



Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems Research

Case study—Mozambique

Andrew Kardan, Sarah Bailey, Ana Solorzano and Lourdes Fidalgo

January 2017

About the project

The Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems study is a two-year research programme (2015 to 2017) led by Oxford Policy Management (OPM), in consortium with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and INASP. Its aim is to strengthen the evidence base as to when and how social protection systems can better respond to shocks in low-income countries and fragile and conflict-affected states, thus minimising negative shock impacts and reducing the need for separate humanitarian responses.

The research is funded by UK Aid from the UK government as part of the UK Department for International Development's (DFID's) Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Programme, an initiative to improve the quality, quantity and use of evidence in humanitarian programming.

Six case studies form the core of the analysis of features of social protection systems that facilitate their use to respond to shocks, and of the ways in which social protection, humanitarian assistance and disaster risk management systems can best work together for a more effective response. The three in-depth case studies—of Mozambique, Mali and Pakistan—explore the issue across a wide range of shocks, and review a number of social protection interventions. Two light-touch country case studies, of the Philippines and Lesotho, focus on a single type of shock. Finally, a light study of the Sahel region reviews region-wide mechanisms for responding to food security crises.

About this report

This is the full case study report for Mozambique. A summary briefing note is published separately.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for all the continuous support and guidance provided by the DFID Mozambique office, and in particular, Kate Greany in carrying out this research. We are thankful to Irish Aid, the International Institute for Environment and Development and other colleagues from OPM for coordinating and sharing findings from their research and ensuring our studies were complementary and collectively strengthened. Thanks also to all the other stakeholders for their valuable insights and opinions, including staff from the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) and the National Institute of Social Action (INAS). Sebastiao Estevão from INAS joined us during our field research and provided much support and insight. The team appreciates the support of DFID's project lead, Heather Kindness. Comments on earlier drafts of this report were kindly shared by DFID (Heather Kindness, Andrew Clayton, Kate Greany, Heloïse Troc and Benjamin Zeitlyn) and the World Bank.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the UK government's official policies.

Suggested citation: Kardan, A., Bailey, S., Solorzano, A. and Fidalgo, L. (2017), 'Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems research: Case study—Mozambique', Oxford Policy Management, Oxford, UK.

Executive summary

Approach

Globally, the frequency and duration of crises and disasters are increasing. These trends have prompted renewed attention on finding better ways to assist affected populations, including examining a potentially increased role for social protection systems in responding to large-scale shocks that typically trigger humanitarian aid. This report explores responses to climatic and economic shocks in Mozambique, and analyses whether social protection can play a greater role. Specifically, it examines which features in the design and implementation of social protection systems facilitate an effective response to shocks, and how disaster risk management (DRM) and social protection systems can best work together for effective responses. The research draws on quantitative and qualitative data gathered through a literature review, document review and consultations with 75 key informants and stakeholders at national and sub-national levels, carried out during three visits from September 2015 to June 2016.

Poverty and vulnerability to shocks

Mozambique has witnessed rapid economic growth in the past decade, but still remains one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, ranking 180 out of 188 countries in the 2015 Human Development Index. Poverty rates stagnated after 2003, with over half of the population living in poverty in 2008-9, and improving only slightly by 2014-15. The country is characterised by a high level of inequality with poverty concentrated in rural areas and mostly in the northern and central areas.

The main shocks affecting people in Mozambique in the last decade are climatic, with annual flooding and cyclones affecting up to 250,000-500,000 people every few years. As of mid-2016, an El Niño-induced drought was affecting nearly 1.5 million people, out of a population of 28 million people. Climate risks have a geographical dimension: 2,700 km of coast is exposed to cyclones and flooding, the nine main river basins and deltas are exposed to flooding, and the southern and central areas are vulnerable to drought. Certain provinces and districts are vastly more affected by climatic shocks than others. While not downplaying the impacts to the people affected, floods and cyclones in Mozambique do not cause very severe disasters in the global picture, with substantially fewer deaths and displacement compared to major disasters in places such as Pakistan and Somalia.

Mozambique also experiences economic shocks and political instability. The 2008 global food and fuel price crisis led to a hike on fuel and crop prices in Mozambique, particularly impacting the urban poor. Episodes of popular protests in 2008, 2010 and 2012 took place in reaction to economic crises. The macroeconomic situation of the country is likely to deteriorate following recently disclosed debts of \$1.4 billion, creating a risk of renewed unrest. In late 2015 and 2016, tensions escalated between the government and armed elements of Renamo, the opposition political party in Mozambique that began as an armed movement in the civil war that ended in 1992.

Disaster risk management

In the last decade the government has developed a robust DRM capacity. The National Institute of Disaster Management (INGC) was established in 1999, from elements of the government's operational relief infrastructure during the civil war. While the INGC does a small amount of relief implementation, its main role is leading the coordination of disaster response and undertaking

actions to prepare for and mitigate the impact of disasters. Since 2007, the INGC has led an annual contingency planning process with government ministries, international aid agencies and some district-level representatives. In times of disaster, the needs of affected populations often exceed the resources in the contingency plan, and not all of the funding outlined in the contingency plan is provided by the government. International aid agencies fill some of the gap between the assistance provided by the government and actual relief needs that are often significantly higher. For flooding in 2013 and 2015, the government respectively financed about 6% and 28% of disaster relief. Beyond smaller emergencies, such as minor flooding, most disaster response implementation is by international aid agencies using resources from international donors.

In times of disaster, the government activates the Coordinating Council for Disaster Management (CCGC) and the Technical Council for Disaster Management (CTGC), which is the government's national platform for disaster management, comprised of directors and technicians who have roles related to disaster management within the ministries and sectors. The CCGC is chaired by the Prime Minister and makes policy decisions regarding government response. The United Nations Office of the Resident Coordinator (UNRCO) activates the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and sectoral clusters. The HCT serves as the primary interface between international aid agencies and the government. The INGC and international aid agencies have a close working relationship from the central level down to the provincial and district levels.

Disaster management and relief in Mozambique are characterised by strong emphasis on preparedness, government leadership in coordinating disaster relief, government discouragement of actions perceived as linked to dependency, implementation and financing of larger disaster responses by international agencies, and a well-established response protocol for response to floods and cyclones that is grounded in contingency planning. Evaluation of the major response to flooding in 2007 found that it to be effective in terms of preparedness (including community disaster preparedness and contingency-planning, and effective communication channels for evacuations), leadership from the INGC, good coordination between the government and international agencies and quick turnaround of international funding for UN agencies. The government and its aid agency partners have since fine-tuned their responses to flood and cyclone relief, and gathering evidence on the appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of these relief efforts is important for improving future responses and weighing alternative approaches.

While droughts are covered in the annual contingency plan, they have rarely required dedicated relief responses, and thus are not a strong feature in DRM systems. The 2015/16 drought is the most severe since the 1980s, and has revealed shortcomings in early actions to address deteriorating food security. International aid agencies issued a request for \$180 million to meet drought needs in 2016—the largest request for Mozambique in a decade, and the first major request for drought response. It is too early to tell whether or not the government and international response to drought will be adequate, but it is apparent that there are important weaknesses in the current DRM system to enable timely interventions reaching larger numbers of people facing drought.

Social protection system and response to shocks

The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) is the lead ministry responsible for basic social security, setting the policy framework and designing social protection programmes. The National Institute of Social Action (INAS) implements the programmes through 30 delegations present across the country. There is a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between these actors at the national level. At the district level, there is no clarity or guidance on the hierarchy of reporting and accountability between INAS, the District Services of Health, Women and Social Action (SDSMAS) and the District Administrator.

The main social protection programmes take the form of non-contributory social assistance interventions covered under basic social security law. They include:

- J the Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB), which provides small unconditional cash transfers to labour-constrained households, covering 365,726 households in 2015;
- J the Direct Social Support Programme (PASD), which provides in-kind benefits to the destitute and those affected by household-level calamities, covering 57,415 households in 2015;
- J the Programme of Social Services for Social Action (PSSAS), which provides limited support to some individuals through its social service institutions (e.g. elderly centres, day care centres), covering 9,134 individuals in 2015; and
- J the Productive Social Action Programme (PASP), a public works programme in urban and rural areas, which evolved from the World Food Programme's (WFP's) food for assets programming, covering 12,499 households in 2015.

These programmes have a number of common implementation features: all are implemented by INAS staff; they rely fully or partially on community-based targeting, and payments and in-kind benefits are delivered manually by INAS staff. Together the programmes covered 445,000 households in the country in 2015, equivalent to 8.4% of the total population and 15% of the population of the poor, but with large variation across provinces and districts. INAS delegations have varying capacity in delivering these programmes, and on average have 2.6 staff per 1000 beneficiaries.

There are a number of key political features that shape social protection and its operations. First, the government's narrative on poverty reduction is centred on job creation and interventions that support livelihoods and asset creation with great interest in public works programmes, which may limit the expansion of other social assistance programmes. Second, MGCAS is not seen as a powerful enough ministry able to coordinate sectoral activities or hold other line ministries to task. Third, the social protection sector is supported by a number of development partners with competing agendas and narratives. Although there is consensus around building social protection systems, there are divergent views on the detail and nature of support to be provided to the government.

The role of MGCAS and INAS in emergencies, on paper mainly, relates to social care services and psycho-social support provided to vulnerable groups before, during and after the occurrence of shocks. Their other main responsibility is to ensure that vulnerable groups are adequately supported by humanitarian interventions. However, MGCAS does not take a leading role around this in practice, and such coordination is mainly done through their representatives at the community level. Also, while INAS and MGCAS are meant to ensure that vulnerable population groups are included in relief assistance, in fact the opposite may be occurring as social protection beneficiaries appear to often be excluded from disaster assistance on the assumption that they are already 'covered'. If they are affected by the shock, their inclusion is particularly important as the value of humanitarian assistance (e.g. 1-3 months of food aid) is often significantly greater than the value of the social assistance provided each month.

Potential for a more shock-responsive social protection system

A new national social protection strategy (ENSSB II) was approved in February 2016, which includes the potential introduction of programmes that are responsive to flood, cyclones and drought. The ENSSB II therefore opens the door to having social protection systems play a greater role in response to major shocks. Although the details were being developed at the time of this research, MGCAS sees the PASP and PASD as two such programmes. However, as discussed

below, organisational capacity constraints and challenges facing social protection programme operations suggest significant barriers to using existing programmes in response to emergencies, especially for rapid onset shocks.

The Productive Social Action Programme (PASP)

In 2016, the PASP was used as an emergency response intervention in drought-affected Gaza province. The timing was moved up by several months in order to assist people already enrolled in the programme. However, the design features of the programme are not very well suited as an emergency response instrument, because the programme has low coverage, and community-based targeting and registration can take up to several months. The PASP could potentially play a preventative / protective function in the future, if the value of benefits to recipients increases and high-quality, relevant assets are created. Both steps would require investment, and households may still require assistance in the event of future shocks, if the shock exceeds their capacity to manage it.

The Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB)

The PSSB has the highest coverage by far of the social protection programmes. In theory, the PSSB could be used to cover a portion of an emergency caseload, by increasing the value of the cash transfer to people who are benefiting from the PSSB in areas affected by the shock (referred to as ‘vertical expansion’). The government, though, has no interest in using the PSSB for this purpose (and is concerned such a step would raise recipients’ expectations for future payments), or in providing cash assistance for disaster relief. The current financial models and political resistance limit the feasibility of making the PSSB more shock-responsive through vertical expansion.

The Direct Social Support Programme (PASD)

In its current form, as well as limited scale, the PASD is not able to provide significant support in response to shocks, especially as the target number of households to be reached by the PASD under ENSSB II is to remain more or less constant and marginally reduce to 45,000 in 2024. Within this context, the PASD can only provide ad-hoc support (as it does now) to households facing idiosyncratic shocks, rather than covariate shocks affecting a very large proportion of households. Moreover, while the PASD is a separate programme with its own specific objectives, it is implemented through INAS, and managed by the same individuals who have responsibilities for delivering the PSSB and PSSAS; thus, any additional requirements under the PASD will affect the likely delivery of other programmes unless organisational capacity is increased. For the PASD to be a viable shock-responsive option in the future it will need to refocus its intentions, simplify its design and operations, and scale up its reach—rather than reduce, as is currently reflected in the ENSSB II.

Piggybacking on social protection systems

The study explored whether humanitarian programmes could use social protection systems and beneficiary databases, now or in the future, to facilitate targeting and registration of relief responses (referred to as ‘piggybacking’). However, quickly identifying households for humanitarian responses has not been a noticeable weakness for aid agencies or government, and the limited coverage of social protection programmes means that even a database of recipients would cover less than 9% of the population at present. INAS also uses systems designed for its unique programmes, and faces the time-consuming process of using its staff to manually deliver

cash and in-kind transfers. As a result of these limitations, there is no obvious added value for humanitarian actors to draw on its administrative structures, beyond the current more informal links that are established with INAS community representatives and local disaster relief committees.

Opportunities and barriers for coordination and synergies between social protection and disaster risk management (DRM)

While MGCAS and INAS already participate in the government's platform for coordinating disaster response (the CTGC) and the contingency planning process, the social protection system could also benefit from better linkages with DRM. There are strong preparedness measures in place in Mozambique, including risk and vulnerability assessments that MGCAS / INAS could draw on for future geographical targeting of core social protection programmes, by prioritising districts that are both highly affected by drought and have high incidence of poverty.

INAS could also adapt its operations to better support its existing beneficiaries who may be affected by flooding and drought. This could be done by altering PSSB payment schedules to better align with times that beneficiaries are most likely to face shocks, as well as establishing and communicating guidance that social protection recipients should not be excluded from disaster relief.

Conclusions

The current DRM approach in Mozambique relies on international aid agencies to fill as much as possible of the gap between what is necessary and what the government can do through its contingency budget. This approach has largely worked fine for the relatively small disasters that Mozambique experienced in the last decade, but the 2016 drought is testing this model. Given climate trends, this drought may be the signal of things to come, rather than an aberration, and a more strategic approach to financing DRM actions will be required. A strategic approach is unlikely to focus only on adjusting the contingency plan and its financing, because the contingency plan is focused on immediate short-term responses and the prepositioning of in-kind assistance. More evidence on flood and cyclone responses will also be important to determine ways to improve them.

Even if response to drought needs to be improved, it is far from evident that social protection will have a major role to play. The review of the social protection system highlighted a number of constraints related to systems and operations, in particular: limited staffing and presence at district and community levels; limited material resources including vehicles and fuel to support routine functions; inefficient and time consuming payment mechanisms; limited management information systems (MIS) and low programme coverage. These features limit the potential for social protection systems to respond to major shocks without compromising the regular operations of other programmes, and do not provide evident opportunities for relief programmes to draw on the social protection administrative systems in delivering their responses. However, not being able to respond to shocks does not mean that social protection cannot be more 'shock-responsive'. Tweaking how the programmes operate, in particular the scheduling of payments and ensuring that INAS beneficiaries are not excluded from relief interventions, are two first steps. Future expansion of social protection could also take into account vulnerability to flooding, cyclones and drought when targeting geographical areas and expanding the number of beneficiaries supported.

Once the social protection programmes have met their primary objectives with sufficient coverage and improved administrative processes (e.g. payments, targeting, MIS,) and capacity, they may be more suitable and viable for reaching some (but unlikely all) households affected by major shocks. Here the PSSB (or a future similar programme) would be a logical candidate for a shock-

responsive role, because of its larger-scale coverage and because cash transfers can be easily ‘vertically scaled’ by increasing the transfer value. This would require a major shift from the government towards accepting cash transfers as a relief response.

Ultimately the question is on how social protection could contribute to a multi-sectoral DRM process, rather than taking centre stage. In Mozambique, the contribution of social protection to the DRM process is, in the first instance, better served by improving the operations and reach of its existing programme and enhancing their ‘protective’ functions, rather than taking on increasing roles in response and recovery that are beyond its current administrative capacity.

Recommendations

The report provides detailed recommendations at the end of this report, which broadly fall into the following categories:

-) **Social protection system strengthening**—improving programme operations and prioritising the actions and activities within the recently approved social protection strategy (ENSSB II), which are most important.
-) **More shock-responsive social protection**—how to improve the responsiveness of existing social protection programmes given their current design and implementation features, including changes to payments schedules, re-thinking the most appropriate social protection programmes for responding to shocks and rationalising their potential role.
-) **Coordination of social protection, DRM and humanitarian response**—improving coordination across the sectors, including by establishing protocols for ensuring social protection beneficiaries are not left out of relief, and use of DRM systems in targeting the expansion of social protection programmes.
-) **DRM and humanitarian response**—improving the DRM and humanitarian response, including by reviewing the adequacy and frequency of data used to address drought, revisions to contingency planning processes, stronger monitoring and evaluation, and reviewing risk financing options for responding to shocks.

Contents

Executive summary	ii
List of tables and figures	ix
Abbreviations	x
1 Approach and method	1
1.1 Research questions	1
1.2 Approach taken in Mozambique	1
1.3 A note on terminology and research scope	2
2 Poverty and vulnerability to shocks in Mozambique	4
2.1 Sustained economic growth with stagnating poverty	4
2.2 Shocks	5
2.3 Vulnerability to climatic shocks	8
3 Disaster risk management (DRM) and humanitarian response systems	13
3.1 Key features of disaster risk management (DRM) in Mozambique	13
3.2 Responses to shocks	17
4 The social protection system and its current role in responding to shocks	25
4.1 Key features of social protection in Mozambique	25
4.2 Current role in responding to covariate shocks	39
5 Potential for a more shock-responsive social protection system	42
5.1 Vertical expansion	42
5.2 Horizontal expansion	47
5.3 Piggybacking	47
5.4 Shadow alignment	48
5.5 Refocusing	49
6 Opportunities and barriers for better coordination of response	51
6.1 Prevention and mitigation	51
6.2 Preparedness	52
6.3 Response and recovery	53
7 Conclusions and recommendations	54
7.1 Conclusions	54
7.2 Recommendations	55
Annex A References	60
Annex B Detailed methodology	63
Annex C Country overview	66
Annex D Humanitarian response and disaster risk management	69
Annex E Social protection sector	75

List of tables and figures

Figure 1	Typology of shock response	3
Figure 2	Number of people affected by climate shocks in the last 10 years	7
Figure 3	Geographical exposure to drought	9
Figure 4	Geographical exposure to floods.....	10
Figure 5	Geographical exposure to cyclones	11
Figure 6	International humanitarian funding to Mozambique 2000-2015	23
Figure 7	Population covered by social protection programmes, 2015 (%)	30
Figure 8	Distribution of social assistance programmes versus distribution of poverty in 2015 30	
Figure 9	Funds allocated to Social Action sector as proportion of the state budget.....	31
Figure 10	Budget allocations to basic social security programme (000's MT)	32
Figure 11	INAS delegation staff per 1000 beneficiary (2015)	34
Figure 12	Annual change in delegation staff between 2013 and 2015	35
Table 1	Disaster risk management conceptual framework.....	3
Table 2	Basic demographic data	4
Table 3	Basic socioeconomic data.....	5
Table 4	Summary of common shocks in Mozambique	6
Table 5	Percentage of population below national poverty line 2008/09 and population affected by flood (2015) and drought (2016)	12
Table 6	Numbers of people affected and receiving food assistance (2007-2016)	18
Table 7	Drought response timeline April 2015-June 2016.....	21
Table 8	Snapshot of international assistance in response to drought in October 2016.....	22
Table 9	Key features of current social assistance programmes	28
Table 10	Number of beneficiaries per INAS staff	34
Table 11	Population affected by drought and social protection coverage (20 most affected districts)	44
Table 12	Population affected by drought and social protection coverage (20 least affected districts)	45
Table 13	List of key informants interviewed	64
Table 14	Country visits and main activities	65
Table 15	Responsibilities of ministries in contingency plan.....	70
Table 16	Contingency plan scenarios.....	70
Table 17	Assistance in response to 2016 drought from February to July 2016	71
Table 18	Contingency planning scenarios since 2011-12	73
Table 19	Allocation of contingency fund by ministry and province 2013-2014.....	74
Table 20	Coverage of PSSB (households)	77
Table 21	Coverage of PASD (households)	78
Table 22	Coverage of PSSAS (individuals).....	78
Table 23	Coverage of PASP (households)	80
Table 24	Key programmes proposed under ENSSB II.....	81
Table 25	Mandatory social security, number of cases and amount in meticaís	83
Table 26	Contributors and beneficiaries of the social security system	83
Box 1Cash transfers and vouchers versus in-kind aid for humanitarian response in Mozambique	17
Box 2	Role of MGCAS in emergency response.....	40
Box 3	Assessing the potential impact of the Productive Social Action Programme (PASP) on climate change resilience.....	52

Abbreviations

CCGC	Coordinating Council for Disaster Management
CCSSB	Council of Coordination of Basic Social Security
CENOE	National Emergency Operation Centre
CLGRC	Local Disaster Risk Management Committees
COSACA	NGO Consortium of Save the Children, CARE International, and Oxfam
CTGC	Technical Council for Disaster Management
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DRM	disaster risk management
DRR	disaster risk reduction
ENSSB	National Strategy for Basic Social Security
Frelimo	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAS	National Institute of Social Action
INGC	National Institute of Disaster Management
INSS	National Institute of Social Security
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
MGCAS	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action
MIS	Management Information System
MPD	Ministry of Planning and Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PASD	Direct Social Support Programme
PASP	Productive Social Action Programme
PES	'Plano Económico e Social' (Economic and Social Policy Statement)
PSSAS	Programme of Social Services for Social Action
PSSB	Basic Social Subsidy Programme
Renamo	Mozambican National Resistance
SDSMAS	District Services of Health, Women and Social Action
SETSAN	Technical Secretariat of Nutrition and Food Security
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
UNRCO	United Nations Office of the Resident Coordinator
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

1 Approach and method

1.1 Research questions

Globally, the frequency, size and duration of disasters and crises—be they the consequence of natural phenomena or economic or political shocks—are on the rise. The cost of responding to these disasters has been increasing, too. While national governments bear the main responsibility for mitigating the risk of shocks and responding to them, the demands to provide assistance that are placed on the international humanitarian community continue to grow. The value of international humanitarian assistance keeps hitting record highs—the last three years have each seen the highest ever levels of assistance provided—yet the gap compared with what is needed continues to widen (Development Initiatives, 2016).

Many shocks are predictable and protracted, and often slow-onset. For this reason, governments and international agencies alike are committed to finding a way forward that responds more efficiently and effectively to shocks: they aim to 'use existing resources and capabilities better to shrink humanitarian needs over the long term', in the words of the Grand Bargain made by the humanitarian and development communities at the World Humanitarian Summit ('Grand Bargain', 2016, p. 14). Many actors are now asking whether and how long-term social protection systems can be part of the solution, since these are already intended to meet the needs of the poorest households, to build resilience and to respond to crises.

This research programme has been commissioned to explore this issue. We examine two related but distinct themes: first, social protection and its potential role in shock response; and second, the opportunities for coordination (and possible integration) of humanitarian interventions, disaster risk management (DRM) and social protection.

Our overarching research question is: **What factors enable social protection systems to be responsive to shocks and to deliver effective shock response?**

There are two associated sub-questions:

1. What features in the design and implementation of social protection systems facilitate an effective response to shocks?
2. How can humanitarian, DRM and social protection systems best work together for effective responses to shocks?

We are addressing these by means of a series of six country case studies—including this one—and a number of related outputs (a literature review, synthesis report, toolkit and others).

1.2 Approach taken in Mozambique

Mozambique was selected as a country case study for several reasons. First, the country regularly experiences floods and periodically experiences drought, and over the last decade has established a relatively robust approach to DRM. Second, in 2015, the government drafted a national social protection strategy with explicit reference to considering how the social protection system could strengthen its approach to addressing climate shocks. Third, there is interest from the government, donors and international aid agencies in the potential role of social protection programmes in response to such shocks, as demonstrated by the national social protection strategy and recent studies on links between social protection and climate change. Translating the global research questions to the country level, our research thus aims to investigate themes such as:

- J How do the Government of Mozambique and its partners respond to shocks including those that are climate-related (floods, drought, cyclones) and/or economic? How is this done and by whom? Are there any gaps in the responses?
- J What are the constraints to the social protection system being more responsive to shocks? What features in the design and implementation of social protection systems might facilitate a more effective response to shocks?
- J How can humanitarian, DRM and social protection systems best work together in response to different shocks in Mozambique?

The research uses a broad set of analytical tools. These include an initial mapping of existing policies, analysis of vulnerability and poverty diagnostics, an overview of administrative and financing arrangements, a review of evidence on policy effectiveness in response to shocks, and an analysis of the factors that shape policy design, implementation and performance, including political economy variables, operational capacity and financial resources. The research draws on both quantitative and qualitative data gathered through a combination of literature review, document review and consultations with key informants and stakeholders at the national and sub-national levels (see Annex B for overall approach and methods) ¹.

1.3 A note on terminology and research scope

It is useful to define the term ‘shock-responsive social protection’, since all social protection is inherently intended to respond to shocks. In this research, we use the term ‘shock’ to refer implicitly to covariate shocks, i.e. those that affect large numbers of people and/or communities at once. Covariate shocks may be natural, economic or political. We focus on the types of covariate shock that affect a substantial share of the population and result in a ‘crisis situation’ that is likely to trigger an international humanitarian response. However, we do not cover the influx of refugees, which triggers specific international mechanisms and is not the sole responsibility of the host country, nor do we cover disease outbreak, which calls primarily for a response from the health system.

We adopt a broad definition of social protection which encompasses a range of instruments including, for example, food distributions, cash transfers, school feeding, grants for goods and basic foodstuffs, subsidies, health insurance and pensions. The overall research programme therefore considers both contributory and non-contributory instruments. Similarly, state and non-state social protection providers are included. We include interventions that can be put in place in advance of a shock to mitigate its impact, not only those implemented after the event. A subset of these interventions is explored for each case study. In Mozambique, for example, we examine mainly the contribution of the public works programme, and cash and in-kind transfer programmes.


Two further concepts merit a brief mention here as they drive the diagnosis of what types of needs a country must address, and what sort of response is feasible (OPM, 2015). First, in terms of need, we recognise that social protection needs in relation to covariate shocks fall into three categories: structural, seasonal and humanitarian. ‘Structural needs’ refer to the type of chronic poverty commonly addressed by long-term social protection programmes. ‘Seasonal needs’ refer to cyclical crises whereby every year or so, poor weather or other conditions push an additional number of households into requiring short-term assistance. ‘Humanitarian crisis needs’ refer to the occasional exceptional year or event when communities that usually manage without any assistance find themselves in need of support.

¹ For a more detailed description of the research design see inception report (OPM 2015).

Second, in terms of response, we note that the ability of a formal (as opposed to informal, household-level) social protection system to handle shocks depends to a large part on the maturity of the system. Our emphasis on understanding opportunities for using state-run social protection systems to respond to shocks means that our studies cover countries where some kind of system is in place. In some cases, it is only nascent, and we take into account the implications of this.

A starting point for the research was a thorough literature review, which identified five main ways in which social protection and humanitarian assistance interventions may adapt or collaborate to address needs arising from covariate shocks (OPM, 2015). We have organised these into a typology of shock response (Figure 1):

Figure 1 Typology of shock response



Source: OPM (2015).

In brief, systems can be shock-responsive in various ways. They can provide top-ups to existing beneficiaries, or temporarily add beneficiaries to existing social protection programmes (which we term 'vertical expansion' and 'horizontal expansion' respectively)—often referred to as 'scaling up' an intervention in response to a shock. Other possibilities include taking advantage of part of an existing programme's infrastructure, such as a database or its personnel, while delivering an entirely different intervention ('piggybacking' on the system); running a separate humanitarian intervention that is designed to have the characteristics of a long-term social protection intervention, in order to facilitate subsequent integration ('shadow alignment'); and, if no additional budget is available, simply 'refocusing' existing resources on the priority households suffering from the shock. This typology is referred to throughout the report.

To explore the potential intersection between DRM and shock-responsive social protection we view DRM activities as having five focal areas: prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (Table 1) (OPM, 2015).

Table 1 Disaster risk management conceptual framework

Concept	Definition
Prevention / mitigation	The outright avoidance or mitigation of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters.
Preparedness	Knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organisations, communities and individuals to anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events / conditions.
Response	The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety, and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected.
Recovery	Restoration, and improvement if appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.

Source: UNISDR 2009 Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva. May.

2 Poverty and vulnerability to shocks in Mozambique

Key points

- J Mozambique has witnessed rapid economic growth in the past decade, but still remains one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, ranking 180 out of 188 countries in the 2015 Human Development Index. Poverty rates have remained relatively stagnant since 2003, with 55% of the population living in poverty in 2008-9 and 49% in 2014-15. The country is characterised by a high level of inequality, with poverty concentrated in rural areas and mostly in the Northern and Central areas.
- J The main shocks triggering humanitarian responses in Mozambique in the last decade are climatic, with annual flooding and cyclones affecting up to 250,000-500,000 people every few years, and a 2016 drought affecting nearly 1.5 million people.
- J People in certain geographical regions of the country are highly exposed to droughts, floods and cyclones: 2,700 km of coast is exposed to cyclones and flooding, the nine main river basins are exposed to flooding, and the southern and central areas are vulnerable to drought.
- J Agriculture is the main livelihood of 80% of the population, contributing to their vulnerability to the negative impacts of droughts and floods on production and food security.
- J Mozambique has faced periodic economic shocks and episodes of political instability. Episodes of popular mobilisation in 2008, 2010 and 2012 took place as a reaction to economic shocks that particularly affected people in urban areas, notably the 2008 financial crisis. Financial instability in 2016 and long-standing political disagreements indicates continued risk.

2.1 Sustained economic growth with stagnating poverty

Mozambique, with an estimated population of about 28 million people, is largely rural with only around 30% of the population living in urban areas (World Bank 2016b). The country is divided into 10 provinces plus Maputo City, which are sub-divided into 128 districts. It has three distinct socio-economic zones: the North (Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula provinces); the Central provinces (Zambezia, Tete, Manica, Sofala); and the Southern region (Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo Province and Maputo City). There are strong disparities in population densities across the country, with Zambézia and Nampula provinces accounting alone for 38% of total population in 2013, according to the projections of the Instituto Nacional de Estatística.

Table 2 Basic demographic data

Indicator	Value
Population projection	28 million
Rural population (%)	68
HIV prevalence (% population aged 15-49)	10
% of households that are female-headed ¹	36
Fertility rate (births per woman)	5.5
Population under 14 years (%)	45
Annual population growth (%)	2.8

Source: Authors based on World Development Indicators. Note: Unless otherwise specified indicators are for 2015; (1) = 2011.

After emerging from a civil war in 1992 as one of the most impoverished and capacity-constrained countries in the world, Mozambique experienced impressive economic growth rate, at about 7.6% per annum from 2005 to 2009 (MPD 2011). However, the country remains one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, ranking 180 out of 188 countries in the 2015 Human Development Index. Indeed, after a significant reduction in the national poverty rate from 69% in 1997 to 54% in 2003, the percentage of poor people remained stagnant in 2008-9 (54.7%) and

improved slightly to 49% in 2014-15 (INE 2016).² Most of the rural population survives at subsistence level (IFAD 2016). Other social indicators such as adult literacy rate (56%), average life expectancy at birth (55 years), and extremely high HIV prevalence also show the big social development challenges faced by the country (UNDP 2016).

Mozambique is also characterised by a high level of inequality, with poverty concentrated in rural areas and mostly in the Northern and Central areas (Alfani et al. 2012). The southern region of Mozambique is instead benefiting from better infrastructure, and from a more varied range of economic opportunities, thanks to the presence of the capital city and the proximity to South Africa (DNEAP, 2010).

Table 3 Basic socioeconomic data

Indicator	Value
Poverty headcount (%) ^a	49
GDP per capita (\$) ^b	525
Primary sector (% of GDP) ^b	26
Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) ^c	80
Human Development Index ranking, 2015	180th out of 188

Notes: (a) % people below national poverty line 2014-15 (INE 2016); (b) 2015 World Bank; (c) 2003 World Bank.

The lack of sustained poverty reduction in face of economic growth has been attributed to the fact that economic growth has come mainly from investments in “mega-projects” and extractive industries that lack strong linkages with the rest of the economy and have generated few jobs. The establishing of concession areas has sometimes deprived local populations of fertile lands. This is particularly problematic given that agriculture is the main livelihood for 80% of households. In general, agricultural productivity is low and 95% of food production is rain-fed. Income from agriculture is further hampered by produce markets that are unreliable and uncompetitive for smallholder farmers, who use traditional farming techniques, low yield seed varieties and manual cultivation (FEWSNET 2014). In this scenario, major droughts and floods have a significant impact on economic performance (GFDRR 2009).

2.2 Shocks

This section considers the major shocks facing people in Mozambique. It considers shocks that result from natural hazards (climatic shocks) and man-made ones (economic shocks and political violence) looking at the speed of their onset (rapid v. slow), their duration, whether or not they trigger humanitarian assistance, and whether they mainly affect rural or urban areas. Table 4 gives an overview of the most common shocks experienced in Mozambique in the last 10 years; more details on each shock types are given in the following subsections.

² The figure of 49% is based on the methodology used by the previous studies (INE 2016).

Table 4 Summary of common shocks in Mozambique

Shock	Warning	Speed	Predictability	Duration	Rural v. urban	Humanitarian assistance?	Social protection response to date
Floods and cyclones	Floods—week Cyclone—days	Sudden onset	Floods predictable For cyclones, vulnerable areas predictable but not location	Short-term	Rural and urban	Yes	Limited In-kind support
Drought	Months	Slow onset	Less predictable	Medium-term	Rural	Sometimes	Public works programmes
Economic shock	?	Slow onset	Unpredictable	Medium-term	Mainly urban	No	Subsidies
Political armed violence	-	Sudden onset	Unpredictable	Unknown	Rural and urban	No	None

Source: Authors from various sources.

2.2.1 Climate shocks

Mozambique is already experiencing changes in its climate, and the adverse consequences of climate change—including rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, and rising sea level—are likely to exacerbate the country's climate vulnerabilities. Over the past 50 years, average temperatures in the country have increased by between 1.1°C and 1.6°C. As temperatures have risen, there has been unpredictable and reduced rainfall, and increases in the duration of dry spells and drought. Temperatures are projected to continue to rise, with southern and coastal areas warming more rapidly than elsewhere (World Bank 2016a). Central Mozambique is projected to experience recurrent agricultural losses as a result of decreased seasonal rainfall, droughts, floods, and uncontrolled bush fires. The coastal lowlands will be affected by severe erosion, saltwater intrusion into freshwater systems, loss of vital infrastructure, and the spread of diseases such as malaria, cholera, and influenza. In addition, there is a high risk of increased-intensity storm surges along the coastlines.

Almost the entire coastal area of Mozambique, 2,700 km is vulnerable to **cyclones**. Eleven cyclones reached the coast of Mozambique during the last 10 years. Strong winds, storm surges, and heavy rains damage infrastructure, disrupt sanitation and electricity supply systems and degrade the coastal environment, having negative consequences for coastal livelihoods. The cyclone season runs from November to April and coincides with the main agricultural season.


Floods have been the primary disaster triggering humanitarian responses by the government and aid agencies because of their severe impact on infrastructure, crops, homes and assets and because they result in temporary displacement. The long coastline, flat topography and location downstream from the nine main river basins in Southern Africa make Mozambique highly susceptible to seasonal floods. Flooding in its deltas is a perennial threat to both farmers and infrastructure, especially when coupled with cyclonic storm surges (World Bank 2016a). Regular floods occur along the Zambezi and Limpopo river basins, and the impacts are concentrated in these areas. For example, according to data from the Office of the Resident Coordinator, the 2013 floods affected a total of 240,000 people, of which over 175,000 (87%) were in Gaza province. While damage to assets and property can have a lasting effect, the presence of floodwater is short-term, and humanitarian responses to floods last three months or less.

Droughts are the most frequent shock, occurring every three to four years in mainly in the central and southern regions. Droughts have resulted in crop loss, reduction of primary productivity in

coastal zones, reduction of grazing areas, increases in food imports, loss of human and animal life, outbreaks of disease, and loss of biodiversity (World Bank 2016a). The most severe drought to hit Mozambique was in 1981-1984; an estimated 100,000 people died and another 4.5 million were affected (Christie and Hanlon 2001). Since the overwhelming majority of rural households depends on dryland farming, droughts affect more people compared to flooding, and often over multiple planting seasons. However, in the past 15 years the food security impacts of drought have rarely been severe enough to trigger substantial relief efforts.

As of 2016 Mozambique is facing its worst drought in decades. In April 2016 the government estimated that nearly 1.5 million people were in need of assistance and that over 550,000 hectares of crops had been destroyed (SETSAN 2016). The impacts have been most severe in Sofala, Gaza, Tete and Maputo provinces. The April 2016 assessment found general acute malnutrition rates for children under five years were 15% in Sofala and 16% in Tete (SETSAN 2016)³.

Figure 2 Number of people affected by climate shocks in the last 10 years



Source: Authors from various sources.

2.2.2 Economic shocks

The economy of Mozambique has been growing robustly during the past five years, though recently the macroeconomic situation in Mozambique has taken a turn for the worse in recent months following its disclosure of hidden external debts of around \$1.4 billion (just below 10% GDP). The country has faced periodic economic shocks, the worst of which was as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis.

The heaviest impacts of the global food and fuel price crisis in 2008 were felt in the external sector, where falling exports and prices reflected falling demand⁴. Tourism, transport, communications and mining, among others, all recorded significant slowdowns in growth (Perezniето et al 2011). In response to this, the government decided to increase the fuel price by 14% to compensate for the increased prices of imported liquid fuels. This decision caused the operators of private passenger transport vehicles to increase their fares by between 33% and 50% (Brito et al. 2014). Parallel to

³ The World Health Organisation considers rates above 15% to be the threshold for a 'critical' emergency (above 10% is 'serious') (WHO 2000).

⁴ The external sector is the portion of a country's economy that interacts with the economies of other countries.

this process, the price of food, notably maize, groundnut, cowpea, butter bean, and most other commonly consumed crops increased substantially by the end of 2008, and remained high until March–April 2009 (Arndt et al. 2016). The price of bread had gone up by about 12.5%, following international inflation pressures (Brito et al. 2014).

The impact of the crisis at the level of the family and the individual became most visible in urban areas. These products are very important sources of calories, particularly for lower income Mozambicans (Arndt et al. 2016). Increased prices for fuel and food, combined with devaluation of the metical, worsened living standards for most citizens (Pereznieto et al. 2011). Although the majority of poor in Mozambique live in rural areas, urban food insecurity was identified as a significant and visible problem stemming from the crisis, since almost half the population in the cities is poor (INE 2010).

Protests and popular mobilisation, largely in Maputo City, and mainly staged by young people, erupted as a consequence of the increase of transport and food costs, the growing feeling of inequality and corruption. Following these ‘food riots’ in 2008, a set of subsidies on price fuel, transportation and bread were introduced, and subsidies on utilities reintroduced which to date remain in place. However, in 2010 and 2012 other explosive protests occurred resulting in civilian casualties (Brito et al. 2014).

2.2.3 Political unrest / armed violence

Mozambique gained independence in 1975 from Portugal following a ten-year guerrilla war of liberation. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) then established a one-party state and supported liberation movements in Rhodesia (the then Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Rhodesia formed the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) in 1976 to counter Frelimo and destabilise Mozambique. South Africa took over support for Renamo in 1980, and the movement also drew support from popular discontent with Frelimo economic policies. Mozambique descended into a devastating civil war that ended in 1992. The first multiparty elections took place in 1994, followed by elections in 1999, 2004 and 2014 elections. Renamo participated as a political party, and Frelimo has won the presidency and the majority of national assembly seats in all elections.

In 2013, Renamo accused the government of violating the 1992 peace agreement and re-started armed activities. While a ceasefire was announced in September 2014, unrest has continued. Renamo strongly criticised the official outcome of the October 2014 provincial elections, leading to new waves of violence, particularly in central and northern Mozambique. More than 11,000 people were displaced by April 2016 following armed clashes between Renamo and the Mozambican army (ACAPS 2016).


2.3 Vulnerability to climatic shocks

There is a geographic dimension of vulnerability to climatic shocks in Mozambique. The south and central portions of the country are most exposed to drought (Figure 3). River basin areas are most exposed to flooding (Figure 4). Sixty percent of the population lives in coastal areas, making them exposed to cyclones (World Bank, 2016a) (Figure 5).

Vulnerability to floods is concentrated along the major river basins; these areas also have the most fertile soil. Thus, there is a paradox for vulnerability to flooding: poor people who lack alternative livelihood strategies may be subjected to floods that damage their livelihoods strategies, but people are also able to improve livelihoods by planting in rich, high-yield soils. To hedge this risk and


reward, households who have enough means maintain farming activities in flood plains but also in higher geographical areas not at risk of flooding.

Figure 3 Geographical exposure to drought




Source: FEWSNET.

Figure 4 Geographical exposure to floods



Source: FEWSNET.

Figure 5 Geographical exposure to cyclones



Source: FEWSNET.

The geographic aspect of vulnerability is visible in the distribution of people affected by flooding and drought (Table 5). Zambezia and Sofala were most affected by 2015 flooding; Sofala, Gaza, Tete and Inhambane have been most affected by the 2016 drought. Within provinces, impacts are geographically further concentrated. During the 2015 floods, 62% of the total people affected were concentrated in five districts in Zambezia (calculation based on data from WFP, 2015). While 60% of Maputo's districts have at least 5% of their population affected by drought, in three Gaza districts 79%-82% of people were estimated to be drought-affected in mid-2016 (Chigubo, Massingir and Massangena) (calculation based on data from SETSAN, 2016). By contrast, the fourth most-affected district—Mabote in Inhambane province—had 47% of their population affected.

Table 5 Percentage of population below national poverty line 2008/09 and population affected by flood (2015) and drought (2016)

Province	% people affected by 2016 drought (May 2016)	% people affected by 2015 floods	% people below national poverty line 2008/09
Cabo Delgado	0	0	37
Gaza	15	0	62
Inhambane	9	1	57
Manica	5	0	55
Maputo City	0	0	36
Maputo	8	0	67
Nampula	0	1	54
Niassa	0	0	31
Sofala	17	3	58
Tete	14	1	42
Zambezia	6	6	70
National (Total)	6	2	55

Source: INE 2010 (poverty), WFP 2015 (2015 floods), SETSTAN 2016 (drought)

Shocks affect provinces with high levels of poverty. As shown in Table 3 above, Zambezia, which has the highest prevalence of poverty, is also worst-affected by flooding; Sofala province, which is the third poorest, had also the highest percentage of people affected by drought in 2016. This does not by any means imply a causal relationship but does suggest that these shocks are hitting poorer populations that are particularly vulnerable to climatic shocks because agriculture and livestock are central to their livelihood, and they are not well equipped to manage them owing to limited adaptive options and capacity. In general, the most disadvantaged households are also in the more remote areas in central and some northern areas, with limited or no access to services and markets.

As the main natural resource users and managers in rural Mozambique, the adverse effects of climate change are likely to be felt disproportionately by women. A study conducted in Southern Mozambique shows how climate shocks are affecting men and women differently owing to their differential roles in the communities and access and control over natural resources and property rights (Ribeiro & Chaùqhe, 2010). Gender relationships are strongly dominated by men who are expected to take main decisions. Women are less integrated in the formal economy and mainly involved in unskilled activity, less educated, and less likely to own land: in 2011 only 39% of women were employed in the previous 12 months against 82% of men (DHS; UNICEF, 2014). Notably, in Mozambique more than a third of the households were female-headed in 2011. An increase in men migrating to find job opportunities has increased the pressure on women to engage in productive work. Women also become overburdened by the combination of productive and reproductive functions in a context of a very high fertility rate. Moreover, environmental degradation has the effect of increasing the time needed to carry out activities that are traditionally women's responsibility such as water and firewood collection (Ribeiro & Chaùqhe, 2010).

3 Disaster risk management (DRM) and humanitarian response systems

Key points

- J DRM and relief in Mozambique is characterised by strong emphasis on preparedness from the national to the local level, government leadership in coordinating disaster relief, government discouragement of actions perceived as linked to dependency, funding and implementation of larger disaster responses by international donors and agencies, and a well established DRM system for floods and cyclones.
- J Since 2007, responses to floods and cyclones appear to have been broadly effective in terms of preparedness, leadership from the INGC, good coordination between the government and international agencies and the manageable scale of flooding and cyclone disasters. However, more evidence on the appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of relief efforts is critical for improving future responses to these shocks and analysing alternative approaches.
- J Relief responses are predominantly in-kind; while vouchers have been used in the 2016 drought response, the government is presently not in favour of cash transfers for relief.
- J Response to a major drought in 2015/16 is different from previous relief efforts because, compared to highly visible floods and cyclones, the impetus for intervention has been less obvious and not grounded in preparedness measures. More assistance is being provided and for longer, and the contribution of international agencies has increased.
- J Weaknesses in the DRM system include limited government resources for implementing relief assistance and the need to improve the quality of information and data collection.
- J It is necessary to review whether current DRM assessment, decision-making and financing are adequate to address drought. While as of mid-2016 it is difficult to draw a definitive conclusion on the adequacy of the drought relief effort, responding to drought appears to be an important weakness in an otherwise relatively effective DRM system.

This section considers how the Government of Mozambique and others manage and respond to shocks through DRM and humanitarian response, as well as the adequacy of effort. It focuses on the main scenarios that have resulted in humanitarian aid and been addressed through DRM since the end of the civil war—floods, cyclones and drought. Economic shocks and armed violence are not addressed because the former is outside of the remit of DRM and the latter, while concerning, has not been severe enough to result in humanitarian assistance in Mozambique in the last decade. The lack of experience limits potential analysis of DRM to manage these shocks.

DRM refers to measures to avoid, lessen or transfer the adverse effects of hazards through activities for prevention, mitigation and preparedness (UNISDR, 2009). Humanitarian response (also referred to as disaster relief) refers to 'actions designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies'⁵. Analysis of humanitarian response and DRM in Mozambique cannot be neatly separated out, because both are part of Mozambique's overall approach to dealing with disasters, and therefore this section addresses them in tandem. They share a national legal framework, strategies and stakeholders.

3.1 Key features of disaster risk management (DRM) in Mozambique

Created in 1999, INGC is responsible for DRM. The INGC leads the coordination of disaster response and supports actions to prepare for and mitigate the impact of disasters. Since 2007, INGC has led an annual contingency planning process with government ministries, international aid agencies and some district-level representatives. The national plan serves as a guiding

⁵ As defined in the guide to Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship, agreed in 2003 by a group of international donors, NGOs and multilateral agencies.

resource and outlines assistance to be provided by the government and its aid agency partners, in three different scenarios of severity and funding required by the government to deliver immediate assistance under each scenario (see Annex D). The scenarios are indicative and the levels of assistance required are determined when a shock occurs.

The INGC chairs the Technical Council for Disaster Management (CTGC), the government's national platform for disaster management⁶. It is comprised of directors and technicians who have roles related to disaster management within the ministries and sectors responsible for development and vulnerability reduction. This structure is replicated at the provincial and district levels where the councils report respectively to the provincial governor and the district administrator. The CTGC advises the higher level Coordinating Council for Disaster Management (CCGC). Chaired by the Prime Minister, the CCGC make policy decisions regarding government response, and meets regularly during emergencies. For recovery, the Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD) coordinates budget revisions to fund urgent recovery needs, and oversees the incorporation of recovery actions into development plans with relevant ministries and donors (GFDRR 2014).

The INGC has four stages of alert: green (no emergency), yellow (concern of potential emergency), orange (impending emergency) and red (emergency declared). The declaration of orange and red alerts by the INGC triggers regular meetings of the CTGC and CCGC, and activates an expanded role for the National Emergency Operation Centre (CENOE)—the department within INGC that provides overall direction and management of emergency response. When the alert is green or yellow, INGC focuses on preparedness and mitigation, and CENOE resumes the status as one department within INGC. The INGC declares when a red or orange alert is over, which is usually a matter of weeks in the case of a red alert for flooding and cyclones and longer in the case of the red alert for the 2016 drought (as discussed below).

The INGC and international aid agencies have a close working relationship from the central level down to the provincial and district levels. In times of disaster, the United Nations Office of the Resident Coordinator activates the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the cluster system. The cluster system is based on 10 humanitarian sectors and programming areas (food security, nutrition, shelter, logistics, telecommunications, water and sanitation, education, protection, health and early recovery) and serves globally as the main coordination mechanism for UN agencies and international aid agencies. The HCT serves at the primary interface between international aid agencies and the government; cluster leaders relay information and decisions between cluster members and the HCT.

Many international aid agencies and donors present in Mozambique have global missions and mandates that span development and humanitarian objectives. Largely focused on developmental initiatives, these agencies take on humanitarian functions only once an emergency is declared by the INGC, or a specific request is made to individual members or the Resident Coordinator.

Our research identified seven striking features of institutional arrangements and priorities for DRM and humanitarian response in Mozambique:

-) Strong emphasis on preparedness;
-) Preparedness is supported from the national down to the local level;
-) Government leadership in coordinating humanitarian relief;

⁶ This paragraph and the subsequent one draw from GFDRR 2014, which provides a detailed overview of the institutional framework for DRM.

- J Government discouragement of actions linked to dependency and handouts;
- J International financing of most larger relief responses directly to UN agencies and NGOs;
- J Disaster response plans specific to the UN system and their partners usually are relatively small and not elaborated every year; and
- J Well-established DRM protocol for responding to floods but not for droughts.

The government's strong **emphasis on preparedness** emerged following the 2000-2001 floods, which exposed the government's lack of readiness to deal with the disaster. Preparedness had not been a priority in the mid to late 1990s because the government and aid agencies wanted to move away from the war time focus on relief—and as a result focused on poverty reduction and not activities to prepare for future disasters (Wiles et al. 2005). In 2006, the government approved a 10-year Master Plan on disaster preparedness and mitigation that was being updated in 2015/16 (see Annex D.1). Preparedness measures include the contingency plan, community-level disaster committees and early warning systems.

Preparedness is supported from the national to the local level. The INGC has formed and trained Local Risk Management Committees (CLGRC) in disaster-prone areas, which receive and disseminate information on early warning, and participate in the coordination of local relief efforts (CFDRR, 2014). Aid agencies have also supported capacity-building of local committees, such as the German Red Cross and Mozambique Red Cross DRR programme in Gaza Province.

As previously discussed, the **government leads the coordination of disaster responses**. When major flooding occurred in 2000-01, international agencies led the response because they doubted the government capacity to do so (Foley 2007). By 2007, the government had built more substantial capacity in the INGC and initiated the contingency planning. This is linked to the spirit of 'auto-estima' (self-esteem) that emerged as a central principle for national development around 2005. This changed how the government dealt with disasters—shifting from dependence on foreign aid to building government capacity to lead, and asserting its role (Wiles et al. 2005).

The **Government of Mozambique is very averse to actions perceived as** handouts, and in favour of work requirements for interventions that provide assistance. Government key informants emphasised that assistance should be short-lived and never raise expectations that people will continue to receive it in the future. Foley (2007) points to the government's Master Plan to illustrate the logic:

The 2006 Master Plan on disaster response states that a crucial weakness in the past was the creation of a 'dependency culture' in the country. It notes that 'begging has become almost a way of life' because many people had grown up in conditions of war and disaster. The Plan argues that the 're-establishment of self-esteem, self-confidence and dignity' is a necessary precondition for 'combating extreme poverty and reducing the country's vulnerability to natural disasters' (Foley 2007).

While the INGC leads the coordination of relief efforts and implements some assistance directly, **the majority of financing and implementation of larger relief responses is funded by international donors and international humanitarian agencies**. It consists of the assistance provided by UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross in response to government requests or as part of their normal operations (e.g. assistance to refugees by WFP and UNHCR). In the 1990s, the government deliberately scaled down its own capacity to directly implement humanitarian responses because maintaining the infrastructure of warehouses, trucks and staff was unsustainable. The government sets aside a relatively small contingency budget for disaster

responses (discussed below), and international aid agencies make up the difference between the needs that the government can meet and the relief responses required.

The government reserves money in the budget to address immediate emergency response and recovery needs. The amount in the annual budget corresponds to the most severe scenario in the contingency plan (Scenario III, which in 2015 was \$17m) (CCGC 2014). These state funds are allocated to the INGC and relevant ministries upon the request of INGC. The priority areas for this funding are monitoring and early warning, pre-positioning resources, search and rescue operations, humanitarian aid within 72 hours, immediate post-emergency reconstruction and monitoring and evaluation (CCGC 2014). While the cost of scenario III is included in the government budget, the actual funding received by INGC has consistently been about 25% of the budgeted scenario (\$4.6 m for scenario III in 2015 and \$2.6 m in 2013).⁷

By contrast, international humanitarian financing was \$12 m in 2015 and \$41 m in 2013, meaning that the government financed about 28% of disaster relief in 2015 and 6% in 2013⁸. In 2016, humanitarian assistance appeared to be about 11% financed by the government⁹. While significantly greater than government resources, from a global perspective Mozambique has received very little international humanitarian financing (from 2004-2013, according to data from Global Humanitarian Assistance, it was the 45th largest recipient, receiving 0.4% of international humanitarian funding).

In the last decade, appeals and **disaster response plans specific to the UN system and their partners have usually been relatively small and not elaborated every year**. In Mozambique, the contingency plan is the central document guiding responses, and aid agencies implement other relief activities in consultation with the government.

Globally, Strategic Response Plans (SRP) (previously called Consolidated Appeals) typically serve as the main point of reference for international humanitarian responses and fundraising for UN agencies and their partners. An SRP for drought response was published by the Office of the Resident Coordinator about one month after the government issued a red alert on 12 April 2016 requesting \$121m (HCT 2016). The amount was revised to \$189m in mid-2016. Until 2016, the largest request by international aid agencies was for \$39m via a Flash Appeal in response to the 2007 floods. In 2015, the HCT prepared a specific Response and Recovery Plan for floods, indicating that the partners required \$30.3m (as stated above all international humanitarian funding was about one-third that amount in 2015, suggesting that the plan was not well-financed) (UNRCO 2015).

Finally, there is a well-established protocol for responding to floods and cyclones but not for droughts. The annual contingency planning process focuses on floods and cyclones (the 2015/16 plan is titled 'Contingency Plan for Rainy Season and Cyclones'). For floods and cyclones, early warning systems and data on rainfall areas are linked to the issuance of alerts and provision of assistance by the government and partners, often drawing from prepositioned supplies. By contrast there are no clear indicators and signals for triggering responses for droughts. The government department SETSAN (the Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition) collects food security data on a bi-annual cycle, and data collection frequency is increasing in mid-2016 because of drought. The data informed decisions to issue orange and red alerts respectively in January and April 2016. However, as discussed in the in greater detail later in this section, the government and HCT have faced challenges in quickly mobilising large-scale efforts. The strengthening of the

⁷ Using data from Government of Mozambique, Contingency Plan 2011-12 to 2015-16

⁸ OCHA Financial Tracking, accessed May 2016

⁹ Calculated on the basis of the government having financed \$10m in January 2016 and the UNRCO's calculation that aid agencies had raised \$85m as of September 2016 (UNRCO 2016b).

government's risk management capacity began in earnest in the mid-2000s and no extremely severe droughts occurred until 2015/2016—thus government capacity-building and DRM has revolved around floods and cyclones.

3.2 Responses to shocks

Until the drought of 2015/2016, DRM efforts and humanitarian assistance in the last decade have been primarily in response to floods and cyclones, because these shocks have triggered acute needs related to loss of assets and food security.¹⁰ In 2007/8 and 2010 droughts occurred in southern and central areas at the same times as floods in river basins. However, these did not lead to major assistance efforts. Humanitarian response is not usually a tool for dealing with economic shocks and it was not used in Mozambique in the 2008 food and fuel crisis (section 2.2.2).

Food aid has been a primary form of disaster relief, with little interest in cash-based responses (Box 1). Other forms include health, water and sanitation, agricultural support (e.g. seeds and tools) and emergency shelter¹¹. The government also resettles flood-affected households to areas not prone to flooding—an effort that dates back decades (Cosgrave et al. 2007). A challenge to resettlement is that some people choose to live in the flood plains where they have access to fields and rich soils. Others stay in flood-prone areas as they have few options given poverty constraints.

Box 1 Cash transfers and vouchers versus in-kind aid for humanitarian response in Mozambique

When asked during this research about the potential for providing people with money rather than in-kind aid, government representatives were consistently not in favour of cash transfers as a form of relief assistance owing to concerns for dependency, access to markets (during floods given infrastructure damage), risks that people would not spend the money wisely, concerns that traders would opportunistically raise prices, and worries that people would continue to expect of demand the money. Aid agencies' lack of experience with cash transfer programming in Mozambique is also an obstacle, though international aid agencies have experience with cash transfers in other contexts. In fact, global trends in cash assistance mean that Mozambique is one of the few countries where cash transfers for relief have not been trialled at some stage—a 2001 USAID reconstruction project appears to be the only example.

Some aid agencies have more strongly considered cash for the drought response in 2016 because of experiences in other countries, and because donors such as DFID have expressed substantial interest. COSACA, a DFID-funded consortium of NGOs (Save The Children, Concern, Care International and Oxfam), planned to pilot cash transfers in 2016 and an appeal by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (IFRC) states that cash transfers will be used (IFRC 2016). However, in 2007 cash transfers were not used, even though the 2007 Flash Appeal indicated that they would be, and as of September 2016 the government would not approve the piloting of cash transfers for the 2016 drought response. Therefore, despite aid agency and donor advocacy for cash transfers, they will not be used in relief efforts unless the government's firm position changes.

Efforts to introduce vouchers as an alternative to in-kind aid have gained more traction than proposals to distribute money. In May 2016, COSACA began providing vouchers for some households affected by drought. At a CTGC meeting where COSACA presented their voucher plans in early 2016, some CTGC members raised questions and concerns about technical issues (e.g. ensuring supply of commodities), but the potential economic benefits of providing money to local traders were viewed as particularly advantageous. The approach was given the green light. In June, COSACA proposed to reach 100,000 households (approximately 500,000 people) with vouchers in response to the 2016 drought, if funding was made available. However, interviewees reported that the lack of in-country experience with vouchers combined with rapid scale-up has led to some initial implementation weaknesses, such as ensuring adequate food quality and quantity from traders.

¹⁰ For description of impacts of floods and cyclones in 2000, 2007, 2013 and 2015 see USAID 2000, Cosgrave et al 2007, UNRCO 2013a, UNRCO 2013b and IFRC 2015.

¹¹ Using sector-specific data from FTS for years available.

Table 6 summarises available data on numbers affected and assisted with food assistance. The table provides insights on coverage of humanitarian assistance but is not a definitive indicator of it, because food assistance is only one element of a disaster response, and everyone affected by a disaster might not need it. Furthermore, the accuracy of estimates of people affected by disasters has been subject to debate. Keeping in mind these considerations, the data suggest that there have been instances where humanitarian assistance for floods and cyclones has been quite comprehensive. Floods in 2013 affected 240,000 people. In March 2013 WFP and partners had assisted 230,000 people; the government had provided affected provinces with 141 tons of maize and 32 tons of beans, and was procuring 480 tons of maize seed and 70,000 hoes and machetes. If there is no double counting of the number of people assisted, WFP's estimates of food assistance alone suggest that food assistance reached 96% of people affected. Coverage for the 2015 flood and 2016 drought appears much weaker. In May 2016, the UNRCO estimated that 423,000 people affected by drought had received food assistance by the government and aid agencies out of an estimated 1.47 m people affected (UNRCO 2016a). While there were plans to assist all affected, aid agencies were dependent on large amounts of additional funding indicated by the SRP for \$189 m (the largest ever request by international aid agencies for Mozambique) (UNRCO 2016a).

Table 6 Numbers of people affected and receiving food assistance (2007-2016)

	2016 drought	2015 flood / cyclones	2013 flood / cyclones	2010 flood / drought	2007 flood / cyclones
Total people affected	1,466,367	420,000	240,827	460,000	494,370
People who received food assistance	423,731 (in May 2016)	54,695 (by international agencies)	230,000	Not available	Not available

Sources: UNRCO 2016a, UNRCO 2015, UNRCO 2013a, FEWSNET 2010, USAID 2007

For international agencies, the INGC provides direction on the overall response, including geographic areas to target. However, aid agencies have flexibility on how they implement responses if the government is on board with the approach. For example, COSACA proposed in the CTGC that they use vouchers in response to the 2016 drought, while WFP is primarily doing food for assets (the 2015/16 drought response is discussed in more detail below). In the past, the INGC has not prescribed that a particular method needs to be used by aid agencies to target populations. The Red Cross, for example, often uses a community-based targeting approach that involves working with local authorities and community members to validate targeting criteria and elaborate lists of those in need of the assistance—the process takes about two days per village. The INGC works with local authorities for the targeting and distribution of their assistance. Agencies providing food vouchers for the 2016 drought response submitted their targeting criteria to the government, who approved it (Food Security Cluster 2016).

3.2.1 Efficiency and effectiveness of responses

Floods and cyclones

Data and conclusions on the effectiveness of responses to flooding and cyclones are drawn from an international evaluation of the 2007 flood response, lesson learning exercises of the 2013 and 2015 floods by the government and Office of the UN Resident Coordinator, and interviews.

The 2007 flood response was INGC's first real leadership test, both for profiting from preparedness and contingency planning as well as leading the coordination of a humanitarian response. A real-

time evaluation of the 2007 international humanitarian response commissioned by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee is the most thorough evaluation of relief efforts in Mozambique, and was based on 35 key informant interviews, small group interviews with 60 people, observation, and a review of 700 documents. It determined that real humanitarian needs created by floods and cyclones had been met and that there had not been indications of excess mortality or acute nutritional distress (Cosgrave et al 2007). The evaluation concluded that the operation was a success and highlighted the government's leadership:

Some aspects of the response in Mozambique represented the ideal of what a response in a developing country should be. In particular, and despite some constraints, INGC behaved as the very model of an ideal National Disaster Management Institute. This strong national coordination also helped with coordination of the international humanitarian response. This is not to say that the response was perfect, but that it was an effective response with all the applicable constraints. Strong national coordination and good international coordination supported each other.

Since that time, the government and aid agencies have been fine-tuning their DRM and responses, including through the annual contingency planning exercises. While there are challenges addressed later in this section, there is little to suggest that subsequent relief actions to address floods have not met a similar range of effectiveness as the 2007 response. A Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) report points to a sharp decrease between the 2000 floods (700 deaths) and the 2013 floods (116 deaths) as evidence of better disaster management (GFDRR 2014). Interviewees described the 2013 and 2015 relief efforts as predictable and timely, with relatively clear roles and responsibilities amongst government sectors and aid agencies in meeting emergency needs. Data from the 2013 response suggests high coverage by food assistance, and documentation and lesson-learning exercises from other years do not raise any weaknesses in coverage (see Cosgrave et al 2007; Foley 2007; UNRCO 2013b). Research and evaluation on the 2007 floods, lesson-learning exercises on 2013 and 2015 flooding and this study identified the following factors contributing to effectiveness:

-)] Community disaster preparedness and effective communication channels for evacuations have supported prompt evacuations, limiting the number of people in affected areas and reducing risk of death;
-)] Contingency-planning and pre-positioning of stocks have enabled timely assistance;
-)] Leadership from the INGC has established clear roles and responsibilities, and government officials in the CENOE are able to take decisions on relief efforts promptly;
-)] The CTCG set-up encourages good coordination and communication between the government and international agencies;
-)] The Central Emergency Response Plan has rapidly dispersed funding to international aid agencies; and
-)] The small size of the international aid community in Mozambique has resulted in many aid agency staff being knowledgeable and familiar with Mozambique.

While little data is available on the efficiency of relief efforts, GFDRR found that measures to improve early warning have clearly paid off. In 2007, INGC had two days of advance warning to evacuate around 150,000 people, and disbursed an estimated \$5 million for this effort. One year later they had five days of warning to evacuate the same number of people and \$3 million was disbursed; the INGC disbursed less than \$1 million to evacuate people in 2011 (GFDRR 2014). The Government of Mozambique had modelled its disaster management approach on that of Latin

American countries, and had assistance from a Guatemalan delegation to assist with flood evacuation simulation exercises in 2006 (Foley 2007).

While not downplaying the severity of the impacts to those affected, floods and cyclones in Mozambique are also on the lower end of the scale of global disasters. Compared to places such as Pakistan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, there are fewer deaths, less displacement and fewer aid agencies on the ground, which makes for more straightforward relief efforts and enables more personal working relationships amongst aid agencies and with the government. The small size of the responses and the fact that they were led by the government are probable reasons why the 2013 and 2015 relief responses were not well documented and received no major evaluations, which would have enabled stronger conclusions on their effectiveness and efficiency in this study. More evidence on the appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts would be helpful for improving future responses to these shocks.

The main weaknesses in DRM and humanitarian response to floods and cyclones noted by informants are two-fold. The first is government resources. The government coordinates humanitarian responses, but does not have specific resources to continue activities outside of a three-month response window allocated for flood and cyclone responses—the relatively small amount of resources from the contingency plan are meant for this time window. This study is not well placed to determine whether this is a problem; it is possible that the three-month approach has evolved to reflect realistic time-frames in which populations require assistance, or that relevant sectors need more resources to support recovery beyond the three-month window. Also, the assistance efforts are mainly financed by and through international agencies, which face no such limitations on timing. During the relief phase, government sectors have specific responsibilities in humanitarian responses but receive little funding directly through the contingency funding process (the specific case of social protection is discussed in section 4.2). The 2013 lesson learning exercises also raised concerns about prepositioned stocks needing to be increased or replenished (UNRCO 2013b).

The second weakness is the need to improve the quality of information and data collection. One challenge has been getting a coherent picture of impacts as disasters unfold. The 2007 real-time evaluation noted that, while emergency needs were met, registration and getting accurate estimates of people affected by the crisis were challenges (Cosgrave et al 2007). Information on needs is collected in different ways from the provincial to district to community levels. The government and aid agency partners have different methodologies and reports that are not systematically shared (WFP 2015). While the INGC brings together the information, arriving at a figure for the number of people affected and who needs what can be contentious, with some aid agencies concern about inflated numbers from the government. WFP believes that the confusion on numbers in 2015 resulted in delays in resource mobilisation and initiating the assistance by WFP and other humanitarian partners (WFP 2015). Some informants stressed the need to strengthen assessment processes through joint government and aid agency efforts to better inform the timing and nature of actions to deal with them.

Aid agency key informants spoke positively of the professional relationship with the government and the government's leadership on DRM and response. A concern they raised was the reliance of aid agencies on government declarations of emergencies, which some believe has constrained their ability to more pro-actively fundraise and ramp up their efforts when they believe actions are warranted, but the government has not declared an emergency (this relates more to drought than flooding, as discussed below). For NGOs, the government also caps the number of expatriate employees to national staff, and securing work permits for expatriates can take more than a year, owing to overall strict labour laws in Mozambique. In theory, this constraint could hamper their

ability to significantly increase their operations quickly, but this has not been raised as a problem in recent responses to floods and cyclones.

Drought

As noted in section 2.2.1 above, a severe drought was unfolding in Southern Africa at the time this research was conducted in 2015 and 2016. The drought puts a magnifying glass to the challenge of assessment and decision-making, because droughts have earlier and less obvious triggers for action compared to floods and cyclones, whose impacts are immediate and highly visible. By contrast multiple informants described droughts as ‘invisible’. One stated, *‘in floods the government quickly declares [a disaster] and mobilises the resources. In drought, it’s slow, they don’t have the same indicators and triggers to react to.’* Table 7 below shows a timeline of the 2015-16 drought and assistance efforts.

Table 7 Drought response timeline April 2015-June 2016

Date	Event
April 2015	FEWSNET finds most households experiencing minimal acute food insecurity (Integrated Phase Classification (IPC)* Phase 1); poor, flood-affected households ‘stressed’ (IPC Phase 2)
November 2015	SETSAN estimates 380,000–1.8m will be affected by drought
January 2016	INGC declares orange alert, activates CENOE
February 2016	FEWSNET estimates 600,000 people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and need food assistance + 600,000 Stressed (IPC Phase 2)
March 2016	INGC and HCT assist 315,366 people by March 2016 Central Emergency Response Fund provides \$4.7m for UN agencies
April 2016	SETSAN estimates 1.5 million people affected INGC declares red alert
May 2016	UNRCO issues SRP stating \$121m required
June 2016	INGC and HCT assist about 182,000 people in May / June

Sources: Authors, various sources. Note: (*) The IPC is a set of standardised tools that aims at providing a “common currency” for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity. The classifications include: Phase 1 – Minimal, Phase 2 – Stressed, Phase 3 – Crisis, Phase 4 – Emergency and Phase 5 – Famine (<http://www.ipcinfo.org>)

Some key informants believe that the drought response has been slow and inadequate, and that the government should have issued orange and red alerts sooner. Some also believe that international aid agencies, and particularly the United Nations, have been too focused on their development activities and failed to grasp the urgency of the deteriorating food security situation and ramp up relief efforts accordingly. The HCT and food security cluster—the most relevant cluster given the large role of food assistance—had their first meetings in mid-January after an orange alert was declared. Two NGO key informants expressed that they had to push for the cluster and HCT to convene in the first place, despite the deteriorating situation at the end of 2015. The governor of Inhambane province initially rejected SETSAN’s November 2015 findings on worsening food security—which perhaps delayed actions to address drought there.

On the other hand, the government and aid agencies have taken several steps. The government issued an orange alert in January, and \$10m was then provided from the government contingency plan. In February 2016, the Mozambican prime minister visited drought-stricken areas in Maputo and Gaza. In March the INGC and aid agencies assisted over 300,000 people. The government had already bilaterally approached aid agencies to support drilling boreholes, and accelerated its

own borehole drilling plans. One could argue that taking earlier action was hampered by difficulties in knowing how the rains would pan out in late 2015 / early 2016, and therefore how harvests would perform.

By June 2016, there were signs that the agencies were poised to increase assistance: COSACA assisted 125,000 people and submitted proposals to donors to reach 500,000 by October. WFP brought in a specific emergency coordinator, the US embassy in Mozambique brought in a representative from the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, DFID deployed a humanitarian adviser to Maputo, the IFRC issued an appeal, the HCT issued the SRP, and Food Security Cluster members agreed on priority intervention areas pending funding (a Food Security Cluster meeting on 2 June comprised 23 people; the previous one comprised about five). The government had indicated in interviews that increasing resources via its own contingency fund was unlikely, thus the expanding of drought response would fall primarily to international aid agencies to implement, and would depend on their success in ramping up capacity and fundraising.

A large component of the drought response has been food assistance through food for assets, general food distribution, and vouchers. In October 2016, nearly 400,000 people were reached with food assistance (OCHA 2016). The aid agencies providing vouchers based the assistance value on providing 90% of daily food requirements (2,100 kilocalories per person, worth approximately \$50 / month), while those providing in-kind aid are providing 50% of daily requirements (Food Security Cluster 2016).

Table 8 Snapshot of international assistance in response to drought in October 2016


Sector	Needs as stated by humanitarian clusters	Response	Estimated people in need	Target for assistance	Estimated people reached	Estimated % of target met in Oct 2016
Agriculture	Access to seeds	Distribution of seeds and inputs; temporary wells; drilling boreholes	500,000	500,000	115,000	23%
Food	Access to food	Food/Cash for Assets; general food distributions; food vouchers; emergency school feeding	1.5m	1.5m	393,835	26%
Nutrition	Accelerate outreach of nutrition interventions	Management of acute malnutrition	280,000	121,828	14,136	12%
Water and Sanitation	Access to water	Water trucking; rehabilitating water points; treatment products; drilling boreholes	500,000	300,000	221,275	74%

Source: OCHA 2016

As of September 2016, international agencies had received \$85m but faced a funding gap of \$126m, indicating shortfalls compared to their planned assistance efforts, though additional funding to the government was expected from the World Bank, African Development Bank and the Chinese government (UNCRO 2016b). The drought response has involved six government agencies, 10 UN agencies, 15 international NGOs and seven local NGOs (OCHA 2016). However, as of October, significant gaps remained in assistance for nutrition, food security and agriculture.

These funding and implementation gaps suggests that the usual approach to international agency relief efforts—seeking funding and expanding response capacity to respond to a major shock—has been inadequate for quick and sufficient response to drought in Mozambique. The critique on late responses to slow-onset emergencies is not specific to Mozambique, and it has been well documented in other places such as the Horn of Africa (see e.g. Levine, 2011). An issue specific to the 2016 Mozambique drought is that aid agencies in-country are not used to responding to drought, and have had to increase their emergency funding and capacity to levels well beyond anything they had experienced in the last decade. The \$189m request was more than four times the amount of international humanitarian funding to Mozambique in 2013, and 17 times the amount in 2015 (see Figure 6).

Figure 6 International humanitarian funding to Mozambique 2000-2015



Source: Data for 2000-2013 from Global Humanitarian Assistance, data for 2014-2015 from Financial Tracking Service

Based on data and actions to date, it is foreseeable that the drought and the response to it will differ from previous shocks and responses in the following ways:

- } More people are affected by the 2016 drought compared to previous other disasters in Mozambique in the past decade. Using SETSAN estimates, approximately three times as many people are affected compared to floods and cyclones in 2015, 2013 and 2007.
- } The disaster will last longer. During flooding in 2007 the red alert lasted from 6 February to 10 March. The red alert declared for the drought in April 2016 was provisionally issued for 90 days. The next harvest will not be until March 2017, and the impacts will probably get worse in the lean season that precedes it.
- } Assistance will be provided for longer. Some agencies have indicated that they will provide households with food assistance for 10 months. By contrast flood responses end within three months.
- } The role of the HCT in an emergency is to fill the gap between what the government can do and what is required, thus the role of international aid agencies is likely to increase. The maximum budget in the contingency plan for 2016 is \$17.6m. Interviews in June 2016 suggested that the government would not provide more than \$10m.

Because of the high reliance on international aid agencies and their partners, the drought response will be subject to any weaknesses that these actors face. For example, a 2014 evaluation of the WFP (which covered emergency and development activities) found weak monitoring, inadequate fundraising and that ‘breaks’ in the food supply pipeline resulted in reduced emergency food rations (Verduijn et al 2014). A more recent challenge is that aid agencies using vouchers in Mozambique have global experience in cash-based responses, but this has not translated into immediate and adequate capacity to delivery voucher responses in Mozambique, which has resulted in learning curves.

Assessment, too, has emerged as an important challenge. The government food security monitoring body SETSAN has been supported by FEWSNET, and technicians from several international agencies were involved in the 2016 data collection and analysis of drought-affected provinces. Concerns have been present throughout the drought response about the quality of data and the accuracy of estimates of the number of people affected. For example, nutrition data is critical to understanding whether a shock is resulting in increased acute malnutrition amongst children, but international aid agencies questioned the quality of initial nutrition data.

There will be a need to review whether DRM assessment, decision-making and financing in Mozambique are adequate to address the drought. As of mid-2016, there are several indications that the response has been slow and insufficient. Lessons may also emerge in the future on whether impacts of drought have been lessened through broader efforts linked to mitigation and preparedness, including improved agricultural techniques, water management, community-level disaster mitigation and other development initiatives in arid and semi-arid areas.

DRM in Mozambique relies on international aid agencies filling as much as possible of the gap between what the government can provide and actual need. While this appears to have worked relatively well in the case of floods, the same cannot be said of drought, and DRM needs to be improved to address it. Whether there is a role for shock-responsive social protection to play is examined in the next two chapters, which outline social protection systems Mozambique and the potential for social protection programmes to be more shock-responsive.

4 The social protection system and its current role in responding to shocks

Key points

- J The main social protection programmes in the country are in the form of non-contributory social assistance interventions covered under basic social security.
- J The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) is the lead ministry responsible for the basic social security systems with the National Institute of Social Action (INAS) the subordinate implementation agency. There is a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between these actors at the national level. However, MGCAS's ability to coordinate activities across the sector is weak, with little convening power. At the district level, there is no clarity or guidance on the hierarchy of reporting and accountability between INAS, District Services of Health, Women and Social Action (SDSMAS) and the District Administrator.
- J The main social assistance programmes are the Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB), Direct Social Support Programme (PASD), Programme of Social Services for Social Action (PSSAS) and Productive Social Action (PASP). These covered close to 445,000 households in 2015, equivalent to 8% of the total population and 15% of the poor, but with large variation across provinces and districts. The PSSB is by far the largest (nearly 366,000 households in 2015).
- J The social assistance programmes have a number of common implementation features: all programmes are implemented by INAS staff; the programmes rely fully or partially on community based targeting, and payments and delivery of in-kind benefits are done manually by INAS staff.
- J The government's narrative on poverty reduction is centred on job creation and interventions that support livelihoods and asset creation, with great interest in public works programmes, which may limit the expansion of other social assistance programmes.
- J The social protection sector is supported by a number of development partners with competing agendas and narratives. While there is consensus on the overall aims and objectives of social protection, there is little agreement on the detail and nature of support.
- J The role of MGCAS and INAS in emergencies, on paper mainly, relates to social care services and psychosocial support provided to the vulnerable groups before, during and after shocks. Their other main responsibility is to ensure that vulnerable groups are adequately supported by humanitarian intervention, although MGCAS does not take a leading role around this in practice, and it is mainly done through their representatives at the community level.
- J Social protection systems and operations face a number of constraints, including limited staffing and presence at district and community levels; limited material resources including vehicles and fuel to support routine functions; time-consuming manual payment mechanisms; limited MIS and low programme coverage.

4.1 Key features of social protection in Mozambique

The social protection law of 2007 establishes social protection systems across three tiers: basic social security; compulsory social security, and supplementary social security. Basic social security relates to non-contributory social assistance, while compulsory and supplementary social security are the contributory elements of the law (e.g. public and private sector pension contributions, etc.); these are further discussed in Annex E. The main social protection programmes in the country are in the form of non-contributory social assistance interventions covered under basic social security. The remainder of this section focuses on this element of social protection.

4.1.1 Institutional arrangement

The overall responsibility for basic social security lies with MGCAS and INAS. While there is a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between INAS and MGCAS at the national level, the institutional arrangements for these two entities is less clear at the sub-national level.

MGCAS is mandated by law to coordinate the activities under basic social security, and provides overall direction to the sector, guided by the National Strategy for Basic Social Security (ENSSB), a policy framework describing the government's key priorities and intentions for the sector. The first national strategy was developed for the period 2010-2014 and was replaced by ENSSB II, approved in February 2016 (see Annex E.2). INAS, a subordinate to MGCAS, is the agency responsible for delivery of programmes and strategies defined by MGCAS, with direct budget provided through the Ministry of Finance. Other institutions responsible for implementation of programmes and instruments under basic social security include Ministries of Education, Health, Agriculture, Public Works, Planning and Development, Labour, and State Administration.

INAS is a centralised administrative agency that has 30 offices across the country. These offices, known as delegations, are based in all provincial capitals, Maputo city, and in only 19 other districts (out of a total of 128) across the country. Given their limited footprint at the district level, the delegations are normally responsible for a number of districts in their vicinity, and report directly to the headquarters in Maputo.

While a semi-autonomous centralised administration, INAS's relationship with lower tiers of government remains ambiguous. In districts where the INAS delegation is present, it is expected to report to the district administrator, who has ultimate responsibility for all administrative matters in the district including allocation of staff across the different departments which is clearly in conflict with INAS's vertical structure, thus creating some confusion around the remit of the district administrator in relation to INAS and to whom INAS needs to report and be accountable. To complicate matters further, the responsibilities of MGCAS and the Ministry of Health at the district level are combined into one unit: the District Services of Health, Women and Social Action (SDSMAS). Although INAS liaises with this division, there is no administrative hierarchy establishing formal linkages, reporting or accountability functions between the two. SDSMAS provides some social protection functions around non-residential social services, but without any dedicated budget, while the responsibility for residential social services (e.g. residential care for children, elderly homes, etc.) falls under INAS (Hodges et al, 2014).

In conclusion, the SDSMAS effectively has three direct lines of reporting / accountability: one to the district administrator, who has the overall responsibility for staff and financing at the district level, and the other two to the Provincial Health, and Women's Provincial Directorate of Social Action, respectively. Currently there is no guidance or clarity on hierarchy of reporting and accountability between these different routes, and therefore on how they are meant to work with one another at the district level.

At the national level MGCAS is also responsible for sectoral coordination of basic social security through the Council of Coordination of Basic Social Security (CCSSSB), created in 2011, with membership from Ministries of Public Works, Agriculture, Finance, Health and Education. However MGCAS has not been very successful in managing this process, with limited convening power and authority to hold to account other line ministries for their activities. Under the first ENSSB (2010-2014), activities under the responsibility of Ministries of Health and Education were mostly not implemented (Hodges et al 2014).

4.1.2 Programmes and coverage

The main programmes under basic social security include:

- J The Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB) that provides a regular monthly cash transfer indefinitely to poor and vulnerable households without working capacity;
- J The Direct Social Assistance Programme (PASD) that provides in-kind support (e.g. food, clothing, housing material, etc.) to a broader category of people and households than the PSSB, including child-headed households, households with children in acute malnutrition recovery phase, households in temporary incapacity for work, the elderly or with chronic and degenerative diseases in a bedridden situation, people in socio-family reintegration process, people with disabilities requiring compensation means, and people living with HIV and AIDS.
- J The Productive Social Action Programme (PASP) is a public works programme that provides monthly cash transfer to poor households with working capacity; and
- J The Programme of Social Services for Social Action (PSSAS) that provides support (food, shelter, etc.) to the users of social service provided by INAS through a number of institutions under its supervision, including support to elderly centres, nurseries, transit centres.

Basic social security in principle also covers programmes under health and education, but in reality, there are few if any social protection programmes implemented by these ministries. More information on these sectors is provided in Annex E.

These main programmes and their main operational features are summarised in Table 9. In 2015, these programmes covered close to 445,000 households, equivalent to 8% of the total population and around 15% of the population of the poor (based on 2008/09 poverty data from the government). PSSB is by far the largest programme covering close to 366,000 households in 2015. In the same year, PASD and PASP covered 57,415 and 12,499 households respectively (see Annex E.4).

The coverage of these programmes varies significantly across provinces with Gaza, Niassa and Manica covering the highest proportion of their population, and Zambezia having the lowest coverage of social assistance of any province in the country (Figure 7 and Figure 8)¹².

¹² The coverage is obtained by multiplying PSSB, PASP and PASD programmes by average size of households per province to obtain number of people reached. PSAS is assumed to be an individual level benefit, and not multiplied by household size. This provides an upper limited of coverage assuming full sharing of benefits within households.


Table 9 Key features of current social assistance programmes

Features	Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB)	Direction Social Assistance Programme (PASD)	PASP	PSSAS
Description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides regular monthly cash transfers indefinitely to poor and vulnerable households without working capacity. It is aimed at the elderly, disabled, or people with chronic degenerative diseases that live on their own or in households where there are no other adults with the capacity to work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides in-kind social transfers (e.g. food, clothing, housing material, etc.) for different periods (6 months-indefinitely) to various categories of people and households in poverty and without means to meet their basic needs, including child-headed households, households with children in acute malnutrition recovery phase, households in temporary incapacity for work, the elderly or with chronic and degenerative diseases in a bedridden situation, people in socio-family reintegration process, people with disabilities, and people living with HIV and AIDS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aims to promote socio-economic inclusion of people in poverty and vulnerability with ability to work through public works 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides assistance to users of the institutional social services under the supervision of INAS including for support to elderly centres, nurseries, transit centres. The support includes providing lodging, food, hygiene control, health support as well as recreational and productive activities to vulnerable groups in its day centres
Eligibility criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chronically poor households that are permanently unable to work: elderly-headed households with no dependants or with dependants unable to work (children or people with disabilities); households headed by a person with a disability with no household members capable of work; households with members who have chronic degenerative illnesses (not bedridden) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Households unable to work / headed by children / transitioning from the PSSB (when all family members are bedridden) / temporarily unable to work; poor households with adults on antiretroviral medication or children suffering from acute malnutrition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focuses on female-headed households; households with people with disabilities, chronic illness or with older people; households with children with malnutrition; households with high dependency; host families in poverty and vulnerability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No eligibility criteria, but support provided only to the institutions managed by INAS
Benefit amount	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 310 MT (\$4.30)-615 MT (\$8.50) depending on household size 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In-kind support e.g. food, nutrition supplements, home building materials, transport costs, funeral expense. The value of the food kit for a household of more than three people is between 2,200 MT (\$30) and 2,500 MT (\$35) depending on local prices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recipients work four days a week for four hours a day and receive a monthly allowance of 650 MT (\$9). Maximum four months (or 64 working days) per household in rural areas and six months (i.e. 96 days of work) in urban areas per year 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Material support, clothing, food and other commodities. Other support include counselling and help in family reunification
Enrolment and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community-based targeting involving community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Individual request or institutional referral 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Three steps for targeting: geographical, community- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not clear

Features	Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB)	Direction Social Assistance Programme (PASD)	PASP	PSSAS
targeting	volunteers 'permanentes' and local leaders		based and proxy-means test. PMT not operating in most districts. Reported that, instead of CBT, local leaders usually select beneficiaries using their own judgement	
Payments and delivery) Monthly manual payments by INAS staff. In effect paid bi-monthly) Older people who were in PSSB who are sick receive payment in their home by INAS. The rest (child-headed households, HIV, etc.) paid at the centre of the locality) Payments are monthly (delivered manually), and made not more than three weeks after the end of the month. The liability of the payments is joint between INAS Delegation and District government) Transfer to institutions
Coverage (2015)) 365,726 households (approx. 1.8 million individuals)) 57,415 households (approx. 287,075 individuals)) 12,499 households (approx. 62,495 individuals)) 9,134 individuals

Source: Various sources, see Annex C


Figure 7 Population covered by social protection programmes, 2015 (%)



Source: INAS 2015 and INE 2010

The distribution of poverty and coverage of social assistance programmes across the provinces highlights some of the inequities of the current coverage. Provinces such as Gaza have a disproportionately higher coverage in comparison to Zambezia (Figure 8).

Figure 8 Distribution of social assistance programmes versus distribution of poverty in 2015



Sources: INAS 2015 and INE 2010.

Inequity of distribution is also evident across districts, where many of those with lowest poverty rates also have some of the highest coverage rates.

4.1.3 Budget and financing

The total budget allocated to Social Action and Labour sector in 2015 stood at 7.09 billion MT (\$99.2 million), representing 3.6% total budget (UNICEF/ILO 2015)^{13 14}. During the period 2012-2015, the sector has witnessed a continuous rise in the budget allocated to basic social security programmes administered through INAS, while at the same time witnessing a decline in state subsidies for fuel, food and transportation¹⁵ (Figure 9 and Figure 10).

Figure 9 Funds allocated to Social Action sector as proportion of the state budget




Source: UNICEF/ILO 2015

Allocations to basic social security programmes has increased from 1.8 billion MT (\$25m) in 2013, to 3.3 billion MT (\$45.8m) in 2015 (Figure 10), financed largely through the state budget. In 2015, over 90% of the funds for the PSSB came through the state budget, with the remainder financed through DFID and the Royal Dutch Embassy, compared to 21.6% in 2011 (UNICEF 2014). The PASP, on the other hand, is largely externally financed through loans provided by the World Bank (INAS 2015).

¹³ This includes state subsidies on fuel, food and transportation in urban areas.

¹⁴ Excluding labour related activities, the total budget allocated to Social Action in 2015 stood at 6.3 billion MT, equivalent to 2.8% of total Government budget (just over 1% of GDP).

¹⁵ The government is considering reforming the fuel pricing mechanism and further rationalising the subsidy with the intention of reducing its commitments; irrespective of this, no fuel subsidy is expected in 2016 given the current fuel prices (IMF 2016). The IMF estimates 0.4% of GDP to be spent on non-fuel price subsidies in 2016.

Figure 10 Budget allocations to basic social security programme (000's MT)

Source: INAS annual reports 2013, 2014, 2015

An important dimension of the budgetary process is its timely release. Although the budget is meant to be released on a monthly basis, there are regular delays in the release of funds, which have serious implications for the operation and delivery of the programmes. In 2015, there were significant delays in approval of the 2015 budget, which was only released in March of that year [instead of January].

4.1.4 Programme implementation

The current social assistance programmes have a number of common implementation features: they are all implemented by INAS staff through their delegations across the country; they rely fully or partially on community based targeting, and their benefits are delivered by INAS staff. The main features of these programmes are summarised in Table 9, and further details can be found in (Annex E). In this section, we focus on two of the key implementation features of these programmes, namely targeting and payments¹⁶.

Targeting and enrolment of beneficiaries

Under the PSSB (the main cash transfer programme) beneficiaries are selected through *'permanentes'*—community volunteers supporting INAS staff. They provide a link between communities and the INAS delegation. The *'permanentes'* draw up an initial list of beneficiaries based on the criteria provided by INAS. This list is meant to be verified by INAS staff through household visits, before approval and finalisation. However due to lack of human resources, household visits do not normally take place, with many families selected based on the sole recommendations of the *'permanentes'* (Selvester et al 2012, Hodges et al 2014). This has the potential to create rent-seeking opportunities at the community level, although it has not been sufficiently researched. The final list of beneficiaries is maintained in a database at delegation level, with a list of potential beneficiaries whom the programme cannot enrol, because of budget limitations and allocated quotas, and whom are kept as substitutes, and maintained in paper form in the office¹⁷. The households in this list are enrolled in the event of exits from the programme. The enrolment process of beneficiaries reportedly takes no more than a month to complete, although it needs to be combined with other responsibilities of the staff, often resulting in longer periods of time to complete. The beneficiaries are expected to be retargeted every two years.

¹⁶ The programme is currently developing its MIS system. There is little information available on this.

¹⁷ The magnitude of the substitutes list is currently not known.

The targeting process under the PASD is based on individuals or households applying for support to INAS, or on referrals made through the system either by *'permanentes'* at the community level, or health workers or other administrative staff at the district level. There are multiple categories of beneficiaries within this programme, each with their own specific eligibility criteria that need to be assessed and verified by the INAS staff. The programme currently does not have an MIS, and only paper-based records are kept. Targeting for the PASP is moving towards a more elaborate process that aims to combine geographical, proxy means-testing and community-based targeting. At present the programme is still utilising a community-based targeting process¹⁸.

Payments

Payments of cash and delivery of in-kind benefits utilise a significant amount of staff time and resources to implement. Under the PSSB and the PASP, payments are carried out manually and delivered at specific pay points in the vicinity of communities by a number of INAS staff (Annex E). This process places significant strain on the existing capacity of the INAS to carry out other functions including enrolment of new beneficiaries, as well as monitoring activities. In any given payment month, 10-15 days are spent delivering payments. While the manual of operations establishes that the PSSB should be provided on a monthly basis, the team's fieldwork in Gaza province suggests that the transfers are normally only paid on a bi-monthly basis, given the different logistical, resource and budgetary constraints the delegations face. These findings are in line with previous studies and evaluations of the PSSB (Selvester et al 2012, Hodges et al 2014), and information gathered through our interviews. INAS staff explained that the main causes of delay to payments are the lack of appropriate transportation, and the distance and accessibility of some communities.


Payments under the PASD are delivered at the centre of the *"Localidades"*—the smallest level of state administration—but for beneficiaries unable to pick these up, they are delivered to their door by INAS staff¹⁹. Again, these deliveries are meant to take place every month, but reportedly take place on a bi-monthly basis. The delegations in Gaza aim to combine delivery of the PASD together with the PSSB; however the need for door to door visits required by the PASD limits the possibility of combining the two.

4.1.5 Organisational capacity

There are big variations in the organisational capacity of the delegations, as measured by the number of staff per 1000 beneficiaries reached. On average, there are 2.6 staff per 1000 beneficiaries reached, ranging from 6.7 staff per 1000 beneficiaries reached in Matola (province of Maputo), to only one staff per 1000 beneficiaries in Machanga in Sofala province (Figure 11).

¹⁸ At the time of research, INAS was testing the PMT formulae on household data it had recently collected. The MIS for this programme will be finalised in 2017.

¹⁹ For the PSSB, the eligible households can identify an alternative nominee to collect the transfers if the primary recipient is unable to go to the pay points.

Figure 11 INAS delegation staff per 1000 beneficiary (2015)

Source: INAS (2015). Notes: ** INAS HQ staff is not considered.

While the number of staff under INAS delegations has increased in recent years, their caseload has remained fairly constant. As shown in Table 10 below, the number of INAS staff has increased from 1,019 in 2013 to 1,259 in 2015²⁰: an annual growth rate of 11%. When compared to the coverage of beneficiaries, each INAS delegation staff member on average covered 353 beneficiaries in 2015, a reduction of just over 40 beneficiaries per delegation staff member from the previous year.


Table 10 Number of beneficiaries per INAS staff

Beneficiary and INAS staffing	2013	2014	2015
Total beneficiary	397,771	469,271	444,774
INAS staff	1019	1188	1259
Beneficiary per staff	390	395	353

Source: INAS.

Overall, while there has been growth in number of INAS staff in total, these changes have not been uniform across all delegations (Figure 12).

²⁰ INAS annual reports. Note the figures above are the sum of staff per each delegation from these reports. The sum for all delegations doesn't add up accurately in the tables provided in these reports, which we have assumed to be errors. In the report the total INAS staff for 2013 and 2014 are 1,119 and 1,188 respectively.

Figure 12 Annual change in delegation staff between 2013 and 2015

Source: INAS (2014 and 2015)

Moreover, as the number of beneficiaries reached by the programmes has increased in the past three years, the relative budget for administering them has declined (ILO, WFP and UNICEF 2015). There is a consensus amongst the government, development partners and civil society alike on the need for greater investment in staffing and other infrastructure, if INAS were to expand its reach and cover a greater number of beneficiaries, or simply introduce new programmes.

“They [INAS] cannot expand without investing in resources. They need to be in more places, need to be closer to the beneficiaries and need to find better ways to deliver benefits. In 2-3 years they will have a management information system in place which will help with transparency and day to day management but without investment in structures it won’t happen.” (Key informant interview with development partner, Maputo)

Aware of this constraint, INAS has developed a costed plan to recruit additional staff at the delegation level. However, INAS is facing major budgetary constraints, and with a freeze on recruitment of new staff in non-priority sectors imposed by the government as part of its austerity measures, this well-known constraint is likely to remain. Moreover, even if finances are available, the process of recruitment itself is centralised and lengthy, as all civil service recruitments require the approval of the Ministry of State Administration.

Human resource constraints are accentuated because of the way the programmes are being implemented, and particularly due to the mode of payments to the beneficiaries (section 4.1.4). MGCAS and INAS are, with support of the donors, exploring opportunities to outsource the payments to external service providers, with the aim of reducing the administrative burden on INAS and the fiduciary risks associated with the current payment system. However, it is important to note that this has been an ongoing process since 2013, and has not yet been resolved. Other initiatives aimed at improving service delivery and organisational capacity of INAS include support in development of targeting and MISs, as well as discussions around the provision of further technical assistance.

At present, there is scepticism as to whether INAS has the human and financial resources, as well as the technical capacity, to implement the new ENSSB II, with the need to address these seen as a prerequisite:

“ENSSB II is a good strategy, but we are worried that the way it has been designed is likely to bring a lot of challenges, because it needs a structure and level of capacity that is capable of delivering the desired programmes [that are currently not in place]. When you look at the legal system in Mozambique, it has a good framework but the challenge is in implementation. There is a need to shy away from the policy issues and focus more on implementation. For INAS for example, we can see a budget allocation to increase the number of beneficiaries, but if you look at the operational levels to the resources to deliver, that has stagnated. The same technical person who would have managed 20 beneficiaries in the past now has 100 beneficiaries. Payments are taking place every two months even if the policy says it is every month. The policy is clear, but they don't have the resources (e.g. vehicles) for implementation. Every year they design a few new policies. The last strategy was more concentrated on road access and the evaluation found that it had reached about 15% of the implementation of the strategy. In the [previous strategy] they were expecting about 1m beneficiaries but they only had around 400,000 beneficiaries after 5 years of implementation.” (Key informant interview with Non-Governmental actors, Maputo)

4.1.6 Political economy of the social protection sector

Although Mozambique has one of the longest and largest social protection programmes (in terms of geographical coverage) in Sub-Saharan Africa—other than South Africa—that is largely domestically funded, the sector itself is not highly visible nationally, and the resources allocated to it are not significant in terms of overall resource allocation, or when benchmarked against comparator countries internationally.

The sector has seen some increases in budget allocations in recent years, largely in terms of value of benefits provided as well as expansion in the number of beneficiaries covered, albeit from a very low base. This expansion has been attributed to a number of factors, including as a response to the 2010 urban riots against price increases; financial support and advocacy by international donors, and securing of commitments from the government as conditions of support, and strong leadership from INAS and MGCAS.

“The reason for the increase in allocations is political. The urban riots in Maputo after the global crises pushed the government to give greater attention to safety nets. Powerful advocacy from directors of INAS also resulted in larger allocations from finance. There was also some push from IMF for moving away from subsidies”. (Key informant interview with Government official, Maputo)

Despite these positive changes, social protection and social assistance programmes in particular are not a high priority for the current establishment. The government's anti-poverty narrative is centred on economic growth and job creation. An anti-hand-out mentality, linked to the spirit of 'auto-estima' (self-esteem) means that existing social assistance programmes are confined to a very narrow subset of the population: elderly and disabled who are economically poor. While there are commitments to maintaining existing programmes of support, focus and attention has shifted to

social assistance interventions linked to productive investments, with attention to public works programmes gaining greater traction and political support.

“There is a strong idea that social protection are hand-outs, that do not really help people escape poverty but instead they incentivise people to avoid work”.

“Poverty reduction has always been a priority but recent recognition and political shift to move from social assistance to productive dimensions is one of the key factors, to support activities that promote livelihoods / income generation. Increasing productivity is an underlying objective across all sectors and vision for government. Financially and socially it is not sustainable to just have social assistance. There has to be a strong focus on medium and long term. We will continue with the social assistance but will now complement that with income generating activities.” (Key informant interview with Government official, Maputo)

The new social protection strategy, ENSSB II, aims to expand the coverage of the population benefiting from social assistance programmes, by broadening the categories of those eligible, and proposals to introduce new programmes. While approved by the Council of Ministers, it remains to be seen whether ENSSB II will be implemented, and whether the government will commit to financing it. Moreover, as noted under section 4.1.5, there is currently some level of scepticism amongst the donors as to whether INAS has the financial resources and human resource capacity to implement the new strategy.

International donors and civil society primarily liaise with the government and coordinate their activities through the social protection working group chaired by MGCAS and co-chaired by UNICEF. While grouped around common higher level objectives of poverty eradication and the consensus for the need for systems strengthening, there are competing agendas and divergent views amongst the development partners on appropriate interventions and means of implementation—which result in bilateral pursuit of these sometimes competing agendas. Some donors, such as the World Bank, command greater influence and access to the government, especially through high level dialogue and significant financial resources (although in the form of concessional loans). Some agencies pursue a narrower agenda related to their remit, such as UNICEF focusing on children.

DFID and the Dutch are the only two donors providing resources directly to the government for the support of the main cash transfer programme (the PSSB) but are seen as less engaged with the wider policy processes, and perceived as having more limited influence and access to the government. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is generally viewed as a more neutral agency with a greater level of access and influence despite limited resources. The ILO was the only agency that was directly engaged and present with the government during the development of the ENSSB II, although other development partners were kept informed of the progress. The Embassy of Sweden and the European Commission are newer entrants into the social protection sectors, with growing interest and potential resources. In 2016, they will be formulating their position and likely areas of support.

“World Bank defines a lot of the agenda because they have control over so many areas of assistance” (Key informant interview with development partner, Maputo)

There is consensus amongst donors on the need for supporting INAS in strengthening its existing systems and capacity, although the nature and modality for that support remains to be agreed. A

number of donors are in favour of establishing a social protection fund, but donors such as the World Bank are likely to operate outside this. The view by civil society and other independent researchers is that donors have been viewed as successful in supporting policy processes, and lobbying for their development and approval. However, there is a general view that the ministries have been less successful in implementing these policies and strategies, and the donor community has had limited influence in supporting these processes. There have been offers of support to INAS with improving its delivery systems through technical assistance, but these have so far been declined by INAS.

Finally, while the donors are heavily engaged in supporting the social protection sector, and trying to leverage additional commitment from the government, there is a perception that their level of influence has been declining since the discovery of gas in 2010, and the shift from public investments with donor financing to foreign private investment. However, the 2016 debt crisis and government's austerity measures suggest a continued but diminishing reliance on donor support.

“Donors were extremely influential during the Chissano years [1986-2005], but under Gibuza [2005-2015] he changed the dynamics with focus on private investment by foreign investors rather than the previous public investment supported by the donors. But this also narrowed the base of growth. Donors are no longer as powerful as before. Government is still living on the continual expectation and future promises of revenue” (Key informant interview with an independent analyst, Maputo)

As noted earlier, MGCAS coordinates the actions under ENSSB that includes interventions from other ministries (section 4.1.1). The general view from the interviewees is that MGCAS has been less successful in engaging with other line ministries, especially around the development of the ENSSB II. MGCAS is not viewed as a large and visible ministry, but one with very limited convening power and success in inter-ministerial coordination of social protection programmes and leveraging their support. As a result of this, the coordination of the basic social protection has been taken up to the level of the prime minister.

“When it comes to inter-ministerial coordination, that is where the problem is. Decisions require implementation by other ministries and in effect endorsement by them to take it forward. MGCAS is trying to take the coordination to the prime minister level to rectify this challenge.” (Key informant interview with a development partner, Maputo)

“MGCAS is not an influential ministry and is extremely weak, compared to health and education which are powerful ministries. MGCAS is a fairly small actor. But they have had strong leadership and have built the longest social protection outside South Africa and are successful in getting an increasing share of the budget, but in the shadow of that of education and health. Compared to other countries where social assistance programmes are being piloted, it is more developed institutionally having established INAS”. (Key informant interview with an independent consultant, Maputo)

While MGCAS is responsible for setting social assistance policy, the mandate and responsibility for implementation lies with INAS. INAS receives most of the resources for the sector, with budgets directly allocated by the Ministry of Finance. The policy direction set by MGCAS has implications on INAS in terms of implementation; however, there is no oversight mechanism for assessing INAS's performance and holding it to account. This seems to create some inherent tension between the two institutions, which was reportedly managed through good relationships fostered

between the former heads of both organisations. Generally, INAS is viewed as being more risk averse, with limited appetite for taking on more programmes or responsibilities²¹.

4.2 Current role in responding to covariate shocks

Here we consider the role that social protection has played in DRM and humanitarian response to floods, cyclones, droughts and economic crisis. MGCAS and INAS play a relatively minor role, but are involved in both preparedness and response: they are informed and consulted on these efforts.

MGCAS and INAS participate in the government's platform for coordinating disaster response (the CTGC) along with other relevant ministries. MGCAS contributes in the contingency planning process and has responsibilities in the contingency plan across prevention, response and recovery, which are mainly focused on social care services with particular attention to gender-based violence, psychosocial support and family reunification. MGCAS is also responsible for advocating and ensuring that the vulnerable population groups are prioritised and supported during the emergency response (Box 2). Their support is reported to be primarily provided at the community and district level, where implementers of emergency programmes identify their beneficiaries in consultation with the traditional community structures including the '*permanentes*' and local leaders.

In the event of floods and cyclones, social protection programmes in affected areas have struggled to continue their normal operations, and according to our key informants in Gaza normally stop operating altogether during the emergency period. However, INAS staff themselves have provided some support to relief efforts. In Gaza, during floods in 2015, INAS assisted in the identification of vulnerable households as part of the resettlement process, and provided input on ensuring that vulnerable people were housed at appropriate areas in the settlement (e.g. disabled people housed near settlement entrances). The main relief intervention that MGCAS supports is the provision of kits containing clothing, hygiene items and other supplies to vulnerable families. These interventions are done via partners such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). While MGCAS received funding via the contingency plan, this funding is not large amounts of monies to mount specific activities: in 2013-14 MGCAS received approximately \$25,000 (GFDRR 2014).

²¹ Key informant interview, Development Partner, Maputo.

Box 2 Role of MGCAS in emergency response

MGCAS has specific responsibilities in relations to climatic shocks, elaborated in the annual contingency plans prepared by INGC. The responsibilities span across preparedness (proactive measures), response (reactive measures) and recovery (measures to return to normal social life). The main activities are elaborated further below:

Preparedness — Proactive measures include:

-) Training of provincial and district staff around prevention and response to Gender Based Violence (GBV) in emergency situations as well as review of data, and mechanisms to monitor, report, address and follow up on GBV related activities.
-) Preparation of messaging for communication with disabled people threatened by floods and advocacy activities with the humanitarian action for prioritisation of vulnerable groups (ill, older people, child-headed households, people with disabilities, etc.) in humanitarian assistance.
-) Advocacy with shelter sectors to ensure compliance with standards in accommodation centres and resettlement neighbourhoods to strengthen the protection environment for vulnerable groups.

Response — Proactive measures in response to shocks from flooding and cyclones include:

-) Advocacy actions to ensure rescue and assistance of vulnerable populations affected by the disaster.
-) Monitoring measures to assess impact of disasters and humanitarian assistance and protection of vulnerable groups.
-) Conducting sectoral and complementary rapid assessments with secondary data; prioritising most vulnerable population groups; compiling and sharing such information.
-) Activation of protection plans and assistance including through delivery of assistance kits to vulnerable groups in conjunction with other sectors.
-) Activities around GBV for prevention, response and dissemination of codes of conducts for operating partners.
-) Monitoring of humanitarian assistance and protection of vulnerable groups including adolescents, young adults and pregnant women.
-) Provision of psychosocial activities, identification of lost children and support in family reunification.

Recovery — Measures to support the return to normal social life include:

-) Continued awareness raising and monitoring around GBV in accommodation quarters, resettlements as well as dissemination of information around local services available for care of children and GBV victims.
-) Conducting monitoring visits to affected areas to ensure all identified vulnerable groups have access to basic social services, protection and health.
-) Promotion of agricultural project for most vulnerable groups of resettlement neighbourhoods.
-) Continued support with family reunification of lost children.
-) Continued psychosocial support.

Source: INGC (2015), Contingency plan for rain and cyclone season 2015/16

SDSMAS and INAS reportedly have provided lists of vulnerable households to prioritise and include them in humanitarian and sectoral interventions, but there is a general view that the lists are questionable in terms of whether they were amongst the most vulnerable or poor:

“INAS / MGCAS are weak around humanitarian response, they are part of CENOE and CTGC but they are not a big part of this, and are not linked to the drought. Information they are getting in terms of vulnerable groups and who is getting assistance from the groups is not very clear.” (Key informant interview with a development partner, Maputo)

Our research in the province of Gaza suggested that emergency interventions do not necessarily utilise the list of existing beneficiaries under social assistance (e.g. PSSB, PASD, etc.). In fact, these beneficiaries may be seen as ‘covered’ by social protection, and therefore de-prioritised for assistance, which is in contrast to the approach undertaken in both Philippines and Lesotho where the beneficiaries of the social protection programmes were prioritised. There does not seem to be a clear policy or directive as to whether those currently benefiting from these programmes should be included in the emergency programmes or not, resulting in discretionary and inconsistent decisions in about their inclusion.

Under ENSSB II there are discussions about the introduction of programmes that are responsive to flood, cyclones and drought. Although the detail of this is currently being developed, MGCAS sees the PASP and PASD as two such programmes. The PASP is meant to provide work to poor and vulnerable households, with labour for a period of up to four months during the lean seasons in May-August to support households with income, as well as to build community assets and thus build their resilience to future climatic shocks. This year the government decided to bring forward the date of this programme in Gaza as part of the response to the drought, in order to help households meet their immediate food requirements. This decision was reportedly made and pushed by the governor of the province, and was not necessarily initiated by INAS. The programme is not expected to be extended with food insecurity during the lean season, though food insecurity is expected to continue and worsen.

In the past, the PASD has been used in flooded areas to provide support with construction of new houses and clothing; despite its small size and the cost and complexity of delivering it, the government is interested in retaining it.

“They want to keep it [PASD], the new strategy trying to move away from in-kind to cash, but the programme will still be there because it is useful politically to be seen to be able to give stuff”. (Key informant with a development partner, Maputo)

INAS also uses the PASD as a response to idiosyncratic shocks affecting households (e.g. house fire). Households are supported with in-kind benefits ranging from food parcels to supporting in the rebuilding of houses. Recipients of food parcels receive these for a period of time that is at the discretion of INAS delegation staff, but which usually lasts between six to 12 months. Direct support through the PASD is limited in size, and dependent on the availability of budgets. The programme currently reaches 59,430 households across the entire country. This programme on average reaches 428 households per district, and is therefore too small in nature to deal with covariate shocks.

Beyond the climatic shocks, the government has also had to respond to economic crises that resulted in large increases in the price of basic commodities, and led to rioting in urban areas. In response to this, the government introduced a set of subsidies around basic food items and transportation. Although a social protection instrument, this is not seen as such within the Mozambican context, and there was little information to assess its design, operations or gather views on its efficacy.

As noted above, the recently approved ENSSB II suggests an appetite for greater involvement by MGCAS in being more responsive to climate related shocks. However—understandably—there is a wariness from INAS in playing more of a role on the frontline of emergency response delivery, given their existing capacity constraints. In the next chapter, we explore the possibilities for a more shock-responsive social protection system in Mozambique under the current system and in future.

5 Potential for a more shock-responsive social protection system

Key points

- J The Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB) is the only social assistance programme that currently has sufficient coverage to be considered under vertical expansion. The evidence suggests that in a few districts the PSSB beneficiaries are likely to be part of the population affected by climatic shocks such as drought. However, where the shock affected population of a district is small, the likelihood of them belonging to the PSSB programme diminishes.
- J At best, the PSSB could be used to cover some of the case load of affected beneficiaries in response to slow onset shocks and only in some geographical areas. However, the current financing mechanisms, political resistance to cash transfers in relief responses, and concerns about managing beneficiary expectations in the future limit the feasibility of this option at present.
- J The existing organisational capacity of the National Institute of Social Action (INAS) and the design and implementation of the core social assistance programmes suggest significant barriers to rapid expansion of existing programmes in response to emergencies, especially rapid on-set shocks. Horizontal expansion requires the programmes to rapidly mobilise, register and enrol additional beneficiaries, which currently is not feasible in Mozambique.
- J Humanitarian actors draw on some of INAS's local community structures to help in identifying the affected populations. However, beyond this, the MIS and manual payment modalities limit the possibilities of piggybacking on INAS systems.
- J The Direct Social Support Programme (PASD) and the Productive Social Action (PASP) are viewed by the government as two of the programmes that could be more responsive to shocks in future. The PASP has already been used as an emergency response in drought-affected areas. However, the existing coverage and design features of the programme (e.g. lengthy targeting process) are not well-suited for emergency response. The PASP can provide a protective function in future, once its core features have improved. The design of the PASD, including its multiplicity of eligibility criteria, in-kind benefit packages as well as its limited coverage cast doubt on its ability to respond to community level shocks.
- J In the immediate future, changes to the operations of the programme—in particular changing the current payment schedule (e.g. making double payments in December)—and ensuring INAS beneficiaries are not excluded for other relief interventions are two ways in which the current programmes can be more responsive to shocks.
- J Once the social protection programmes have met their primary objectives with sufficient coverage and improved administrative processes (e.g. payments, targeting, MIS, etc.) and capacity, they may be more suitable and viable for reaching some (but unlikely all) of the affected households. This will require a change in the political environment and, in the case of the PSSB, acceptance of cash transfers for humanitarian response.

In this section, we assess the potential for a more shock-responsive social protection system in Mozambique based on its existing systems, organisational structures and operational modalities, as well as how these might work over time. This section explores the scalability of the current systems in response to shocks, based on the typology described in section 1.3.

5.1 Vertical expansion

Vertical expansion of the social protection programmes entails increasing the benefit value or duration of existing programmes, or introducing additional 'extraordinary' payments during emergencies.

The technical viability of the vertical expansion of existing social assistance programmes is, in the first instance, contingent on the adequacy of coverage in relation to the geographical areas and households affected by shocks. Otherwise, if those receiving the payments are not amongst those affected by the shock, the impact of increasing benefits is negated.

SESTAN (2016) estimates 71 districts to have been affected by the recent drought. In these districts the median population affected by the drought is 15%, and the median population covered by the PSSB (the largest social protection programme) is only 9%. In other words, in most districts, the population of those covered by social protection programmes is smaller than the population in need of support. This suggests that even if the recipients of the PSSB were indeed the population most affected by the drought, there is still a large population that remains in need of support²². The target population for the PSSB are by design the elderly and people with disabilities with no labour capacity. This population group may well be some of the most affected groups by slow onset shocks such as droughts; given its narrow population target, it is also likely that the programme is leaving out many equally vulnerable households. Overall the probability of the PSSB programme containing households affected by the drought increases the higher the proportion of a district's population affected by the drought (or any other shock) and in need of support. Conversely, it is also reasonable to assume that the probability of overlap between those affected by the drought and the recipients of social assistance programmes diminishes, in relation to the smaller the proportion of population of an area affected by the droughts. This is especially important to note as the areas where the population in need of support are smallest are also areas where the population covered by the social assistance programmes are larger, thus creating the false assumption that the social assistance programmes are an appropriate delivery channel of support. In reality, they may not be a suitable channel for identifying those affected by the drought.

Table 11 presents the coverage of the PSSB and population affected by the drought in the 20 most drought affected districts²³. What is evident from this table is that the proportion of population in need of support is significantly larger than the population covered through the PSSB. There are a few districts where the size of the population affected and PSSB coverage districts (e.g. Massangena, Massingir and Chigubo in Gaza) suggest vertical expansion of PSSB to be a sensible consideration that could potentially cover a proportion (but not all) of the case load of those affected. However, this possibility diminishes as the proportion of population in need of support decreases. In fact, at the other end of the scale the population of the 20 districts with the lowest number of individuals affected stands at less than 5% of the population (Table 12). For these districts, the likelihood that the PSSB beneficiaries comes from the 5% of the population is small.

In summary, from the perspective of coverage only, in some of the most affected districts, a vertically expanded PSSB could, in principle, support part of an emergency response to shocks and cover some of the caseload of humanitarian need. The other social assistance programmes on the other hand (i.e. the in-kind support to destitute PASD, and the public works programme PASP) are so small that they are not covering a meaningful proportion of the affected population to render vertical expansion impactful.

Increasing the benefit values of existing social assistance programmes places little or limited additional administrative burden on INAS, and would require little change to the existing operational structures of the programmes. The provision of top-up support to beneficiaries of any of these programmes in the event of an emergency, however, is characterised by the need for two critical features: first, timeliness of response—especially for a rapid-onset shock—and, second, the availability of finances.

²² The methodology used to capture the number of individuals in need of support is based on household survey data that is representative at the provincial level, with district estimates extrapolated using population data. As such, it is not possible to match this data with information on the beneficiaries of the PSSB and other social assistance programmes. Moreover, little information is available on the actual socio-economic characteristics of social assistance recipient households. Therefore, in the first instance there is an assumption that programme recipients are in fact households meeting the targeting criteria of the various programmes—that is likely not the case.

²³ These districts combined contain 58% of total population in need of support.

Table 11 Population affected by drought and social protection coverage (20 most affected districts)

Province	District	Population	Drought affected as % of total population	% of population covered by PSSB	Difference (% points)
Gaza	Massangena	18,222	83%	39%	44%
Gaza	Massingir	35,224	79%	15%	64%
Gaza	Chigubo	29,383	79%	24%	55%
Inhambane	Mabote	52,038	47%	18%	29%
Inhambane	Govuro	41,635	45%	16%	28%
Sofala	Muanza	36,849	43%	10%	33%
Gaza	Mabalane	38,707	43%	17%	26%
Sofala	Chemba	78,478	42%	6%	36%
Sofala	Machanga	62,827	42%	12%	30%
Inhambane	Funhalouro	47,637	39%	15%	24%
Sofala	Buzi	190,975	39%	5%	34%
Gaza	Guija	93,890	38%	15%	23%
Sofala	Caia	147,228	34%	10%	25%
Tete	Magoé	99,210	32%	13%	19%
Tete	Changara	199,975	32%	0%	32%
Inhambane	Vilankulo	164,264	31%	10%	22%
Tete	Mutarara	276,043	30%	9%	21%
Gaza	Chicualacuala	44,847	30%	34%	-4%
Tete	Chiuta	97,782	27%	7%	20%
Zambezia	Mopeia	156,873	21%	9%	12%

Source: INAS, INE and SETSAN (2016)

Table 12 Population affected by drought and social protection coverage (20 least affected districts)

Province	District	Population	Drought affected as % of total population	% of population covered by PSSB	Difference (% points)
Tete	Zumbo	79,014	5%	5%	0%
Tete	Tsangamo	225,927	5%	8%	-3%
Manica	Sussundenga	165,616	5%	10%	-5%
Inhambane	Jangamo	110,152	5%	8%	-3%
Tete	Angonia	380,134	5%	9%	-4%
Inhambane	Inharrime	126,260	5%	7%	-2%
Inhambane	Zavala	159,710	5%	5%	-1%
Inhambane	Massinga	203,666	4%	7%	-3%
Inhambane	Homoine	127,727	4%	8%	-4%
Zambezia	Lugela	153,884	3%	5%	-2%
Sofala	Chibabava	132,060	3%	5%	-2%
Manica	Tambara	54,416	3%	28%	-25%
Zambezia	Mocuba	385,902	3%	11%	-9%
M. Província	Cidade da Matola	927,123	2%	1%	1%
Zambezia	Ile	331,706	2%	3%	-1%
Zambezia	Maganja da Costa	314,454	1%	1%	0%
Gaza	Manjacaze	181,999	1%	13%	-12%
Inhambane	Morrumbene	147,728	1%	8%	-7%
Zambezia	Milange	641,348	0.2%	1%	-1%
Manica	Barue	224,884	0.1%	14%	-14%

Source: INAS, INE and SETSAN (2016)

Making timely payments to social assistance recipients has been a regular challenge for INAS. As noted in chapter 4, the current manual process for paying beneficiaries places a significant administrative burden on the delegations' staff, who are not always able to issue payments on time during non-emergency conditions. While the increase in the value of transfers could be addressed through increasing the denomination of transfers made, the payment itself will rely on INAS's administrative infrastructure and schedule, that currently takes place on a bi-monthly basis. Timeliness will also be contingent on availability of finances. One source of financing that could, in principle, be released rapidly is the **availability of contingency funds**. Under current contingency financing, INAS receives no budget for programmatic response to shocks (both value of benefits to affected population and administrative costs) which would be needed in the event of vertical expansion. Government contingency budget for potential shocks are linked to its annual contingency planning led by INGC. As noted in section 3.2, the government normally budgets \$3.5-\$4 million to cover a proportion of immediate emergency response and recovery, with funds mostly channelled through INGC. In principle, the contingency budget includes funding requirements by sector / ministry as part of their role and responsibilities in the emergency response. In 2015/16, MGCAS was notionally allocated \$350,000 under the worst-case scenario (maximum amount); this

is equivalent to 15,000 households receiving an additional payment of 1,350 MT (\$18.7)²⁴. Alternative sources of financing for vertical expansion include links to insurance mechanisms (e.g. Africa Risk Capacity) or channelling of humanitarian aid through government systems. While the former is currently being explored, and may be feasible in future, at present there is no appetite by the development partners for channelling resources through the government systems. Given the above, under the current administrative structure the introduction of an 'extraordinary' payment goes beyond the existing operational and financial capability of the government and INAS in particular.

Vertical expansion could also be achieved by extending the duration of existing interventions. As noted earlier, the government has brought forward the implementation of the PASP in the province of Gaza by three months as response to the current drought. However, the duration of the programme remains the same, implying little support to food insecure households during the lean seasons. Where PASP is in place, and where it coincides with areas most affected by slow-onset shocks such as drought, the programme could in principle be used in response to shocks to support households to cope with immediate consumption needs. Currently PASP covers 12,499 beneficiary households across 14 districts and in Maputo City, thus limiting its existing role in responding to shocks, although more resources will be directed towards this programme in future and with the support of the World Bank.

In conclusion, from a technical and operational perspective, the feasibility of vertical expansion of social protection programmes in Mozambique during emergencies and in the immediate future, beyond PSSB, is limited. Even under the PSSB, the coverage is still significantly lower than the population in need of support in many affected areas. Beyond its coverage, political preference for in-kind support and low acceptability of cash in response to emergencies, combined with concerns related to management of beneficiary expectations, casts doubt on the viability of the PSSB as a shock-responsive instrument under the current political climate.

In the immediate future, regardless of whether there is an emergency or not, the programme could consider having a different payment profile in certain months, either in anticipation of impending shocks, or in order to mitigate further delays to delivery of payments. For example, given the delays in the release of budgets during the first quarter of the new financial year, the government may want to consider an adjusted payment during the month of December of the previous financial year, or consider a different payment profile during the lean seasons. Beyond this the programme may wish to formally move to a bi-monthly payment schedule, given that this is what happens in practice and whilst payment systems are manual.

Factors necessary to make vertical expansion of social assistance programmes a viable option in the future include the need for change in the current political views on the appropriateness of cash and social protection programmes during emergency response. It also requires the programmes to expand further, and to improve their operations (e.g. payments). Finally, for a vertical expansion to be feasible, availability of immediate sources of finance is imperative. This may be achieved through improvements in the existing contingency mechanisms for release of funds and the level of financing available, or through alternative financing mechanisms such as regional insurance mechanisms.

²⁴ The value of humanitarian in-kind support is around 2000 MT. The 1350MT provides the difference between what beneficiaries under the PSSB currently receive (maximum of 650 MT) and the value of humanitarian transfers.

5.2 Horizontal expansion

Horizontal expansion of social protection programmes entails adding new beneficiaries to an existing programme. This can be done by extending the geographical coverage of an existing programme, enrolling more people in the same geographical areas, or by changing the criteria or rules by which eligibility is determined.

The existing organisational capacity and programme operations suggest significant barriers to rapid expansion of existing programmes in response to emergencies, especially those that are rapid in onset. The small number of staff within the INAS delegation have limited resources and operational budgets but increasing responsibilities: they handle targeting, enrolment and payment of beneficiaries. Delegations are unable to pay beneficiaries monthly as intended, and already spend considerable time delivering programme benefits to an increasing number of people, thus reducing time available to target new beneficiaries for the programme. Fieldwork in the province of Gaza found enrolment of a small number of beneficiaries to take more than three months to complete. Interviews with stakeholders in Maputo and Gaza suggests that INAS is unable to rapidly expand and cover significantly more beneficiaries without further increase in resources to administer its programmes. Moreover, there is an emerging consensus amongst social protection stakeholders for the need for strengthening and improving existing systems, particularly in relation to targeting of beneficiaries, MIS and payments systems.

Given this, existing programmes are unable to scale up their coverage rapidly and at significant scale in response to emergencies. However, as the programme continues its expansion in line with the objectives of ENSSB II, it could consider prioritising geographical areas and populations most vulnerable to particular shocks.

Beyond the factors mentioned above, for a horizontal expansion to be feasible in future there is a need for alternative administrative processes, and criteria to be used by the existing programme that enable a rapid scale-up or modifications to the current registration processes. Such modifications should follow similar models to those developed in Ethiopia and Kenya, where additional households are registered and only provided with benefit during emergencies, and triggered through well-developed early warning systems. This will require an MIS system that is accurate, comprehensive and up-to-date.

5.3 Piggybacking

One mechanism for using social protection systems as a response to shocks is to piggyback on the administrative framework of existing social protection interventions but operate the programmes separately. This may include using the same targeting, enrolment or payment processes.

To some extent humanitarian emergency responses do piggyback on the administrative framework of INAS. During the emergencies, government agencies or NGOs often rely on or consult the *'permanentes'* in identifying the most vulnerable or affected populations within communities. In addition to the *'permanentes'*, the programmes also consult community leaders. However, even when using the established structures, the programmes do not necessarily use the same criteria as those used for other INAS programmes, and in fact there is no clear guideline as to whether to prioritise or even include existing INAS beneficiaries or not. Additionally, some interventions implemented through NGOs rely on their own procedures for identifying beneficiaries, although some form of community engagement in beneficiary selection is the norm. INAS staff at the delegations or their representatives in SDSMAS normally do not lead the processes for beneficiary

selection, rather they are consulted. Moreover, the programmes will normally rely on their own structures for delivery of support that is often in kind.

The MIS and payments systems of INAS are currently not capable of rapidly responding to emergency situations, given staffing and resource constraints, as well as their operational modality. At present, there are no unified MIS systems across all INAS programmes to enable a unified beneficiary list being produced or shared. While the PSSB uses a computer based MIS system that captures the information of households enrolled in the programme, it does not similarly capture information of eligible beneficiary households currently not reached by the programme. The information for these households is only maintained in paper format and thus not easy to retrieve, amend or utilise during emergencies. In relation to payments, as noted earlier, the current manual delivery of payments places a significant burden on the delegations' staff availability and other resources, and has not been delivered as regularly as planned by the established regulations.

In conclusion, at present the organisational capability, as well as the operational modality of the INAS programmes, are not such that they favour piggybacking by humanitarian actors beyond the current links with community structures and INAS community representatives. While piggybacking is not feasible, this does not mean that humanitarian actors and social protection should not work more closely with one another. In fact, there is a need for an agreement and communication on how the current recipients of social assistance should be dealt with and to ensure that they are not unjustly excluded, especially given the small amount of benefits they receive.

In future, for the social assistance programmes and supporting administrative systems to be a viable option for piggybacking, there is a need for an MIS that is comprehensive and accurate. Moreover, the system must have adequate protocols in place to enable the sharing of recipient information with aid agencies whilst maintaining the integrity of the data and confidentiality of the recipients. In relation to payment, alternative models need to be considered (e.g. electronic or mobile based) to make piggybacking on the payment systems a viable option.

5.4 Shadow alignment

Shadow alignment refers to developing parallel humanitarian systems that align as best as possible with a current or possible future social protection programme.

As noted in section 3, Mozambique has an elaborate and well-functioning government-led emergency system, with clear roles and responsibilities for ministries, UN agencies and NGOs. Overall the existing system is appropriate, although there is a need for improvement in relation to responses to drought. Shadow alignment is not necessarily appropriate for rapid onset shocks that are geographically concentrated and managed well and where the justification for use of social protection programmes is less appropriate, given the indiscriminate nature of flooding²⁵. Moreover, Mozambique has not really experienced slow onset shocks such as drought regularly enough or at significant scale similar to the current drought, to warrant the establishment of a parallel humanitarian system.

However, there is chronic food insecurity in the arid and semi-arid areas of the country, and the intention of the government (through ENSSB II) is to scale up the PASP as a seasonal public works programme in food insecure areas. The aim is to smooth the consumption of households during the lean season, and in doing so, produce community assets that will build the resilience of communities to future shocks. It therefore aims to prevent vulnerability and exposure to future

²⁵ While shadow alignment is not necessary, better coordination of response is still important so as not to exclude the current recipients of social protection programmes.

shocks and limit their likely impact. It has a number of design and implementation features which may limit the government's commitment to rapidly scaling it up in an environment of limited administrative capacity and financial resource. Given this, the government could potentially involve other partners to implement programmes with similar design features in prioritised areas.

If the PASP is intended as an emergency response programme, it will require significant redesign to be capable of rapidly identifying and enrolling households in need of support and quickly implementing the projects. Currently a rapid rollout would not be feasible, because the PASP relies on a comprehensive proxy means and community-based targeting process, as well as an elaborate process for designing and selecting infrastructure projects. The current design of the PASP also envisages the enrolment of beneficiaries for a period of three years. This means that either the programme would continue to target the same households annually for three years (irrespective of how other households may have been impacted by drought), or that mechanisms would need to be in place to expand and contract coverage during periods of shock to accommodate new or additional shock-affected households, for example by registering more people than are normally enrolled.

5.5 Refocusing

Refocusing is about reprioritisation of areas of focus by the government.

In the event of any shocks, the government may introduce new policies or social protection instruments to support those most affected, as was the case with introduction of food, fuel and transportation subsidies in 2010. The new strategy identifies the PASD as a potential instrument for shock-responsive social protection, although it is not clear whether this is purely through re-focusing its intentions, or through horizontal expansion. Nevertheless, for it to provide this function it will require the narrowing of its focus, the simplification of its eligibility criteria, and uniformity in the type and value of support it provides. In its current form as well as scale, the PASD is not able to provide significant support in response to shocks, especially as the target number of households to be reached by the PASD under ENSSB II is to remain more or less constant and marginally reduce to 45,000 in 2024. Within this context, the PASD can only provide ad-hoc support (as it does now) to households facing idiosyncratic shocks, rather than covariate shocks affecting a very large proportion of households. Moreover, while the PASD is a separate programme with its own specific objectives, it is implemented through INAS and managed by the same individuals who have responsibilities for delivering the PSSB and the PSSAS, thus any additional requirements under the PASD will affect the likely delivery under other programmes. Therefore, for the PASD to be a viable shock-responsive option in the future it will need to refocus its intentions, simplify its design and operations, scale up its reach rather than reduce as is currently reflected in the ENSSB II.

This year, the government has refocused the timing of the PASP to respond to the existing drought—a novel way of responding to current emergency response. However, given the objectives of the programme and its design features, the conclusion of this research is that it should first aim to fulfil its 'prevention' function well, and support households in building resilience to future shocks in specific climate vulnerable areas (e.g. areas prone to drought and facing chronic food insecurity), rather than aiming for it to be used as an emergency response or recovery instrument. In future, when the primary objectives of the social assistance programmes have been met and where other conditions are in place, social assistance programmes could be considered as potential delivery channels for reaching populations in need of emergency support, although this may only ease the humanitarian case load rather than fully replace it.

Some shocks, e.g. economic downturn, may also have implications on governments' own budgets with the need for budgetary cuts and adjustments. Under such circumstances the government may also want to adjust its existing social protection system to refocus assistance to groups most vulnerable. There is no indication that there are budgetary pressures to reduce the current scope of social assistance programmes in Mozambique. However, recent economic developments—with the emergence of previously undisclosed but substantial stock of debt, and suspension of direct financial support by the development partners—may limit the existing plans for expansion of the social protection system following the approval of the ENSSB II.

6 Opportunities and barriers for better coordination of response

Key points

There are strong preparedness measures in place in Mozambique, including risk and vulnerability assessments that the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) / the National Institute of Social Action (INAS) can, in principle, draw upon and use as part of criteria for targeting geographical areas or for targeting households as social protection programme coverage scales up.

- J If the government intends to use the Direct Social Support Programme (PASD) and the Productive Social Action (PASP) as shock-responsive instruments, these programmes and their roles should be incorporated into the annual disaster contingency planning process.
- J Post-disaster, for longer term recovery interventions the government can, in principle, draw on a set of criteria that is used as part of needs assessments or other damage and loss assessments, to direct its social protection programme coverage and future expansion.

This section explores the potential ways in which social protection systems in Mozambique can, in so far as they are relevant, be better linked to the management of climate-related disaster risks and other shocks (e.g. economic). We explore whether there are additional ways in which the current social protection system as is understood in Mozambique can link with DRM, and thus focus on climate-related disasters. These are explored across the five phases: prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (see section 1.3 above).

6.1 Prevention and mitigation

The main function of social protection in its regular form is to contribute to resolving the underlying situations of poverty and vulnerability among households and communities, by meeting their immediate needs, to build their asset base and potential resilience to future shocks. The main social assistance programmes under the basic social security largely support households and individuals with no labour capacity (with the exception of the PASP), and mainly serve to partially meet their immediate needs. These instruments can play an important role in mitigating the impact of future shocks, however they do require higher transfer values to enable households to meet their minimum consumption requirements, before they can serve in building their asset base, improve their livelihoods and build their resilience to future shocks. Therefore, in theory these instruments could contribute to household-level mitigation, but at present this cannot be expected of them.

The PASP in particular is seen as a vehicle to provide households and communities with coping capacity in response to current and future shocks through household level income and community assets. McCord et al (2016) highlight some of the challenges under the current design of the PASP that may affect the potential impact of the PASP in mitigating the impact of shocks (Box 3).

Box 3 Assessing the potential impact of the Productive Social Action Programme (PASP) on climate change resilience

According to McCord et al. (2016) the theory behind using public works programmes (PWPs) such as the PASP in relation to climate change resilience is that they may affect resilience through wages or income provided, creation of assets and through skills training. The wages can potentially increase the coping and adaptive capacities of beneficiaries by improving access to food or prevention of negative coping mechanisms. Developed community structures could reduce the adverse impacts of climate shocks, or even enable positive adaptation in livelihoods, and finally through working or on the job training, beneficiaries may acquire new skills that may potentially enhance resilience by enabling new livelihood opportunities.

Assessing the existing PASP, the study suggests that it is not likely to have an impact on resilience either through wages or assets created, and thus have limited impact on resilience and climate change adaptation without significant improvements. The study notes that the current wages will only provide partial support to households' coping capacities, but are inadequate for investment in inputs and labour diversification and thus unlikely to improve their adaptive capacities. The quality of assets created is also reported to be poor and not durable, with inadequate processes for selection, design and monitoring of infrastructure produced. Further, the study indicated that there is a limited supply of capital inputs, materials and equipment, and selected infrastructure do not correspond to the priorities of local authorities, thus undermining ownership.

A number of suggestions are made in order to improve the programme, including: wider focus development of key INAS processes and systems prerequisite for effective implementation such as payments, MIS, M&E, targeting and grievances; review of institutional responsibilities and protocols for asset selection, and shifting the mandate for selection of assets to district services, and alignment with district plans and priorities, including local adaptation plans where they are used, and; phased scheduling for introduction of additional programme components once basic programme performance is assured.

McCord et al (2016).

6.2 Preparedness

There are strong preparedness measures in place in Mozambique including early warning, risk and vulnerability assessments, contingency planning and pre-positioning of supplies especially for rapid onset shocks. MGCAS / INAS, can in principle, draw on some of these measures, particularly data on risk and vulnerability assessments, and use these as part of criteria for targeting geographical areas it aims to support. This is particularly relevant for programmes such as the PASP, which aim to address seasonal food insecurity in drought prone areas. The areas affected by food insecurity in arid and semi-arid areas informed previous food for asset targeting by WFP in 2013.

The targeting of households under social protection may also benefit from indicators that may be predictors of future vulnerability to shocks (e.g. livelihoods, asset base, etc.), although these will not be perfect and will be prone to design and implementation errors similar to proximate measures of poverty that programmes normally draw on.

The current evolution of drought response also suggests the need for better utilisation of information generated through SETSAN on the situation of food security in the contingency planning process (that is currently heavily geared towards rapid onset shocks). If the PASD and the PASP are truly considered as part of emergency response programmes, then they should also be reflected in future contingency planning. Moreover, officials at MGCAS and INAS should utilise information generated through SETSAN on food security into their planning and support they provide.

6.3 Response and recovery

Section 5 explored the potential options for use of social protection systems as part of response to emergencies. In terms of longer term recovery interventions post disaster, the government can draw on a set of criteria that is used in the needs assessments or other damage and loss assessments for determining its targeting in future expansion. While in theory public works programmes can be used for reconstruction activities such as rebuilding infrastructure, this requires technical expertise, machinery, skills and resources that are generally not present in labour intensive PWPs and certainly not evident in the current PASP, which faces challenges for appropriate selection of assets, design, adequate technical inputs and appropriate technical inputs (McCord et al., 2016).

What is clear from previous chapters is the need for continued coordination that the current set up enables, especially around identifying and reaching the affected population groups, some of whom are recipients of social protection programmes.

7 Conclusions and recommendations

7.1 Conclusions

The overall aim of this study was to examine two related but distinct themes: first, social protection and its potential role in shock response; and, second, the intersections and opportunities for closer coordination among humanitarian response, DRM and social protection. In particular, the research aimed to answer the following questions:

- J How does the Government of Mozambique respond to shocks, including those that are climate-related (floods, drought, cyclones) or economic (e.g. inflation)? How is this done and by whom? Are there any gaps in the current response?
- J What features in the design and implementation of social protection systems facilitate an effective response to shocks? How does this relate to social protection as defined in Mozambique? What are the constraints to the social protection system being more responsive to shocks?
- J How can humanitarian, DRM and social protection systems best work together for effective responses to shocks?

The research found that in recent years much focus has been placed on preparedness and response to floods and cyclones. The response to flooding since 2007 appears to have been effective in terms of preparedness; leadership from the INGC; good coordination between the government and international agencies, quick turn-around of international funding for UN agencies, and the manageable scale of flooding and cyclone disasters. However, more evidence on flood and cyclone responses is needed to determine the best ways to improve them, and the major drought in 2015/16 has raised serious questions on the suitability of the current DRM system in responding to slow-onset and larger scale shocks. As the response is still unfolding it is difficult to draw a conclusion on the adequacy of the current assessments, decision-making and financing for drought, but there seem to be important weaknesses that need to be addressed. The current DRM approach relies on international aid agencies to fill the gap between what is necessary and what the government can do through its contingency budget. In the case of the drought, this entails looking to aid agencies to quickly expand their operations and provide assistance to households made food insecure. Reliance on international humanitarian architecture for timely response to drought is tricky, because humanitarian agencies and funding mainly shift into high gear when situations become very detrimental to people's well-being, rather than at earlier signals of worsening food insecurity.

Given climate trends, this drought may be the signal of things to come rather than an aberration, and a more strategic approach to financing DRM actions will be required. A strategic approach is unlikely to focus only on adjusting the disaster contingency plan and its financing, which is focused on immediate short-term responses and the prepositioning of in-kind assistance. Adjusting the contingency planning process to cover actions related to drought would require a ten-fold increase in financing. Focusing on the existing contingency planning process might neglect a longer-term, more food security-focused approach. Alternatively, new financing sources and approaches could be used. The World Bank in 2016 is reviewing options for disaster risk financing which may serve as a basis for recommending a financing mechanism.

In acknowledgement of the recurring nature of climatic shocks, the social protection strategy intends on taking a larger role in responding to them. Under the recently approved national strategy ENSSB II, two programmes in particular have been earmarked as potential instruments: the PASP and the PASD. Once fully operational, the newly redesigned PASP has been portrayed

as a seasonal public works programme aimed at supporting households to meet their immediate needs in arid and semi-arid areas during the lean calendar. Together with the community assets built, the programme aims to build resilience of households and communities to future shocks. In the meantime the government has brought forward the timing of the PASP as a response to the current drought in Gaza province.

These policy intentions and initial interventions raise questions as to the suitability of the current social protection system in responding to shocks, and on the appropriate mechanism for doing so. The review of the social protection system has highlighted a number of well-known constraints related to systems and operations, in particular: limited staffing and presence at district and community levels; limited material resources including vehicles and fuel to support routine functions; inefficient and time consuming payment mechanisms; limited MIS and ultimately low programme coverage. These features limit the role of social protection in being able to respond rapidly to shocks without compromising the regular operations of other programmes, neither do they provide opportunities for other programmes to draw on the current social protection administrative systems in delivering their responses.

However, not being able to respond to shocks does not mean that social protection cannot be 'shock-responsive'. In the immediate term, changes to operations of the programmes—in particular, changing the current PSSB payment schedule (e.g. making double payments in December) and payments—and ensuring INAS beneficiaries are not excluded for other relief interventions are two first steps. Future expansion of social protection could also take into account climate vulnerabilities in conjunction with other criteria used, when targeting geographical areas and expanding the number of beneficiaries supported.

Once the social protection programmes have met their primary objectives with sufficient coverage, and improved administrative processes (e.g. payments, targeting, MIS, etc.) and capacity, they may be more suitable and viable for reaching some (but unlikely all) of the affected households. This will require a change in the political environment, and acceptance of cash-based responses as well as a more favourable view of social protection as response delivery mechanism.

Ultimately the question is how social protection could contribute to a multi-sectoral DRM process, rather than taking centre stage. In Mozambique, the contribution of social protection to the DRM process is in the first instance better served by improving the operations and reach of its existing programme and enhancing their 'protective' functions, rather than taking on increasing roles in response and recovery that are beyond its current administrative capacity. While doing so the programmes can still, as noted above, improve their operations in the short term to improve the overall humanitarian and DRM response.

7.2 Recommendations

Our recommendations fall into four categories: prioritising the strengthening of the social protection system; shock-responsive social protection; coordination of social protection, DRM and humanitarian response; and DRM and humanitarian response.

7.2.1 Social protection system strengthening

Recommendation 1 — Prioritise the strengthening of the current social protection system.

Given the current administrative structure and limited capacity of INAS, and weaknesses in the design and implementation features of existing programmes, priority should be placed on strengthening the current system with particular attention to organisational capacity and

identification of ways to improve presence at the district level through increases or changes to staffing structures, rather than taking on increasing roles and functions. Given the current freeze on civil service recruitment, this solution will have to relate to organisational restructuring and reducing administrative burden, improving systems and formalisation of a new working relationship between INAS delegations and the district government, and in particular the SDSMAS.

Recommendation 2 — Continue the existing initiatives to improve operations of current programmes including the identification of beneficiaries, MIS, payments and monitoring activities.

The government is already undertaking many initiatives to improve its systems, including its MIS and targeting processes. Any proposed targeting process should take into consideration the existing capacity, selecting mechanisms that are simple to administer and which are most *cost effective* rather than just more effective. The government is also aware of the challenges with the current payments processes that take much of their time and resources. The government is right to think that outsourcing of payments may not necessarily improve delivery or be necessarily cheaper. Any solution is likely to entail multiple service providers, which will require strong a procurement system and management oversight.

Recommendation 3 — Given the current economic environment and realism around existing implementation capacity, prioritise the actions and activities within the recently approved ENSSB II which are most important, and implement these in stages.

Achievements under ENSSB I suggest the existing targets to be overambitious. Under ENSSB I, the strategy aimed to introduce a child grant and the PASP, and to reach over 500,000 and 900,000 households respectively. The child grant was not introduced, and the coverage of PASP was just over 12,000 households in 2015. This suggests the need for setting more credible and realistic targets under the regulations to be developed soon, and prioritisation of actions accordingly.

7.2.2 A more shock-responsive social protection

Recommendation 4 — Consider different payment schedule that would support existing beneficiaries of social assistance programmes to better cope with impending shocks.

While INAS does not currently have the capacity to rapidly respond to emergency situations, it can consider changes to some of its normal operations to better support its beneficiaries in times of crises. Given the regular delays in budgetary release, especially during the first quarter of the financial year (and as this coincides with the period of heightened exposure to climatic shocks), programmes such as the PSSB may want to consider a different payment plan that provides different values at different times of the year, such as a double payment in the month of December. Viewed over more than one year, this option would be fiscally cost neutral if the aggregate amount paid across the year remains the same.

Recommendation 5 — Consider the PSSB rather than the PASP or PASD as a more suitable ‘shock-responsive’ instrument.

As the government wants social protection programmes to play a role in responding to emergencies, it should also consider the PSSB. The PSSB is the programme with the largest coverage in terms of areas reached and beneficiaries covered. Given the current capacity of INAS, the PSSB is the programme which could in principle cover, with the least additional administrative burden, some or a large part of the caseload of households affected by drought, at least in some areas. This could be done by a one-off or temporary increase (vertical expansion) to the amount

paid to beneficiaries that is equivalent to the immediate needs of the affected households. This is likely to be cheaper, quicker and with greater reach than either the PASD or PASP can currently manage, given their complexity and operative challenges.

Recommendation 6 — Determine the specific roles of the PASP across the DRM cycle, and design programme accordingly.

It is important to clarify whether the PASP is conceived as a social protection instrument that aims to build household and community resilience to future shocks, or as a rapid shock-responsive instrument used as part of emergency response, or both. If the PASP is conceived as a climate-sensitive social protection instrument with the aim of building resilience to future shocks, it needs to increase the level of benefits it provides, expand its coverage and improve the process for asset selection and monitoring of quality (among other design and operational considerations and options) (see McCord et al. 2016). A *post-hoc* ‘shock-responsive’ PASP, on the other hand, will require very simple design features that can be rapidly scaled up to identify new beneficiaries and deliver support to affected populations. If the government intends to use the PASP to respond to climatic and economic related shocks, it should look primarily to its international partners who have greater capacity to rapidly increase food and cash based interventions, such as food for assets or cash for assets. In the context of slow-onset crisis response, extending the duration of the PASP, where it is in operation, could serve as a suitable shock response mechanism too, provided additional financing could be mobilised and channelled through the system.

Recommendation 7 — Align Food For Asset or Cash For Asset interventions implemented by aid agencies around some common features of the PASP.

As noted in the previous recommendation, the current design features of the PASP, including the inability to quickly add new beneficiaries, do not allow it to rapidly respond to immediate shocks, and parallel programmes with simplified features (such as food for assets or cash for assets) implemented by NGOs may be more suited in the short term. Nevertheless, it is still reasonable to establish a set of common guidelines that the implementers of these programmes can adhere to (e.g. types of assets selected, process of asset selection, level of benefit, etc.) and which may enable future takeover of these programmes by government, as was the case with the piloted cash for work programme by WFP that paved the way for the PASP.

The timing and duration of relief responses using food for assets and cash for assets may need to be different to the PASP, as otherwise their function in providing adequate household relief could be compromised. Households may have increased needs related to the shock, requiring more income compared with the duration of the programme as it is normally implemented. To implement cash or food for assets programmes in response to shocks, aid agencies should use their own targeting processes and not INAS’s, which take substantially longer. They should, however, use targeting criteria that correspond to INAS criteria, and also consider the impact of the specific shock.

Recommendation 8 — Review the possible role that the PASD can provide in emergency response and redesign accordingly.

The PASD is a very small programme, covering just over 50,000 households across the entire country and with an average of 428 households in each district. This scale is significantly below the number of households that are normally in need of emergency response, particularly the drought. If the target coverage of the programme remains at the same level as is proposed under the ENSSB II (i.e. 45,000 households by 2024), the programme could only provide support to a very limited number of affected households in the event of covariate shocks. Even with a sufficient scale, the programme would need to simplify its multiple eligibility criteria and means of verification, as well

as provide a more unified package than it currently does. It is also important to note that the same individual in INAS responsible for the PASD is also responsible for the PSSB and PSSAS, thus human resources are limited, which may interfere with the timeliness of programme delivery.

7.2.3 Coordination of social protection, disaster risk management and humanitarian response

Recommendation 9 — Ensure that the existing beneficiaries of social assistance programme are not excluded from emergency response programmes if they are affected by the shock.

Currently there is no clear directive as to whether beneficiaries of INAS should or should not be included in any emergency responses, and there are examples of INGC considering them as already ‘covered’ because of their inclusion in social protection programmes. Given the low value of the cash benefits provided under current programmes generally (e.g. 650 MT or \$9 maximum under PSSB), and in comparison to support provided under humanitarian response (e.g. equivalent to 2000 MT or about \$35 per month for a food ration / voucher), it is important to ensure that these beneficiaries are included under relief programmes if they are affected by the shock. This will require having clear guidelines and communicating clear messages to community leaders, *permanentes*, aid agencies and local disaster risk management committees to ensure the consideration of INAS beneficiaries in targeting. If INGC and aid agencies are not in favour of this proposal, MGCAS and INAS could consider providing beneficiaries with a partial package of support equivalent to the difference between their current level of support and the value of benefit provided by the emergency response. Given the administrative complexity of expanding these benefits, it would be more straightforward to advocate for the inclusion of INAS beneficiaries with INGC and the CTGC.

Recommendation 10 — Once the MIS is established, systematically draw on this list to ensure the most vulnerable populations are considered in the targeting of emergency response programmes.

Related to the above recommendation, INAS needs to systematically utilise its MIS and lists of beneficiaries, and advocate that agencies implementing humanitarian response consider whether those households are affected by the shock. INAS should also keep an electronic record of eligible beneficiary households currently unable to enrol (such as the current waiting list for the PSSB and PASP), and also utilise these to inform targeting of emergency response.

Recommendation 11 — Consider incorporation of risk, vulnerability and post-disaster assessments carried out under DRM activities in programme targeting under social protection.

In principle, social protection could incorporate the analysis of risks, vulnerability and post-disaster assessments in its geographical targeting and support with its prioritisation of areas to be expanded (e.g. prioritising chronically food insecure areas as is meant to be done for the PASP).

7.2.4 Disaster risk management and humanitarian response

Recommendation 12 — Review the adequacy and frequency of data collection used to inform decision-making on actions to address drought.

Data used for response for drought were based on the bi-annual assessments carried out by SETSAN in November and March of every year, and the data collection cycle was adjusted in mid-

2016 to incorporate more frequent data collection and improve the quality of data, particularly on nutrition. Given the longer delay in responding to the drought, review whether existing information is reliable, timely and adequate or whether there is a need for additional, better and more frequent data.

Recommendation 13 — Revise contingency planning process to incorporate triggers for drought response.

The contingency plan and early warning systems focus on flooding and cyclones. Explore the possibility of establishing specific triggers (e.g. data on rainfall, agricultural production, food insecurity) for drought, in order to facilitate planning and decision-making for relief efforts and support to food security and livelihoods in the event of future drought.

Recommendation 14 — Review the financing options for DRM and humanitarian response given the current reliance on donor financing.

A large part of financing for emergency response is provided through the international community. Given the current unfavourable international experience with financing slow onset shocks through the humanitarian architecture, consider alternative risk financing mechanisms such as Africa Risk Capacity to finance to respond to shocks.

Recommendation 15 — Improve monitoring and evaluation of relief responses.

Improving response to drought, flooding and cyclones and weighing alternative approaches should be underpinned by better evidence on the appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of relief responses. This evidence can be built through monitoring the cost and coverage of responses and household-level outcomes, as well as through independent evaluations of larger humanitarian responses.

Annex A References

- ACAPS (2016), 'Displacement to Malawi. ACAPS briefing note 10 March 2016', ACAPS and Start Network.
- Alfani, F., Azzarri, C., d'Errico, M., Molini, V. (2012), 'Poverty in Mozambique - new evidence from recent household surveys', World Bank.
- Arndt, C., Hussain, MA., Salvucci, V. and Østerdal, LP (2016), 'Effects of food price shocks on child malnutrition: the Mozambican experience 2008/2009.' *Economics and Human Biology* 22: 1-13.
- Brito, L. (2010), 'O Sistema Eleitoral Uma Dimensão Crítica Da Representação Política Em Moçambique.' *Instituto de Estudos Sociais E Economicos (IESE)*.
- Brito, L., Chaimite, E., Pereira, C., Posse, L., Sambo, M. and Shankland, A. (2014), 'Hunger revolts and citizen strikes: popular protests in Mozambique, 2008-2012.' *Brighton/Maputo: Institute of Development Studies/Instituto de Estudos Sociais E Economicos Food Riots* (October).
- CCGC [Conselho Coordenador de Gestão de Calamidades] (2014), 'Plano de Contingência para Época Chuvosa e de Ciclones 2015/2016', Ministério da Administração Estatal e Função Pública
- Christie, F. and Hanlon, J. (2001), *Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000. African Issues*, Indiana University Press.
- CLGF (2013), 'The local government system in Mozambique. Key facts,' 127-31.
- Cosgrave., J., Gonçalves, C., Martyris, D., Polastro, R. and Sikumba-Dils, M. (2007), 'Inter-agency real-time evaluation of the response to the February 2007 floods and cyclone in Mozambique'.
- Cunha, N., Pellerano, L., Mueller, J., Lledo, V., Xiao, Y. and Gitton, P. (2013), 'Extension of social security. Towards a Mozambican social protection floor. Consolidating a comprehensive social protection system in Mozambique : analysis of policy alternatives and costs.' 41. ESS Paper.
- Development Initiatives (2016), '[Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016](#)', Development Initiatives.
- DNEAP (2010), 'Pobreza e Bem-Estar em Moçambique: terceira avaliação nacional', DNEAP.
- FEWSNET (2010), 'Mozambique Food Security Outlook April to September 2010', FEWSNET.
- FEWSNET (2014) 'Mozambique Livelihood Zone Descriptions', FEWSNET.
- Foley, C. (2007), 'Mozambique: A case study in the role of the affected state in humanitarian action'. HPG Working Paper, ODI, London.
- Food Security Cluster (2016), 'Food security cluster meeting minutes. 15 September 2016'.
- Forquilha, S. (2014), 'Do Discurso Da 'história de Sucesso' às Dinâmicas Políticas Internas: O Desafio Da Transição Política Em Moçambique.' In *Desafios Para Mocambique*, edited by Luis de Brito; Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco; Sergio Chichava; Salvador Forquilha; Antonio Francisco., 61-82. Maputo: Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos (IESE).
- GFDRR (2009), 'Economic vulnerability and disaster risk assessment in Malawi and Mozambique'.
- GFDRR (2014), 'Recovery from recurrent floods 2000-2013. Mozambique. Recovery framework case study'.
- 'Grand Bargain' (2016), '[The Grand Bargain—a shared commitment to better serve people in need](#)', World Humanitarian Summit.
- HCT (2016), '2016 Strategic Response Plan Mozambique'.
- Hodges, A., Pellerano, L., Guimarães, L., Matos, N. and Selvester, K. (2014), 'Avaliação E Revisão Da Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica. Nota Técnica', OPM.
- IFAD (2016), '[Rural Poverty Portal](#)', International Fund for Agricultural Development.
- IFRC (2015), 'Mozambique: floods operations update', IFRC.
- IFRC (2016), 'Emergency appeal operation update Mozambique: food insecurity', IFRC.
- ILO, WFP and UNICEF (2015) 'The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique'. United Nations in Mozambique.
- IMF (2016), 'Republic of Mozambique Article IV Consultation—Press release; staff report. IMF Country Report no. 16/9', January.

- INE (2010), 'Poverty and Wellbeing In Mozambique: Third National Poverty Assessment', Maputo.
- INE (2011), 'Anuário Estatístico', Maputo.
- INE (2012), 'Anuário Estatístico', Maputo.
- INE (2013), 'Anuário Estatístico', Maputo.
- INE (2014), 'Anuário Estatístico', Maputo.
- INE (2016), 'Pobreza e Bem-Estar em Moçambique: Quarta Avaliação Nacional (IOF 2014/15)', Maputo.
- INGC (2015), Contingency plan for rain and cyclone season 2015/16
- INSS (2014), 'Segurança Social Obrigatória Em Moçambique', Instituto Nacional de Segurança Social.
- Levine, S. with Crosskey, A. and Abdinoor, M. (2011), 'System failure? Revisiting the problem of timely response to crises in the Horn of Africa', Humanitarian Practice Network.
- McCord, A., Beazley, R., Solorzano, A. and Artur, L. (2016), '[ICF social protection and climate change in Mozambique with a focus on the role of the PASP: Feasibility and design consultancy. Final report](#)', OPM, Oxford.
- MGCAS (2010), 'Legal framework for social security in Mozambique', Ministério do Género, Criança e Acção Social, Maputo.
- MPD (2011), 'Plano de Acção Para a Redução Da Pobreza (PARP) 2011-2014', Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento, Maputo.
- Negussie, E. (2014), 'Mozambican parliament passes a new disaster management law'. ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-law/news/africa/mozambican-parliament-passes-a-new-disaster-management-law/
- OCHA (2016), 'Mozambique humanitarian dashboard 31 October 2016'.
- Perezniето, P., Gbedemah, C., Monjane, P., Roesen, G., Jones, N. and Harper, C. (2011), 'Youth vulnerabilities and adaptation. Exploring the impact of macro-level shocks on youth: 3F crisis and climate change in Ghana, Mozambique and Vietnam.' ODI, London.
- República de Moçambique (2007), *Lei de Protecção Social*, Maputo.
- República de Moçambique (2014), 'Boletim Da República. Orçamento Do Estado Para O Ano de 2014', Maputo.
- República de Moçambique (2015), MINISTÉRIO DO GÉNERO, CRIANÇA E ACÇÃO SOCIAL INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ACÇÃO SOCIAL: Relatório Anual 2015, Dezembro.
- República de Moçambique (2016), 'Estratégia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica (2016-2024), Fevereiro'.
- Ribeiro, N. and Chauque, A. (2010), *Gender and climate change: Mozambique case study*, Cape Town.
- Selvester, K., Fidalgo, L. and Taimo, N. (2012), 'Transforming cash transfers: beneficiary and community perspectives on the Basic Social Subsidy Programme in Mozambique,' no. December: 69.
- SETSAN (2016), 'Relatório da Avaliação da Situação de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional'. República de Moçambique, Ministério da Agricultura e Segurança Alimentar, Secretariado Técnico de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional.
- UNDP (2016), '[Human Development Report: Mozambique](#)'.
- UNICEF (2014), 'Situation analysis of children in Mozambique. Costing report. March.'
- UNISDR (2009), UNISDR 'Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction'. United Nations International Strategy on Disaster Reduction.
- UNRCO (2013a), 'Mozambique: Flooding, Office of the Resident Coordinator, Situation Report No. 4'.
- UNRCO (2013b), 'Mozambique Lesson Learned Summary Report'.
- UNRCO (2015), 'Mozambique Lesson Learned Summary Report'.
- UNRCO (2016a), 'Mozambique: Drought, Office of the Resident Coordinator, Situation Report No. 4'.
- UNRCO (2016b), 'Mozambique: Drought, Office of the Resident Coordinator, Situation Report No. 5'.
- USAID (2000), 'Southern Africa Floods Fact Sheet #23 Fiscal Year 2000'.
- USAID (2007), 'Mozambique Floods and Cyclones Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year 2007'.

- Verduijn, R., Starr, L., and Fidalgo, L. (2014), 'Mozambique, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200355, Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Disaster-affected Populations in Mozambique: An evaluation of WFP's Operation (2012-2014)'. World Food Programme Office of Evaluation.
- WHO (2000), 'Management of malnutrition in major emergencies', World Health Organisation.
- Wiles, P., Selvester, K. and Fidalgo, L. (2005), 'Learning lessons from disaster recovery: the case of Mozambique. Disaster Risk Management Working Paper Series No. 12', World Bank.
- World Bank (2016a), '[Climate Change Knowledge Portal. Mozambique Dashboard](#)'.
- World Bank (2016b), '[World Development Indicators](#)'.
- World Food Programme (2016). '[Mozambique Country Information](#)'.

Annex B Detailed methodology

B.1 Approach to the research

The overall research combines both quantitative and qualitative data, gathered through a combination of desk-based research (literature review and interviews), and six country case studies, three in-depth and three light ones (document review, consultations with key informants and stakeholders). In-depth case studies provide detailed information gathered over at least three in-country research periods, accompanied by regular consultations and interactions with key stakeholders in-between the missions. The light case studies analyse information relevant to the main research questions, but during just one in-country research period and focusing on specific aspects particularly interesting to examine (such as an effective DRM system, a successful experience in piggybacking, or multiple regional initiatives aimed to deliver effective shock responses). The research has three main components—normative, diagnostic and explanatory:

1. **Normative:** this component ensured key terminology and concepts were clarified, leading to consistency across the project, e.g. on the objectives of social protection and key enabling factors and constraints as identified by the literature. Some of this was completed during the literature review and inception phase consultations. The aim was to identify what qualifies as a shock-responsive social protection policy and system, their properties and the links to humanitarian interventions.
2. **Diagnostic:** this component mapped out social protection policies and systems and considered their (actual and potential) degree of responsiveness in the context of different shocks. It also provided descriptive analysis of broader processes that influence that effectiveness, such as political considerations, the budget process and the legislative framework.
3. **Explanatory:** this component addressed the question ‘why’? It examined the factors underlying the patterns and results highlighted at the diagnostic stage. Its objective was to provide information on the reasons why policy and systems have evolved and performed as outlined. Factors considered include: policy design and implementation details, administrative / operational capacity, political economy variables and financing sources and arrangements. The analysis was applied to both social protection policies, systems and to the coordination or integration (and/or lack thereof) between social protection and humanitarian shock response.

B.2 Analytical tools

Answering the research questions required the application of a broad set of analytical tools covering different themes and pursuing different objectives. These are:

1. **Mapping and analysis of stakeholders, power relations and governance:** This set of tools analyses the people and organisations who are—or might be—involved in contributing to a shock-responsive social protection system; their mandates, interest and influence, the way they organise themselves and their capacities. It consists of stakeholder analysis, institutional analysis and organisational capacity assessments.
2. **Vulnerability / poverty analysis:** This involved creating a ‘risk and vulnerability profile’ for each country, drawing on secondary quantitative and qualitative data from a range of reputable sources.
3. **Mapping and analysis of policies and systems for social protection, humanitarian assistance and DRM:** This involved reviewing and updating existing mappings, and collecting information relating to the design of relevant policies and systems and the features of policy delivery. Following the mapping exercises, policy analysis was conducted to review explanatory factors.

4. **Budget / financial analysis:** This involved review of the macroeconomic environment and medium term outlook of key economic indicators; review of budgetary processes and rules for allocation of budgets, their use and reallocation within and across sectors or administrative entities; analysis of sources and levels of expenditure allocated to social protection, DRM, humanitarian response, and (if relevant) climate change; and financial analysis of specific social protection, disaster risk reduction (DRR) / DRM, or humanitarian response programmes or interventions.

Our approach paid attention to issues of conflict and fragility, and their impact on the development and implementation of policies and systems that can respond to shocks. This has been linked to the questions explored under analytical tools such as the vulnerability analysis and financial analysis, since conflict and fragility may have a bearing on topics such as the assessment and mitigation of risk and issues surrounding funding cycles.

B.3 Overview of stakeholder consultations

A summary of key informant interviews is presented in Table 13. The team met with some 73 respondents.

Table 13 List of key informants interviewed

Type	No. interviewed	Organisation
INGC, INAS and MGCAS	24	National level (12) Provincial and district level (12)
Other government officials	14	National level (7) Ministry of Finance, MITADRE, SETSAN, MISAU Provincial and district level (7) level
Multilateral development partners	16) World Bank) OCHA) ILO) WFP) UNICEF) European Union) Irish Aid) Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands) Embassy of Sweden
DFID	2	2 in DFID country office
NGO	10) Oxfam) Civil Society Platform for Social Protection) Save the Children) IRC
Policy / research organisations	7) OPM) Independent consultants) ANSA) IESE

Source: OPM.

B.4 Overview of activities

This research was carried out from September 2015 to June 2016, and included desk based review of key documents (e.g. reports and publicly available data, etc.); three country visits to gather evidence and share initial findings; and data coding, analysis and report writing in between

each country visit, with each subsequent country visit serving to fill gaps identified in previous rounds of data analysis and exploration of new questions. Table 14 summarises the main activities carried out under each visit. Overall, the team carried out 73 key informant interviews with representatives from government, development partners, NGOs, civil society and university researchers.

Table 14 Country visits and main activities

Date	Activities
17- 27 November	Presented the aims of the study and framework to stakeholders from government, donors and NGOs during the social protection week and undertook 24 key informant interviews with stakeholders from the donor community, NGOs and the government.
7- 19 March	Interviews with additional stakeholders in Maputo including with government, civil society platform on social protection, representatives from the humanitarian sector as well as researchers from the university and think tanks. One week of research in three districts in the Province of Gaza in collaboration with the focal point for emergency response from INAS
22 May- 1 June	Presented the initial findings to MGCAS, attended the social protection event and carried out additional interviews mainly on the humanitarian sector and with INGC.

Source: OPM.

The study carried out one week of fieldwork during its second country visit. The purpose of the fieldwork was to visit a number of districts that had experienced climate related shocks in recent years, to understand how they responded to these shocks and whether social protection has played any role or should play in future. Moreover, the research aimed to better understand the operational detail of existing social protection instruments, and how they are implemented at the subnational level. The study focused on the province of Gaza. It selected two districts that are currently experiencing drought and which also experienced flooding in 2013, namely: Guija and Chibuto. The study also visited Chokwe, where floods were experienced in 2013. INAS delegations were present in two of these districts. The team also held a number of meetings in Xai Xai, the provincial capital, with staff from INAS delegation, MGCAS, and representatives from NGOs.

Collaboration with other research initiatives

This study has made concerted efforts to coordinate its activities with two other studies that took place in Mozambique in the same period:

1. OPM and ODI are looking at the feasibility and design elements of closer link between resilience to climate change and social protection with a particular focus on the PASD.
2. An Irish Aid funded study carried out by IIED looking at climate resilience and poverty eradication and role of social protection in supporting climate resilience of the poorest. The study is looking at synergies between social protection provision and support to climate resilience, by assessing how social protection and aligned interventions can address climate vulnerability by increasing the climate resilience of target groups—the poorest and most vulnerable. This study is particularly focused at the community level.

The teams have held numerous meetings to coordinate their respective research design and fieldwork operations; share and validate emerging findings, and to synthesise findings into a single summary note for the government.

Annex C Country overview

Key points

- J Mozambique is politically and administratively centralised, with power concentrated in the presidency and national state organs. The country has had several institutional reforms which supported the political transition, such as the 1990 constitution, the peace agreement in 1992, and the first multiparty elections in 1994. However, the country still experiences some challenges in terms of its decentralisation policies which have been slow to implement.
- J The macroeconomic situation of the country is likely to deteriorate following recently disclosed debts of \$ 1.4 billion. While the previous IMF economic assessments painted a positive outlook, short term challenge with debt repayments and dwindling foreign reserves were noted.
- J Government's response to increasing debt levels has been to reduce its expenditure commitments, including through a freeze on civil service recruitment.

C.1 Governance

Mozambique gained independence in 1975 from Portugal, following a ten-year guerrilla war of liberation. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) then established a one-party state and supported liberation movements in Rhodesia and South Africa. Rhodesia formed the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) in 1976, to counter Frelimo and destabilise Mozambique. South Africa took over support to Renamo in 1980, and the movement also drew support from popular discontent with Frelimo economic policies. Mozambique descended into a devastating civil war (AfriMAP 2008). Mozambique had several institutional reforms which supported the political transition of the country, such as the 1990 constitution which introduced a multiparty system, the peace agreement signed between Renamo and the government in 1992, and the first multiparty elections in 1994 when Frelimo won the presidency and the majority of national assembly seats (Forquilha 2014). Further multiparty elections took place in 1999, 2004 and 2014 elections; Frelimo won the presidency and the majority of national assembly seats in all elections.

Mozambique is politically and administratively centralised, with power concentrated in the presidency and the national state organs. The President of the Republic holds the position of head of state and chairs the Council of State, and ex officio the Council of Ministers that is responsible for governing Mozambique. Legislative power is shared between the president and parliamentary deputies, elected through proportional representation.

Administratively, the central government is presented at the sub-national level through cascading state structure at the level of provinces, districts, administrative posts, localities, settlements and villages. Key appointments are made by the central executive, to whom they directly report (e.g. the President selects the Provincial Governors, and the District Administrators are nominated by Minister of State Administration (AfriMAP 2008)). The local government only covers a proportion of the population, and is predominantly urban, with municipalities in all 33 cities and only ten out of the 116 towns in the districts (CLGF 2013). Decentralisation policy focused on a gradual creation of municipalities based on the urban centres (Brito 2010).

C.2 Economy and budget

C.2.1 Macroeconomic environment

The macroeconomic situation in Mozambique has taken a turn for the worse in recent months, following its disclosure of hidden external debts of around \$1.4 billion (just below 10% GDP), taken

out by state-owned public companies and which the country cannot service, thus increasing the probability of default. This has resulted in the downgrading of Fitch credit ratings of the country, and suspension of direct aid support by development partners²⁶. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a statement in April 2016, stating it is in the process of reassessing the macroeconomic outlook of the country following these revelations²⁷. The IMF's most recent staff consultation report had provided a positive picture of the health of the economy in the longer term, although it, too, had highlighted some short-term challenges related to growing levels of international debt and dwindling reserves, which are now likely to worsen (IMF 2016). According to this report:

- J The economy has been growing robustly during the past five years, with an average growth rate of 7%. Despite lower commodity prices and slowdown of the Chinese economy, the state of the economy remains healthy with a positive outlook, owing to likely investments in the energy sector. The growth of the economy is largely driven by growth in the mining sector and impending large infrastructure investments in natural gas initiatives.
- J Prices have been relatively stable, despite the depreciation of metical against the US dollar and South African rand (making imports more expensive) in 2014. With anticipated increases in the price of bread (due to regional drought) and electricity (as a result of tariff reforms), inflation is expected to rise to 5.6% in 2016 from a projected 12-month average of 1.9% in 2015.
- J The debt profile of the country remains stable and rated as moderate, meaning it is within acceptable thresholds of sustainability. However recent depreciation of the currency has resulted in a significant increase in the present value of external debt, reaching close to 40 percent of GDP at the end of 2015, from 30 percent at the end of 2014. This has resulted in the need for tighter fiscal management. While there are short-term pressures on the overall public debt, this is expected to fall in the longer term, declining to less than 20% by mid 2020s, as a result of higher growth rates anticipated as a result of production of liquidated natural gas.

It is very clear that this assessment is likely to change given the likely impact of the new debt disclosure on debt sustainability.

C.2.2 Fiscal environment

Even before the debt crisis, the government had, in light of rising debt levels in the short / medium term, and because of dwindling international reserves, tightened its fiscal management. It reduced its 2016 expenditures by 1.5% of GDP compared to 2015, with adjustments largely focusing on reducing subsidies and containing the wage bill. The wage bill is expected to be reduced by 0.2 percentage points of GDP in 2016, as the government intends to slow down the pace of hiring, as well as to increase administrative controls on salary payments to weed out 'ghost workers'. There are strict limits on new hiring in non-priority sectors. Additionally, public investments are expected to be adjusted downwards taking into consideration implementation capacity, and through application of more rigorous evaluation procedures, especially for projects exceeding \$50 million (IMF 2016). The government registered a fiscal deficit of 10.6% of GDP in 2014, this was projected to fall to 6% of GDP in 2016 but is now likely to increase. This is despite projected increases in growth of revenue (expected to increase by 1% of GDP in 2016 alone) and a relatively flat expenditure profile (Ibid). This suggests limited space for increasing expenditures towards social protection beyond existing commitments, or unless additional resources are reallocated from other sectors.

²⁶ <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSFit959912>.

²⁷ <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pr16184.htm>.

C.2.3 Budgetary process

The government's financial year corresponds to the calendar year, commencing in January. The budgetary cycle broadly consists of three stages: budget for formulation and approval (appropriation), budget execution, and budget reporting, auditing and evaluation (Hodges and Tibana. 2004). The budget is governed by the SISTAFE Law, which defines the scope of the public sector, the remit of institutions, as well as the rules and procedures for the preparation, approval and execution of the state budget (IMF 2014).

The budgetary process begins with the annual budget statement “Documento de Fundamentação do Orçamento do Estado” prepared by the Ministry of Finance, that reviews the international and domestic conditions, sets out macroeconomic forecasts, revenue and expenditure estimates and financing requirements. This informs the development of the medium-term budget framework “Cenário Fiscal de Medio Prazo” that provides comprehensive historical, current and projected estimates of public finances for a period of three years. This document is prepared by the Ministry of Planning and Development by May of each year, and determines the overall resource envelope and initial ceilings for budgeting. This is given to line ministries as guidance for preparation of their budget proposals and requirements for submission of their “Plano Economico e Social” (PES), that gives a statement of their economic and social policies in the medium term. The Ministry of Finance sends the budgets and the PES to Council of Ministers by 15 September, and this document in turn is submitted to the parliament before 30 September. The parliament approves the budget by 15 December each year through an annual appropriation law “Lei orçamental”.

During execution of the budget, numerous adjustments are made either through the parliament or with approval of the Ministry of Economic Planning. According to the law, increases of the original budget should only be authorised by law. The annual budget law allows for increases of the overall budget expenditure in cases where collections exceeds budget revenue, and only for specific categories of expenditure such as debt reduction, priority investment projects and deficit reduction. Changes to the composition of expenditure do not require legislative approval. The government can increase appropriations to ministries within the limits of the national budget through use of the contingency funds. Budget allocations can be transferred by the government across different items of expenditure, or between different institutions in case they are not needed by one.

With the exception of risks to external financing, no fiscal risk is recognised or analysed in budget documents, and there are no strategies for managing them. The main risks relate to susceptibility to exogenous shocks from natural disasters, activities of public enterprises, large and multi-annual contracts for infrastructure as well as contingent liabilities and quasi-fiscal activities. In relation to natural disasters, fiscal risks are not assessed ex-ante, although response costs can be substantial, e.g. for the post disaster reconstruction plan following the 2013 floods (IMF 2016).

The government has a limited provision for contingencies. There are no clear guidelines for how they can be accessed. The main stipulation is that the resources must, by law, be used for the execution of expenditures that cannot be foreseen or postponed. These are categorised as “provisional appropriations” within the budget.

Annex D Humanitarian response and disaster risk management

D.1 Law and regulation

A legal framework to govern disaster management was lacking until 2014, when the government passed law No. 15/2014. The law covers the prevention and mitigation of the impacts of disasters, assistance, rescue operations and reconstruction and recovery. The situation under which the government should solicit support is specified under Article 18(1)(f) whereby the Council of Ministers is exceptionally mandated to call on public and private entities to provide assistance in response to disaster (Negussie, 2014).

The law stipulates that international emergency aid is regulated by the government, which is a continuation of its previous approach. INGOs in Mozambique are required to register with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In theory, their permission to work in the country can be withdrawn. However, research on the flood response in 2007 found no concerns that this could be used to inhibit the work of INGOs in Mozambique, or constrain their independence (Foley, 2007).

Linked to the disaster law and passed at the same time, law No. 16/2014 establishes the principles and norms for protection, conservation and sustainable restoration of biodiversity (República de Moçambique, 2014). Mozambique is signatory to the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.

D.2 Strategies and policies

In 1999, the National Policy on Disaster Management was passed. Following the 1999 policy the government's approach to dealing with disasters evolved into a broader process of disaster management with a strong focus on prevention. The policy set up the INGC, which replaced the government disaster relief agency (Departamento de Prevenção e Combate as Calamidades Naturais, or DPCCN), which had been focused on aid delivery and was unsustainable in the post-war context, with its 3,000 staff and 400 vehicles (Wiles et al, 2005). The policy marked a shift from reactive assistance to preventive actions, and from direct delivery of humanitarian assistance to a coordination and leadership role (Ibid.).

In 2006, the government approved a 10-year Master Plan (*Plano Director de Prevenção e Mitigação de Desastres*), which was being updated in 2015/16. Following the Master Plan, in 2007 the INGC established three regional Emergency Operation Centres (CENOE) to enhance disaster preparedness and response. It also created a unit for civil protection and rescue operations (UNAPROC), a department for drought mitigation (DARIDAS), and a cabinet for resettlement and reconstruction (GACOR).

D.2.1 Contingency plan

The Annual Contingency Plan for the Rainy and Cyclone Season is the central strategy for disaster management. The contingency plan defines 'the actions to be undertaken by each sector and province in the component of preventing, mitigating, managing and reducing the impact of disasters resulting from extreme events forecast for the rainy and cyclone season'.²⁸ The INGC is responsible for drawing up annual contingency plans through a process of participation by various sectors of the government, civil society, UN agencies, NGOs, international cooperation partners

²⁸ Government of Mozambique, Contingency Plan 2011-12

and the Local Disaster Management Committees (CLGRCs). The contingency plan presents the activities to be undertaken by each sector and at each level of government (central, provincial and community) (Table 15) and support provided by the UN agencies and NGOs via the HCT and clusters.

Table 15 Responsibilities of ministries in contingency plan

Ministry	Main Responsibilities as of 2011-12
Ministry of Transportation and Communication	Monitor cyclone systems in order to issue timely warnings and actions.
Ministry of Public Works and Housing	Monitor and inform water resource management.
	Manage water supply and sanitation situation before, during and after shock.
	Monitor, coordinate and implement the provision of shelters in safe spaces.
	Introduced in 2013-14: Rehabilitation and repair of hydraulic infrastructure.
	Rapid assessment and mobilisation of contractors for road repairs.
Ministry of Education	Monitor, coordinate and facilitate minimisation of disruption to schools, pupils and teaching activities.
Ministry of Agriculture	Assess vulnerability of agricultural outputs, determine needs and recommend relevant actions.
Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare	Ensuring humanitarian assistance towards the most vulnerable populations.
Ministry of Health	Minimise vulnerability of people affected by epidemics and re-establish health services.
Ministry for coordination of environmental action	Expansion of resettlement neighbourhoods.
Ministry of Industry and Trade	Assessment and mobilisation of consumer goods along with facilitation of purchases.
Ministry of Sea, Inland Waters and Fisheries	Introduced in 2015-16: Support construction of new and rehabilitation of damaged fish farms etc.

Source: Adapted from Government of Mozambique, Contingency Plan 2011-12 to 2015-16

Three scenarios of shocks are prepared, progressing from smaller to larger scale threats (Table 16). For each scenario, the damage and budget for response is estimated. Contingency funds are then allocated in the national budget each year. The three scenarios differ minimally between plans. Interviewees described the estimates as imperfect but plausible, with a weakness being the amount and quality of input from district levels.

Table 16 Contingency plan scenarios

Scenario	Definition of each scenario in contingency plans
Scenario I	Storms, localised inundation, drought, and medium risk of floods
Scenario II	Threats from scenario I plus floods in high risk river basins and cyclones
Scenario III	Threats from scenario II plus major cyclones and earthquakes

Source: Adapted from Government of Mozambique, Contingency Plan 2011-12 to 2015-16

D.2.2 UN agencies and international NGOs

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) forms the basis for UN programming. For 2012-2015, the UNDAF's mention of humanitarian response was simply that, should government capacities be overwhelmed, the UN System would provide complementary humanitarian relief to the most affected communities by activating its humanitarian clusters (United Nations, 2011).

D.3 Key programmes

D.3.1 Humanitarian response

Most humanitarian assistance is in response to flooding, which occurs on a near annual basis. Food assistance has been the largest sector in flood responses followed by health.²⁹ The most recent humanitarian responses to flooding were in 2015 and 2013. Actions to address the impacts of drought in 2015 were limited and mainly took the form of drilling boreholes. The declaration of a red alert in April 2016 shifted the response to include a strong focus on food assistance. Relief has mainly provided in the form of in-kind assistance (e.g. food aid, shelter materials, non-food item kits). Vouchers have been used for seeds and tools and, to a lesser extent, food. Cash transfers have not been used in emergency response.

The largest NGO-led humanitarian and DRM programme is COSACA. COSACA is a consortium of the NGOs Save the Children, CARE International, and Oxfam. Founded in 2007 for information sharing, DFID has funded COSACA since 2011. The consortium provides support to the INGC, districts and civil society to build capacity for effective and rapid relief response, with a strong focus on prepositioning relief supplies. DFID is also turning to COSACA for implementation of humanitarian response, including responding to drought in 2016.

Table 17 Assistance in response to 2016 drought from February to July 2016

Partners	Type of assistance	People reached
COSACA, the World Food Programme, World Vision International, German Agro Action, Ecumenical Committee for Social Development, Mozambique Red Cross and the Lutheran World Federation	General food distribution, food for assets and food vouchers	190,225 (in September 2016), 384,385 people with emergency food assistance
Plan International	School feeding	1,873
FAO	Distribution of vegetable seeds	23,000 households
WASH partners	Water trucking and rehabilitation of water points	79,582
UNICEF and partners	Treatment for malnutrition	6,200

Source: Mozambique Drought, Office of the Resident Coordinator, Situation Report No. 5

D.3.2 Disaster risk management³⁰

Donors supporting government efforts to address disaster risk include GFDRR, DFID, Government of Denmark, GIZ, UNDP, ECHO and USAID. GIZ funded a project on institutionalising disaster prevention in Mozambique, which supported the INGC to establish DRR structures at the national, provincial, district and community levels. DFID, DANIDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and

²⁹ Using sector-specific data from FTS for years available

³⁰ The first two paragraphs are adapted from Few et al., 2015

the Austrian Development Cooperation funded the Adaptation Learning Programme for Africa which sought to increase the capacity of vulnerable households to adapt to climate variability and change. IrishAid is undertaking analysis on options for aligning social protection with climate resilience. DFID has funded OPM to analyse the potential to support climate-sensitive social protection with a focus on the PASP.

GFDRR has been very active in supporting DRM in Mozambique. The Programmatic Support to DRM, which ended in December 2014, aimed to support the INGC to conduct a risk assessment, develop an online risk data platform, increase integration of disaster risk into national policies and advance risk transfer dialogue. GFDRR also funded the Strengthening Hydro-meteorological Capacity for Improved Early Warning and the Safer Schools Project.

D.4 Financing

D.4.1 Humanitarian response

The government plays the leading role in initiating and coordinating humanitarian responses but most of the implementation of humanitarian response is off-budget. It consists of the assistance provided by agencies related to the contingency plan, and other assistance in response to government requests or as part of their normal operations (e.g. assistance to refugees by WFP and UNHCR). The INGC does have a small amount of money for search and rescue. Different sectors are engaged in different aspects of response as described above, but the additional money they receive via the contingency plan is minimal.

From a global perspective, Mozambique does not receive much international humanitarian financing. From 2004-2013, according to data from Global Humanitarian Assistance, it was the 45th largest recipient of humanitarian funding, receiving 0.4% of global humanitarian funding. In the last 15 years, the largest international humanitarian funding occurred in 2000/2001, 2007/2008 and 2013 related to flooding.

D.4.2 Disaster risk management

We do not have an overall figure for DRR and DRM. Through the contingency plan, the government reserves \$ 3.5 to 4 million to cover a proportion of the immediate emergency response and recovery needs. Most of these state funds are allocated through the INGC.³¹ The priority areas for this funding are monitoring and early warning, pre-positioning resources, search and rescue operations, humanitarian aid within 72 hours, immediate post-emergency reconstruction, and monitoring and evaluation.³² Scenario III—the largest possible funding allocation—is included in the budget. Funding is allocated based on the scenario realised, and the funding allocated consistently has been well below the amount budgeted (Table 18). The contingency plan budget estimates the funding required by the INGC and per ministry, including MGCAS. When an INGC request for contingency funding is approved, at the national level the ministries receive the funding directly from the Ministry of Finance. Until 2015, the provincial allocation to sectors was channelled via the INGC. In 2016, the Ministry of Finance is providing this funding directly to the ministries. A key informant indicated that INGC had been approached by ministries to request this change.

³¹ Recovery from Recurrent Floods 2000-2013 MOZAMBIQUE August 2014 Recovery Framework Case Study

³² Government of Mozambique, Contingency Plans 2014-15

Table 18 Contingency planning scenarios since 2011-12

	Scenario	Estimated Impact (people in thousands)	Estimated Budget (million metical)	Contingency Funds Allocated (million metrical)
2011-12	Scenario I	634	393	60
	Scenario II	732	428	80
	Scenario III	997	499	120
2013-14	Scenario I	320	232	24
	Scenario II	693	485	56
	Scenario III	936	878	152
2014-15	Scenario I	318	350	101
	Scenario II	520	670	130
	Scenario III	934	992	186
2015-16	Scenario I	485	250	-
	Scenario II	679	580	-
	Scenario III	1,123	967	260

Source: Adapted from Government of Mozambique, Contingency Plan 2011-12 to 2015-16

Table 19 shows the allocation of the contingency fund by ministry in 2013.

In December 2015, the World Bank undertook a mission to explore a disaster risk financing strategy to strengthen financial capacity to respond to disasters. The mission focused on assessing fiscal vulnerability to disasters and exploring potential risk financing instruments. It will consider the establishment of a Disaster Risk Reduction Fund and options for risk transfer. In 2016 World Bank will be working with the Ministry of Economy and Finance on this issue.

Table 19 Allocation of contingency fund by ministry and province 2013-2014

Ministry	Amount allocated (MT)
Ministry of Agriculture	1,900,000
Ministry of Public Works and Housing	2,025,000
Ministry of Education	740,000
Ministry of Health	1,100,000
Ministry of Women and Social Action	1,100,000
Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Action	800,000
National Institute of Meteorology	800,000
Total	8,465,000
Provincial Organs	
Provincial INGC Office, Niassa	1,900,000
Provincial INGC Office, Cabo Delgado	2,090,000
Provincial INGC Office, Nampula	1,800,000
Provincial INGC Office, Zambézia	7,334,810
Provincial INGC Office, Tete	2,090,000
Provincial INGC Office, Manica	1,450,000
Provincial INGC Office, Sofala	4,250,000
Provincial INGC Office, Inhambane	1,670,000
Provincial INGC Office, Gaza	9,700,000
Provincial INGC Office, Maputo	3,150,000
Total	35,434,810

Source: GFDRR 2014

D.4.3 Recovery³³

Financing for longer term recovery and reconstruction are sourced separately from contingency budgets. Budgets for multi-year recovery needs are mainly folded into the national development plan and macroeconomic framework, as laid out in the Medium Term Fiscal Framework (CFMP or Cenário Fiscal de Medio Prazo) every year. In this manner, reconstruction needs are merged into the regular budget cycle, and managed as medium- to long-term development projects through existing mechanisms. For example, World Bank loans for the PASP or the roads and bridges management both include the financing of recovery or rehabilitation after the 2013 floods. Other funding for recovery from external sources may be managed off-budget (i.e. not implemented directly through government systems) by the funding organisations.

³³ Adapted from GFDRR 2014

Annex E Social protection sector

E.1 Law and regulation

The laws governing social protection in Mozambique include the **Articles 35, 88, 89, 91 and 95 in the Constitution**, establishing that all citizens are entitled to education, health and housing without any discrimination, as well as protection in disability or old age.

The **Social Protection Law 4/2007** sets out the social protection system in Mozambique, consisting of three levels: **a) basic social security, b) mandatory social security c) supplementary social security**. Basic social security refers to the **non-contributory branch of social protection**, while compulsory social security and complementary social security are the **contributory branch system** (both for public and private sector workers and the self-employed). The different policy instruments will be explained in the next subsection.

With regard to basic social security, the law emphasises its compensatory function, covering all national citizens unfit for work, without means to meet their basic needs, while including as potential recipients a wider range of vulnerable people, including people in absolute poverty, children in difficult circumstances and elderly, sick and disabled. The Social Protection Law further establishes that the basic social security is realised through:

-)] **Risk benefits**, equivalent to social transfers which can be monetary or in kind;
-)] **Social support benefits**, equivalent to the provision of services, programmes and projects aimed at individuals or groups of people with special needs.

The regulations of the Basic Social Security (Decree No. 85/2009) establish the following components: Direct Social Action, Social Action for Health, School Social Action and Productive Social Action.

Other legislation relevant to social protection include: the Law for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Elderly (Law 3/2014 on), the Law on Protection and Promotion of the Rights of the Child (Law No 7 / 2008), the Family Law (Law 12/2004 on), the Law of Guardianship of Minors Organization (Law 8/2008), the Law on Human Trafficking (Law No 6/2008), the Labour Law (2007) and the Law on Domestic Violence (2009).

E.2 Strategies and policies

The first strategy to implement the basic social security law was the **National Strategy for Basic Social Security 2010-2014 (ENSSB I)**, which established the principles, key actions, implementation tools, and targets, for the implementation of basic social protection between 2010 and 2014.

The **new ENSSB II (2016-2024)** was developed and approved after the **evaluation of the ENSSB I**. It reflects a dynamic and promotive social protection approach, which emphasises the potential of social protection to **increase the human, productive and social capital** of households and individuals. It aims to enhance their capabilities and resilience. The strategy proposes a set of goals to be realised in 2019 and 2024 through the basic social protection programmes.

Policy priorities and direction are also articulated in the annual budget through the Economic and Social Plan for 2016 (PES 2016) which is an instrument of programming and management of economic and social activity for MGCAS.

E.3 Institutional arrangements

The line ministry responsible for the main existing basic social protection programmes through the Direct Social Action and Productive Social Action components in the country is MGCAS, implemented through INAS. The Health Ministry is in charge of managing social action for health. The Ministry of Education manages the social school action.

E.4 Programmes under basic social security (non-contributory programmes)

E.4.1 Direct Social Action

The PSSB and the PASD are the main programmes under Direct Social Action.

Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB)

The origins of the PSSB can be traced back to 1990, when it was first established as a Food Subsidy Programme (PSA) in urban areas, and in response to withdrawal of food and other market subsidies in place during the armed conflict³⁴. The PSA was managed by the Office for Assistance to the Vulnerable Population (GAPVU) before it was relaunched under INAS in 1997, and renamed the PSSB in 2010 (Selvester et al. 2012). The programme thus moved from being a cash transfer programme for destitute people in the provincial capitals to a transfer programme for poor and vulnerable households with no labour capacity, expanded to rural areas (ESSB 2010-2014).

The PSSB is an unconditional cash transfer targeting chronic poor households with no labour capacity. In particular, the programme targets: elderly-headed households with no dependants or with dependants unable to work (children or people with disabilities); households headed by a person with disability with no household members capable of work; and households with members who have chronic degenerative illnesses (not bedridden). Households are selected through community volunteers *permanentes* based on criteria established by INAS, and in consultation with community leaders. Selected beneficiaries are in principle paid on a monthly basis between 310-615 MT depending on household size³⁵. Payments are made manually by INAS staff at specified pay points. The coverage of the programme has increased steadily over the years, increasing from 274,025 households in 2012 to 371,746 in 2015, and expected to increase to 371,746 in 2016: representing an annual growth rate of 11% for the period (Table 20).

³⁴ This was carried out as part of the Mozambican economic structural adjustment programme led by the World Bank and the IMF.

³⁵ The payment schedule is as follows: 310 MT for single per household; 390 MT for households with two individuals; 460 MT for households with three individuals; 530 MT for households with four individuals, and; 615 MT for households with five members or more.

Table 20 Coverage of PSSB (households)

Province	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016 (PES)	Annualised growth rate
C. Delgado	24,712	26,165	34,960	34,344	35,977	13%
C. Maputo	8,120	8,777	10,023	9,158	9,158	4%
Gaza	31,172	36,029	38,920	37,605	37,837	7%
Inhambane	22,872	26,237	28,350	27,776	27,979	7%
Manica	26,257	32,251	36,906	35,450	35,685	11%
Nampula	45,956	51,379	64,819	67,056	70,638	15%
Niassa	25,039	25,978	30,995	35,428	29,600	6%
P. Maputo	10,909	11,162	13,909	13,226	13,246	7%
Sofala	26,474	28,282	29,939	30,194	30,937	5%
Tete	27,634	30,722	35,723	37,047	39,110	12%
Zambézia	24,880	29,046	36,765	38,442	41,580	19%
Total	274,025	306,028	361,309	365,726	371,746	11%

Source: 2012 from INAS Annual Report (2013), 2013-2015 actual numbers provided by INAS to IIED and Irish AID Study and shared with this team. 2016 Figures are from the Economic and Social Plan (PES) for 2016.

Direct Social Support Programme (PASD)

The PASD aims to provide in-kind or financial assistance to help people to cope with crisis that aggravate their vulnerability. The PASD has three subcomponents (Hodges et al 2014):

- J **Regular in-kind transfers to households unable to work.** This includes households headed by children until they reach the age of maturity; households transitioning from the PSSB (when all family members are bedridden); households temporarily unable to work.
- J **Regular in-kind transfers to poor households with adults on Anti-Retroviral Treatment or children suffering from acute malnutrition.** The support is designed as a complementary intervention to the therapeutic action against acute malnutrition carried out by the health services, to increase their effectiveness and restore the nutritional situation of the individual. Support includes delivery of a food kit to meet the food needs of the household or distribution of breastmilk substitutes for a fixed period time to children who cannot be breastfed.
- J **'Multiform' timely support in response to shocks and specific vulnerabilities.** It includes the distribution support for people with disabilities, paying transportation costs for family reunification, and funeral expenses; the distribution of maternity package in case of twin and triplets births, the provision of home building materials in case of total or partial loss, the distribution of food kits and school supplies to needy households, etc. This support is normally one off.

One of the main in-kind benefits is food kits that normally consists of a number of food items including rice, beans, salt, sugar, vegetable oil and eggs or sardines, with an approximate value of 2200 MT-2500 MT. The elderly receive this kit permanently, with other groups receiving it for a specified amount of time: people with HIV will usually receive it for 6 months (HIV), for children from 0-2 the support is provided until they reach 2 years of age, children older than 2 years will receive it for a year and half, child-headed households receive it until they are 18 years of age (PASD Manual, no date). The benefits are delivered at the centre of the locality, but for beneficiaries unable to pick these up, it is delivered to their door by INAS staff. The PASD covered 57,415 households in 2015 (Table 21).

Table 21 Coverage of PASD (households)

Province	2013	2014	2015	2016 (PES)	Annualised growth rate (2013-2015)
C. Delgado	2,512	2,407	3,664	2,893	21%
C. Maputo	2,071	1,283	2,472	2,114	9%
Gaza	5,935	7,094	7,211	6,345	10%
Inhambane	3,194	3,509	3,944	3,760	11%
Manica	3,993	4,422	2,876	2,643	-15%
Nampula	4,957	4,762	6,314	4,667	13%
Niassa	6,606	7,632	6,346	6,201	-2%
P. Maputo	2,329	3,557	2,200	1,922	-3%
Sofala	7,557	5,245	9,970	4,676	15%
Tete	3,940	4,540	4,091	4,035	2%
Zambézia	8,984	8,417	8,327	8,031	-4%
Total	52,078	52,868	57,415	47,287	5%

Source: 2013-2015 actual numbers provided by INAS to IIED and Irish AID Study and shared with this team. 2016 Figures are from the Economic and Social Plan (PES) for 2016.

Programme Social Services for Social Action (PSSAS)

PSSAS provides direct assistance to users of the social units under the supervision of INAS, including for support to elderly centres, nurseries, transit centres and open centres (INAS 2015). The groups supported under this programme include abandoned or marginalised vulnerable people, including children in distress, helpless elderly, disabled people, returnees, victims of violence or trafficking, and people living on the street, and the guidance and facilitation of family reunification (Hodges et al 2014). The coverage of this programme is very low, supporting 9,134 individuals³⁶ in 2015 (Table 22).

Table 22 Coverage of PSSAS (individuals)

Province	2013	2014	2015
C. Delgado	382	335	926
C. Maputo	1,167	560	1,574
Gaza	1,182	913	1,171
Inhambane	515	257	386
Manica	577	524	322
Nampula	1,169	574	988
Niassa	845	820	961
P. Maputo	295	157	575
Sofala	864	591	809
Tete	991	837	147
Zambézia	981	1,633	1,275
Total	8,968	7,201	9,134

Source: 2013-2015 actual numbers provided by INAS to IIED and Irish AID Study and shared with this team. 2016 Figures are from the Economic and Social Plan (PES) for 2016.

³⁶ This support is provided to individuals, households or institutions.

E.4.2 Productive Social Action

The PASP is the main programme under the Productive Social Action component.

Productive Social Action Programme (PASP)

The PASP under ENSSB (2010-2014) was part of a set of development programmes aimed at extremely poor people with physical capacity to work. Initiatives under development programmes included: a programme of social benefit for work that provided employment opportunities over 18 months in return for monthly allowances; income generation programmes targeted at individual or household level to develop economic activities, and; a community development programme that aimed to support communities with construction of small community infrastructure. The responsibility of these programmes was shared between ministries responsible for social and development including agriculture, public works and housing and state administration. The strategy also aimed to design and operationalise a national productive social assistance programme in response to chronic food insecurity aggravated by shocks and structural risks and impacts of environmental change, such as drought and unemployment. Following a decree in 2011, the programme was introduced and piloted in 26 districts in the south and centre region, with support from WFP and the World Bank. The programme was redesigned following lessons learned, and is currently being expanded with support from the World Bank.

The new PASP aims to promote socio-economic inclusion of people in poverty and vulnerability with ability to work through public works, with the use of labour-intensive and development initiatives for income generation. In rural areas, the PASP is expected to operate in arid and semi-arid areas and respond to seasonal food insecurities, providing temporary support on a seasonal basis. In urban areas, the PASP is meant to address poverty and high unemployment and underemployment and complementing income (Hodges et al 2014).

The programme focuses on female-headed households; households with people with disabilities, chronic illness or with elderly; households with children with malnutrition; households with high dependency; host families in poverty and vulnerability. The recipients are expected work for four hours a day and four days a week and to receive a monthly allowance of 650 MT. The maximum number of months that a household can work is four (i.e. 64 working days) in rural areas and six months (i.e. 96 days of work) in urban areas per year. The PASP has three steps for targeting: geographical, community-based and proxy-means test (PMT). In arid and semi-arid areas the geographical targeting is to target the poorest administrative posts, localities and communities. Within each community, the chiefs and district secretaries are responsible for drawing up the initial list of beneficiaries that should be validated by the local advisory committees and presented at public meetings, before submission to INAS, which applies a PMT formulae and selects the final list of beneficiaries. The new targeting process has not yet been implemented. Finally in terms of payment, beneficiaries are meant to be paid monthly, and no more than three weeks after the end of the month, at a location near the residence of the beneficiaries. In 2015, the coverage of the programme was limited to 14 districts and Maputo city, reaching 12,499 households. The programme aims to reach 79,832 households in 2016 (Table 23).

Table 23 Coverage of PASP (households)

Province	2013	2014	2015	2016 (PES)
C. Delgado				2,950
C. Maputo	1,000	2,870		3,700
Gaza	7,285	7,582	3,813	5,914
Inhambane	4,305	4,315	2,814	3,164
Manica	2,844	3,876	1,876	7,376
Nampula		4,773	530	19,850
Niassa			530	1,177
P. Maputo	1,191	1,584		700
Sofala	5,674	5,493	2,406	6,901
Tete	8,398	10,558		6,375
Zambézia		6,842	530	21,725
Total	30,697	47,893	12,499	79,832

Source: 2013-2015 actual numbers provided by INAS to IIED and Irish AID Study and shared with this team. 2016 Figures are from the Economic and Social Plan (PES) for 2016.

E.4.3 Health Social Action

The main objective of Health Social Action is to promote access of poor and vulnerable people to their services. Currently this is mainly done through free primary health care provided to all. Under ENSSB I, the Ministry of Health was meant to establish a transfer (monetary or in-kind) to mothers to encourage delivery at health facilities. It was also meant to provide specific nutritional support to children between 6-24 months, and adolescent girls, to tackle the problem of chronic malnutrition and anaemia. This first initiative did not take place, and the second was only partially met through the PASD, following transfer of responsibility for this from health to INAS (Hodges et al 2014).

E.4.4 School Social Action

The main social protection instruments in the education sector include free primary education, free supply of textbooks to all elementary school students from 1st to 7th class, school feeding programmes, and the Program of Direct Support to School (ADE) that aims to provide direct subsidies to all public primary schools for the purchase of school supplies and to support vulnerable children and needy girls (ENSSB I). A national school feeding programme (PRONAE) was approved by Government in 2013, but was very small in scale, covering only 2.7% of pupils in primary school in mid-2014 (Hodges et al, 2014).

E.4.5 Proposed changes to the programmes under ENSSB II

The new strategy approved in February 2016 proposes a number of changes to the existing basic social security programmes. The draft strategy proposes some changes to the above programme; these are summarised in Table 24.

Table 24 Key programmes proposed under ENSSB II

Programme	Current Design/feature	Proposed changes
PSSB	Provides regular monthly cash transfer indefinitely to poor and vulnerable households without working capacity. It is aimed at the elderly, disabled or people with chronic degenerative diseases that live on their own or in households where there are no other adults with the capacity to work.	Change eligibility criteria by targeting individuals unable to work, regardless of the household composition and work capacity of the households as whole. Restructure the PSSB, introduce design and implement new criteria and procedures for determining the eligibility for the subsidy for the elderly.
Child Grant	N/A	New interventions for the creation of a subsidies package for children in three areas. The child allowance (0 - 2 years). Allowance for orphaned children living in poor and vulnerable families. Grant support for heads-of-household children.
PASD	In-kind social transfers for a fixed period to various categories of people and households in poverty and without means to meet their basic needs, including child-headed households, households with children in acute malnutrition recovery phase, households in temporary incapacity for work, the elderly or with chronic and degenerative diseases in bedridden situations, people in socio-family reintegration process, people with disabilities requiring compensation means, and people living with HIV and AIDS.	Improve budgetary planning mechanisms of multiform support in response to situations of specific shocks and natural disasters. Clarify PASD service standards—multiform support—and strengthen the mechanisms for identification and referral of people / households eligible for assistance. In coordination with INGC, to determine the package of interventions to be provided by the MGCAS / INAS in responding to disasters, establish protocols and procedures for implementation.
PASP	Aims to promote socio-economic inclusion of people in poverty and vulnerability with ability to work through public works with the use of labour-intensive and development initiatives for income generation.	Aims to increase coverage, improve geographical and individual targeting with focus on arid and semi-arid areas. Strengthen the role of PASP in response to disasters and the effects of climate change. Design and implement measures to promote economic empowerment of beneficiaries of the PASP. Reflect on the feasibility of introducing differentiated subsidies for urban and rural areas.

Source: República de Moçambique (2016)

E.5 Programmes under mandatory social security (contributory programmes)

Mandatory social security comprises benefits associated with compulsory social insurance and other contributory mechanisms. The institution in charge of the administration of this pillar is the **National Institute of Social Security (INSS)**, which falls under the tutelage of the Ministry of Labour. INSS was created 20 years ago, and has covered resident waged workers in the private sector since then, while statutory coverage was extended to the self-employed in 2007 (Cunha et al. 2013).

According to the Social Protection Law (República de Moçambique 2007) the enrolment in the mandatory social security covers employees as well as the self-employed. It also covers national and foreign residents in national territory and their employers. Employers are required to register the employees within their service. It is up to self-employed workers to register themselves. It also comprises a subsystem for civil servants (including the military), which is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance.

It comprises benefits in case of sickness, maternity, invalidity, old age and allowances for burial expenses. The benefits may be in cash or in kind. Cash benefits are reviewed periodically, taking into account wage variations and financial capabilities (INSS 2014) (see Table 25).

Sick pay

This is granted to workers who, by a medical certificate, are declared unable to work, and meet a warranty period and professionalism index. It is assigned to the employee who has six months of contributions, and a professionalism index for earnings registration of at least 20 days in each of the last two months preceding the second month prior to the beginning of the sick leave. In 2012, 6,353 cases were registered, representing 29.6 million MT. This figure had a 14.7% reduction compared to 2011 (INE 2012).

Maternity allowance

This is granted in order to ensure the stability of working women, assuming a temporary loss of productivity, reducing the burden on the employer. It corresponds to two months' salary. 1,055 cases of maternity leave were registered in 2012, which represented 22.8 million MT, a 4.2% increase in respect to 2011 figures (INE 2012).

Old age pension

This is granted when the recipient has 20 years of enrolment; 120 months of contributions; 55 years of age (women) and 60 years (man). It is also granted, regardless of age, to the worker that has 30 years of registration and 300 months of contributions. In 2012, 17,346 people were recipients of the old age pension, which represented 706 million MT (INE 2012).

Disability pension

This is provided to disabled workers before reaching the age of old-age retirement, providing medical evidence is supplied. 1,259 workers were recipients of this support in 2012. This represented 38.5 million MT and a 6.8% increase compared to 2011 (INE 2012).

Death grant

This is granted after a 3-year enrollment and six months contributions in 12 months preceding death. 1,835 death grants were provided in 2012, which represented 84.3 million MT and a 2.8% increase compared to 2011 (INE 2012).

Survival pension

The conditions to be met in order to receive this are that the employee has satisfied five years of registration and 60 months of contributions. The recipients are the surviving spouse (if not separated), children under 18, and in certain circumstances, young adults between 21 or 25 years old, depending on whether they are enrolled in secondary or higher education. In 2012, 17,028 people were recipients of the survival pension. This was equivalent to 1.2 million MT and a growth of 20.9% compared to 2011 (INE 2012).

Table 25 Mandatory social security, number of cases and amount in meticaais

Benefits	Number of cases		Amounts in Meticaais		Change in amounts
	2011	2012	2011	2012	2012/2011
Sick pay	7,582	6,353	34,719,963	29,630,292	-14.7
Death grant	1,985	1,835	82,034,503	84,304,540	2.8
Funeral arrangements	2,110	2,075	6,294,324	6,252,020	-0.7
Hospital benefit	16	14	1,640	3,287	100.7
Maternity allowance	871	1,055	21,883,100	22,803,772	4.2
Subsistence allowance	565	528	5,425,075	4,978,678	8.2
Old age allowance	575	508	6,823,155	7,480,892	9.6
Old age pension	16,125	17,346	557,732,423	706,001,708	26.6
Disability pension	1,235	1,259	36,117,030	38,581,794	6.8
Survival pension	16,086	17,028	316,593,318	390,660,337	23.4
Total	47,150	48,001	1,067,624,531	1,290,697,320	20.9

Source: INE 2012

Minimum pension

Contributions to mandatory social security are distributed between employers and workers. The portion allocated to the employee may not exceed 50% of the amount of those contributions. Enrolment in the social security system has been steadily increasing. For instance, in 2010 there were 854,653 registered beneficiaries and 33 142 contributors. By 2014, 1.1 million people were registered in the minimum pension and 50,085 contributors have been enrolled (Table 26).

The contributions due to the mandatory social security are subject to a prescription period of 10 years. The entitlement to benefits expire within three years, counted from the day the payment is made or the date of the event constituting the right (MGCAS 2010).

Table 26 Contributors and beneficiaries of the social security system

	Enrolled contributors	Registered beneficiaries	Change of beneficiaries, in respect to previous year %
2014	58,045	1,290,931	10.8
2013	50,085	1,164,881	13.2
2012	43,485	1,028,925	11.4
2011	37,797	923,763	8.1
2010	33,142	854,653	

Source: INE 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014

E.6 Supplementary social security

Supplementary social security covers people enrolled in the mandatory social security system on an optional basis; it is intended to strengthen benefits of the mandatory social security (República de Moçambique 2007). The Minister of Finance, after consultation with the Minister of Labour, licenses the personal and complementary entities and mechanisms of mandatory social security. The latter are in the nature of pension funds, and others embodied in autonomous assets solely to achieve the objectives for which they were constituted. The registration with personal and

complementary mechanisms and institutions does not preclude the requirement of registration with the mandatory social security (MGCAS 2010).

The revenues of the complementary social security are the workers' contributions or contributions of the workers and of their employers, and other contributions provided by law or in conditions to be set by agreement with the managing entity (Ibid.). So far, no specific regulations or mechanisms have been developed (Cunha et al. 2013)



Oxford Policy Management

Registered in England: 3122495
Oxford Policy Management Limited, Level 3 Clarendon House, 52 Cornmarket Street, Oxford, OX1 3HJ. www.opml.co.uk

In association with:

