report, in which we describe our protocols regarding evaluation governance, quality assurance, data protection, research ethics, safeguarding, and conflicts of interest (OPM, 2021b). This approach applies to all workstreams and associated outputs, including this process review report. The MEK component's framework for communications and stakeholder engagement can also be found in its inception report.

1.2 The EIP

Economic inclusion programmes have been implemented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Kenya for more than 10 years. While evaluations of these programmes have shown promising results in terms of poverty reduction (Jimenez Gallardo *et al.*, 2021; Gobin and Santos, 2015; BOMA, 2019; OPM, 2016), NGOs have not been able to implement these programmes at scale due to cost and reach. To move toward scaling up economic inclusion approaches in Kenya, a pilot programme is being implemented by the DSD of the MoPS, with technical assistance provided by a consortium led by GDI, together with BOMA and Village Enterprise. In its first phase, the pilot programme aimed to reach 7,500 households across 10 sub-counties in five counties: Marsabit, Kisumu, Taita Taveta, Makeni, and Murang'a. The consortium was tasked with adapting their economic inclusion approaches to be implementable by the GoK and through the GoK's

systems. The consortium will lead on implementing the activities for the first phase of the EIP and DSD will lead the implementation of the second phase, as well as eventual scale-up of the programme across Kenya should the EIP be shown to be successful.

The EIP focuses on fostering the social and economic inclusion of extremely poor households by increasing their access to skills, productive inputs and assets, finance, and economic opportunities. The EIP is grounded in a poverty graduation approach¹. As described in the EIP theory of change (ToC) outlined in Annex A, the EIP provides a sequenced, time-bound, and targeted set of interventions to selected households comprising regular consumption support, skills training, asset transfer/seed capital, savings, and mentoring. This is expected to empower selected households and participants to overcome poverty barriers and achieve sustained economic well-being.

The ToC also serves as a guiding framework to monitor progress, evaluate impact, and make necessary adjustments to achieve the overarching objectives of the EIP. During the inception phase, a dedicated exercise was undertaken to understand and formulate the theory of change for the EIP, specifically for evaluation purposes. This aimed to address the initial relevance question (A1), which concerns the presence of a sound intervention logic and underlying assumptions. This is outlined in Addendum 3 of the HSNP Phase 3 inception report (OPM, 2021c), which constitutes another distinct outcome of the evaluation produced during the inception phase.

Accordingly, the EIP aims to achieve not only graduation from poverty but also sustainable improvements in income and livelihoods. The programme aims to implement individual self-empowerment strategies through investments in human capital development, skills training, and providing participants with an asset transfer. It aims to achieve its graduation objectives by stabilising consumption through a regular cash transfer and facilitating asset transfers, while also expanding access to finance and investment to help households acquire the capital they need to graduate to more sustainable livelihoods. This is done in part through the provision of two large payments (asset transfers) which participants are told are for investment in their new businesses (i.e. not to meet immediate consumption needs); and through building human capital through mentorship. EIP mentors, supported by mentor supervisors, provide guidance, skills training, and support to programme participants to enhance their capacity to identify viable economic opportunities and establish businesses which will prove a sustainable livelihood. As part of the mentorship, programme participants are encouraged and helped to form Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs) which improve access to business capital and serve as key teaching instruments in empowering participants to establish and manage their own finances for increased economic resilience.

Two separate models of the EIP are being piloted: Model A and Model B. Model A is being implemented with support from BOMA, while Model B is being implemented with support from Village Enterprise. Although the key components of the programme are largely the same across the two models, importantly, the two differ in terms of duration (24 months for Model A and 18 months for Model B) as well as their targeting approach (see Section 3.2 for details).

1.2.1 Capacity-building component

In addition to providing technical assistance to the implementation of the EIP, the GDI consortium is mandated to build the capacity of GoK staff – at national, county, and sub-county levels – to deliver the EIP. The capacity-building component ultimately aims to prepare the GoK to deliver the EIP to subsequent cohorts (with backend support from the consortium) in the same counties, and,

¹ Graduation programmes are a type of economic inclusion programme. In this report, we use the term economic inclusion programme and graduation programme interchangeably.

potentially, at a later point to lead the scale-up of the EIP to additional counties across Kenya. This long-term capacity development constitutes another part of the ToC.

The GDI consortium identifies three capacity-building principles that govern the EIP implementation (GDI, 2021b):

- Jointly designing and implementing the EIP;
- Learning-by-doing to identify which economic inclusion model is most appropriate to scale-up; and
- Focusing on the extreme poor, which includes jointly developing appropriate targeting methodologies and tools to enrol the extreme poor in the EIP.

The capacity-building component comprises ‘on-the-job’ training (e.g. field visits, involvement of officials in implementation, appointing shadow officers and programme managers, etc.) to transfer technical knowhow related to implementation to relevant DSD and county officials as well as facilitated workshops or learning forums to provide training on specific topics related to the EIP (e.g. design workshops, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) workshops, etc.).

As an integral facet of the program's strategic approach, the capacity-building component – as outlined in the EIP Operational Manual (MoPS, 2022) – is expected to yield various outcomes, including:

- DSD and county officials gain technical proficiency in implementing targeting for EIP implementation.
- DSD and relevant GoK implementers are able to make informed decisions about the EIP targeting design for GoK implementation and potential scale up.
- GoK has the adequate technical capacity, experience, and systems to effectively execute all the targeting components for phase 2 of the pilot.

1.3 Purpose and scope of this report

This report is the first report of the process review workstream under the MEK component. Its main objective is to review the implementation of the EIP targeting process of the first phase and to identify and document findings and lessons. The evidence presented in this report is used to answer evaluation questions related to the coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the EIP's targeting and enrolment process. A particular focus is placed on reviewing to what extent this process was delivered successfully through government systems.

The findings from this report were shared and discussed at a workshop with DSD staff at the national, county, and sub-county levels, and the GDI consortium. The workshop provided an opportunity for DSD and the consortium to discuss the findings of this report, share lessons learned from implementation of the targeting approach with officials in other counties, and reflect on what this means for the second phase of implementation.

1.4 Structure of this report

The remainder of this report is structured as follows:

- Chapter 2 sets out the approach and methodology of the process review.

- Chapter 3 provides a description of how the EIP targeting approach was designed to be implemented according to the programme's Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022).
- Chapter 4 presents a descriptive assessment of the outcomes of the targeting process in terms of whether the right number of households were reached, with the intended demographic profile, and in the intended time.
- Chapter 5 describes the implementation challenges and analyses why the EIP did not achieve all the intended targeting outcomes.
- Chapter 6 assesses the extent to which the design of the EIP's targeting approach is aligned with the existing targeting mechanisms used by the GoK and with the existing data management systems that are used to support the delivery of social assistance. This chapter also assesses to what extent non-alignment of systems may have contributed to some of the implementation challenges.
- Chapter 7 reports findings on the capacity of the GoK to deliver the EIP's targeting approach, presenting stakeholders' perceptions of the effectiveness of the capacity-building activities. The purpose of this chapter is to assess the sustainability of the process as it is currently designed.
- Chapter 8 outlines high-level conclusions and proposes recommendations and questions for reflection and discussion during the associated learning workshop.

2 Process review approach and methodology

2.1 Objective of the process review

The main objective of the process review is to provide evidence to support lesson learning and adaptation during the pilot phase of the EIP that can help facilitate the GoK's taking over and eventual scaling up of the EIP.² The process review is designed to provide timely insights into what has worked or not in terms of two selected core implementation processes – targeting and mentorship – during Phase 1, assess the extent to which the programme design and implementation is compatible with the GoK's systems and structures, and explore whether the GoK has the required capacity and tools to deliver the programme.³ These insights allow DSD and the GDI consortium to adjust the EIP design or implementation modalities ahead of the implementation of the programme for Phase 2, should this be necessary.

The GoK, the GDI consortium, and development partners supporting the EIP's implementation are the primary audience for the findings from the process review. The findings of the report were discussed during an internal learning workshop involving DSD, GDI, FCDO, World Bank, the Social Protection Secretariat (SPS), DSA, and NDMA. The objective of the workshop was to reflect on the findings and recommendations from the review and to discuss adaptations to the targeting process that might be required for the implementation of the EIP for Phase 2. Chapter 8 of this report lists the guiding recommendations and questions for the workshop.

Some of the conclusions and lessons learned from this review may also be of interest to a broader set of stakeholders (e.g. other governments or NGOs implementing economic inclusion programmes through government systems). Thus, a separate policy note accompanies this report with the aim of disseminating globally relevant findings and lessons beyond the primary audience.

2.2 Research focus

This first round of the process review is focused on the selection of participants for the EIP (i.e. targeting – see Box 1 and Figure 1). This focus was chosen because: (i) the programme is implementing two different and complex targeting approaches that differ between models A and B, both of which are new to the GoK and DSD, in particular, and therefore present opportunities for learning; and (ii) the success and impact of the EIP depends on whether the right households, who have the potential to engage with additional economic activities, are selected for participation.

Following the definition of targeting implementation presented in Box 1 and considering the implementation processes outlined in the EIP's Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022), this review focuses specifically on the EIP's processes of: (i) community entry⁴; (ii) participant targeting; and (iii) enrolment (see Figure 1). Activities that took place in the pre-intervention stage and as part of the delivery of the EIP are beyond the scope of this report.

² This focus on Phase 1 activities is necessitated by the evaluation timeline, which ends in March 2024. As the first phase of the EIP pilots will conclude in late 2023, there will not be time for the evaluation to look at Phase 2.

³ The focus of the process review was determined during the inception phase and in consultation with key stakeholders in the GoK and implementing consortium, as well as considering complementarities with the Impact Evaluation workstream of the MEK component. Further details can be found in the Process Review Design Note.

⁴ This step is included in the review as it initiates the registration process by preparing the household listing in Model B.


Box 1: Definition of targeting

The aim of targeting is to identify those households or individuals who are eligible for a social protection programme. The decision to target, as opposed to a universal approach, is usually motivated by pragmatic considerations of resource scarcity or by considerations of fairness (Devereux, 2021).

The targeting strategy of a programme defines who is eligible to participate. An assessment of the targeting strategy of the EIP is beyond the scope of this report.

The focus of this report is on the process of implementing the EIP's targeting strategy. Following Lindert *et al.* (2020), we consider the implementation of targeting to entail three distinct administrative functions: registration of potential households, eligibility determination (i.e. selection of households or participants), and enrolment.

Figure 1: Overview of EIP implementation steps



Source: Authors based on EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022).

2.2.1 Key research questions

Table 1 summarises the key research questions (by OECD-DAC criteria) that have informed the focus and approach to this round of the process review. Following the implementation timeline, this first round of the process review focuses specifically on the approaches to targeting, while the second round will focus on the processes of mentoring.

The main body of this report is organised around the design, outcomes and implementation challenges of the targeting process. A summary of findings against these evaluation questions, structured by question, can be found in Annex B.

Table 1: Key research questions

| DAC criteria | # | Research questions |
|----------------|----|--|
| Relevance | A1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the assumptions related to the implementation of targeting held during implementation? |
| | A2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the intervention design for the EIP provide sufficient flexibility to respond to changes in the context of implementation, or upon evidence generated by the programme? |
| Coherence | B1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How coherent is the EIP delivery system for targeting with other GoK systems? Were the appropriate stakeholders involved in the EIP targeting system? |
| | B2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent are coordination and linkages working between government departments and systems as it relates to the implementation of targeting? |
| Effectiveness | C1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What capacities do stakeholders think have to be in place at all levels of government for the EIP to function (at pilot and at scale)? To what extent are effective training and capacity-building arrangements in place and successfully implemented? |
| | C2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have the systems to deliver targeting been set up? To what extent do stakeholders think that the GoK developed the capacity to implement these systems independently? |
| Efficiency | D1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the intended number of households been reached? Are the targeting approaches equally effective at reaching the intended household numbers in different contexts? Is the programme able to reach the percentage of NSNP households it wanted to reach? |
| Sustainability | E1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent does the GoK have the capacity to continue to implement the targeting approaches? |

Note: The research questions have been slightly adjusted since the submission of the process review design note as more information on programme implementation has become available. These adjustments do not alter the scope of the review but serve to tighten the focus of the research questions.

2.3 Data sources and analysis

The data collection and analysis for the process review was conducted between April and September 2022. The evaluation team was able to work freely without any interference and to follow their chosen methodologies, collect data without constraints, and analyse the findings without any undue influence. The process review drew on both primary and secondary data sources.

Primary data were collected at the national, county, and sub-county levels in the form of KIIs. At the national level KIIs were conducted with over 30 representatives from DSD, the GDI consortium, development partners and other relevant organisations involved in the implementation of the EIP (e.g. DSA and Development Pathways).⁵ While some interviews were conducted bilaterally, others were conducted in a group setting where this was deemed appropriate. Some key informants were also interviewed more than once as the targeting process continued to evolve. A list of national-level stakeholders who were as part of this process review is presented in Annex B.

⁵ Since key informants were selected based on their position in relevant organisations, no stratification by gender or other social characteristics was employed.

The initial data collected at the national level played a crucial role in informing and shaping the design of data collection activities at the county and sub-county levels. The insights and findings obtained from the national-level data collection provided a foundation for understanding the broader context and landscape of targeting for the EIP. Based on the national-level data, specific topics and corresponding interview schedules were developed to guide the data collection process at the county and sub-county levels. This ensured that the data collected in the counties were aligned with the overarching goals of the process review and contributed to a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the targeting activities.

The national-level data also served as a reference point for identifying key stakeholders and key informant interviewees at the county and sub-county levels. The county and sub-county level data were then analysed in conjunction with the national-level data to facilitate a comprehensive analysis.

At the county and sub-county levels, KIIs were held with DSD staff, county government staff, and consortium staff in two selected EIP counties, Marsabit (Model A) and Taita Taveta (Model B). The selection of these counties was based on several considerations:

- Two separate models of the EIP (Model A and Model B) are being implemented and tested. While most of the components of the two models are the same, they differ in terms of implementation duration and targeting approach (see Section 3.2 for details). Given the focus on the targeting approach, Marsabit and Taita Taveta have been selected to ensure that both models of implementation are reviewed.
- Marsabit is a large, arid county with a high poverty rate (64%), while Taita Taveta is a smaller, semi-arid county with a lower poverty rate (32%) (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). The assumption is that these characteristics might influence both the programme implementation and its potential impact.
- These counties overlap with the impact evaluation's sample, which is important to maximise the explanatory power of our overall findings and to draw on participant-level data collected as part of the impact evaluation.

In Taita Taveta, 13 KIIs were held between 25 and 29 April 2022, while in Marsabit ten KIIs were held between 9 and 13 May 2022. The list of key informants interviewed in both counties can be found in Annex D.

All KII transcripts and notes were coded thematically to support the analysis.

As noted in Section 1.1, this work was undertaken under the overall MEK approach to evaluation management, covering evaluation governance, quality assurance, data protection, research ethics, safeguarding, and conflicts of interest (Inception Report, OPM, 2021b).⁶ Some elements particularly relevant to this work are outlined below:

The “Do no harm” principle was actively adhered to throughout the evaluation to uphold ethical standards and to ensure the well-being and dignity of all participants and stakeholders involved. Prior to data collection, we obtained informed consent from each respondent, clearly explaining the purpose of the evaluation and the voluntary nature of their involvement. Respondents were also notified that they reserved the right not to answer a question or withdraw their consent at any point during the interview.

⁶ Although note that it was not possible to constitute a formal Evaluation Advisory Group as originally envisaged in the Inception Report. Institute the main stakeholders are consulted separately at key points in the work.

Extra precautions were also taken to maintain confidentiality and anonymity and to safeguard sensitive information. In the analysis phase, a thorough examination of the data was conducted to identify any potential risks or harm that could arise from the dissemination of certain findings. The goal of this was to be mindful of any sensitive information that could inadvertently identify participants or communities. As a result, data is presented in a balanced and responsible manner, protecting the privacy of those involved while still providing valuable insights for the evaluation.

No evaluation team members had any conflict of interest with regards to the EIP programme.

In addition to the primary data collected specifically for this process review, the report also draws on secondary data sources, some of which allow for an analysis across all five EIP counties:

- **Review of programme documentation:** Relevant programme documentation (e.g. design documents, the Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022), county trip reports, etc.) was reviewed to gain an understanding of the programme design and implementation processes, to understand which stakeholders are involved at each stage of implementation, what tools and information are available for the GoK to take on relevant roles, and what lessons the programme itself has been documenting.
- **Review of sector-wide policy and operational documents:** Some chapters in this report situate the EIP targeting process within the wider processes and systems of the GoK. Thus, relevant policy and operational documents from the wider social protection sector in Kenya were also reviewed and analysed.
- **Review of international literature:** A rapid review of the international literature on economic inclusion programmes and targeting allowed us to situate the targeting experience of the EIP in the global debate.
- **Analysis of programme monitoring data:** Available programme monitoring data provided by both DSD and the GDI consortium were analysed to track the progress of potential participants through the targeting process.
- **Analysis of quantitative and qualitative impact evaluation data:** The process review drew on a limited set of indicators from the baseline quantitative household survey conducted as part of the EIP impact evaluation. Further, qualitative data on the perceptions of the targeting process and outcomes collected from community leaders in treatment communities were analysed. The EIP impact evaluation is conducted in three counties: Kisumu, Marsabit, and Taita Taveta. See OPM (2022a) and OPM (2022b) for further details about the quantitative and qualitative data collected for the baseline of the EIP impact evaluation.

2.3.1 Analytical framework

The process review's analytical framework was constructed to address evaluation questions outlined above. It sought to examine the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the EIP targeting approach. In pursuit of these objectives, qualitative data was thematically analysed to identify key themes and patterns related to the EIP's targeting processes. The analysis focused on various aspects, including assumptions, targeting process design, coherence with other government systems, coordination, stakeholder capacity, training arrangements, systems implementation, coherence of targeting approaches, and the government's capacity to sustainably undertake the targeting as designed. Below, we provide a further description of some of the key themes utilised in the thematic analysis. Additionally, a table outlining the thematic analytical framework can be found in Annex E.

Assumptions: Analysis under this theme delved into some of the underlying assumptions made during the design and implementation of the targeting process. It explored whether these

assumptions were valid and how they might have influenced the effectiveness and efficiency of the targeting process all the way up to enrolment. Assessing the accuracy of these assumptions provided valuable insights into some of the gaps observed between expected outcomes and actual results of targeting.

Targeting process design: Examination of this theme focused on evaluating the design of the targeting process itself. It examined the clarity and appropriateness of the process' structure, mechanisms, and procedures. This analysis was further strengthened by conducting a comparative analysis with the GoK's existing targeting process, the HTM.

Coherence with other government systems: Under this theme, the analysis investigated the degree to which the EIP's targeting mechanisms and procedures aligned with other existing government systems and processes. The analysis aimed to identify potential synergies between the HTM and Model A and B approaches to targeting as well as and potential areas of improvement highlighting where the EIP's targeting system could work harmoniously with other government systems. The analysis also looked to uncover any potential gaps or areas of mismatch that might hinder effective implementation of the EIP.

Coordination: Analysis of this theme explored how well the different stakeholders involved in the targeting process worked together to achieve common objectives. It assessed the level of coordination and the degree of involvement and active participation of each stakeholder in the design, planning, and execution of the targeting activities. By evaluating coordination, analysis of this theme sought to identify any potential challenges, bottlenecks, or gaps that may have hindered the optimal functioning of the targeting process.

GoKs capacity: This theme evaluated the government's capacity to sustainably undertake the targeting process beyond the pilot phase. It sought to identify any gaps in the institutional structures, resources, and policies needed to ensure the continuity of the targeting approach to phase 2 of the EIP. Information under this theme was used to pinpoint any gaps in stakeholder capacity in terms of technical knowledge, skills, and resources of the stakeholders involved in the targeting process. The analysis sought to understand the capabilities required of these stakeholders to effectively carry out their roles and responsibilities within the EIP targeting process and to identify any strengths and weaknesses in terms of expertise, training, and available resources that could impact the successful implementation of the targeting activities.

Enquiring about stakeholder capacity helped to pinpoint potential challenges and barriers that could hinder the effective execution of the EIP by the GoK.

Training Arrangements: This theme focused on the training and capacity-building arrangements put in place for stakeholders involved in the targeting process. The analysis sought to understand the structure and effectiveness of the training and knowledge transfer approaches designed to equip the GoK stakeholders with the necessary skills and knowledge to independently carry out the EIP targeting activities. This included examining if there were any barriers to the capacity building of EIP stakeholders and explored the extent to which appropriate channels were used during capacity development.

To ensure the accuracy and depth of the analysis, each theme underwent a rigorous refinement and definition process through iterative examination and interpretation of the data. This approach allowed themes to emerge organically from the data and ensured that they were grounded in the respondents' actual experiences and perspectives. In so doing, the analyses considered the contextual intricacies that might influence the EIP targeting process.

The analysis was strengthened with a validation process that involved cross-referencing the identified themes with the original data and conducting supplementary interviews to ensure their credibility and relevance. Through this validation, the credibility and relevance of the key themes were confirmed, bolstering the overall robustness of the findings.

In the analysis, data are disaggregated by Model and by county where appropriate.

2.4 Quality Assurance

During the process review, a rigorous and comprehensive quality assurance process was implemented to ensure the validity and reliability of the findings and maintain the overall integrity of the evaluation. The quality assurance measures were integrated into each stage of the research, starting with meticulous data collection and documentation procedures. Standardised protocols, including confidentiality and consent procedures, were diligently followed before conducting interviews, and recordings were made to produce accurate transcripts for KII's with implementation staff at the county and sub-county levels. To ensure data accuracy and reliability from the national level interviews, comprehensive notes were recorded and documented through condensed summaries capturing essential points and significant insights from the interviews. These provided a streamlined overview of the key information and served as a vital foundation for the subsequent data collection and analysis.

To further enhance the credibility of the findings, triangulation and validation exercises were undertaken. Triangulation involved cross-referencing data with other sources of information. Efforts were made to understand the source of any discrepancies identified and any substantial variances, and gaps were subsequently addressed through a follow-up series of interviews with relevant stakeholders at the national level. This approach aimed to ensure accurate data interpretation and representation.

The validation of key findings was conducted during a learning workshop – seeking feedback from the participants to ensure that the analysis and interpretations accurately aligned with their views and experiences.

As an additional layer of scrutiny, the tools used for data collection and the draft findings were subjected to a peer review process. External experts engaged in thoughtful discussions to provide valuable insights and perspectives on the analysis. These peer reviews proved valuable in identifying any potential biases or blind spots in the approach, challenging and refining the interpretations, and ultimately contributing to the overall robustness of the study.

2.5 Report use and influence plan

The primary use objective of this report and the first process review was to effectively use the resultant findings, lessons, conclusions, and recommendations to inform the design and implementation of targeting in Phase 2 of the pilot. The plan was centred around a learning workshop held from 30th November to 1st December 2022. This workshop focused on a thorough examination of the findings and recommendations encapsulated within the 1st draft submission of this process review report. The workshop explored the intricacies of the targeting process by deliberating on the gaps observed and challenges faced with the primary aim of proposing actionable recommendations to improve the targeting process for Phase 2.

As part of the influence strategy, the workshop looked to inform decision-making, guide program improvements, enhance accountability, facilitate learning and capacity building, strengthen

stakeholder engagement, and contribute to the relevant policy dialogue on the GoK implementation of the Economic Inclusion Programme. This was achieved through

- **Sharing comprehensive workshop findings:** A concise report summarising the key discussions, insights, and recommendations from the EIP Learning Workshop was developed and circulated to stakeholders.
- **Identifying and highlighting key action points:** The workshop report developed visual representations highlighting the primary action points identified during the workshop, along with the corresponding responsible implementers and emphasising areas for immediate attention and consideration.
- **Establishing accountability mechanisms:** As detailed in the report, the workshop facilitated collaboration between relevant stakeholders to create a framework for tracking the implementation of recommendations and action points. Designated responsible individuals or teams for each action point were identified to be accountable to an EIP leadership team working group.
- **Integration into phase 2 implementation strategy:** The workshop was followed by collaboration with program implementers to incorporate the workshop's insights and recommendations into the design of the targeting processes for the EIP operational manual for GoK Phase 2 implementation.

The first draft submission of this process review report played a pivotal role in guiding discussions and during the workshop which in turn developed and documented concrete next steps for implementing the recommendations.

2.6 Limitations

There are several limitations to the process review that are worth highlighting.

- The scope of this process review has been designed to conform to the resource envelope available for the workstream. The process review does not currently cover questions on the overall cost, cost-effectiveness, or cost-efficiency of the targeting process. The process review also does not include a fully-fledged capacity assessment of the GoK's capacity to deliver the EIP but instead considers stakeholders' perceptions on the capacity within the GoK to run and scale up the EIP. Finally, this process review does not include an assessment of inclusion and exclusion errors resulting from the EIP targeting method.
- The targeting process for the EIP was very drawn out and was finalised in batches, even within counties. As a result, the targeting process had not been concluded when primary data were collected for the process review and several follow-up interviews had to take place with the implementing consortium. This meant that the list of EIP households and participants had not been finalised at the time of data collection, which limited key informants' ability to comment on the accuracy and outcomes of the targeting process.
- Given the duration of the targeting process, some key informants may have faced recall challenges as some processes had taken place more than six months before the interview.
- Availability of respondents posed a challenge to completing all KIIs as planned. This issue was exacerbated by several senior officials who were closely involved with the EIP leaving the GoK. Most notably, the research team was not able to interview the DSD Deputy Director who had overseen the EIP since its inception and was closely involved in the design and implementation of the programme's targeting.

3 Design of the targeting approach

This chapter describes the design of the EIP's targeting approach. Section 3.1 starts by providing background information on targeting approaches applied by economic inclusion programmes globally to provide context for later analysis. Section 3.2 describes the targeting strategy, eligibility criteria, and key implementation steps of the EIP as set out in its Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022).

3.1 Targeting for economic inclusion programmes

Most economic inclusion programmes target poor and extremely poor households who are deemed to have the ability to participate in economic activities. In other words, the key target populations of economic inclusion programmes often overlap partially with other social assistance programmes, such as cash transfers targeting lifecycle risks. However, the full set of eligibility criteria often differ in the sense that many cash transfer programmes are targeted at poor *and* labour-constrained households such as people with disabilities or older people (as is the case with the CCTP, for example), while eligibility for a households' participation in economic inclusion programmes is often linked to the availability of surplus labour and the ability to work (Andrews *et al.*, 2021).

To identify and select poor households, economic inclusion programmes usually rely on similar targeting mechanisms to other poverty-targeted social assistance programmes (BRAC, 2020). Most economic inclusion programmes are found to target their participants through Proxy Means Tests (PMTs), CBT, or a combination of the two (see Box 2). In NGO-led economic inclusion programmes around the world, PMTs are often applied through the administration of poverty scorecards such as the Poverty Probability Index (PPI).⁷ In many contexts and programmes, CBT takes the forms of participatory rural appraisals (PRAs), which seek to incorporate the knowledge and opinions of community members in planning and managing development programmes. It is worth noting that no targeting approach is perfect and the use of PMT, CBT, or a combination of the two will have different costs and may result in different degrees of targeting errors depending on the context and how the approach is implemented. As a result, the choice of targeting mechanism is often contested and subject to heated debates (see Box 2).

Box 2: Poverty-targeting – PMT versus CBT

In resource-scarce contexts, social assistance programmes aim to target the poorest households. However, in most developing countries it is very difficult to accurately assess household income (and by implication, poverty status) due to the absence of reliable administrative income records. Therefore, it is necessary to use alternative approaches to estimate household income or assess poverty status. The most used poverty-targeting tools in such contexts are PMTs and CBT (Devereux *et al.*, 2015).

A PMT usually aims to predict a household's level of welfare and thus their poverty status by using an algorithm to identify 'proxy' indicators and computing their correlation with poverty estimates constructed through national consumption or household budget surveys. There are mixed opinions on the effectiveness of PMTs. To some actors, PMTs are seen as scientific, data-driven, and replicable means to target social assistance and prevent patronage, thus protecting the reputation of a programme. PMTs are relatively easy to administer and apply a uniform set of criteria to each household considered for inclusion in the programme. On the other hand, the algorithm behind the PMT is not always well understood such that the decision-making process is seen as a black box by communities and even programme

⁷ The PPI is a global poverty measurement tool that uses the answers to 10 country-specific questions about a household's characteristics and asset ownership to calculate the likelihood that the household is living below the poverty line.

implementers and policymakers. In some cases, statistical errors or the use of outdated household data can result in significant inclusion and exclusion errors (Grosh *et al.*, 2022).

In CBT, the community or its representatives are given the responsibility to select beneficiaries for a social assistance programme, either according to their own criteria or by applying or verifying externally defined criteria (McCord, 2013). There are several potential advantages in involving the community in selecting beneficiaries, including a reduction in cost by avoiding the need to perform an individual assessment of each household, an improvement of social acceptability and transparency of targeting decisions, and a reflection of local knowledge. At the same time, CBT risks providing an opportunity for local elites to influence the process and could lead to the exclusion of social minority groups that are already marginalised or discriminated against by the majority group in the community. It is sometimes also argued that CBT approaches are difficult to implement at scale and in settings where communities are not small and cohesive (e.g. in urban areas) (Devereux *et al.*, 2015).

It is also common and cost-efficient for economic inclusion programmes to leverage national socio-economic databases for targeting where these exist (BRAC, 2020). The World Bank's *State of Economic Inclusion Report* (Andrews *et al.*, 2021) found that about one-third of all economic inclusion programmes surveyed globally draw on existing databases (including government social registries, beneficiary registries, and others) to identify programme participants. In some cases, existing data may need to be updated or coupled with verification approaches to minimise exclusion errors (BRAC, 2020). For example, in the Philippines a graduation pilot supported by BRAC first selected poor households from the country's social registry, the *Listahanan*, and then conducted additional verification and validation steps through local community councils. The *State of Economic Inclusion Report* also finds that the costs of delivering economic inclusion programmes is lower when existing databases are used. For example, in Benin and Niger economic inclusion programmes built on the targeting mechanism of the existing social safety net were found to have lower targeting costs (Andrews *et al.*, 2021).

Finally, irrespective of the chosen targeting method, economic inclusion programmes' approaches highlight the importance of community engagement and outreach to secure community buy-in and support for the programme (BRAC, 2020). It is argued that targeting is often the first step of entry into the community and therefore must also involve a thorough explanation of the objectives of the programme. However, it is important to note that community engagement and outreach are important for the implementation and delivery of any social protection programme, and can be delivered in combination with or separately to the targeting process.

3.2 Targeting in the GoK's EIP

3.2.1 EIP targeting strategy

The EIP's targeting strategy for Phase 1 was designed to identify 7,500 households to participate in the EIP across the five pilot counties. Of these 7,500 households, the strategy stipulated that 25% of households (1,875) should currently be enrolled in the NSNP.⁸

The targeting strategy sought to identify households living in poverty, and extreme poverty, '*with at least one household member who can engage in productive and sustainable economic opportunities as an individual or as part of a business group*' (GDI, 2021a). This household member would then be registered as the participant in the EIP, on behalf of the household, and would take part in the skills development training and run the household's business. Given that not

⁸ NSNP households will continue to receive their regular cash transfer every two months during the period of EIP support. The NSNP cash transfer will replace the consumption support provided by the EIP. The value of the EIP consumption support is aligned with the NSNP transfer.

all NSNP households may have a household member who can engage in economic activities,⁹ NSNP households could identify a non-household member caregiver to take part in the EIP activities and run a business on behalf of the NSNP household.

The programme's eligibility criteria are summarised in Box 3.

Box 3: EIP eligibility criteria

The EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) defines targeting as '*a process by which individuals/households are identified and selected using pre-determined criteria for assistance based on needs*'. However, the Manual does not explicitly define any uniform eligibility criteria for selection. A review of the targeting tools and information from KIIs conducted as part of this review suggest that the following criteria were applied to select EIP participants:

- Household poverty: Models A and B both use household surveys and PMTs to assess household poverty. However, a uniform poverty threshold for eligibility is not defined in any programme documentation and it is not clear if the cut-off scores applied by the two models equate to the same level of poverty.
- Ability to participate: The EIP seeks to identify households with at least one member that can perform an economic activity. Information from KIIs suggest that excluding factors are related to age (those under 18 and those debilitated by old age or older than 80), severe physical or mental disability, and addiction. However, the EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) does not uniformly define the ability to participate.
- Categorical inclusion criteria: Implementers from both models reported that another aim of the programme is to reach marginalised groups such as women and people with disabilities. There is some indication that categorical selection criteria were applied in combination with poverty scores, whereby the poverty score threshold was adjusted to be more favourable for such groups. Again, it is not clear whether this was uniformly defined and implemented.
- No current or previous participation in a graduation programme: Key informants noted that an effort was made not to select households who are currently or who have previously participated in economic inclusion programmes.


3.2.2 Design of EIP targeting method and implementation process

In this section we describe how the targeting process (marked in green in Figure 2) was designed to be implemented according to the EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022). We start by describing the designed process for community entry, followed by participant targeting and, finally, enrolment for Model A and Model B. The decision was taken to pilot two models of economic inclusion for several reasons. First, as stated in the Project Appraisal Document, KSEIP was designed to test '*customized economic inclusion models*' (World Bank, 2018) and therefore more than one model needed to be implemented for learning purposes. Second, the GDI consortium asserted that the design of each model was specific to the context in which it would be implemented (e.g. livelihood zones, climatic zones, etc.), which necessitated different targeting approaches and adaptations to the package of support. As a result, Model A was implemented by BOMA and Model B was implemented by Village Enterprise.

Each process is broken down into several steps, which differ slightly between Model A and Model B (Figure 2). While models A and B classify the community entry and participant targeting activities slightly differently, overall the two approaches follow a very similar logic. The enrolment process is the same for both models.

⁹ Three of the four NSNP cash transfers are targeted at households that are likely labour constrained. These are households that care for orphans and vulnerable children, persons with severe disabilities, and older persons aged 70 and above.

Figure 2: EIP targeting process – community entry, participant targeting, and enrolment



Source: Authors based on EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022).

3.2.3 Community entry

Community entry is the first step in the implementation of the EIP. The objective of this step is to ‘*initiate, nurture, and sustain a desirable relationship with the community, to secure and uphold the community’s interest and ownership of the programme*’ (MoPS, 2022).

It is important to note that this step is more extensive for Model B than for Model A, because Model B uses this step to identify and update a list of all households in the village (see Figure 2). In contrast, in Model A this step of listing households is conducted as part of the PRA exercise (see below), which the EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) groups under the ‘participant targeting’ step.

Model A

- **Step 1 – Community entry meeting:** A *baraza* (community meeting) is organised at the location level during which the Sub-County Social Development Officer (SCSDO) provides an overview of the EIP and introduces the programme implementation team. This meeting is also an opportunity to receive feedback from the community and to select the community members that will form the ‘locational committee’ to provide information for the village profile survey.
- **Step 2 – Village profile survey:** A focus group discussion is conducted with the locational committee and a village profile survey is administered to gather information about the village.

Model B

- **Step 1 – Community entry:** During a meeting with community leaders, the SCSDO provides an overview of the programme and introduces the implementation team.
- **Step 2 – Transect walk¹⁰:** A transect walk team is formed of community leaders, community representatives, and the EIP implementation team to develop an understanding of the characteristics of the village. The team conduct a guided walk through the village during which they record their observations of the village. During the transect walk, the team also prepares or confirms the list of all households in the village.
- **Step 3 – Participatory community meeting:** The objective of this meeting is to update the list of all households in the village and to draw a map of the village showing all households. This is done through focus group discussions with the transect walk team conducted by mentors and mentor supervisors.
- **Step 4 – Village introductory meeting:** The EIP is introduced to the community and an opportunity is provided for community members to ask questions about the programme. The schedule for conducting the PPI exercise (see below) is agreed.

3.2.4 Participant targeting

This section describes the participant targeting process for models A and B as presented in the Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022). An overview of the key design similarities and differences between models A and B with regard to the participant targeting process is provided in Table 2.

The objective of the participant targeting step is to select EIP households according to the eligibility criteria (see Box 3). For this purpose, Model A involved a targeting mechanism that combines a CBT with a PMT element, while Model B relies on a PMT only. Box 4 provides the rationale for this difference.

Model A

- **Step 1 – PRA:** As part of this exercise, a transect walk is conducted to develop an understanding of the characteristics of the village (cluster). Then, a PRA meeting is conducted that involves community leaders, community volunteers, mentors, and the SCSDO. A map of the village is drawn on the ground listing all households in the village. The participants of the meeting are asked to rank all households in five wealth categories, with 1 representing the extreme poor and 5 representing the least poor. The list of all households and their respective wealth ranks are recorded and captured on a tablet.
- **Step 2 – Participant Targeting Tool (PTT) exercise:** All households ranked into categories 1 and 2 are surveyed by sub-contracted enumerators applying the PTT to collect information about the household that will then be used to verify their eligibility and enrol them in the programme (see Table 8 for further detail on the PTT tool).¹¹
- **Step 3 – Verification:** Based on the data collected through the PTT, eligible households and potential replacement households are selected. The selected households' willingness to participate is confirmed through another household visit, and a meeting is called with the locational committee (community members selected during community entry) to verify the

¹⁰ A transect walk is a tool for describing and showing the location and distribution of resources, features, landscapes, and primary land uses along a given transect.

¹¹ The Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) does not outline the process for identifying the EIP participant who will take part in EIP activities on behalf of the household.

ability of the selected households to participate.¹² The list of verified households is submitted to the programme implementation team for enrolment (see below).¹³

Model B

- **Step 1 – PPI exercise:** All households of the village are surveyed by the mentors using the PPI tool to collect information about the household (see Table 8 for further detail on the PPI tool). The data is used to verify their eligibility for the programme.
- **Step 2 – Validation and registration of qualified households:** Based on the data collected through the PPI, eligible households and potential replacement households are selected. The selected households’ willingness to participate is confirmed through another household visit and selected households are invited to a community interest meeting to discuss the next steps. Details of selected households are verified and updated as required. The list of verified households is submitted to the programme implementation team for enrolment (see below).

Table 2: Key similarities and differences in participant targeting process between Model A and Model B

| | Model A | Model B |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| CBT | PRA wealth ranking exercise | None |
| Household survey | Sub-group: Only those households ranked in group 1 or 2 during PRA are surveyed | Census: All households in a village are surveyed |
| Data collectors | Enumerators | Mentors |
| Data collection method | CAPI using tablets and the <i>TaroWorks</i> ¹⁴ software | CAPI using tablets and the <i>TaroWorks</i> software |
| Spot-checks for quality assurance | Conducted by mentor supervisors – at least 10% of surveyed households | Conducted by enumerators – unspecified proportion of surveyed households |
| PMT tool | PTT (adapted version of PPI tool) | PPI |

Source: Authors based on EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) and KILs.

¹² While the Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) does not specify what the ‘ability to participate’ means, KILs confirmed that an inability to participate would be characterised by a severe disability, mental illness, or drug or alcohol addiction.

¹³ In this section of the EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) enrolment is called ‘registration’. However, to maintain conceptual clarity in this report, we propose to align the terminology with the common terminology used in the literature concerning the administrative processes of cash transfers, whereby registration is the process that lists all potentially eligible households and enrolment is the process that formalises the selection of eligible households.

¹⁴ *TaroWorks* is a mobile field service app powered by Salesforce that allows for offline mobile data collection.

Box 4: Consortium perspectives on CBT

Model A assigns part of the responsibility for the selection of EIP participants to the community by asking community members to rank households according to their wealth using the PRA. In contrast, Model B does not include a CBT element and surveys all households in a village applying the PPI tool.

However, Village Enterprise, responsible for designing and implementing Model B, previously included a CBT element in its targeting mechanism. The Participatory Wealth Ranking (PWR) exercise required community opinion leaders to assign four wealth ranks to all households in a programme implementation village. Only households in the two lowest ranks were surveyed using the PPI.

Village Enterprise dropped the PWR after a pilot study conducted in 2020 showed that the PWR approach led to significant exclusion errors. The study showed that 27% of households ranked as 'rich' and 47% of households ranked as 'moderately rich' (categories 3 and 4) actually qualified for the programme when applying the PPI tool. Based on this study, Village Enterprise concluded that *'community-based targeting is far less accurate than the use of statistical methods in rural village settings and that in these settings CBT performs no better than a random lottery.'*

Source: Village Enterprise (2020) and Klls.

3.2.5 Enrolment

Enrolment is the process of formalising participation in the programme among eligible households that were selected based on the targeting process. In the case of the EIP, the main objective of the enrolment process is to ensure all households have an open bank account with one of the NSNP Payment Service Providers (PSPs). All EIP households receive their regular consumption support payments and the asset transfer through these accounts. This step entails opening a bank account for non-NSNP households and confirming the existing bank account details for NSNP households.

To trigger the account-opening process, the registration details of each selected individual (i.e. the selected participant in each EIP household) must be added to the CCTP-MIS, which is managed by DSA.¹⁵ Legally, this can only be achieved once the selected participants' details have been verified against the IPRS.¹⁶

According to the EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022), there are 16 detailed administrative steps involved in the enrolment of selected EIP participants. These steps are the same for models A and B and can be grouped and summarised as follows:

- **Steps 1–5:** Preparatory steps involving DSA sharing information regarding enrolment requirements and templates with the programme implementation team;
- **Steps 6–8:** Configuration of the CCTP-MIS and defining the format for sharing of EIP participant lists;
- **Steps 9–10:** Validation of the EIP participants list against IPRS and CCTP-MIS;
- **Steps 11–13:** Resolution of IPRS mismatches, finalisation, and sign-off of EIP participants list and CCTP-MIS enrolment; and
- **Steps 14–16:** Account opening for all non-NSNP EIP participants.

It is important to note that the first eight steps were specific to the pilot round as in subsequent rounds all requirements should be known, and all necessary configurations should have been completed.

¹⁵ DSA was established in 2016, initially as the Social Assistance Unit, to coordinate and harmonise the management and implementation of the CCTP.

¹⁶ The IPRS is housed within the Ministry of Interior and is used to verify the identity and citizenship of individuals.

4 Findings: Targeting outcomes

This chapter assesses whether the targeting process, as designed and implemented for the first phase of the EIP, was effective and efficient in achieving its intended objectives. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and assess the targeting outcomes; analysis of the challenges faced during implementation that meant that not all outcomes were achieved is to follow in Chapter 5. Section 4.1 assesses whether the EIP targeting process was effective at reaching the intended number of households. Section 4.2 assesses whether the EIP targeting process selected the right households. Finally, Section 4.3 analyses the extent to which the targeting process was implemented in line with the planned timelines.

4.1 Reaching the intended number of households

Making an assessment about whether the EIP was successful at reaching the intended number of households is not straightforward and depends on the indicator considered. Targeting activities began in July 2021 but at the time of writing the enrolment process was still ongoing as the programme had not yet managed to complete the account-opening process for the full number of the targeted 7,500 households.

Overall, by 31 August 2022, 7,595 households had been identified and approved to participate in the EIP across the five pilot counties. These households had passed the IPRS checks and had been captured in the CCTP-MIS. However, follow-up verification visits indicated that 386 of these were deceased, had migrated, or were unable or unwilling to participate in the programme – likely due to the long delays between the start of targeting and completion of the IPRS checks (see Section 4.3). Therefore, the programme moved 7,162 households to the account-opening stage.¹⁷ At the time of writing, not all of these households had opened a bank account, which would be considered the final stage to complete the targeting process (see Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation of the challenges faced in finalising the targeting process). Only 56% of households had received their first consumption support payment and 31% had received the asset transfer (Table 3).

Table 3: EIP households by August 2022

| Model | Approved participants | Approved participants moved to account opening | Received consumption support | | Received asset transfer | |
|--------------|-----------------------|--|------------------------------|------------|-------------------------|------------|
| | | | Number | % of total | Number | % of total |
| | Total | Total | | | | |
| Model A | 3,893 | 3,571 | 1,713 | 48% | 2,230 | 62% |
| Model B | 3,702 | 3,591 | 2,328 | 65% | 0 | 0% |
| Total | 7,595 | 7,162 | 4,041 | 56% | 2,230 | 31% |

Note: Consumption support and asset transfer payments were disbursed in June 2022. At the time of writing, no further payments had been made.

Source: Authors using data supplied by GDI consortium, September 2022.

¹⁷ The GDI consortium intends to replace the 386 households using the lists of potential households registered during the PTT or PPI data collection. The consortium submitted the details of 11,273 households for IPRS verification and assumes that the 386 outstanding households will be drawn from this list.

4.2 Reaching the intended households

The effectiveness of targeting refers to how well a targeting mechanism manages to reach the intended recipients of a certain programme (Kidd and Athias, 2020). The intended recipients are defined as those who are eligible for a programme according to pre-defined criteria. In this section, we provide an assessment of whether the EIP reached the right participants, i.e. whether the EIP participants meet the programme’s eligibility criteria (see Section 3.2.1).¹⁸ Given that, thus far, only household-level data of selected EIP participants are available, we only focus this assessment on two of the eligibility criteria: NSNP enrolment status (Section 4.2.1) and the poverty status of selected households (Section 4.2.2).

Another measure for assessing targeting performance relates to communities’ perceptions about the accuracy of the outcome. Analysing perceptions about targeting accuracy can provide an indication about the perceived legitimacy of the targeting mechanism, community buy-in, and community support for the programme. Studies argue that targeting legitimacy is important as it can ultimately affect social cohesion at the local level (e.g. Premand and Schnitzer, 2021). In Section 4.2.3, we draw on qualitative interviews with community leaders in the three EIP impact evaluation counties, programme implementers, and county and sub-county representatives in Marsabit and Taita Taveta to assess whether key informants think that the targeting process led to the ‘right’ participants being selected for the programme.

4.2.1 Reaching NSNP households

The EIP intended to reach a total of 1,875 existing NSNP households, equivalent to 25% of total EIP households. This quota was intended to be binding at the county and sub-county level, resulting in a target of 375 NSNP households per county.

The EIP pilot did not manage to reach the NSNP quota in four out of the five implementation counties, which also means that the EIP did not reach the total number of intended NSNP households. In total, the EIP was able to identify 1,441 households enrolled in the NSNP, comprising 20% of the total households (7,162). The final achievement by county is shown in Table 4. The challenges faced in identifying NSNP households are analysed in Section 5.2.1.

Table 4: Number of EIP households by NSNP status and sub-county, August 2022

| County | NSNP | Non-NSNP | % NSNP | Non-NSNP | NSNP | % NSNP |
|--------------|---------|----------|--------|----------|-------|--------|
| | Model A | | | Model B | | |
| Taita Taveta | 157 | 525 | 23% | 60 | 695 | 8% |
| Marsabit | 485 | 927 | 34% | - | - | - |
| Kisumu | - | - | - | 211 | 1,102 | 16% |
| Makueni | 154 | 597 | 21% | 127 | 651 | 16% |
| Murang’a | 136 | 590 | 19% | 111 | 634 | 15% |
| Total | 932 | 2,639 | 35% | 509 | 3,082 | 17% |

Source: Authors using data supplied by GDI consortium, September 2022.


Marsabit is the only county in which the EIP reached and even overachieved the NSNP quota. It reached 485 NSNP households there, which is equivalent to 34% of all EIP participants enrolled in the county. Of these households, 61% (or 294 households) are enrolled in the HSNP. In

¹⁸ A full assessment of effectiveness that includes a detailed estimation of targeting errors (i.e. inclusion and exclusion errors) is outside the scope of this review.

the other four counties (where the HSNP is not present), the EIP faced severe challenges in identifying enough NSNP households that met the programme’s eligibility criteria in terms of poverty status and having a household member who would be considered able to participate in the programme.

Data collected as part of the baseline survey for the impact evaluation of the EIP confirms that, in Marsabit, the majority of NSNP households enrolled in the EIP are part of the HSNP (Figure 3).¹⁹ On the other hand, in Kisumu about 60% of all NSNP households enrolled in the EIP were part of the CT-OVC and 39% were enrolled in the OP-CT. In both sub-counties in Taita Taveta²⁰ the majority of all NSNP households selected for the EIP are OP-CT participants, followed by households receiving support via the CT-OVC. In all counties, households enrolled in the PWSD-CT constitute the smallest share of NSNP households selected for the EIP.²¹

Figure 3: Distribution of type of NSNP participants among EIP treatment households



Source: OPM (2022a)


4.2.2 Reaching households living in poverty

In this section, we look at three measures of poverty (see Box 5) to estimate the proportion of selected EIP households that are living in poverty. We draw on consumption data collected by the baseline survey of the EIP impact evaluation to identify to what extent the EIP targeting mechanism reached the right people according to its eligibility criteria.

¹⁹ The difference in the proportion of households enrolled in the HSNP in Marsabit according to the monitoring data versus the baseline data is because the baseline survey was conducted in February 2022 and the sample was drawn from the list of selected households at the time. Since then, several more verification steps and a supplementary re-targeting exercise to increase the proportion of NSNP beneficiaries were conducted.

²⁰ The data for Taita Taveta are disaggregated by sub-county as different EIP models are implemented in Mwatate and Taveta.

²¹ Given that the EIP impact evaluation is implemented in three out of the five EIP counties, comparable data are not available for Murang'a and Makeni.

Figure 4: Poverty headcount among sampled EIP participants

Source: OPM (2022a)

The results from the EIP baseline survey show that the poverty incidence among the households selected for the EIP is indeed high (Figure 4). In Marsabit and Mwatate (Model A), 88% and 86% of all selected EIP households are estimated to fall under the national consumption poverty line, respectively.²² In Kisumu and Taveta (Model B), 90% and 92% of selected households are estimated to be poor. Food poverty is also very widespread among the selected EIP households, with between 88% of households in Marsabit and 92% in Kisumu having a level of food expenditure that suggests that they fall below the national food poverty line. Kisumu is the area with the highest extreme poverty headcount among sampled EIP households in the baseline survey, with 62% reporting a total expenditure below the national extreme poverty line. All the estimated poverty rates for EIP households in the evaluation areas are far higher than the latest available county-level poverty rates estimated for Marsabit, Kisumu, and Taita Taveta based on the results from the 2015/16 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS).²³

²² The national poverty lines used for this analysis were adjusted for local prices.

²³ Rural poverty headcounts estimated using the 2015/16 KIHBS are 37% for Kisumu, 67% for Marsabit, and 34% for Taita Taveta. Rural food poverty headcounts estimated using the 2015/16 KIHBS are 40% for Kisumu, 57% for Marsabit, and 44% for Taita Taveta. Extreme poverty headcounts estimated using the 2015/16 KIHBS are 9% for Kisumu, 31% for Marsabit, and 7% for Taita Taveta.

Box 5: Poverty measurement

Poverty headcount: The percentage of individuals living in households with monthly adult equivalent total consumption expenditure lower than the national poverty line.

Extreme poverty headcount: The percentage of individuals living in households with adult equivalent total consumption expenditure lower than the national food poverty line.

Food poverty headcount: The percentage of individuals living in households with monthly adult equivalent food consumption expenditure lower than the national food poverty line.

The methodology used to compute these poverty measures closely follows the methodology used to compute the most updated, publicly available Kenyan official poverty rates using the 2015/16 KIHBS.²⁴ A comprehensive description of the methodology followed to compute poverty estimates, and of its limitations, can be found in Section 7 of Volume 2 of the baseline report of the EIP impact evaluation (OPM, 2022b).

There is no significant difference in the poverty incidence between selected NSNP and non-NSNP households in the baseline sample. We estimated the poverty status of all households included in the baseline survey and found that a similar proportion of NSNP households and non-NSNP households in the three counties selected for the impact evaluation live in poverty and extreme poverty.²⁵ There is also no significant difference in the food poverty headcount for NSNP and non-NSNP households. However, these results should be interpreted with caution as the baseline sample was drawn before the supplementary targeting of NSNP households took place (see Section 5.2.1). The supplementary targeting of NSNP households relaxed the poverty score cut-off and age cut-off for participation, which may reduce the comparability between the final population of NSNP households and the baseline sample of NSNP households.

Caution must be taken when drawing conclusions regarding the EIP's targeting effectiveness based on the results presented in this section. Looking only at the proportion of a programme's participants who are poor does not take exclusion errors into account and, thus, may lead to biased conclusions about the effectiveness of the targeting method (Kidd and Athias, 2020). In other words, from the data presented in Figure 4 we cannot tell how many poor and extremely poor households the EIP targeting mechanism missed in the programme locations. It does also not tell us whether the EIP was in fact successful at selecting the *poorest* households in the selected villages and counties. This is further complicated by the geographical targeting of villages that preceded the targeting of households. If a village was not selected for participation in the EIP, extremely poor households in those villages are automatically excluded from the programme, even if they are poorer than the poorest households in the selected villages. Finally, similarly to the targeting of the NSNP, county-level quotas are bound to negatively affect the targeting effectiveness of the EIP (see OPM, 2019). For example, the headcount and depth of poverty in Marsabit is significantly higher than in the other four EIP counties, yet the target number of EIP participants is the same as in other counties where overall poverty rates are lower.

Overall, while we cannot assess whether the EIP identified the *poorest* households in the selected villages and counties, the baseline survey results indicate that the EIP targeting approach has certainly identified households living in poverty.²⁶

²⁴ KIHBS is a multi-indicator survey that focuses on monitoring household consumption patterns in all the counties. The estimates are designed to be representative at both the county and the national level. The survey is conducted by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and is funded by GoK and the World Bank.

²⁵ The baseline survey results indicate that 84% and 48% of non-NSNP households and 85% and 47% of NSNP households live in poverty and extreme poverty, respectively. The food poverty headcount is 83% for both NSNP and non-NSNP households in the baseline sample.

²⁶ A full discussion of the socio-economic profiles of selected EIP households can be found in the baseline report of the EIP impact evaluation (OPM, 2022a; OPM, 2022b).

4.2.3 Perceptions about targeting accuracy

In Model A areas included in this research (Marsabit and Mwatate), most community leaders expressed satisfaction with the targeting process and agreed that the programme selected the ‘right people’. Many community leaders appreciated the ‘*bottom-up approach*’ through the PRA and concluded that this resulted in a selection of households who ‘*really need help*’. One community leader from Saku sub-county in Marsabit thought that the process was the right process because ‘*they have not chosen but the community did*’. This view was shared by many community leaders who were interviewed in Marsabit and Mwatate.

In Model B areas (Kisumu and Taveta), the perceptions among community leaders were more mixed. On the one hand, many community leaders thought that the process (which excluded the CBT component) was generally ‘*free of bias*’ and appreciated the fact that all households were surveyed by people from outside the community. One community leader in Kisumu explained:

What I can say about the entire process is that it went on well because no one at the village level had access to the list so no one could say that someone from the village added or removed someone from the list.

Most respondents agreed with another community leader who noted that ‘*they got the rightful beneficiaries whom I believe are poor people*’ and another concluded:

At first there was some propaganda that some of the selected households were for the rich people but when the list was brought back to us, we were really impressed and said that they used the very best criteria and only selected deserving households.

However, in Model B areas more community leaders did raise concerns about the legitimacy of the targeting process than in Model A areas. This finding is not surprising as the CBT process, which serves to generate community buy-in by incorporating the views of the community into the targeting decision, was excluded from Model B. Indeed, some of the concerns raised relate to the fact that the community, and in particular the community leader, was not included in the selection of the participants but that instead ‘*the selection was done by a machine*’. One community leader in Taveta believed someone who knows the community well should have been involved in selecting the households to mitigate the perceived risk of potential inclusion errors due to respondents who provided false information during the PPI survey as that they thought their answers would get them selected. As one community leader in Kisumu put it:

There are people who were being briefed that you, even if they ask you this, this is what you should say... Such that if they were asked their various ways of cooking they use, even though you can see gas, they’ll say they use firewood.

However, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, the high poverty headcount among selected EIP households suggests that the level of inclusion errors is likely low and that the EIP was able to reach poor and extremely poor households.

Finally, there were some concerns common to both Model A and Model B areas, such as potential exclusion errors due to the village-level quotas and the long time that passed between the targeting exercises and the enrolment of participants. Community leaders from all areas, but especially Marsabit where the overall poverty incidence is the highest, noted that even though the targeting process managed to select poor households, some deserving households were still left out due to the restricted number that could be selected for the programme. In other places, community leaders expressed frustration with the lengthy process and

the fact that some selected participants were later removed again from the lists (likely due to issues with their ID cards – see Section 5.3.1 for a more detailed discussion of this). For example, one community leader in Taveta explained:

I was happy with the process, apart from when they removed people. Then people started asking themselves questions.

4.3 Reaching the intended households in the intended time

The implementation of the targeting activities required significantly more time and resources than expected and resulted in programme implementation delays of over one year (Figure 5). According to the EIP inception report approved in January 2021, the targeting of EIP participants was planned to be implemented over a period of five months (initially, February to June 2021). The original target date for the first payment to all 7,500 households was set for July 2021 (GDI, 2021b), which would have marked the start of the EIP. However, by August 2022 the process was still ongoing and only 7,126 households had been approved and moved to the account-opening stage.


Delays experienced during the pre-implementation activities, including the selection of EIP intervention areas (see Chapter 2.0 of the EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) and Figure 1), required a revision of this timeline. The final list of villages was selected by May 2021 so that the selection and training of mentors could start in June.²⁷ In some counties, community entry took place immediately, but in others (e.g. Marsabit) targeting activities were delayed and did not start until October (see Section 5.2.3). As a result, the lists of eligible households were received in batches, rather than all at once, between November and mid-December 2021.

The initial timelines were ambitious and did not factor in sufficient time for IPRS verification, CCTP-MIS enrolment, and account opening. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, these steps in the targeting process introduced significant challenges and delays that could have been mitigated, to some extent, had the GDI consortium and DSD had a better understanding of the requirements of the GoK's systems prior to implementing the targeting approach.

While the first lists were submitted for IPRS checks as early as November 2021, the full target number of EIP participants was only approved nine months later in August 2022 (see Figure 5). However, as mentioned above, 386 of the approved households were ultimately not moved to the account-opening stage due to migration, death, or inability or unwillingness to participate. During these nine months the GDI consortium, DSD, and DSA worked on verifying the ID information of the selected EIP households through the GoK's IPRS system (see Section 5.3.1). A further complicating factor was that the initial targeting exercise had not yielded the target quota for NSNP households, which meant that a re-targeting exercise for this group had to be conducted between February and April 2022 (see Section 5.2.1). As a result of these challenges, approvals and enrolment of selected EIP participants was concluded in batches so that by June 2022 only about 56% and 31% of the total selected number of EIP participants were included in the first payroll for the consumption support and asset transfer, respectively (almost a full year after the intended first payment date). For these participants, the EIP intervention activities started in June 2022. The remaining participants are now enrolled in the CCTP-MIS and, for the most part, have opened their bank accounts, but are still waiting for their first payment at the time of writing of this report (September 2022).

²⁷ A few additional villages were added to create village clusters in Taita Taveta in late 2021 as the programme could not identify 50 eligible households in the original villages.

Figure 5: Timeline of implementation of EIP targeting process



Source: Authors based on KIIs.

5 Findings: Implementation review

In this chapter, we review the implementation challenges of the EIP targeting approach to analyse why the targeting approach experienced difficulties in meeting its objectives. Specifically, we focus on the challenges that resulted in significant delays to completing the targeting process. Section 5.1 discusses the process of implementing the community entry. Section 5.2 focuses on the challenges of implementing participant targeting, and specifically of identifying sufficient NSNP households (Section 5.2.1). Finally, Section 5.3 discusses the enrolment with a focus on the challenges of verification using the IPRS (Section 5.3.1).

It is worth noting that, despite significant delays, in general the process of targeting has been implemented with a high degree of fidelity to the process outlined in the Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022). Almost all key informants described how the process of implementing the targeting approach – particularly community entry and participant targeting – largely adhered to the processes as outlined in the Manual. We therefore do not provide a detailed account of how each stage of the targeting was implemented as this would largely repeat the description provided in Section 3.2. Rather, we focus on deviations from the process or key issues that contributed to the delays.

5.1 Community entry

The challenges during community entry were mostly localised, and the process of community entry went smoothly in most EIP villages. In Marsabit, community entry was delayed due to insecurity; the implementation team, in consultation with local leaders, had to assess on a case-by-case basis when it was safe to visit communities.

In Marsabit, there were also indications that some political leaders felt they had not been involved in sensitisation. Sensitisation and consultation had involved county and sub-county officials as well as local leaders in the intervention villages. However, one key informant noted that political leaders, such as Members of the County Assembly, felt they had not been sufficiently sensitised or involved in the programme prior to community entry. This was only mentioned in one sub-county and may have been especially sensitive in the run-up to the August 2022 election.

In Taita Taveta, one key informant noted that COVID-19 restrictions on gatherings resulted in inconsistent programme information. Community sensitisation meetings had to take place over several days rather than during one large *baraza* in each community. In some communities, the time allocated to each *baraza* was also limited. A mentor supervisor from Taita Taveta explained how short, separate sensitisation meetings affected the quality of information shared with potential participants:²⁸

So, the community gets a totally different [picture] of what EIP is about. When we go back, they say things like, 'it's the seeds project' and we wonder what information they were given and even those who attend the meeting don't get it correctly. We were told we had to hold a meeting for one hour, so we skip a lot of information and give what is basic...

²⁸ It is not clear whether those conducting the community entry meetings were provided with a script to ensure consistency of information during the community entry process.

5.2 Participant targeting

In most villages, the initial round of participant targeting was completed as planned.

Mentors and enumerators were able to visit households to administer the PPI or PTT tools and most key informants reported that this process took between two and three weeks to complete. In a minority of cases, the implementers were unable to identify 50 households to participate in the EIP in the selected village. This necessitated the inclusion of additional villages in the village cluster to meet the village-level target. In these cases, the process of community entry and participant targeting had to be implemented from the beginning in the newly identified villages, introducing delays of several weeks.

5.2.1 Identification of NSNP households

As part of the design of the EIP, it was agreed that the programme would target households already enrolled in the GoK's NSNP cash transfers. The GoK wanted to target 25% NSNP households for two reasons. First, targeting NSNP households is favourable for the EIP's budget as the consumption support for these households would be funded from the NSNP allocations rather than EIP allocations. Second, the National Social Protection Policy (2011) refers to graduation from social assistance programmes and states that:

The Government and its partners shall develop a strategy that will economically and socially empower social protection beneficiaries to wean themselves off social assistance schemes and programmes and become financially self-sufficient wherever possible.

The policy goes on to state that '*vulnerable but able-bodied groups receiving social assistance support will have a clear exit strategy of exiting the programme*'. Therefore, including NSNP households in the EIP provides an opportunity to test whether NSNP households can graduate into sustainable livelihoods, if provided with additional support, and no longer require social assistance support after programme completion.

The GDI consortium raised concerns about the demographic profile of NSNP households and their suitability for participation in an economic inclusion programme. As previously stated, economic inclusion programmes are designed to support households with surplus labour that can engage in productive economic activities. However, apart from the HSNP, the NSNP cash transfers (CT-OVC, PWSD-CT, and OP-CT) are designed to address lifecycle risks and target beneficiaries that, for the most part, cannot be economically active (i.e. children, older persons, and persons with severe disabilities) and usually require a caregiver to act on their behalf. The baseline survey results indicate that NSNP households face greater labour constraints than non-NSNP households. Specifically, NSNP households are found to have a greater dependency ratio²⁹ and significantly older household heads. They are also more likely to be female headed and to have a household member with a disability compared to non-NSNP households. The GDI consortium raised the risk that including households who cannot fully participate in the EIP activities may have a negative effect on the programme's outcomes and impact.³⁰ Further, as the National Social Protection Policy implies, it is not the intention of GoK to graduate or exit old or infirm groups from social assistance programmes as their lifecycle risks will persist throughout their

²⁹ Age dependency ratio is defined as the proportion of a population that is dependent (aged 0–14 and 65+ years) on the working age population (aged 15–64 years).

³⁰ The descriptive analysis of outcome indicators will be disaggregated for NSNP and non-NSNP households as part of the impact evaluation's endline analysis.

lifetime. Despite these arguments, the decision was taken to retain the 25% NSNP household target by identifying NSNP households with surplus labour capacity.

Overall, meeting the 25% NSNP target proved challenging (see Section 4.2.1). The GDI consortium and DSD had sought to identify villages that would have enough NSNP households as part of the site selection activities. It was therefore assumed that following the targeting approach as outlined in the Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022) would identify enough NSNP households by virtue of their presence in the selected EIP villages. However, in all counties but Marsabit³¹ the target could not be met (as shown in Table 4) for several reasons:

- First, a small number of NSNP households that had been interviewed during the PTT or PPI data collection had not indicated that they were part of the NSNP. Key informants explained that households thought this might disqualify them from the EIP, suggesting a misunderstanding of the eligibility criteria.
- Second, some NSNP households were assessed as being unable to participate in the EIP as there was no household member or caregiver who could engage in the programme on their behalf (e.g. household members are too old to participate in skills development programmes or to be economically active). In some cases, the NSNP beneficiary's usual caregiver qualified to participate in the EIP themselves and therefore could not also participate on behalf of the NSNP household as well, resulting in the NSNP household not being able to participate in the EIP.
- Third, the NSNP has not conducted an *en masse* recertification exercise since 2017. As a result, the number of NSNP households residing in the EIP villages was lower than expected as some households had moved away or the beneficiary had passed away.
- Finally, a small number of NSNP households did not qualify for the EIP as their poverty score (assessed by the PTT or PPI) was above the cut-off, which disqualified them from participating in the programme.

To identify additional NSNP households, both BOMA and Village Enterprise relaxed the qualification criteria related to the poverty cut-off scores and age cut-offs for NSNP households, but despite this very few additional NSNP households qualified. Village Enterprise moved the poverty cut-off score, which enabled them to include 10 additional NSNP households on the enrolment list. Similarly, respondents from BOMA noted that increasing the poverty cut-off entailed only a small number of NSNP households qualifying for EIP. To augment this, BOMA also allowed household members over the age of 80, who are usually considered too old to be economically active, to register as EIP participants.³²

Further, a supplementary targeting exercise for NSNP households was conducted between February and April 2022. This targeting exercise followed a slightly different approach to the targeting process outlined in the Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022). BOMA and Village Enterprise received lists from DSD and DSA of households enrolled in the NSNP in the targeted locations based on the December 2021 disbursement data. The data did not include detailed geographical information and the implementers had to engage with chiefs to determine which villages people

³¹ Marsabit has a high number of NSNP households due to the presence of the HSNP, which provides regular consumption support to approximately 18,000 households. Further, the poverty rate in Marsabit (64%) is much higher than in Taita Taveta (32%), Kisumu (34%), Makueni (35%), and Murang'a (25%) (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). The target for NSNP households was met in Marsabit as a whole, though not in each cluster. This distributional requirement was waived.

³² Changes to the eligibility criteria for NSNP households and the supplementary targeting exercise may reduce the representativeness of the impact evaluation's sample, which was drawn prior to these activities taking place. For example, NSNP households enrolled in the EIP after the baseline sample was drawn may be less poor or may have older household members participating in the EIP than those NSNP households initially targeted and sampled for the baseline survey.

lived in, leading to additional delays. These engagements also revealed that almost one-third of NSNP beneficiaries had either migrated or died since the last NSNP targeting in 2017. The lists of NSNP households residing in the targeted villages were then compared to the PRA and PTT lists (in Model A) and PPI lists (in Model B) to identify any overlap, triggering the following actions:

- Households appearing on both lists that had not reported being part of the NSNP were approached to enrol in the EIP.
- Households appearing on both lists that were thought not to have a suitable participant or who were disqualified based on their poverty score were revisited to determine whether a household member could in fact participate in the EIP.
- Households not appearing on the PTT or PPI lists were approached to determine whether they would like to participate in the EIP. If interested, the PPI or PTT tool was administered to assess their eligibility for the programme and whether a suitable programme participant (household member or caregiver) could be identified.

After re-targeting, the proportion of households enrolled in the EIP who are also enrolled in the NSNP across all counties increased from 18% to 20%.

Overall, the combination of an overambitious target for including NSNP households in the EIP, the lack of a customised targeting approach for identifying NSNP households, and infrequent recertification of NSNP households contributed to the EIP missing its enrolment target for NSNP participants and to significant delays in the participant targeting process. It also likely resulted in a profile of EIP participants that are different from those usually selected, with key informants noting that participants recruited during this process were generally older than participants identified during the initial targeting.

5.2.2 Data quality

The participant targeting approach relies to a large extent on the data collected during the PPI and PTT surveys. Therefore, collecting high-quality data is crucial to ensure that the *right* participants are selected for the EIP and that the IPRS and CCTP-MIS checks can be completed smoothly.

The design of the data collection tools reduced the quality of data collected and contributed to delays. First, the data collection tools were not fully adapted to the requirements of the EIP. In the initial stages of targeting, BOMA used a tool that had been designed for an economic inclusion programme focusing on women that did not collect the data required by the EIP. Further, had the consortium known the full data requirements of the IPRS checks prior to starting the targeting process, the data collection tools could have been designed to ensure that all the identification information of all relevant household members was collected in the required format. This would have significantly reduced the delays encountered during the IPRS verification stage (see Section 5.3.1). Second, the data collection tools did not contain sufficient built-in validation checks to minimise data entry errors in terms of key identification information. For example, requiring the data collector to capture an ID number twice is good practice to ensure that data is not captured incorrectly. Finally, the PPI and PTT tools were not translated and available in local languages, requiring mentors and enumerators to translate the questions themselves while administering the tools. One key informant noted that this resulted in inconsistent translations during data collection and data collectors had to be retrained on the tools.

There is anecdotal evidence that respondent fatigue may have also reduced the quality of data collected during participant targeting. An SCSDO noted that in Taita Taveta, where data

collection for the ESR³³ had recently concluded, there was mistrust in the data collection process and fatigue in answering similar sets of questions repeatedly:

It's at around the same time we did Inua Jamii, the same time we did ESR, there was community fatigue by all these questions being repeated every time. The same time OPM came and did impact evaluation in the same household. The same person will not give the same answer four times. They will ask you to write what they told you the other time. The intention of ESR was that this will hopefully stop, going to the community many times.

5.2.3 Contextual challenges

Several contextual factors contributed to some further delays in completing participant targeting.

Implementation of the targeting approach was delayed by violence and insecurity in Marsabit. Marsabit Town experienced several sporadic incidents of violence at the time that mentor training for targeting was taking place. The EIP deliberately hired mentors and mentor supervisors from EIP locations and even villages to mitigate the risk of clashes between mentors and the community during targeting and programme implementation. However, this meant that the mentor training brought together mentors from several ethnic groups – a situation that was assessed as a possible target for attack – so the team opted to delay training until tensions eased.

The drought affecting Marsabit, Taita Taveta, and Makueni resulted in households migrating in search of water at the time of targeting. Migration meant that some households were not present at the time of the PRA, PTT, or PPI as they had gone in search of water. In some villages, this meant the date for the PRA had to be delayed or PTT had to be conducted over a longer period, while in others households who had migrated could not be part of the targeting process. Further, the delays in finalising the targeting process (i.e. enrolment) also resulted in some households identified as eligible for the EIP subsequently migrating before they could enrol in the programme.

Inaccessibility of EIP villages reduced the number of households that could be visited each day. Several of the targeted counties – most notably Marsabit – are very large, with sub-counties and villages connected by a poor road network. Even within villages, the distance between households can be vast, with low-quality roads, increasing the time to travel from household to household for data collection. The targeting approach required mentors and enumerators to visit each household to administer the PPI or PTT. However, key informants noted that inaccessibility made it difficult for mentors and enumerators to meet their survey targets each day. An SCSDO in Marsabit explained:

Mobilisation is easy; people come in large numbers to know what they are being given. PRA was easy; targeting was a bit challenging because Marsabit is vast and moving from one place to another is not easy and not finding people at home because of migration.

Finally, COVID-19 restricted the number of people who could gather for community meetings. In some villages this restriction affected the implementation of the PRA, which requires the whole community to gather for the exercise. One key informant noted that the PRA only works when the whole community is present as households' wealth may be inaccurately reflected when they are not present at the meeting. Another key informant felt that local chiefs used the restriction

³³ The ESR is a database that is being developed to contain socio-economic data on a large proportion of the Kenyan population (individuals and households). The ESR will be used as a common registration system and eligibility gateway for potential beneficiaries of a wide range of interventions (including, but not limited to, cash transfers) supporting poor and vulnerable households (OPM, 2020).

as an excuse to restrict the number of community members participating in the process. In response to concerns about the process being manipulated, the team called off the exercise until it was possible to get a large enough group together to participate in the PRA.

5.3 Enrolment

5.3.1 Verification using IPRS

One of the biggest challenges that caused the most significant delay in finalising the targeting process was the verification of potential participants' identification data against the IPRS. This verification step is a statutory requirement for all social protection programmes run by the GoK to ensure that programme participants are Kenyan citizens and forms part of the targeting process of the NSNP (including the HSNP) and ESR data collection. The process is described in Box 6.

Box 6: IPRS verification process

The IPRS is linked to the CCTP-MIS, housed at DSA, which allows identification information collected as part of targeting processes to be automatically checked against the IPRS data. The CCTP-MIS supplies basic information including the ID number, date of birth, name, gender, and geographic location of the person to the IPRS to be compared against the IPRS data and identify whether there are mismatches against any key variables.

In the NSNP, the CCTP-MIS and Harmonised Targeting Tool (HTT) data collection tools link directly to the IPRS, which allows identification details to be checked in the field as soon as an interview is concluded. This means enumerators can correct any mismatches that may have occurred due to data entry errors or incorrect information being supplied on the spot. The ESR data collection incorporated an offline version of this check that allowed enumerators to check data with the IPRS at the end of each day once data were synced. Enumerators could easily return to households the following day to correct any mismatches. Neither the real-time nor offline IPRS verification checks were included in the EIP data collection tools and the IPRS verification step was conducted once the full list of eligible households was finalised in each county.

Source: Authors based on KIIs.

Initial delays in the verification process were encountered as the data supplied to DSA for verification were not in the required format. The GDI consortium used their own data management system, Salesforce, to manage data collected as part of the participant targeting process using the *TaroWorks* platform. This data collection platform and data management system is not the same system as was used by the GoK during NSNP targeting or ESR data collection (see Section 6.2). The GDI consortium exported the data in Excel in a format that had been agreed with DSD. However, this format was not compatible with the CCTP-MIS or IPRS and had to be converted before submission to DSA. According to key informants, this misunderstanding of the required format was the result of limited communications and consultation with DSA by DSD and the GDI consortium to fully understand the requirements of the IPRS verification process. The differing data formats also had implications later for correcting data mismatches identified by the IPRS, as key informants within the consortium noted that they received data back from the IPRS checks with missing fields. Overall, this contributed to delays by necessitating additional data cleaning and management steps before IPRS checks could be conducted and mismatches rectified.

Once submitted to DSA, the lists returned from verification showed a high degree of mismatch between the IPRS data and the registration data. The first round of verification took place over several weeks as the IPRS was not able to process all 7,500 records at once, with the

system sometimes timing-out before the verification process was complete. The verified lists were returned at the end of December 2021/early January 2022, with most potential participants' data not having been successfully matched to the IPRS across both models A and B. The reasons for mismatch were both on the side of the data supplied by the GDI consortium and issues with the currency of the IPRS (see Table 5 and Table 6). The issues affected both NSNP and non-NSNP households, though, as expected, the proportion of households without errors during the IPRS verification was higher for NSNP households as these households have already been verified against the IPRS during NSNP enrolment.

Table 5: Errors during IPRS verification in Model A areas (January 2022)

| | All | | Non-NSNP | | NSNP | |
|---------------------------------------|-------|-----|----------|-----|------|-----|
| Household records sent to IPRS | 2,588 | | 2,226 | | 362 | |
| Outcome from IPRS verification | | | | | | |
| | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| Full name mismatch | 162 | 6% | 142 | 6% | 20 | 6% |
| Partial name mismatch | 579 | 22% | 498 | 22% | 81 | 22% |
| Sex mismatch | 111 | 4% | 101 | 5% | 10 | 3% |
| DOB mismatch | 1,346 | 52% | 1,124 | 50% | 222 | 61% |
| Geo-code mismatch | 1 | 0% | 1 | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| Invalid ID | 8 | 0% | 0 | 0% | 8 | 2% |
| Duplicate ID | 15 | 1% | 15 | 1% | 0 | 0% |
| No response from IPRS | 329 | 13% | 326 | 15% | 3 | 1% |
| No error on IPRS | 37 | 1% | 19 | 1% | 18 | 5% |

Note: Only one IPRS error is reported per household in data supplied by BOMA and the data supplied refers to a subset of total households submitted to the IPRS only. Source: BOMA monitoring data, September 2022

Table 6: Errors during IPRS verification in Model B areas (January 2022)

| | All | | Non-NSNP | | NSNP | |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Household records sent to IPRS | 4,101 | | 3,466 | | 635 | |
| Outcome from IPRS verification | | | | | | |
| | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| Full name mismatch | 340 | 8% | 334 | 10% | 6 | 1% |
| Partial name mismatch | 295 | 7% | 235 | 7% | 60 | 9% |
| Sex mismatch | 380 | 9% | 361 | 10% | 19 | 3% |
| DOB mismatch | 1,160 | 28% | 960 | 28% | 200 | 31% |
| Geo-code mismatch | 1,493 | 36% | 1,243 | 36% | 250 | 39% |
| Duplicate ID | 6 | 0% | 2 | 0% | 4 | 1% |
| No response from IPRS | 432 | 11% | 407 | 12% | 25 | 4% |
| No error on IPRS | 303 | 7% | 149 | 4% | 154 | 24% |

Note: Each household record could be subject to more than one error. Data from 4,101 households who were offered to participate in the EIP based on eligibility and willingness were submitted to the IPRS for verification.

Source: Village Enterprise monitoring data, May 2022

Incorrect ID numbers caused many of the mismatches with the IPRS. During PPI or PTT, data collectors could have collected incorrect ID information due to data capture errors. It was also

noted that, during the run-up to the August 2022 election, there was some reluctance to provide ID information during data collection, resulting in refusals or the deliberate supply of incorrect information as households were not sure how this data would be used.

Key informants also noted that there was confusion about whose ID information to capture during data collection. While the EIP is targeted at the household level, each household is required to identify a household member (or caregiver in the case of NSNP households) who will participate in the EIP activities and run the household business. Enumerators/mentors were supposed to collect the ID information of the EIP participant (for non-NSNP households) or the NSNP beneficiary (not the caregiver participant) for verification with the IPRS. However, this seems to have not been well understood at the time of data collection and was only clarified after data collection had been completed once the GDI consortium fully understood the requirements of the IPRS verification process. As a result, data collectors were not trained on whose data to collect, and the data collection tools were not designed to ensure that the required information was gathered correctly. In some cases, this meant that basic demographic details of one household member were captured (i.e. name, date of birth) alongside the ID number of another household member, which led to mismatches with the IPRS data. In other cases, only the household head's data were captured but not the participant's data, meaning data collectors had to return to the household to collect this information.

In addition, data quality issues contributed to mismatches with the IPRS data (see Section 5.2.2). As shown in Table 5 and Table 6, and in addition to the reasons for mismatch described above, these errors happened for the following reasons:

- **Full name mismatch:** Data collectors were not aware that they had to collect the name exactly as it appears on the ID document; respondents sometimes provided nicknames that differed entirely from the name shown on their ID document.
- **Partial name mismatch:** Data collectors were not aware that they had to collect the name exactly as it appears on the ID document; data collectors captured names incorrectly, including spelling errors, typos, or first names and surnames in the wrong order; respondents only supplied part of their full name.
- **Sex mismatch:** Data collectors captured the sex of the household head rather than the EIP participant.
- **Date of birth:** Data collectors captured the date of birth of the household head rather than the EIP participant; data collectors captured the interview date rather than date of birth; respondents who did not know their exact date of birth used a default date of 01 January or 31 December. Inconsistencies in terms of which default date was used during data collection and by the IPRS caused a high number of mismatches.
- **Invalid ID:** The ID information of minors – who were not eligible for the programme – was captured during data collection.
- **Geo-code mismatch:** The GPS coordinates captured during data collection did not correspond to the IPRS geo-codes because of administrative boundary changes or because GPS coordinates were captured in the wrong place.

Respondents also noted several issues related to the currency of the IPRS data. The two most common issues with the IPRS were:

1. **No response from IPRS:** Some IDs not appearing in the digital system resulting in a non-response from the IPRS; older 'generations' of ID numbers start with a '0', which was automatically removed by Excel thus rendering the ID number too short.
2. **Duplicate IDs:** Kenyan ID numbers are not unique; only the serial number on the ID card is unique. However, serial numbers are not used as identifiers as they change if an ID card is

replaced. Therefore, the IPRS may return someone else's information if the ID number is duplicated in the system.

The result of the high number of mismatches was that verification and consequently enrolment took place in several, iterative batches over several months. Some mismatches resulting from typos or data capture errors could be rectified quickly as data collectors had taken photos of the ID documents, which contained the correct information. In other cases, mentors and enumerators had to return to the villages to re-collect, correct, and verify the data that had been collected and to gather photos of ID documents to be submitted to the IPRS as supporting documentation. In cases where there was still no response from the IPRS or mismatches persisted, DSD and the GDI consortium engaged with the National Registration Bureau to manually verify about 2,900 physical ID records. Finally, in cases where data could not be matched to the IPRS at all, households could not be enrolled in the EIP and were replaced with households from the 'buffer' list.

Lack of clarity regarding the IPRS verification process prior to designing and implementing the targeting process contributed to significant challenges and delays. Verification of potential participants' identification is not usually part of BOMA's or Village Enterprise's standard targeting process. Further, DSD is also not involved in implementing the targeting for social assistance programmes, a function that lies with DSA. Key informants at DSA felt they had not been sufficiently involved during planning, designing, and implementing the targeting process and therefore had not been given the opportunity to share operational lessons with the consortium and DSD. As a result, the process of IPRS verification, as well the challenges associated with this process, were not fully understood by DSD or the consortium and could neither be properly factored into the workplan for implementation nor the procedures properly followed during household data collection.³⁴

Interviews with BOMA further emphasise that, with increased foresight, some of the challenges could have been mitigated. Targeting in Marsabit took place later than other counties and, as a result, the IPRS mismatches had already been identified in other counties. To improve the data quality in Marsabit, BOMA's data collection instruments were adapted to collect ID information for the household head, caregiver (where applicable), and the EIP participant to ensure that the right ID information was collected and available during the IPRS check. In addition, enumerator training emphasised the need to collect names exactly as per the ID card, while the data collection tool was modified to collect the ID number twice.

Finally, key informants noted that delays in finalising the IPRS process have contributed to higher-than-expected participant dropout. The GDI consortium noted an increased incidence of voluntary participant dropout from the programme, with several potential EIP households citing disinterest in the programme. In other cases, migration out of the EIP villages to look for work meant some households were no longer available for the programme. Lastly, they noted the deaths of several participants from NSNP households, particularly the OP-CT, between the time of data collection and finalising enrolment.

5.3.2 Account opening

The final stage of enrolment into the EIP is opening a bank account to receive the bi-monthly consumption support and the asset transfer. The process of opening bank accounts is activated once DSD has approved the enrolment list (i.e. once IPRS verification is complete and

³⁴ Similarly, NDMA has significant operational experience of implementing the targeting of the HSNP, including in Marsabit, and could have shared their experience with DSD and the GDI consortium. NDMA was not interviewed as part of this research.

participants are incorporated in the CCTP-MIS). Most non-NSNP participants needed to open a bank account with one of the GoK's partner banks, while NSNP households already have bank accounts into which they receive their NSNP payments.

Key informants reported that attendance at account opening posed a challenge. Prospective EIP participants need to be physically present to open a bank account, in accordance with know-your-customer requirements. However, some participants did not attend the meeting to open bank accounts and mentor supervisors noted that they had to individually track participants to bring them to open a bank account. This was especially problematic in Marsabit where there are many pastoralist households, and account opening therefore had to take place on a rolling basis rather than in one batch. The significant delays between data collection and account opening likely contributed to this challenge.

Further mismatches were identified with the enrolment data during the banks' verification process. The banks also conduct a verification and approval process as part of account opening. Several participants faced challenges with approval due to mismatches between the banks' data and the enrolment data obtained from the CCTP-MIS.³⁵ Key informants attributed the data errors to the way in which data transfers took place at each stage of the enrolment process and the lack of interoperability between various systems. Data transfer takes place manually from the GDI consortium to DSD, which then transfers data to Development Pathways³⁶ for uploading to the CCTP-MIS. The sub-county officers who manage the account-opening process download data from the CCTP-MIS, which are then verified by the banks. This multi-stage process introduces several points at which data errors can be introduced. While the number of mismatches during account opening was limited, resolving these issues also took some time and contributed to further delays in finalising the enrolment process.

³⁵ Data on the extent of this challenge were not available at the time of writing.

³⁶ Development Pathways are a consultancy that were contracted to develop the CCTP-MIS and therefore supported DSD to upload data to the system.

6 Findings: Compatibility of approach with government systems

This chapter aims to answer research questions linked to coherence by exploring to what extent the design and the implementation arrangements of the EIP targeting mechanism are compatible with existing GoK systems. Section 6.1 assesses the alignment of the EIP targeting mechanism with the targeting mechanism used by the GoK, referring to both the HTM of the NSNP and the roll-out of the ESR. Section 6.2 assesses coordination within the government system and alignment of data management systems.

6.1 Alignment with existing GoK targeting mechanisms

6.1.1 The NSNP's HTM

The NSNP was established with the aim of coordinating and harmonising the design and operational processes of the four national cash transfer programmes (CT-OVC, OP-CT,³⁷ PWSD-CT, and HSNP). Prior to 2018, each of the four programmes had separate eligibility criteria and processes for targeting its beneficiaries. The HTM was developed to unify the various targeting approaches, including the elements related to definitions of poverty and vulnerability, the CBT process, and the PMT (Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, 2016).

The HTM was first piloted in 2018 and further refined in 2019 after a review by OPM (2019).

The HTM includes the following steps (Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP), 2019; NDMA, 2019):

- **Community entry:** Community sensitisation and awareness-raising *barazas*;
- **Identification:** Listing of poor and vulnerable households through community-based screening (CBS)³⁸;
- **Registration of listed households:** Enumerators visit all listed households using the HTT questionnaire. The registration software will also automatically run IPRS checks as soon as the questionnaire is complete;
- **Selection of households:** Application of a regression-based PMT³⁹ to the data collected via the HTT to select the poorest households and those matching the categorical criteria;
- **Community-based validation (CBV):** Proposed beneficiary lists presented at a community *baraza* to correct inclusion and exclusion errors;
- **Enrolment:** opening of bank accounts.

³⁷ In 2018, the OP-CT moved from being a poverty-targeted programme to a universal social pension for all Kenyan citizens aged 70 years old and above.

³⁸ This step involves a community *baraza* to ask the community to identify and list all poor and vulnerable households and people over 70 in the sub-location. These households are visited and surveyed with tablets. Their information will be subjected to the IPRS. The list of potential participants will be displayed in a public place in the community for seven days, after which another *baraza* will be held to confirm that all households deemed poor and vulnerable have indeed been listed. Any household included or excluded can then be removed or added. It is important to note that for the HSNP targeting this step is omitted because HSNP conducts a census registration of the entire population (OPM, 2019). For the ESR this step is also mostly omitted for similar reasons.

³⁹ Prior to the OPM review in 2019, the PMT applied by the HTM was conducted based on the generation of a Living Conditions Score, which was constructed through a method called Principal Component Analysis (PCA) using data from the Kenya 2009 Census. The OPM review found that a regression-based PMT would perform slightly better in terms of inclusion and exclusion errors than the PCA approach, in addition to reducing complexity in the implementation of the HTM. The review recommended revising the HTT to align with the 2015/16 KIHBS and replacing the PCA-based PMT model with a regression-based PMT model.

The targeting steps involved in the HTM are very similar to the EIP targeting steps of Model A and Model B (see Table 7). Each model starts with a community entry step that involves explaining the process and the programme objectives to communities. Like Model A, the HTM engages the community in identifying poor and vulnerable households. While the HTM does not ask the community to rank households, it visits only those households that the community members identify to be poor and vulnerable.⁴⁰ The HTM, Model A, and Model B all involve household visits, applying different types of questionnaires (HTT, PTT, and PPI) but all with the same objective of collecting data to apply a PMT that would help verify the poverty status of the potential beneficiaries in addition to other categorical criteria. Further, all questionnaires collect the demographic and identification information of household members to perform the IPRS check, identify and register the beneficiary with the programme, and open a bank account. Finally, all mechanisms have a validation step during which the list of selected households is confirmed at the community level.

The key difference between the targeting implementation steps of the HTM and EIP’s models A and B is that the HTM builds in the IPRS checks at the registration stage, while the EIP conducts IPRS checks only at the enrolment stage. Key informants described that, in the case of the HSNP, this built-in verification of ID information of potential beneficiaries works through an application that allows for a real-time IPRS verification of the collected information in the field. In this way, any mismatches can directly be investigated and corrected.

Table 7: Comparison of targeting implementation steps used for HTM versus EIP

| Step | HTM | Model A | Model B |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| 1) Community entry | Community sensitisation and awareness-raising <i>barazas</i> | Community entry meeting and village profile survey | Community entry meetings |
| 2) Identification and listing | Identification of all poor and vulnerable households by community members through <i>barazas</i> (CBS) | PRA: Meeting and wealth ranking | Transect walk and participatory community meeting |
| 3) CBT | | | None |
| 4) Registration and household survey | Visit of all households listed in CBS applying HTT questionnaire HSNP: Census | Visit all households in PRA ranks 1 and 2, applying PTT questionnaire | Visit all households (census), applying PPI questionnaire |
| 5) Selection of beneficiaries | PMT: Regression-based PMT using HTT data | PMT: Construction of poverty scores using PTT data | PMT: Construction of poverty scores using PPI data |
| 6) Validation | CBV: Presentation and validation of potential beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries) at community <i>barazas</i> | Confirm willingness and ability to participate through household visits and community meeting | Confirm willingness to participate through household visit and community interest meeting |
| 7) IPRS checks | Performed automatically during step 4 | Performed manually during enrolment | Performed manually during enrolment |

Source: MLSP (2019) and EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022)

An investigation of the PMT tools used by the HTM and the EIP models A and B also reveals significant similarities (Table 8). The PMT used in the HTM takes a regression-based approach that predicts household consumption (as a proxy for poverty) with the help of 30 variables, estimating the coefficient associated with each variable. The PPI is also a type of PMT that

⁴⁰ Except for the HSNP, which adopts a census-based approach and visits all households in a community.

contains 10 simple questions that are scored to estimate the probability that a household is poor.⁴¹ The questions and assigned scores are also selected through a regression-based methodology, combining a lasso and a ridge regression (IPA, 2018). Finally, the PTT is a tool that was adapted by BOMA, using the PPI as a starting point, but with significant variations in the questions and scores.⁴² Although the methodology behind the construction of the PMTs and the questions included varies slightly between the models, there is significant overlap between the types of variables used for their construction, particularly between the HTM and the PPI. The underlying consumption data on which they are constructed are also the same (i.e. the 2015/16 KIHBS).

It was not possible within the scope of this study to do a comparative targeting assessment to determine the relative exclusion and inclusion errors resulting from the three targeting approaches. However, if deemed a priority, a separate analysis could be done using the KIHBS data to assess the relative performance of the three tools, including their level of overlap.

Table 8: Comparison of PMT tools used for targeting by HTM/ESR versus EIP

| | HTT | PTT (Model A) | PPI (Model B) |
|---|---|--|--|
| Total number of questions | 62 | 79 | 56 |
| Number of variables used to construct the PMT | 30 ^a | 13 ^b | 10 ^b |
| Type of variables used to construct the PMT | Geographic location Dwelling conditions Asset and livestock ownership Household demographics, including dependency ratio Household head characteristics, including education, and economic activities | Dwelling conditions Asset, livestock, and land ownership Household economic activities Disability Cash transfer beneficiary status Food security Financial inclusion | Geographic location Dwelling conditions Ownership of household items Level of education Consumption of selected food items |
| Underlying consumption data that PMT is based on | KIHBS 2015/16 | KIHBS 2015/16 ^c | KIHBS 2015/16 |
| Type of PMT | Regression-based PMT | Regression-based PMT ^c | Regression-based PMT |

Source: Authors based on MLSP (2020a), EIP Operations Manual (MoPS, 2022), and IPA (2018)

Notes: ^a This refers to all variables used to construct the *rural* PMT;

^b This refers to all 'scored' variables, i.e. those variables used to construct the PTT and PPI scores;

^c This is an assumption given that the PTT is an adaptation of the PPI. However, as the PTT scoring has undergone many revisions it is not clear if the scores in use still reflect the estimated correlations with household consumption poverty estimates.

⁴¹ The 10 questions included in the PPI are chosen based on two considerations: (i) how well they can predict whether a household's consumption is above or below the national poverty line based on data from the 2015/16 KIHBS; and (ii) whether they are simple to administer, easy to verify, and responsive to changes in consumption. The scorecard provides points for every possible response to each of the 10 questions. The sum of the points of the selected responses provides a PPI score for the household. The lower the composite score, the higher the likelihood that the household falls below a chosen poverty line.

⁴² Despite repeated attempts, the research team had not, at the time of writing, received any documentation from BOMA describing how the PTT was developed or on what basis the poverty score is calculated.

6.1.2 The ESR

The GoK is currently investing in expanding the function of the Single Registry by adding a social registry module. The objective of the ESR is to construct a database of actual and potential social protection beneficiaries by collecting data from at least 50% of the poorest households in Kenya (MLSP, 2020a). The rationale for the ESR is that *‘as social protection coverage grows, integrating and harmonizing data collection efforts can achieve greater efficiency gains’* and at the same time reduce community fatigue, inefficient use of resources, and the lack of standardised data resulting from often overlapping registration processes (MLSP, 2020a).

The ESR applies an adapted version of the HTM, including the HTT, as the main questionnaire for data collection and an application of the same regression-based PMT (MLSP, 2020a). The ESR household database is populated by collecting data at the household level. In sub-counties where the national poverty rate is higher than 50%, a census-based approach is taken, whereby all households in the sub-county will be surveyed. In sub-counties where the poverty rate is below 50%, only listed households will be surveyed. Households can be listed either at mass registration sites or through on-demand registration at MLSP sub-county programme offices.

In line with the HTM, the ESR also incorporates IPRS checks during registration and data collection (MLSP, 2020b). The ESR MIS checks the validity of the ID information entered against the IPRS during data collection. If data collection is done offline, the check is performed as soon as the data is synced (usually at the end of each day). Identification information for each member of the household should be collected and verified during ESR data collection to allow programmes to target any individual within the registered household. However, some stakeholders raised concerns that in practice this might not have happened consistently across the ESR roll-out.

It is important to note that the mandate of the ESR ends at the stage of applying the PMT to the collected data, which means that protocols for validation and enrolment will be programme specific. In the case of the NSNP, these protocols will be aligned with the HTM protocols for CBV, which involves community *barazas* to correct exclusion errors, inclusion errors, and missed households. There are slightly adapted versions of the CBV protocols for the CCTP (see MLSP, 2019) and the HSNP (see NDMA, 2019).

According to a key stakeholder from SPS, as at September 2022 the data collection for the ESR had been completed in 24 out of 47 counties in Kenya, including in all five EIP target counties. The ESR currently contains data from all households in the eight HSNP counties where a census-based approach was taken. In addition, data have been collected from an additional 16 counties, following the registration approaches explained above, in line with sub-county poverty levels. An independent quality assurance firm has been hired to verify the data quality, but this process is still ongoing at the time of writing.

6.1.3 Alignment with the HTM and the ESR

Despite initial plans, the EIP did not draw on ESR data to select participants during the pilot phase. This was likely for practical reasons as at the time when the EIP started planning for the first phase, ESR data were not yet available (i.e. during inception in early 2021). That said, by the time implementation of the targeting process started in June 2021, ESR data were available for two of the five EIP counties (Marsabit and Makueni), although these data were eventually not used.

However, the EIP targeting mechanism was also not aligned with the HTM, despite the significant similarities in implementation steps and the PMT applied by the approaches.

Some stakeholders argued that the targeting design of models A and B is specific to economic inclusion programming. However, the key objective of both the HTM and the Model A and Model B targeting approaches is to identify households living in poverty as well as other pertinent household and individual characteristics such as demographic information (see Box 3). While the models differ slightly in the extent to which they include CBT elements, the final selection of households under the HTM and models A and B is based on a PMT that in all cases was developed using data from the latest KIHBS of 2015/16 (see Table 8).

The key EIP eligibility criterion that is specific to an economic inclusion programme is the presence of at least one person in the household with the ability to engage in an economic activity, and the HTM collects all of the data needed to assess this factor. The HTM includes a household roster, collecting details on each member of the household, including their gender, age, disability status, chronic illness, level of education, and economic activity performed (MLSP, 2020a). Once the criterion ('ability to participate') is uniformly and clearly defined, a binary filter could easily be constructed based on the available data so that only those poor households that do have a member that meets this condition are selected. In addition, the data from the household roster can be further used to apply filters linked to other categorical inclusion criteria the EIP might have (see Box 3).

Finally, community engagement and sensitisation were named by several key stakeholders as important features that set the EIP targeting mechanism apart from the HTM. However, again, given the similarities in the steps involved, the HTM could easily be adapted to incorporate messaging about the objective of the EIP at the community entry stage and to verify the willingness and ability of selected households at the validation stage. The validation stage could also be used to verify that none of the selected participants are currently or have previously participated in a graduation programme. Village profile surveys and transect walks, which in the EIP mostly serve to gain an understanding of the community conditions rather than targeting, could be conducted at either stage.

Given that the ESR builds on the HTM (see sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2), an adaptation of the HTM for the EIP during the pilot stage could have been a strategic opportunity to facilitate coherence and improve conditions for scale-up of the EIP. The long-term vision of the GoK is that future programmes to support poor households, such as the EIP, will target their participants through the ESR to improve the coherence and the efficiency of the social protection system. A continued lack of alignment between the targeting approach applied by the EIP and the dominant targeting approach underlying the roll-out of the ESR may jeopardise the long-term sustainability of the EIP.

6.2 Coordination and data management

6.2.1 Coordination within the GoK

To implement the EIP through the GoK's systems, the GDI consortium needed to partner closely with DSD, DSA, and NDMA. Broadening the partnerships would have ensured that all relevant government experience is leveraged to the benefit of the EIP, including operational expertise. DSA is responsible for implementing the CT-OVC, OP-CT, and PWSD-CT, and has developed harmonised systems under the CCTP to facilitate this. Crucially, DSA, together with DSD is responsible for implementing the targeting of the NSNP and is the custodian of the CCTP-MIS, which links to the IPRS. DSA is therefore most familiar with the operational requirements of

implementing some aspects of the targeting processes and the challenges that are faced in terms of the various steps in participant targeting and enrolment. Similarly, the HSNP team within NDMA is responsible for operationalising the HSNP's targeting processes and has specific knowledge of implementing targeting in Marsabit, where contextual factors entail additional challenges to the process. DSD, on the other hand, has the mandate to implement the EIP but does not have the same deep experience of operationalising some aspects of the targeting processes; therefore, it was not best placed to advise on how the EIP processes could integrate with GoK systems or provide detailed guidance on the enrolment processes (e.g. the IPRS verification checks).

Kills suggest that DSA was consulted, but not closely engaged, during the design and implementation processes, and this hampered lesson learning. DSA was present at several of the workshops held during the programme's inception and design phases, but was not engaged in the design in the same way that DSD was. As a result, DSA staff felt they had not been sufficiently involved in the EIP implementation and reported that they had had only limited opportunity to share their expertise with DSD and the GDI consortium. At the same time, DSD was not able to provide the GDI consortium with the detailed operational requirements to implement the targeting, which led the GDI consortium to feel that there had not been full disclosure of the targeting processes. Indeed, in several cases, they felt that new targeting requirements emerged from nowhere. Ultimately, the coordination difficulties between DSD, DSA, NDMA, and the GDI consortium meant that the EIP's targeting processes did not fully consider the lessons learned from NSNP targeting and nor did they factor in the GoK's statutory requirements, such as the IPRS checks. This was a key contributing factor to the challenges and delays experienced during the targeting process, described in Chapter 5 above.

6.2.2 Data management

The targeting process was supported by parallel data management platforms, posing further challenges to coordination. The GDI consortium used its own data management system, Salesforce, to manage data collected as part of the participant targeting process using the *TaroWorks* platform. This data collection platform and data management system is not the same system used by the GoK during NSNP targeting or ESR data collection. The use of a parallel system was needed because, first, the CCTP-MIS could not be used since the data fields that need to be stored for the two EIP targeting models are different to the data stored for the NSNP (using the HTM) due to the different targeting approaches. Second, the EIP module within the Community Development MIS⁴³ had not yet been developed due to delays in contracting the developers. Therefore, a decision was taken to proceed with implementation using the consortium's own data management systems to avoid further delays to implementation.

The use of parallel systems has contributed to challenges and delays in transferring data between systems. The EIP uses the Salesforce system to manage the targeting process and the CCTP-MIS to finalise enrolment and make payments. However, linking these two systems has proved challenging and data transfers have had to take place manually. As mentioned in Section 5.3, the consortium has faced challenges with manual data sharing due to the different data formats extracted from Salesforce and required by the CCTP-MIS/IPRS. Overall, the use of two different data management systems for different processes has made coordination and data sharing cumbersome, error-prone, and inefficient.

⁴³ As part of the KSEIP IT strategy, a new data management system called the CD-MIS is being developed to support DSD to manage the EIP, community groups, and volunteer organisations. The EIP will have its own module, drawing on CCTP modules where possible, to support the processes of targeting and enrolment, payments, mentoring, and the grievance redress mechanism, according to key informants.

This also poses a challenge for Phase 2 of the EIP as the MIS will not have been tested during Phase 1. A new MIS is currently being developed to support the EIP implementation (among other initiatives) but this was not ready in time for Phase 1 implementation. For sustainability and coherence, the GDI consortium explained that data management should have taken place using the GoK's systems, but this was not possible due to the different targeting approach taken by the EIP. This will likely introduce challenges to the transition as the system will only be properly tested during the implementation of Phase 2. However, it is crucial that the new system is piloted and tested during Phase 2 so that any challenges can be dealt with before scale-up.

7 Findings: Capacity of GoK to deliver the targeting approach

This chapter aims to answer research questions linked to effectiveness – by exploring the extent to which the EIP is effectively involving GoK in the implementation of the targeting (see Section 7.1) – and sustainability, by looking at whether there is sufficient capacity within GoK to implement the EIP – and specifically the targeting process – as it has been designed beyond the period of technical assistance support (Section 7.2).

7.1 Capacity-building activities

As described in Section 1.2, the consortium’s approach to capacity building followed a learning-by-doing approach combined with workshops and learning forums to enhance participants’ knowledge on key aspects of design and delivery. In the following sections, we assess the effectiveness of these processes and some of the challenges to implementation.

7.1.1 Effectiveness of workshops and learning forums

Most officials found workshops and training to be useful ways to enhance their knowledge of key graduation implementation processes, including targeting. Across Marsabit and Taita Taveta, a range of officials reported being involved in the design workshops and training sessions related to targeting. Self-assessments from the workshops and learning forums show that most participants felt that their knowledge of graduation approaches and processes improved in key areas after attending the design workshops. In general, the feedback received on the workshops from participants was positive, with many participants highlighting the use of group work as an effective tool for learning. Other participants noted that the workshops were long and required more participatory sessions to keep officials engaged, while avoiding the use of long presentations containing technical jargon.

However, among the implementing consortium, there was a perception that workshops and learning sessions were not always reaching the intended audience. Although officials representing DSD at national, county, and sub-county levels as well as commissioners from the counties and sub-counties attended most of the workshops, the GDI consortium felt that there could have been better representation and attendance from each level of government. Further, there was a concern that different officials attended each session, resulting in officials gaining partial knowledge of the programme and its processes rather than a holistic picture. There was also the perception that officials attending the training were not fully committed to learning and did not fully engage with the sessions, especially during multi-day workshops.

7.1.2 Effectiveness of the learning-by-doing approach

At the national level, the implementing consortium noted that the appointment of shadow officers within DSD has not delivered as planned. The ambition of the consortium was to identify officials within DSD to shadow key roles in the GDI team to facilitate a seamless transition when the implementation of Phase 2 begins. While DSD officials have been charged with managing implementation in specific counties or taking over cross-cutting roles (such as M&E, communications, and case management), key informants noted that the level of engagement has varied due to the range of competing commitments and responsibilities that DSD officials already

have. In relation to targeting, all key targeting processes have largely been led and implemented by the GDI consortium with support from county-level officials, with national DSD officials attending field visits, engagements, or working sessions on an *ad hoc* basis.

At the county and sub-county levels, key informants reported that there is a good working relationship between the consortium and the county and sub-county government teams.

Respondents from the counties explained that there is daily contact with the consortium, which is facilitated by having offices in the same building. This has helped to resolve issues with the implementation of the targeting process that have arisen and to provide practical experience of implementation to government stakeholders who will be taking over implementation in Phase 2.

The relationship is described by a County Programme Manager from the GDI consortium reflecting on working with county officials and is corroborated by a county official:

It opened my eyes, they were welcoming and ready to learn, my coordinator is willing to learn, they have many ideas, and they can sort out very many problems. They are resourceful and acting on requests.

We work as a team. [...] If you work alone you will not survive. We need one another. Any activity they do, like training baseline survey to the mentors, they involve us; we plan and go together. They have done a lot. As government we have not been doing things the way they do them. They have mentored us a lot.

However, several county-level officials felt they had not been sufficiently involved in field activities to fully internalise the EIP targeting process. During KIs, some government officials noted that they only received reports when the implementers returned from field activities, which hampered their ability to truly learn from the process. Implementers explained that government officials had competing commitments and heavy workloads, which limited their ability to participate fully in some parts of the process. A County Programme Manager described the challenge in the following terms:

... and government, with all other activities in the office, they will not always be in the field. Today they will be there and tomorrow they are not present. They see the first process, then third, and the other day the second, but they don't understand. They know the process but taking it up and doing it... they need commitment. They needed to commit one person to the programme, though that is not easy for government, so that person learns by doing. Learning in training and doing it practically is hard, but they are having very many other things they are doing in the office.

As a result, key informants raised concerns that field activities had only served to raise awareness, which may not translate into changed practice. One national stakeholder felt that the GoK was not always taking a hands-on approach to implementation, while another explained that this meant government officials were not fully internalising the targeting processes and lessons from implementation. Some stakeholders attributed this outcome to the role that county- and sub-county-level DSD officials were given in the implementation of Phase 1 targeting, which was largely limited to community entry and oversight of the targeting process rather than being actively involved in the practicalities of implementation. The role of DSD during Model A targeting is described by one County Programme Manager as '*mobilisation, open the meeting for the team and oversee what is happening*' during PRA and '*to take enumerators to the specific households... and oversee what is happening*' during PTT.

On the other hand, at both the national and county levels, officials felt they were well prepared to implement the targeting process based on their experience targeting the NSNP

and, more recently, the ESR data collection. In both cases, DSD officers in the counties and sub-counties had been involved in implementing the HTM to identify large numbers of households using a similar targeting approach. Similarly, county officials have been involved in implementing the NSNP for many years and feel comfortable with the process of identifying vulnerable households for social programmes. This assumed understanding of the process, and the similarity with the NSNP targeting process, may explain why other key informants felt that DSD was not taking a ‘hands-on’ approach to implementation and may suggest limited buy-in to the EIP’s targeting processes.

7.1.3 Sustainability of capacity building

At both national and county levels, attrition or transfer of government officials poses a risk to the success and sustainability of the capacity-building activities. Several senior government officials, including the Deputy Director of Social Development, the Head of SPS, and the Director of Social Assistance, have left the public service since the beginning of the programme. With them leaves much institutional knowledge related to the implementation of social assistance targeting in general and of the targeting processes of the EIP. Further, the GDI consortium noted that there have also been several changes in personnel at the county level, with limited handover activities taking place, which affects the ability of the consortium to build capacity within government. A County Programme Manager explained the challenge:

The County Commissioner who started is no longer there. Now I have to repeat the whole story to the new person. So there are no good structures of handing over, especially the county. National governments are structured; they leave information to each other. But when a new person comes in the county the whole department changes and you redo everything.

A related concern is that mentor supervisors and mentors, who implemented the targeting approach, will not necessarily be engaged during the second phase. However, mentor supervisors and mentors have practical experience of implementing the targeting process (and the EIP in general) that will be lost if they are not retained. Mentor supervisors and mentors would also be best placed to train the new cohort of mentors in pilot counties and additional counties on the targeting processes. A mentor supervisor in Marsabit explained that:

...at the location level, they don’t have the right person as a mentor and the mentoring part will be a very big challenge for them. My advice is that they retain the mentors and ensure the programme runs; they understand the community and they know the challenges beforehand.

Overall, these findings suggest that the GoK may struggle to implement the EIP’s targeting approach as it is currently designed during Phase 2. While officials at all levels of government seem to have a high level of awareness of the targeting steps as outlined in Section 3.2.2, they have less practical experience of implementing the EIP’s targeting processes, which may introduce challenges in Phase 2 especially if mentor supervisors and mentors are not retained. Further, given the similarities with the NSNP targeting process, it is likely that government officials will fall back on implementing targeting processes they are familiar with and which they have the existing capacity to implement. As Chapter 6 argued, using the HTM, and data from the ESR, could be an option that may yield similar targeting outcomes while increasing the efficiency of the targeting approach by aligning it to existing processes and data systems used by the GoK.

7.2 Human resource capacity

This section assesses stakeholders' perceptions of the GoK's capacity to take over the EIP in the second phase. It is worth highlighting that the design of the EIP is heavily dependent on mentor supervisors and mentors to conduct targeting and crucially deliver the EIP interventions. For this reason, the second process review report will focus specifically on the mentorship component of the EIP. Where this section discusses the role of mentors, we focus only on their responsibilities in relation to the targeting process.

KIIs indicated that DSD and county government officials do not have sufficient capacity to absorb the additional responsibilities of the EIP. As discussed in Section 7.1.2, a key reason that learning-by-doing activities have not been fully successful in building capacity within government is the competing priorities of government staff. Aside from delivering the EIP, DSD is responsible for delivering welfare services for families, women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups and these competing priorities often draw them away from EIP activities. A county official in Taita Taveta noted that '*capacity is a challenge*' and that '*sometimes the officers are overwhelmed by the amount of work*'. An SCSDO further explains:

We don't have enough staff. We are three here: myself, the coordinator, and one Social Development Officer. We need someone to collect data, receive it in the office. We deal with a lot of things, certificates, conflict of groups, Inua Jamii, case management more than 10 every day because even those with caregivers say they are consuming their money and they want them changed. We need more officers.

Given these capacity constraints, having a separate targeting approach for the EIP that does not use the data from the ESR or requires the use of parallel systems will only serve to increase the workload of DSD officials and county staff, likely exacerbating the issues of staff turnover.

Further, the EIP's targeting approach for both Model A and Model B is human resource intensive, particularly in relation to the role of mentor supervisors and mentors. Mentor supervisors are required to coach and train mentors on the targeting processes, support community mobilisation, and coordinate and oversee the work of 15 mentors (in 15 villages)⁴⁴ during targeting, as well as report on implementation progress in the sub-county. DSD officers facilitate community entry and mobilisation, provide oversight of targeting activities, and verify the lists of households produced during targeting. Mentors conduct the PRA and the PTT in Model A. In Model B villages, enumerators are contracted to conduct the PPI.

To implement the targeting approach as it is currently designed, DSD will need to engage mentor supervisors, mentors, and enumerators. These individuals should be remunerated for their work and cannot be engaged as volunteers. This means that DSD would either need to increase its staff complement or will have to manage the contracts of mentor supervisors, mentors, and enumerators. The former will result in a large increase in the cost of employment, which is unlikely given fiscal constraints, while the latter will require personnel to manage the contracts of mentor supervisors, mentors, and enumerators – thus further increasing the workload. In addition, due consideration needs to be given to the level of remuneration of mentors to reduce turnover. It was noted that six mentors in Marsabit left the EIP for other opportunities as they receive thorough training as part of the EIP which sets them up well for other jobs. As mentioned above, the cost of engaging mentors to deliver the EIP could be reduced somewhat if mentors do not need to be engaged for the targeting process as well.

⁴⁴ In Marsabit, a sub-county social development officer noted that even the current number of mentors and enumerators was insufficient given the size of the county.

8 Conclusions and implications for programming

One of the main objectives of the process review workstream is to provide timely and relevant insights into key implementation processes that DSD, the GDI consortium, and other partners can use to reflect on and adjust programming going forward.

In line with this objective, this final chapter has two parts. Section 8.1 sets out some of the overall conclusions and issues arising and their potential implications for future programming. Section 8.2 draws on these conclusions and proposes a range of recommendations and associated questions to support their operationalisation. The intention is to stimulate discussion and reflection by the actors involved in the design and implementation of the EIP and jointly use these reflection sessions to i) agree on the proposed recommendations, and ii) adjust the programme design to incorporate some of the findings and recommendations into Phase 2 and eventually during the scale-up. An overview of the summary findings per evaluation question can be found in Annex B.

8.1 Conclusions

As set out in this report, the targeting of households for the EIP encountered several challenges and, as evidenced by the learning and adaptation that took place, all stakeholders worked hard to resolve these and adjust the targeting process to reach the intended number of households.

It is important to re-state the lens for analysis that has underpinned our assessment: for EIP targeting to be successfully delivered by the government at scale, implementation modalities need to be compatible with existing systems, as well as being underpinned by realistic expectations around GoK capacity. The findings from this process review reiterate the importance of this approach – in order to take a tried-and-tested model of graduation implemented by NGOs and apply it through government systems, implementation processes will need to be carefully assessed and very likely altered to fit relevant government requirements as well as available capacity. It is important to ensure that all relevant stakeholders have been identified and engaged, government systems are properly understood, and implementation processes are, from the outset, adjusted to work through and with government systems, thereby laying the foundation for sustainability and future uptake and scale-up through government. Our assessment of lessons learned, conclusions, and suggestions on recommendations have been guided by returning to this key requirement – to develop and test an EIP that has been designed to be scalable by government.

First, the findings of this review have shown that the targeting processes of the economic inclusion models need to be adapted to be implemented through the government's existing systems and not vice versa. The planning and design phase of the EIP during Phase 2 needs to consider the existing systems and processes within SDSP that are used to target social assistance programmes and assess how to align the EIP processes to these. During the design of Phase 1, it was felt that using the HTM approach would have entailed a compromise in terms of the effectiveness of the targeting outcomes. However, the discussion presented in Section 6.1 suggests that it is reasonable to assume that using the HTT, PTT, or PPI (all of which employ a PMT-based approach) in combination with a community validation component would likely yield similar targeting outcomes. This conclusion is supported by other studies that have found that the effectiveness of targeting is ultimately driven by implementation of the chosen targeting method rather than by the choice of the method itself (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004; Devereux *et al.*, 2015). As such, given the similarity of the EIP's targeting approaches to the HTM, there is no strong justification to introduce a new targeting method or radically adjust the HTM. Rather, the design stage for Phase 2 should consider how the ESR data could be used to fit the needs of the EIP.

Adapting an existing targeting approach like the HTM has the potential to improve the efficiency, sustainability, and coherence of the EIP targeting approach. In terms of efficiency, the discussion on human resource capacity constraints faced by the GoK, particularly on the sub-county level, underscores the need for an efficient targeting process that utilises existing government systems. The GoK has invested significantly in the ESR and the design of the HTM which underpins it, and the use of these systems could reduce the cost of targeting for the EIP significantly. Finally, the use of two new targeting approaches has impacted coherence with other government systems. For example, a new MIS is being built for the EIP, with two new targeting modules to accommodate the bespoke requirements of the EIP's targeting approaches. However, this new data management system was not available in time for Phase 1, necessitating the use of the consortium's own parallel data management platforms.

Another key learning is that it is crucial to involve the right set of stakeholders from inception to gain an understanding of governments' processes and requirements. DSD is mandated to deliver the EIP on behalf of SDSP and has been closely involved in all phases of design and implementation of the EIP. However, DSD does not have operational experience of delivering social assistance, which lies with DSA (for the CCTP) and NDMA (for HSNP). While these stakeholders were consulted during the inception and design stages of Phase 1, often in large, multi-stakeholder workshops, they should be brought into the implementing partnership going forward to ensure that operational lessons and requirements are shared with the implementing consortium. This type of partnership would have resulted in better awareness of the GoK's processes and requirements and this would have mitigated some of the implementation challenges and delays experienced. As discussed in Section 5.3, many (but not all) of the challenges faced with the IPRS verification could have been avoided if the data collection instruments and data collection training had been designed with the IPRS requirements in mind, or if the GoK's existing data collection tools had been adapted and utilised.

This review has also highlighted the difficulties of including other social assistance programme beneficiaries to economic inclusion programmes (NSNP households in the case of EIP). Economic inclusion programmes are not typically targeted at the types of households enrolled in the NSNP (with the possible exception of the HSNP) because these households are significantly more labour-constrained than other households. In the context of the EIP, the inclusion of 20% NSNP households does raise a risk that the programme's impact may be dampened as these households may not be best suited to participating in the programme.⁴⁵ Further, the targeting approach struggled to identify enough NSNP households in the first round, which necessitated a second round of targeting. This was partly due to the poor quality of the data retrieved from the CCTP-MIS (specifically in terms of the currency of the data). NSNP targeting has not been updated since 2017, with reports from the GDI consortium that up to 30% of NSNP households were deceased, had migrated, or were no longer eligible for the NSNP. If programmes are going to piggyback on the NSNP to deliver complementary support, the GoK needs to ensure that accurate, complete, and reliable data on NSNP households can be easily obtained. However, in the short term the EIP will have to work within the constraints of the current NSNP list, which implies that the targeting approach for NSNP households may need to be tailored. This might entail incorporating an approach that proactively identifies NSNP households for inclusion in the programme or using the ESR data for targeting which will also allow to cross-check the NSNP disbursement lists.

The capacity-building approach has been effective in raising awareness of graduation approaches but may not translate into changed practice. Most officials found workshops and training to be useful ways to enhance their knowledge of key graduation implementation processes, including targeting. However, among the implementing consortium there was a perception that workshops and learning sessions were not always reaching the intended audience.

⁴⁵ This question will be assessed as part of the endline report of the impact evaluation.

In terms of learning-by-doing, while there are good working relationships between the consortium and government officials involved in implementation, stakeholders (including from the GoK) felt the government officials had not been sufficiently involved in field activities to fully internalise the EIP targeting process. Further, given the similarity of the EIP targeting approach to the HTM, many officials felt comfortable with the process of identifying poor and vulnerable households for social programmes as they had done this many times before.

Finally, the approach to capacity building needs to consider the context of high workloads and high staff turnover to ensure sustainability. DSD officials face high workloads, which has been exacerbated by the introduction of the EIP and other activities under KSEIP. This in turn results in high turnover rates, which poses a challenge to sustainably building government capacity. Therefore, it is important that the consortium's approach to capacity building focuses on institutionalising capacity in entrenched systems and processes, rather than focusing on building the capacity of individuals. This includes ensuring that the right documentation of processes is available to facilitate handover processes that may not otherwise take place. At the same time, the GoK should consider how to strengthen its own handover processes, which is especially important for the sustainability of several new programmes that are being piloted by SDSP.

8.2 Recommendations and topics discussed in the workshop

Based on the findings and conclusions, this section summarises the recommendations and questions that were discussed with key stakeholders as part of the process review learning workshop. The workshop addressed the following recommendations, derived from the findings described in the draft report:

1. **Draw on ESR data to select households and participants for Phase 2 and adjust the remaining operational processes required for EIP targeting accordingly.** Given the capacity constraints within the GoK, specifically at the county and sub-county-levels, it is not recommended to continue implementing two new targeting approaches. Drawing on the ESR for targeting has the potential to reduce the costs of EIP implementation considerably and free up time and resources for other key processes under the EIP, such as mentoring. The similarities between Models A and B and the HTT that was used for ESR data collection provide further justification for using the ESR data to target. ESR data is available for all EIP intervention counties and contains the necessary information to identify whether a household is eligible for the EIP (e.g., poverty level, NSNP status and demographic household data to verify 'ability to participate'). Another significant advantage of targeting future EIP participants through the ESR is that they will have already completed IPRS checks. Finally, given that the ESR's targeting protocols ends at the application of the PMT (to determine household poverty levels), any programme utilising the data has the opportunity to, and is required to, design bespoke protocols for communication and sensitisation, validation and verification to ensure that selected households comply with programme-specific eligibility criteria (including the possibility of incorporating community-based validation processes), and enrolment of selected households. This provides an opportunity to layer on additional operational processes for EIP targeting by reflection on the following questions:
 - a. How could the community entry protocols be adapted when selecting households and participants from the ESR?
 - b. How could the validation step be designed for the EIP when selecting households and participants from the ESR?
 - i. To what extent and how can the community be involved in validating the households and participants selected through the ESR?

- ii. What additional factors specific to the EIP will need to be verified during the validation step once potential participants have been selected from the ESR and how (e.g. willingness to participate in the EIP, previous participation in a graduation programme, etc)?
 - c. How should the steps of the EIP enrolment process be structured (and simplified) if EIP participants are selected via the ESR?
2. **Improve the compatibility of EIP data management systems with those in use by the GoK.** Once the targeting approach for Phase 2 has been finalised, the Operational Manual and the targeting module of the CD-MIS should be updated to reflect any agreed changes to the implementation of the EIP targeting strategy. It will be important that the CD-MIS will be ready to pilot during the implementation of the second phase of the EIP given that this opportunity was missed during the first phase. Furthermore, should the decision be taken that targeting for the EIP will be done through the ESR, the CD-MIS targeting module needs to reflect this and the CD-MIS should be interoperable with the ESR. If the EIP continues using the payment module of the CCTP-MIS, interoperability between the CD-MIS and the CCTP-MIS must also be guaranteed.
- a. How does the CD-MIS need to link to the CCTP-MIS and the ESR to support programme delivery?
 - b. What adjustments need to be made to the EIP targeting module of the CD-MIS? (if any)
 - c. What other changes to the EIP data management system are necessary to make it compatible with GoK systems?
3. **Develop clear, uniform eligibility criteria for the EIP, including for ‘the ability to participate’ and the categorical inclusion criteria to ensure preference to marginalised groups is given uniformly across counties.** The review indicated that several factors were considered to determine the ‘ability to participate’ including severe disability, old age, mental illness, drug, or alcohol addiction. At the same time, it was highlighted that the EIP aims to give preference to marginalised groups such as women or people with moderate disabilities. However, these criteria and their application are not clearly and uniformly defined which poses a risk to the transparency and scalability of the implementation of the EIP targeting strategy as well as the equity of targeting outcomes. The EIP eligibility criteria, including the ‘ability to participate’ and categorical inclusion criteria should be the same for the whole programme and they should be applied similarly across models A and B and across all areas in which the EIP is implemented.
- a. How should the ‘ability to participate’ be defined?
 - b. Should the EIP have any categorical inclusion criteria which will give preference to certain marginalised groups? If so, what should those be, how should they be defined and how should they be applied?
4. **Consider revising the 25% target quota for NSNP households for the next phases of the EIP, taking an approach of giving preference to eligible NSNP households rather than setting fixed quotas.** Selecting EIP households and participants from the ESR data should make it easier to identify NSNP households as the ESR contains data on NSNP status and includes demographic variables about the household that could be used to determine their ‘ability to participate’ once this is clearly defined (see above). However, the target population for economic inclusion programmes (i.e., households that have surplus labour) continue to be at odds with the fact that many NSNP transfers are designed to address lifecycle risks and target individuals within households that, for the most part, cannot be economically active (i.e., children, older persons, and persons with severe disabilities). While in some cases, it is

possible to identify a caregiver to participate in their place, this review found that it was significantly more difficult to find NSNP households that meet the EIP criteria for having the ‘ability to participate’ compared to non-NSNP households. NSNP households are also unevenly distributed across geographic locations which made it significantly more difficult to reach fixed targets in some counties/sub-counties than in others. Thus, the EIP implementers may want to reflect on the following:

- a. Which households (CT-OVC, OP-CT, PWSD-CT and/or HSNP) are best suited to participate in the EIP? Are any of these households better suited than others?
- b. Should the target quota be replaced by a selection mechanism that gives preference to eligible NSNP households over non-NSNP households but without having a fixed binding quota at each level? If so, how?
- c. Does selecting future EIP households and participants from the ESR have the potential to solve the difficulties in identifying ‘enough’ NSNP households? If not, what additional adaptations to the approach need to be made to identify enough NSNP households?

5. **Strengthen coordination and engagement between DSD and the GDI consortium and other parts of government, particularly those with operational expertise in targeting social assistance including SPS, DSA and NDMA.** SPS oversees the roll-out of the ESR, while DSA and NDMA are responsible for the operational delivery of the CCTP and the HSNP, respectively. The findings from this review suggest that closer and more timely collaboration with these stakeholders could have avoided many of the challenges experienced during the targeting process. While DSD is the designated implementation agency for the EIP, other stakeholders also have important operational expertise in relation to targeting social assistance. The following questions should be considered to improve the design and implementation of the operational processes for the second phase of the EIP, including targeting:

- a. What concrete actions can be taken to strengthen the coordination during the design and implementation of the next phase of the EIP?
- b. Which other key stakeholders need to be brought into the implementation partnership to improve delivery processes?
- c. How can the PSPs be engaged to increase the efficiency of the process of account opening for non-NSNP households (i.e., in terms of collecting the right data, transferring data)?

6. **Clearly define the implementation arrangements and roles and responsibilities at the county and sub-county levels for the implementation of phase 2.** County and sub-county officials have high workloads and limited capacity to take on additional responsibilities. Therefore, implementing a targeting process that minimises the additional workload for county and sub-county official is important. Targeting EIP households through the ESR has the potential to reduce the additional workload of DSD at the county- and sub-county-level with respect to targeting. However, some responsibilities will remain, including for community entry, validation, and verification, in addition to all other tasks that county- and sub-county level staff have to undertake. Further, it is not clear what the roles and responsibilities of county and sub-county officials will be during Phase 2 and beyond, and this should be clearly outlined in the operational manual. The EIP implementers may want to consider the following:

- a. When the EIP is implemented by the GoK in phase 2, who will perform the tasks related to targeting at the county- and sub-county-level?

- b. What are the plans to fill capacity gaps and is a fully-fledged capacity assessment necessary?

In addition to these programme-specific recommendations, the process review identified several broader recommendations aimed at strengthening the GoK's processes and systems and the social protection system more broadly. While these recommendations go beyond the mandate of the EIP implementers (i.e., DSD and the GDI consortium) and could not be fully resolved at the workshop, their implementation is deemed essential to enable a successful scale-up of the EIP, and to enhance the Kenyan social protection system.

7. **Ensure currency of the ESR data by frequently updating data.** The ESR manual stipulates that data should be updated every four years, if not more frequently. Further, the GoK should incorporate on-demand mechanisms to facilitate adding and updating household information on a rolling basis. Considering the non-static nature of poverty, this will be important to make sure inclusion and exclusion errors are kept to a minimum should the EIP choose to target through the ESR.
8. **Update the HTM PMT model using the latest KIHBS data once this is available.** The PMT model applied during the roll-out of the ESR is based on the KIHBS 2015/16 data. Once the KIHBS 2020 data is available, the formula should be updated and applied to improve estimation of households' poverty status, and as a result, the targeting accuracy of any programme using the ESR data to target.
9. **Prioritise the development of interoperability of the various MIS** to ensure smooth operational delivery of Kenya' emerging integrated social protection systems, including the ESR, CCTP, HSNP and EIP. This may be achieved by strengthening the MIS capacity of the SDSP with the mandate to help establish interoperability and linkages with the MIS of other programmes such as the CD-MIS that is being developed for the EIP.
10. **Strengthen hand-over processes**, especially at the county and sub-county-level to ensure that institutional capacity development and learning is not lost when individuals move position or leave the civil service.

It is important to highlight that these recommendations and questions for reflection are specific to the first process review report focused on targeting. While there are already many other learnings emerging – specifically in regard to the delivery of the EIP intervention package such as the consumption support and asset payments, the mentoring, the formation of savings and business groups, etc. (including questions about the capacity required to deliver these) – these topics were the focus of the second process review report and associated learning workshop, which was delivered in 2023 in line with the EIP implementation timelines.

8.3 Workshop decisions and way forward

At the workshop, facilitated by OPM, participants were taken through these findings from review of targeting and invited to discuss what this means for the design and implementation of the EIP in Phase 2. The workshop was interactive and participatory, and participants were able to reflect on the findings and recommendations described above. Participants were also given the opportunity to discuss the feasibility of the recommendations including whether and how these should be operationalised and implemented, by whom, and when. A workshop report was produced that reflects the results from the workshop, including the decisions taken in terms of adaptations, responsibilities, and next steps

During the two-day workshop, various stakeholders involved in EIP implementation engaged in collaborative discussions addressing the challenges of EIP targeting, along with

the underlying factors contributing to these challenges. In line with the process review's findings, participants consistently underscored that many challenges originated from deficiencies in the design of phase one, which were exacerbated by insufficient coordination among crucial stakeholders. The workshop underscored the significance of involving the right stakeholders with accountability in the framing and design phases. The recommendations put forth by participants overwhelmingly stressed the importance of this aspect. Notably, participants not only proposed solutions aligned with the recommendations from this process review's but also progressed towards outlining practical steps for their implementation in phase 2 (These tasks and action points are highlighted in Annex F).

Taking insights from the lessons learned and recommendations highlighted in this Process Review, the workshop yielded significant decisions and recommendations from the participants. Some of the key outcomes include:

- **Involving relevant stakeholders at the design phase:** Participants recognised that effective involvement of the right stakeholders during the design phase is paramount. They highlighted that such engagement would have enabled IPRS verification integration into data collection, mitigating discrepancies and streamlining the process. The consensus was that proper engagement could have prevented the design oversight that led to subsequent challenges.
- **Improving communication on data collection:** Clear and explicit communication on data collection procedures was identified as vital. Participants stressed that providing precise instructions on data fields, formats, and eligible individuals would have minimized IPRS-related challenges.
- **Reducing verification scope:** Participants agreed that limiting the scope of IPRS verification to essential fields would have been more effective. They proposed a selective approach, considering vital fields for verification rather than an exhaustive process. Additionally, it was suggested that NSNP beneficiaries with already verified data should only undergo validation instead of complete verification.
- **Utilising verified ESR data for targeting:** Participants acknowledged that utilising already verified ESR data would streamline targeting efforts. This approach would leverage pre-verified information thereby enhancing the efficiency of targeting for Gok in Phase 2.
- **Integration of IPRS checks into data collection:** Integrating IPRS checks into the data collection process, similar to the ESR data collection approach, was proposed. This real-time correction mechanism would expedite error rectification.
- **Revising or removing quotas:** Participants recommended either eliminating the quota system or revising it by considering the distribution of current NSNP beneficiaries. The objective was to strike a balance between ensuring participation and ensuring NSNP beneficiaries were actually able to engage in EIP activities.
- **Pre-Identifying NSNP Participants:** Utilising existing NSNP beneficiary lists before targeting would expedite participant identification.
- **Determining implementation areas and NSNP criteria:** To ensure uniformity and consistency across the program, a well-defined process for determining implementation areas and establishing criteria for the inclusion of NSNP beneficiaries was proposed.


- **Enhancing communication and messaging:** Participants recognised the need for clearer messaging on EIP participation implications for NSNP beneficiaries. This should include defining the difference between "graduation" and program exit.
- **Defining eligibility criteria and designing specific tools:** For phase two of the EIP, the workshop suggested defining eligibility criteria and creating an EIP-specific tool. They also emphasised the need for clear protocols to facilitate the replacement of households dropped during community validation.
- **Enhancing community entry and validation:** The workshop proposed enhancing the community entry and validation procedures by actively engaging community leaders and gatekeepers. It was recommended that clear and comprehensive messaging, along with sensitisation efforts, be undertaken to ensure participants have a thorough understanding of the program's objectives and timeline.
- **Integrating CD-MIS with ESR and CCTP-MIS:** Participants stressed the importance of integrating the data management systems in order to facilitate streamlined targeting processes and real-time data exchange.

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Annex A EIP Theory of Change



Annex B Summary answers to the evaluation questions

| DAC criteria | # | Research questions | Summary conclusion |
|--------------|----|--|--|
| Relevance | A1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the assumptions related to the implementation of targeting held during implementation? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some but not all assumptions related to the targeting held during the implementation. The targeting tools used were mostly appropriate to select households that meet the EIP’s eligibility criteria in terms of poverty status and achieved high levels of perceived legitimacy among community leaders. However, the implementation of the targeting process required significantly more time and resources than expected and resulted in programme implementation delays of over one year. This was mostly due to a failure to include assumptions with regards to all requirements needed to implement the targeting process through the GoK’s systems. Most crucially, the assumption that, before enrolment, all selected households would need to pass the IPRS checks meant that this process was not planned for and ultimately led to severe delays, partly also because there was no clarity about the detailed requirements of the process. Secondly, the targeting process was implemented on the assumption that it would be possible to find sufficient eligible NSNP beneficiaries in each sub-location where the EIP is implemented. In all counties except for Marsabit it proved very challenging to find enough NSNP beneficiaries, which was partly due to an overambitious target, out of date data on NSNP beneficiaries (the last CCTP recertification took place in 2017) and the lack of a customised targeting approach to identify NSNP beneficiaries. |
| | A2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the intervention design for the EIP provide sufficient flexibility to respond to changes in the context of implementation, or upon evidence generated by the programme? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The implementation of the EIP targeting responded flexibly throughout and in response to unexpected challenges as they arose. The design in phases, where phase 1 is considered a pilot, allows for adaptation before the design and implementation of phase 2, taking into account considerations and lessons learnt from phase 1, especially in terms of operational processes. This process review plays an important part in this regard. In terms of the context-specific design of the model A and B targeting approach, this review finds that the two approaches are very similar by design and performed similarly in terms of targeting outputs. Their difference lies mostly in the resource requirement for implementation but as this review concluded, both models are likely too resource-intensive considering GoK capacities and a more stream-lined unified targeting approach, possibly drawing on ESR data, is recommended. |
| Coherence | B1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How coherent is the EIP delivery system for targeting with other GoK systems? Were the appropriate stakeholders involved in the EIP targeting system? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EIP delivery system for the targeting is not fully coherent with government systems. The IPRS verification, which is a statutory requirement for all social assistance programmes run by the GoK, was not planned for and constituted a major obstacle in the timely implementation of the targeting. Initial delays were encountered due to the data supplied to the DSA for verification not being in the required format which is partly due to the fact that the EIP targeting process was supported by parallel data management platforms due to delays in completing the CD-MIS. The EIP targeting mechanism was not aligned with the GoK’s NSNP HTM and the EIP did not draw on data from the ESR, a social registry which is currently being rolled out by the GoK (partly because this was not fully available at the start of targeting for phase 1). Both the HTM and the ESR built in the IPRS checks automatically at the registration stage during data collection in the field, while the EIP conducted IPRS checks manually at the enrolment stage. The findings of this review show that for efficiency, sustainability, and coherence, it is important that the targeting processes of economic inclusion models are adapted to be implemented through existing government. Although ESR data was not fully available at the start of the first phase of the EIP, an adaptation of the HTM for the EIP during the pilot stage could have been a strategic opportunity to facilitate coherence and improve the conditions for subsequent scale-up of the EIP. The GoK has invested significantly in the ESR and the design of the HTM, and use of these systems could minimise the additional workload and reduce the cost of targeting for the EIP significantly. systems. All appropriate stakeholders were involved in the EIP targeting system but some not to the extent that might have been required. DSD is mandated to deliver the EIP on behalf of SDSP and has been closely involved in all phases of |

| DAC criteria | # | Research questions | Summary conclusion |
|---------------|----|---|---|
| | | | design and implementation of the EIP. However, DSD does not have operational experience of delivering social assistance, which lies with DSA (for the CCTP) and NDMA (for HSNP). While these stakeholders were consulted during the inception and design stages of Phase 1, often in large, multi-stakeholder workshops, they should be brought into the implementing partnership going forward to ensure that operational lessons and requirements are shared with the implementing consortium. This type of partnership would have resulted in better awareness of the GoK's processes and requirements, and this would have mitigated some of the implementation challenges and delays experienced. In addition, should DSD decide that phase 2 of the EIP will draw on the ESR for targeting, SDSP will also have to be closely involved in the implementing partnership for the EIP (see recommendations). |
| | B2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent are coordination and linkages working between government departments and systems as it relates to the implementation of targeting? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> While all relevant government departments were engaged to some extent in the implementation of the targeting of the EIP, coordination challenges impacted the effective and efficient delivery of the process. While DSA and NDMA were present at several of the workshops held during the programme's inception and design phases, there was a perception among stakeholders that these departments were not engaged sufficiently in the design in the same way that DSD was. At the same time, DSD was not able to provide the GDI consortium with the detailed operational requirements to implement the targeting which resulted in the fact that several requirements only emerging during the implementation of the process. Ultimately, the coordination difficulties between DSD, DSA, NDMA, and the GDI consortium meant that the EIP's targeting processes did not fully consider the lessons learned from NSNP targeting and nor did they factor in the GoK's statutory requirements, such as the IPRS checks. This was a key contributing factor to the challenges and delays experienced during the targeting process |
| Effectiveness | C1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What capacities do stakeholders think have to be in place at all levels of government for the EIP to function (at pilot and at scale)? To what extent are effective training and capacity-building arrangements in place and successfully implemented? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The design of the EIP is heavily dependent on mentor supervisors, mentors, and enumerators to conduct targeting and crucially deliver the EIP interventions. As it is currently designed, the EIP targeting cannot be implemented without the cadre of mentors. Mentor supervisors are required to coach and train mentors on the targeting processes, support community mobilisation, and coordinate and oversee the work of 15 mentors (in 15 villages) during targeting, as well as report on implementation progress in the sub-county. In phase 1 DSD officers facilitated community entry and mobilisation, provide oversight of targeting activities, and verify the lists of households produced during targeting. Mentors conduct the PRA and the PTT in Model A. In Model B villages, enumerators are contracted to conduct the PPI. Technical assistance providers have put in place a capacity building plan, following a learning-by-doing approach combined with workshops and learning forums to enhance participants' knowledge of key aspects of design and delivery. The activities of the plan were, for the most part, implemented and most officials found workshops and training to be useful ways to enhance their knowledge of key graduation implementation processes, including targeting. However, there was also the perception that workshops and learning sessions were not always reaching the intended audience. The appointment of shadow officers within DSD was also not delivered as planned, as the level of engagement by shadow officers varied due to competing priorities and commitments. In relation to targeting, all key targeting processes have largely been led and implemented by the GDI consortium with support from county-level officials, with national DSD officials attending field visits, engagements, or working sessions on an <i>ad hoc</i> basis. As a result, key informants raised concerns that field activities had only served to raise awareness, which may not translate into changed practice. Attrition or transfer of government officials combined with weak hand-over processes also poses a risk to the success and sustainability of the capacity-building activities. |
| | C2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have the systems to deliver targeting been set up? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The systems for delivering targeting under models A and B have been set up in the sense that all tools are available and have been piloted and refined. However, most crucially, given the delay of the CD-MIS, the GDI consortium had to use its own data management system, Salesforce, to manage data collected as part of the participant targeting process using the <i>TaroWorks</i> platform. This data collection platform and data management system is not the same |

| DAC criteria | # | Research questions | Summary conclusion |
|-----------------------|----|--|--|
| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent do stakeholders think that the GoK developed the capacity to implement these systems independently? | <p>system used by the GoK during NSNP targeting or ESR data collection. The CCTP-MIS targeting module could not be used since the data fields that need to be stored for the two EIP targeting models are different to the data stored for the NSNP (using the HTM) due to the different targeting approaches. Delays in contracting the CD-MIS developers had knock-on effects on the timely set up of the system. This also poses challenges for phase 2 as the CD-MIS will not have been tested during phase 1. It is crucial that the new system is piloted and tested during Phase 2 so that any challenges can be dealt with before scale-up.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> While officials at all levels of government seem to have a high level of awareness of the targeting steps of models A and B, they have less practical experience of implementing the EIP's targeting processes, which may introduce challenges in Phase 2 especially if mentor supervisors and mentors are not retained. Further, given the similarities with the NSNP targeting process, it is likely that government officials will fall back on implementing targeting processes they are familiar with and which they have the existing capacity to implement. Using the HTM, and data from the ESR, could be an option that may yield similar targeting outcomes while increasing the efficiency of the targeting approach by aligning it to existing processes and data systems used by the GoK. <p>However, it is also important to note that the capacity building activities only focus on building skills and knowledge of existing staff but cannot build capacity in terms of the availability of resources. As explained in the answer to evaluation question E1 (see below), it is likely that the GoK's capacity in terms of the availability of resources, especially human resources at the county and sub-county level, is not sufficient to deliver the EIP which also indicates the need to design a more streamline process for targeting, possibly drawing on the ESR (see recommendations).</p> |
| Efficiency | D1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the intended number of households been reached? Are the targeting approaches equally effective at reaching the intended household numbers in different contexts? Is the programme able to reach the percentage of NSNP households it wanted to reach? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The intended number of households have been reached (i.e. registered in the CCTP-MIS) but not in the intended time. At the time of writing, the intended number of beneficiaries had not yet been enrolled or paid. The two targeting models that were piloted were equally effective at reaching the intended number of households. In model A areas it was easier to reach the intended number of NSNP households, but this was less a function of the model A targeting approach and instead related to the presence of a larger number of NSNP households (i.e. HSNP households). The programme was not able to reach the intended number of NSNP households. The EIP fell short of its target to enrol 25% NSNP households of the targeted 7,500 households. After an extensive re-targeting exercise, the proportion of households enrolled in the EIP who are also enrolled in the NSNP across all counties increased from 18% to 20%. |
| Sustainability | E1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent does the GoK have the capacity to continue to implement the targeting approaches? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EIP targeting approaches for models A and B are human resource intensive, particularly in relation to the role of mentor supervisors and mentors. While this review has not conducted a full-fledged capacity assessment, qualitative findings indicate that county and sub-county level DSD staff are already capacity-constrained and that DSD would need to engage mentor supervisors, mentors, and enumerators, either by increasing their staff complement or by managing the contracts of mentor supervisors, mentors, and enumerators. The former will result in a large increase in the cost of employment, which is unlikely to be feasible given fiscal constraints, while the latter approach will require personnel to manage the contracts of mentor supervisors, mentors and enumerators further increasing the workload of staff. While mentor supervisors and mentors will be needed to implement the mentoring component of the EIP (not subject of this review), a more streamlined and cost-effective targeting approach would make the implementation and the scale-up of the EIP more feasible and sustainable (see recommendations). |

Annex C List of national-level interviews

| Institution | Role | Name | Date of interview |
|----------------------|--|---------------------|-------------------|
| DSA | Director of Social Assistance | John Gachigi | 29 Mar 2022 |
| DSA | Deputy Director of Social Assistance | Judy Tuda | 29 Mar 2022 |
| DSA | Head of MIS | Evelyn Mwangi | 29 Mar 2022 |
| DSA | Head of M&E | Dianah Muyalah | 29 Mar 2022 |
| DSA | Head of Targeting | Peterson Ndwiga | 29 Mar 2022 |
| DSA | Head of GRM | Eliud Maina | 29 Mar 2022 |
| World Bank | Senior Social Protection Specialist | Yulia Smolyar | 29 Mar 2022 |
| World Bank | Social Protection Specialist | Naseer Uddin Khan | 29 Mar 2022 |
| GDI consortium | Operations Manager | Ann Murage | 30 Mar 2022 |
| GDI consortium | National Technical Assistance Coordinator | George N'dungu | 30 Mar 2022 |
| GDI consortium | Operations Associate and Programme Support | Yvonne Mwendu | 30 Mar 2022 |
| BOMA | EIP Programme Coordinator (Model A) | Isabella Lengopito | 30 Mar 2022 |
| BOMA | EIP M&E Officer (Model A) | Sylvia Migide Masia | 30 Mar 2022 |
| BOMA | Data Analyst (Model A) | George Washington | 30 Mar 2022 |
| Village Enterprise | EIP Programme Manager (Model B) | Isaiah Lekesike | 30 Mar 2022 |
| Village Enterprise | EIP Programme Coordinator (Model B) | Dan Kezengwa | 30 Mar 2022 |
| DSD | Deputy Coordinator Economic Inclusion | Susan Muteti | 31 Mar 2022 |
| DSD | Programme Officer Economic Inclusion | Flora Mbae | 31 Mar 2022 |
| DSD | M&E Coordinator | Steven Ndung'u | 31 Mar 2022 |
| Development Pathways | Director & Principal MIS Specialist | Richard Chirchir | 31 Mar 2022 |
| Development Pathways | Lead Developer, CD-MIS | Daniel Mburu | 31 Mar 2022 |
| Development Pathways | Developer, CD-MIS | Paul Muriuki | 31 Mar 2022 |
| GDI consortium | Director of GDI consortium | Alice Gugelev | 1 Apr 2022 |
| BOMA | EIP Programme Manager (Model A) | Dorine Genga | 5 May 2022 |
| Village Enterprise | EIP Programme Manager (Model B) | Isaiah Lekesike | 6 May 2022 |
| Village Enterprise | EIP M&E Coordinator (Model B) | Lawrence Opado | 6 May 2022 |
| GDI consortium | Operations Manager | Ann Murage | 7 Sep 2022 |
| GDI consortium | National Technical Assistance Coordinator | George N'dungu | 7 Sep 2022 |
| GDI consortium | M&E Manager | Charles Maina | 7 Sep 2022 |
| SPS | Programme Coordinator | Stefanie Bitengo | 8 Sep 2022 |

Annex D List of county- and sub-county-level interviews

D.1 County- and sub-county-level KIIs – Taita Taveta

| Institution | Title | Data of interview |
|--------------------|--|-------------------|
| GDI Consortium | County Programme Manager | 25 Apr 2022 |
| GoK | County Disability Officer | 25 Apr 2022 |
| DSD | SCSDO (Taveta) | 26 Apr 2022 |
| GoK | Sub-county Livestock Production officer (Taveta) | 26 Apr 2022 |
| Village Enterprise | Mentor supervisor (Taveta) | 26 Apr 2022 |
| GoK | Deputy County Commissioner (Taveta) | 26 Apr 2022 |
| GoK | County Commissioner | 27 Apr 2022 |
| DSD | County Coordinator Social Development | 27 Apr 2022 |
| GoK | County Director Youth, Sports, Gender, Culture and Social Services | 28 Apr 2022 |
| NDMA | Assistant Director of Contingency Planning and Response | 28 Apr 2022 |
| DSD | SCSDO (Mwatate) | 28 Apr 2022 |
| BOMA | Mentor Supervisor (Mwatate) | 28 Apr 2022 |
| GoK | Deputy County Commissioner (Mwatate) | 28 Apr 2022 |

D.2 County- and sub-county-level KIIs – Marsabit

| Institution | Title | Data of interview |
|----------------|---|-------------------|
| DSD | County Coordinator Social Development | 9 May 2022 |
| GoK | Assistant County Commissioner | 9 May 2022 |
| GDI Consortium | County Programme Manager | 9 May 2022 |
| BOMA | Mentor Supervisor (Saku) | 9 May 2022 |
| DSD | SCSDO (North Horr) | 9 May 2022 |
| DSD | SCSDO (Saku) | 10 May 2022 |
| NDMA | Programme officer HSNP (Saku) | 10 May 2022 |
| NDMA | County Drought Coordinator (Marsabit, Samburu and Laikipia) | 10 May 2022 |
| GoK | Deputy Director Agriculture | 10 May 2022 |
| GoK | Deputy County Commissioner | 10 May 2022 |

Annex E Analytical Framework

| Theme | Sub -themes | Evaluation considerations |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Implementation | Execution of targeting activities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How was targeting implemented? What were the key processes? • Who were the key players involved in the implementation? • What was the extent of their involvement? • Achievements of programme targets and objectives |
| | Training Arrangements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building activities for implementers • Effectiveness of capacity building approaches for implementation stakeholders • Identification of possible government capacity gaps • Strategies for capacity building around existing tools and systems |
| The learning partnership | Coordination | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stakeholder collaboration and involvement in the targeting process • Identification of challenges and gaps in coordination • Effectiveness of the partnership between GoK and the technical assistance partner (GDI) |
| Design Vs System integration learnings | Assumptions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Underlying assumptions in targeting process design • Influence of assumptions on targeting effectiveness and efficiency |
| | Targeting process design | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarity and appropriateness of targeting process structure and mechanisms • Comparative analysis with the Harmonized Targeting Methodology (HTM) – Differences or similarities between EIP targeting and existing systems • Are the programme's current targeting and selection modalities (including the enrolment process, accounts opening and case management,) appropriate to deliver and achieve its targets and objectives? |
| | Learnings for phase 2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learnings from ESR and NSNP implementation for targeting design and process |
| Sustainability, government capacity, and scale | GoK's capacity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government's capability for sustainable targeting beyond the pilot phase • Capacity and resources required to conduct targeting activities |

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| | Coherence with other government systems | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alignment of EIP's targeting with existing government systems • Potential synergies and areas of improvement with other systems |
| | Scale | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suitability of EIP targeting models for scale-up by the GoK • Plan for scale-up without GDI consortium, roles, and responsibilities |

Annex F Learning workshop tasks and action points

| No. | Tasks | Coordinating persons |
|-----|--|---|
| 1. | <p>Define EIP targeting criteria including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to participate • Willingness to participate • Vulnerability inclusion criteria – Identify relevant fields to pull from ESR <p>- Check what is in the ESR and identify what additional data needs to be collected</p> <p>- Outline what data needs to be validated and how it will be validated</p> | <p>- M&E Coordinator (DSD) - Lead person</p> <p>- M&E Analyst (Village Enterprises - GDI)</p> <p>- Data Analyst (Boma - GDI)</p> |
| 2. | <p>Set up EIP Technical Committee:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Send invitations to committee members Define and write-up the committee roles Define and write up members roles & responsibilities <p>Convene meeting (first meeting)</p> | <p>- M&E Officer (DSD)</p> <p>- EIP Comms Officer (DSD)</p> <p>- Operations Manager (GDI)</p> |
| 3. | <p>- Write-up new targeting steps and protocols aligned with use of the ESR (including community entry and sensitization, validation, etc.)</p> <p>- Update operational manual accordingly</p> <p>Keep - CDMIS ICT officer (DSD) updated so that it can be looped back to the completion of CD-MIS in task 4.</p> | <p>- M&E Coordinator (DSD) - Lead person</p> <p>- M&E Analyst (Village Enterprises - GDI)</p> <p>- Data Analyst (Boma - GDI)</p> |
| 4. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Inform Development Pathways that there will be a change in targeting approach for phase 2 Continue to coordinate with Development Pathway to align CDMIS with new targeting approach from Task 1 and Task 3 Oversee CDMIS completion | <p>- CDMIS ICT officer (DSD) – Lead person</p> <p>To coordinate with Development Pathways</p> |
| 5. | <p>Decide what to do about NSNP quota outline (preference to NSNP households or defined quota):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How it will link to wider sector messaging - Whether NSNP beneficiaries get priority <p>Feed this information back to the persons assigned tasks 1 & 3</p> | <p>EIP Coordinator and SPS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To be validated by new EIP technical committee |
| 6. | <p>Define how the NSNP list will be acquired and match it with ESR lists to feed into CD-MIS</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDMIS ICT officer (DSD) |
| 7. | <p>Define exact roles and responsibilities for the county and sub-county staff</p> | <p>- M&E Officer (DSD)</p> <p>- Operations Manager (GDI)</p> <p>- EIP Comms Officer (DSD)</p> |